fix: partage dirigé — ACL court-circuitée après résolution Partage/ + chemin canonique au token #196

- le partage EST l'autorisation: plus de 403 'Accès refusé à la vault' pour un
  destinataire sans accès au vault émetteur (api_file, raw, download)
- chemin virtuel canonique Partage/<token>/<nom> — désambiguïse les homonymes,
  fallback par nom conservé
- 'reçu' = partagé_avec contient l'utilisateur: un admin ne voit plus les
  partages des autres comme reçus (fix File not found: Partage/…)
- +3 tests (14 total)

.env.example

@@ -7,17 +7,28 @@ OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=true
 OBSIGATE_ADMIN_USER=admin
 OBSIGATE_ADMIN_PASSWORD=chab30
 
-# Sécurité des cookies (activer si derrière HTTPS)
-# OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES=false
+# DANGER : si OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=false, toute requête devient un admin
+# anonyme. Le serveur REFUSE de démarrer sur une adresse non-loopback
+# (ex. 0.0.0.0) sauf si l'on force l'opt-in ci-dessous. À réserver au local.
+# OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE=false
+
+# Sécurité des cookies : true|false|auto (défaut : auto — Secure si la
+# requête arrive en https, sinon pas de flag ; les navigateurs ignorent les
+# cookies `Secure` en HTTP, ce qui casserait les logins en local).
+# Derrière un reverse proxy qui termine TLS, auto suffit avec
+# OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true (X-Forwarded-Proto honoré).
+# OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES=auto
 
 # Tokens TTL en secondes
-# OBSIGATE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL=900
+# OBSIGATE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL=31536000000  # 1000 ans
 # OBSIGATE_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL=604800
 
 # Rate limiting
 # OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS=10
 # OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=10
 # OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS=900
+# Compteurs partagés/persistants (SQLite WAL, multi-workers) — défaut : mémoire.
+# OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB=data/ratelimit.db
 
 # IP client derrière un reverse proxy (fait confiance à X-Forwarded-For)
 # OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=false
@@ -46,7 +57,10 @@ OBSIGATE_ADMIN_PASSWORD=chab30
 # OBSIGATE_PDF_MAX_SIZE_MB=50        # PDFs plus volumineux = texte non indexé
 # OBSIGATE_PDF_EXTRACT_TIMEOUT=30    # secondes avant abandon de l'extraction
 
-# WebAuthn / MFA (ROADMAP #64) — nécessaire hors localhost
+# WebAuthn / MFA (ROADMAP #64) — par défaut rp_id/origines sont dérivés de la
+# requête (hôte exact, port inclus) : rien à configurer en accès direct.
+# À renseigner uniquement pour un accès via reverse-proxy sous un autre nom
+# (avec OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true pour X-Forwarded-Host/Proto) :
 # OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_RP_ID=obsigate.example.com
 # OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME=ObsiGate
 # OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS=https://obsigate.example.com
@@ -74,3 +88,19 @@ DEEPSEEK_MODEL=deepseek-chat
 # Chaîne de repli sans clé (DuckDuckGo puis Bing) si SearXNG ne remonte rien
 # OBSIGATE_WEB_FALLBACK=1
 # OBSIGATE_WEB_TIMEOUT=10
+# Fournisseurs à clé (#92), essayés avant SearXNG — injecter via Infisical en prod
+# OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY=
+# OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY=
+# OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY=
+# OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY=
+# Ordre des fournisseurs (sinon : clés présentes puis SearXNG puis replis)
+# OBSIGATE_WEB_PROVIDERS=brave,searxng
+# Réessais réseau (backoff maison) + cache SQLite des résultats web
+# OBSIGATE_WEB_RETRY=1
+# OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_TTL=900          # secondes ; 0 = cache désactivé
+# Rendu dynamique (pages SPA) — dépendance optionnelle :
+#   pip install playwright && playwright install chromium
+# ── Assistant IA — sources connectées (Gitea / GitHub) ──
+# OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL=https://git.example.net
+# OBSIGATE_GITEA_TOKEN=
+# OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN=

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -36,9 +36,21 @@ jobs:
         run: node tests/frontend/validate-imports.mjs
 
       - name: Frontend unit tests
-        run: node tests/frontend/unit.test.mjs
+        run: |
+          node tests/frontend/unit.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/navfacets.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/desktop-roots.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/image-viewer.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/pdf-viewer.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/forge-completion.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/config-mobile.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/settings-order-avatar.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/mobile-toolbar.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/pretty.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/media-viewer.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/mfa-settings.test.mjs
 
-      - name: Frontend JSDOM tests (PaneManager + Excalidraw + Plugins + AI + SW + Collab + Mobile + Semantic + Desktop + Inline edition)
+      - name: Frontend JSDOM tests (PaneManager + Excalidraw + Plugins + AI + SW + Collab + Mobile + Semantic + Desktop + Inline edition + Upload + XLSX)
         run: |
           cd tests/frontend
           if [ -d node_modules ]; then
@@ -48,6 +60,7 @@ jobs:
             node ai.test.mjs
             node ai-sidebar.test.mjs
             node sidebar-filters.test.mjs
+            node search-facets.test.mjs
             node sw.test.mjs
             node collab.test.mjs
             node mobile-editor.test.mjs
@@ -55,6 +68,11 @@ jobs:
             node desktop.test.mjs
             node toolbar-order.test.mjs
             node editor-inline.test.mjs
+            node ai-quick-actions.test.mjs
+            node upload.test.mjs
+            node config-ai-keys.test.mjs
+            node xlsx-viewer.test.mjs
+            node filechat.test.mjs
           else
             echo "tests/frontend/node_modules missing - installing jsdom"
             npm install --no-audit --no-fund --silent
@@ -64,6 +82,7 @@ jobs:
             node ai.test.mjs
             node ai-sidebar.test.mjs
             node sidebar-filters.test.mjs
+            node search-facets.test.mjs
             node sw.test.mjs
             node collab.test.mjs
             node mobile-editor.test.mjs
@@ -71,6 +90,11 @@ jobs:
             node desktop.test.mjs
             node toolbar-order.test.mjs
             node editor-inline.test.mjs
+            node ai-quick-actions.test.mjs
+            node upload.test.mjs
+            node config-ai-keys.test.mjs
+            node xlsx-viewer.test.mjs
+            node filechat.test.mjs
           fi
 
   # ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -113,15 +137,68 @@ jobs:
           python-version: "3.11"
 
       - name: Install dependencies
+        # setuptools / pip sont mis à jour : l'image de base peut embarquer
+        # une version couverte par un advisory fraîchement publié
+        # (PYSEC-2026-3447 / PYSEC-2026-3721).
+        # NOTE runner Gitea Act (BUG-083) : aucun `#` dans le `run:`.
         run: |
+          pip install -U pip setuptools
           pip install bandit pip-audit
           pip install -r backend/requirements.txt
 
-      - name: Bandit (SAST)
-        run: bandit -r backend/ --skip B101,B110,B310 || echo "bandit found issues (non-blocking)"
+      - name: Bandit (SAST, bloquant — #87)
+        # B105 est exclu (aligné avec [tool.bandit] de pyproject.toml :
+        # faux positifs systématiques sur les noms de variables) ; les rares
+        # vrais positifs restants portent un `# nosec` justifié inline.
+        run: bandit -r backend/ --skip B101,B105,B110,B310
 
-      - name: Pip-audit (dependency vulnerabilities)
-        run: pip-audit || echo "pip-audit found vulnerabilities (non-blocking)"
+      - name: Semgrep (SAST local) — DÉSACTIVÉ (BUG-091)
+        # Les règles locales (semgrep-rules/, 8 règles) ne sont plus exécutées
+        # en CI : semgrep-core est un exécutable natif que le runner actuel ne
+        # peut pas lancer (exit 127, sans message exploitable) — les releases
+        # récentes exigent un CPU x86-64-v2, et la dernière version compatible
+        # (1.157.0, core statique vérifié en baseline v1) échoue aussi. Les
+        # règles restent applicables en local : `semgrep --config semgrep-rules/
+        # backend/`. À réactiver dès que le runner dispose d'un CPU x86-64-v2
+        # (ou d'une image de runner plus récente). Bandit et pip-audit, eux,
+        # restent bloquants dans ce job.
+        # NOTE runner Gitea Act (BUG-083) : aucun `#` dans le `run:`.
+        continue-on-error: true
+        run: |
+          echo "::warning::SAST semgrep non exécutée (runner incompatible — BUG-091). Bandit et pip-audit restent bloquants."
+
+      - name: Pip-audit (bloquant — #87)
+        # Bloquant depuis T6 (#87) : dépendances qualifiées (mistune 3.3.3,
+        # python-multipart 0.0.31, weasyprint 70, mcp 1.28.1, fastapi 0.141.1
+        # + starlette 1.7.0, setuptools 84 — suite complète verte + 0 vuln).
+        # Seule exception documentée : PYSEC-2026-1325 (ecdsa, Minerva) —
+        # aucun correctif upstream ET ObsiGate ne signe/vérifie qu'en HS256
+        # (backend/auth/jwt_handler.py), les chemins ECDSA P-256 ne
+        # s'exécutent jamais. Les advisories pyjwt (PYSEC-2026-178 puis
+        # CVE-2026-102274) sont corrigées par le plancher pyjwt>=2.14.0 de
+        # backend/requirements.txt (BUG-091, BUG-095).
+        # PYSEC-2026-3910 / PYSEC-2026-3911 (pypdf, DoS de ressources sur
+        # l'extraction de texte et la lecture d'outlines — donc atteignables
+        # via backend/pdf_reader.py) sont corrigés par le plancher
+        # pypdf>=6.16.1 (BUG-093).
+        # CVE-2026-97687 / CVE-2026-97688 / CVE-2026-97689 (urllib3 2.7.0)
+        # corrigés par le plancher urllib3>=2.8.0.
+        # CVE-2026-104874 (multidict 6.7.x) corrigé par le plancher
+        # multidict>=6.9.1 (transitive aiohttp/yarl ; 6.7.x est dans la
+        # toolcache de l'image du runner — même piège « already satisfied »).
+        # CVE-2026-85394 (python-jose ≤3.5.0, forgery HS256 par clé publique
+        # DER passée comme secret HMAC) : AUCUN correctif upstream (projet
+        # sans release depuis 2025). Non atteignable dans ObsiGate :
+        # jwt.decode passe toujours algorithms=["HS256"] et un secret
+        # symétrique serveur (backend/auth/jwt_handler.py,
+        # backend/mcp/confirmations.py) — jamais une clé publique comme clé.
+        # Ces planchers doivent rester *au-dessus* des versions préinstallées
+        # dans la toolcache de l'image du runner : en dessous, pip répond
+        # « already satisfied » et n'aligne jamais (c'est exactement ce qui a
+        # fait échouer ce job). Le garde-fou tests/test_ci_workflow.py::
+        # TestDependencySecurityFloors verrouille ces planchers.
+        # NOTE runner Gitea Act (BUG-083) : aucun `#` dans le `run:`.
+        run: pip-audit --ignore-vuln PYSEC-2026-1325 --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-85394
 
   # ── Docker build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
   build:
@@ -183,6 +260,9 @@ jobs:
           npm ci
           npx playwright install --with-deps chromium
 
+      - name: Npm audit (bloquant — #87, 0 dépendance prod hors Playwright)
+        run: npm audit --omit=dev
+
       - name: Start ObsiGate
         run: |
           docker rm -f obsigate-e2e 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -194,6 +274,7 @@ jobs:
             -e DIR_1_NAME=TestDir \
             -e DIR_1_PATH=/vaults/TestDir \
             -e OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=false \
+            -e OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE=true \
             obsigate:ci
           # Docker-in-docker : le bind mount $(pwd)/... pointe sur un chemin
           # du job container, inexistant sur l'hôte → montage vide. Les -v

.gitignore

@@ -31,6 +31,21 @@ desktop/backend/
 desktop/frontend/
 backend/VERSION
 
+# Artefacts générés par les runs E2E (excalidraw crée ces diagrammes)
+test_vault/IT/e2e-diagram-*.excalidraw
+
+# Fixtures de test locales non versionnées (~200 Mo, pas de fixture CI).
+# Aucun test/CI ne les référence : les tests unitaires génèrent leurs fixtures
+# dans tmp_path (tests/conftest.py), et l'E2E n'utilise que les fixtures
+# committées (test_vault/sample-*.{mp3,png,svg,webm,pdf}, test_dir/*.md).
+# → à committer volontairement : `git add -f <chemin>`.
+test_dir/music/
+test_dir/video/
+test_vault/images/
+test_vault/markdown/
+test_vault/budget.xlsx
+test_home/
+
 # Tauri updater signing keys (private key — never commit)
 desktop/*.key
 desktop/*.key.pub

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,47 +1,101 @@
 # AGENTS.md — Instructions obligatoires du dépôt ObsiGate
 
 > Ces instructions s'appliquent à **toute** intervention (humaine ou IA) sur ce dépôt.
+> Documentation et réponses en **français**.
 
 ## Règle n°1 — Méthode de livraison unique
 
 Avant toute tâche (fonctionnalité, bug, refactor), **lire et appliquer**
 [`docs/DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md`](./docs/DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md) (Definition of Done).
-Aucune tâche n'est terminée avant que sa checklist soit complète **et le CI vert**.
+Aucune tâche n'est terminée avant que sa checklist soit complète **et le CI vert**
+(jobs `lint`, `test`, `security`, `build`, `e2e` de `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`).
 
 ## Avant de commencer
 
 1. Lire [`docs/ROADMAP.md`](./docs/ROADMAP.md) (travail à venir + index) et
    [`docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md`](./docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md) (bugs).
-2. Identifier ou créer l'**ID stable** (`#NN` pour une feature, `BUG-NNN` pour un bug)
-   et passer son statut à « en cours » **avant** de coder.
+2. Identifier ou créer l'**ID stable** (`#NN` pour une feature, `BUG-NNN` pour un bug —
+   jamais réutilisé) et passer son statut à « en cours » **avant** de coder.
+
+## Architecture (ce qui n'est pas obvious)
+
+- **Backend** : FastAPI/Python 3.11, point d'entrée `backend/main.py` (endpoints + rendu
+  markdown), index en mémoire (`indexer.py`, `search.py`), watcher (`watcher.py`),
+  auth dans `backend/auth/`. Pas de base de données : JSON dans `data/`.
+- **Frontend** : vanilla JS **zéro framework, zéro build npm** (`frontend/app.js`,
+  `index.html`, `style.css`). Ne pas ajouter de dépendances npm ni d'étape de build.
+- **Desktop** : Tauri (Rust) dans `desktop/` ; `tauri.conf.json` embarque `backend/**` et
+  `frontend/**` depuis `desktop/` — les scripts de build font le **staging** (copie) avant
+  `cargo tauri build`, sinon le build échoue.
+- **i18n** : tout texte d'interface doit exister en FR **et** EN
+  (`frontend/locales/fr.json` + `en.json`).
+
+## Vérifications locales (pwsh, à faire passer avant tout commit/push)
+
+```powershell
+# Backend (venv à la racine)
+.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pytest tests/
+.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m ruff check backend/
+.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m mypy backend/ --ignore-missing-imports
+
+# Frontend : scripts Node à exécuter directement (pas de runner)
+node tests/frontend/validate-imports.mjs
+node tests/frontend/unit.test.mjs
+# Tests JSDOM : node_modules dans tests/frontend/ (npm install là-bas si absent), ex :
+node tests/frontend/pane-manager.test.mjs
+
+# E2E (si UI touchée, ~10 min) : reproduit le job CI e2e (port 2029, auth désactivée)
+npm run test:e2e                    # prérequis : uv, Node >= 20, npx playwright install chromium
+bash scripts/run-e2e-local.sh -g "nom du test"   # filtre / --headed
+
+# Windows sans bash exploitable (WSL HS, git-bash bloqué par App Control) :
+npm run test:e2e:ps                 # équivalent PowerShell, mêmes conditions que le CI
+pwsh -File scripts/run-e2e-local.ps1 -PlaywrightArgs @('-g','nom du test')
+```
+
+- Un seul test backend : `.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pytest tests/test_search.py -q`.
+- **Sélection E2E** : vérifier chaque sélecteur dans le DOM réel avant de l'utiliser dans un
+  test ; tout test nouveau/modifié doit passer en local avant push ; pas de contournement
+  qui masque la flakiness (`waitForTimeout` arbitraires, fallbacks silencieux).
+- La suite E2E doit finir à **100 %** sans s'appuyer sur les retries. Jamais de `git push`
+  avant que les 5 étapes locales soient vertes.
+
+## Version & hooks (pièges)
+
+- `VERSION` (racine) = **source unique de vérité** (SemVer), incrémenté **automatiquement à
+  chaque commit** par le hook `.githooks/prepare-commit-msg` — `feat` → mineur,
+  `!:` / `BREAKING CHANGE` → majeur, sinon correctif. Le même commit resynchronise
+  `package.json`, le desktop Tauri, `README.md`/`README.fr.md`, `docs/ROADMAP.md` et publie
+  la section `[Unreleased]` du `CHANGELOG.md` en `[X.Y.Z] — date` ; tag `vX.Y.Z` créé au
+  commit, publié au push (`push.followTags`).
+- Hooks **obligatoires**, à installer une fois par clone : `scripts/install-hooks.sh`
+  (sinon la version ne suit plus et le CI échoue via le garde-fou `tests/test_version.py`).
+- Le rattachement des fichiers de bump se fait par un `--amend` immédiat : **le SHA affiché
+  par `git commit` change** — ne pas s'y fier.
+- Commit sans incrément (exceptionnel) : `SKIP_VERSION_BUMP=1 git commit …`.
+- Ne jamais réécrire une version déjà publiée dans le CHANGELOG ; jamais de détail dupliqué
+  entre Roadmap et CHANGELOG.
 
 ## À la fin de chaque tâche (obligatoire)
 
-- Ajouter/mettre à jour les **tests unitaires**.
-- Vérifications locales vertes : `pytest`, `ruff`, `mypy`, tests frontend (`E2E` si UI).
-- Mettre à jour la documentation requise : `CHANGELOG.md` (`[Unreleased]`), `docs/ROADMAP.md`
-  (statut + index), fiche `docs/features/` **ou** `docs/archive/`, `docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md`,
-  guide utilisateur i18n FR/EN + README si impact utilisateur.
-- **Commit** conventionnel référençant l'ID, puis **push**.
-- Version : le fichier VERSION (racine du dépôt) est la **source unique de
-  vérité (MAJEUR.MINEUR.CORRECTIF), incrémenté automatiquement à chaque commit** par le hook
-  .githooks/prepare-commit-msg — feat → mineur, !: / BREAKING CHANGE → majeur, sinon
-  correctif. Le même commit resynchronise package.json, le desktop Tauri, README.md/
-  README.fr.md, docs/ROADMAP.md et publie la section [Unreleased] du CHANGELOG.md en
-  [X.Y.Z] — date ; le tag vX.Y.Z est créé au commit et publié au push (push.followTags).
-  Hooks à installer une fois par clone : scripts/install-hooks.sh. Garde-fou :
-  tests/test_version.py (détail : docs/DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md §7).
-- Vérifier le **CI Gitea vert** (jobs `lint`, `test`, `security`, `build`, `e2e`).
+- Tests unitaires ajoutés/mis à jour (correctif sans test de non-régression = pas terminé).
+- Toutes les vérifications locales ci-dessus vertes (`E2E` si UI).
+- Documentation mise à jour : `CHANGELOG.md` (`[Unreleased]`), `docs/ROADMAP.md` (statut +
+  index), fiche `docs/features/` **ou** `docs/archive/`, `docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md` (si bug),
+  guide utilisateur i18n FR/EN + README si impact utilisateur, docstrings +
+  `response_model` si API.
+- **Commit** conventionnel référençant l'ID (`feat: … #12`), puis **push** et **CI vert**.
 
 ## Cartographie documentaire
 
 | Sujet | Fichier |
 |---|---|
 | Méthode de livraison / DoD | `docs/DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md` |
-| Version livrée (source unique) | VERSION + scripts/bump_version.py |
+| Version livrée (source unique) | `VERSION` + `scripts/bump_version.py` |
 | Travail à venir + index | `docs/ROADMAP.md` |
 | Historique des versions | `CHANGELOG.md` |
 | Conception par feature | `docs/features/<slug>.md` |
+| Guides d'utilisation | `docs/GUIDES/` |
 | Archive du complété | `docs/archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md` |
 | Bugs / TODO | `docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md` |
 | Build & releases | `docs/DEVELOPMENT_AND_RELEASES.md` |
@@ -50,5 +104,8 @@ Aucune tâche n'est terminée avant que sa checklist soit complète **et le CI v
 ## Conventions
 
 - Commits : `type: description` — `feat`, `fix`, `perf`, `refactor`, `docs`, `style`, `chore`, `test`.
-- **Ne jamais** committer de secrets, clés ou tokens.
-- Réponses et documentation en **français** ; respecter le style du code existant.
+- Sécurité : tout chemin fichier fourni par l'utilisateur passe par `_resolve_safe_path()`.
+- **Ne jamais** committer de secrets, clés ou tokens (`.env` jamais committé ; secrets dans
+  `data/api_keys.json` ou variables `OBSIGATE_*`).
+- Respecter le style du code existant (ruff/mypy 0 erreur ; CSS variables, pas de couleurs
+  hardcodées ; `safeCreateIcons()` plutôt que `lucide.createIcons()` direct).

Dockerfile

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ COPY --from=builder /install /usr/local
 
 # WeasyPrint runtime dependencies
 RUN apt-get update \
-    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libpango-1.0-0 libpangocairo-1.0-0 shared-mime-info \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libpango-1.0-0 libpangocairo-1.0-0 shared-mime-info fonts-noto-color-emoji \
     && apt-get clean \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ COPY VERSION ./VERSION
 # Using explicit UID/GID 1000 to match common host user and docker-compose settings
 RUN groupadd -g 1000 obsigate && useradd -u 1000 -g obsigate -d /app -s /sbin/nologin obsigate \
     && mkdir -p /app/data \
+    && chmod 777 /app/data \
     && chown -R obsigate:obsigate /app
 USER obsigate
 

README.fr.md

@@ -1,66 +1,81 @@
 # ObsiGate
 
-> **Version française** — ce document est le miroir synchronisé de [README.md](README.md) (référence complète). Dernière synchronisation : juin 2026.
+> **Version française** — ce document est le miroir synchronisé de [README.md](README.md) (référence complète). Dernière synchronisation : septembre 2026.
 
 **Porte d'entrée web ultra-léger pour vos vaults Obsidian** — Accédez, naviguez et recherchez dans toutes vos notes Obsidian depuis n'importe quel appareil via une interface web moderne et responsive.
 
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.7.3-blue.svg)]()
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.67.2-blue.svg)]()
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-Ready-blue.svg)](https://www.docker.com/)
 [![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11+-green.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
 [![CI/CD](https://img.shields.io/badge/CI%2FCD-Gitea_Actions-green.svg)](https://git.dracodev.net/Projets/ObsiGate/actions)
 
-```
-┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
-│  [🔍 Recherche...]          [☀/🌙 Thème]   ObsiGate    │
-├──────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┤
-│  SIDEBAR     │           CONTENT AREA                   │
-│  ▼ Recettes  │   📄 Titre du fichier                    │
-│    📁 Soupes │   Tags: #recette #rapide                 │
-│    📄 Pizza  │   [Contenu Markdown rendu]               │
-│  ▼ IT        │                                          │
-│    📁 Docker │                                          │
-│  Tags Cloud  │                                          │
-└──────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────┘
-```
+![Interface ObsiGate — tableau de bord Statistiques avec vaults, tags et raccourcis clavier](docs/images/obsigate-home.png)
+
+> Interface web d'ObsiGate : sidebar multi-vault, recherche globale, statistiques et raccourcis.
+
+---
+
+## 📚 Guides
+
+Les **guides d'utilisation** pas à pas se trouvent dans [`docs/GUIDES/`](docs/GUIDES/) :
+
+| Guide | Contenu |
+|---|---|
+| 🚀 [Prise en main](docs/GUIDES/PRISE_EN_MAIN.md) | Premier lancement, interface, navigation, vaults, raccourcis |
+| 🔍 [Recherche, PDF, Excel & Excalidraw](docs/GUIDES/RECHERCHE_PDF_EXCALIDRAW.md) | Syntaxe de requête, recherche sémantique, lecteurs PDF/Excel, diagrammes |
+| 🤖 [Assistant IA & Forge](docs/GUIDES/ASSISTANT_IA_FORGE.md) | Fournisseurs, éditeur IA, BooksLM, Forge, commandes `@` / `/` |
+| 📝 [Édition & collaboration](docs/GUIDES/COLLABORATION.md) | Édition simultanée, curseurs distants, persistance |
+| 📱 [PWA & hors-ligne](docs/GUIDES/PWA_HORS_LIGNE.md) | Installation, cache hors-ligne, file de synchro, notifications |
+| 🔌 [API REST](docs/GUIDES/API_REST.md) | Authentification, clés API, endpoints, exemples `curl`, SSE |
+| 🧩 [Serveur MCP](docs/GUIDES/MCP.md) | Brancher Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline… sur vos vaults |
+| 🔒 [Authentification & sécurité](docs/GUIDES/AUTHENTIFICATION_SECURITE.md) | Utilisateurs, MFA, permissions par vault, durcissement |
+| 🐳 [Déploiement Docker](docs/GUIDES/DEPLOIEMENT_DOCKER.md) | `docker-compose`, volumes, reverse proxy, mises à jour |
+| 🖥️ [Desktop (Tauri)](docs/GUIDES/DESKTOP.md) | Installation, premier lancement, build depuis les sources, dépannage |
+
+> Index complet : [`docs/GUIDES/README.md`](docs/GUIDES/README.md).
 
 ---
 
 ## 📋 Table des matières
 
-- [Fonctionnalités](#fonctionnalites)
-- [Prérequis](#prerequis)
-- [Installation rapide](#installation-rapide)
-- [Configuration détaillée](#configuration-detaillee)
-- [Variables d'environnement](#variables-denvironnement)
-- [🔒 Authentification](#authentification)
-- [Ajouter une nouvelle vault](#ajouter-une-nouvelle-vault)
-- [Build & déploiement avec build.sh](#build-deploiement-avec-buildsh)
-- [Rendu d'images Obsidian](#rendu-dimages-obsidian)
-- [Desktop (Tauri) — Application native](#desktop-tauri-application-native)
-- [Utilisation](#utilisation)
-- [API](#api)
-- [Recherche avancée](#recherche-avancee)
-- [Dépannage](#depannage)
-- [Performance](#performance)
-- [Sécurité](#securite)
-- [Stack technique](#stack-technique)
-- [Architecture](#architecture)
-- [Développement](#developpement)
-- [Licence](#licence)
-- [Changelog](#changelog)
+- ✨ [Fonctionnalités](#fonctionnalites)
+- 📚 [Guides](#guides)
+- 🚀 [Prérequis](#prerequis)
+- ⚡ [Installation rapide](#installation-rapide)
+- ⚙️ [Configuration détaillée](#configuration-detaillee)
+- 🌍 [Variables d'environnement](#variables-denvironnement)
+- 🔒 [Authentification](#authentification)
+- ➕ [Ajouter une nouvelle vault](#ajouter-une-nouvelle-vault)
+- 🔨 [Build & déploiement avec build.sh](#build-deploiement-avec-buildsh)
+- 🖼️ [Rendu d'images Obsidian](#rendu-dimages-obsidian)
+- 🖥️ [Desktop (Tauri) — Application native](#desktop-tauri-application-native)
+- 📖 [Utilisation](#utilisation)
+- 👥 [Collaboration temps réel](#collaboration-temps-reel)
+- 🔌 [API](#api)
+- 🔍 [Recherche avancée](#recherche-avancee)
+- 🔧 [Dépannage](#depannage)
+- ⚡ [Performance](#performance)
+- 🛡️ [Sécurité](#securite)
+- 🏗️ [Stack technique](#stack-technique)
+- 🏠 [Architecture](#architecture)
+- 📝 [Développement](#developpement)
+- 📄 [Licence](#licence)
+- 🤝 [Support](#support)
+- 📝 [Changelog](#changelog)
 
 ---
 
 ## ✨ Fonctionnalités
 
 - **🤖 AI Editor intégré** — Éditeur CodeMirror 6 avec toolbar IA : amélioration, correction, traduction, génération, réécriture personnalisée, toolbox (liste, tableau, frontmatter, canvas) — multi-provider DeepSeek/OpenRouter/Gemini
-- **🧩 Serveur MCP & agent IA** — Serveur Model Context Protocol intégré (`/mcp`) et assistant avec function calling : lisez, cherchez et modifiez vos vaults depuis Claude Desktop, Cursor… avec confirmations two-step, permissions par vault, rate limiting et redaction des secrets ([guide](docs/MCP_GUIDE.md))
+- **🧩 Serveur MCP & agent IA** — Serveur Model Context Protocol intégré (`/mcp`) et assistant avec function calling : lisez, cherchez et modifiez vos vaults depuis Claude Desktop, Cursor… avec confirmations two-step, permissions par vault, rate limiting et redaction des secrets ([guide](docs/GUIDES/MCP.md))
 - **👥 Collaboration temps réel** — Édition simultanée d'un même document (Yjs/CRDT) : curseurs distants colorés, indicateur de présence, fusion sans conflit, reconnexion automatique et persistance serveur ([détail](docs/features/collaboration.md))
+- **📖 Guide d'utilisation intégré** — Aide complète en FR/EN accessible depuis le menu Options : interface, navigation, recherche, fichiers, IA, sécurité, API & intégrations (OpenAPI, MCP), hors-ligne, collaboration, desktop, plus une section **Architecture** avec diagramme Mermaid ; téléchargeable en **Markdown** et **PDF** dans la langue courante ([détail](docs/features/guide-coverage-105.md))
 - **📱 Éditeur mobile natif** — Édition optimisée pour le tactile : barre d'outils Markdown flottante (gras/italique/code/liste/lien), bouton « Coller » persistant (contournement iOS), zoom par pincement et hauteur ajustable, raccourcis swipe (liens entrants / table des matières) et mode lecture plein écran avec navigation entre fichiers ([détail](docs/features/mobile-editor.md))
 - **🗺️ Vue graphe interactive** — Canvas force-directed avec Barnes-Hut O(n log n), filtres (tag, type), profondeur, mode focus, historique de navigation ←→↑, export PNG, aperçu au survol (Ctrl+click)
 - **🗂️ Multi-vault** : Visualisez plusieurs vaults Obsidian simultanément
-- **🌳 Navigation arborescente** : Parcourez vos dossiers et fichiers dans la sidebar
+- **🌳 Navigation arborescente** : Parcourez vos dossiers et fichiers dans la sidebar ; chaque clic sur un répertoire de l'arbre ouvre un **onglet de navigation** — chemin, récents, sous-répertoires cliquables, facettes Vaults · Tags · Extensions, tri Pertinence/Date et enregistrement du répertoire — qui coexiste avec vos fichiers ouverts
 - **🔍 Recherche avancée** : Moteur TF-IDF avec stemming français, normalisation des accents, snippets surlignés, facettes, pagination et tri — plus une **recherche sémantique** optionnelle (embeddings `all-MiniLM-L6-v2`, fusion hybride TF-IDF + RRF) activable via le toggle `~` ([détail](docs/features/semantic-search.md))
 - **💡 Autocomplétion intelligente** : Suggestions de fichiers, tags et historique avec navigation clavier
 - **🧩 Syntaxe de requête** : Opérateurs `tag:`, `#`, `vault:`, `title:`, `path:`, `ext:` avec chips visuels
@@ -68,7 +83,9 @@
 - **🏷️ Tag cloud** : Filtrage par tags extraits des frontmatters YAML
 - **🔗 Wikilinks** : Les `[[liens internes]]` Obsidian sont cliquables
 - **🖼️ Images Obsidian** : Support complet des syntaxes d'images Obsidian avec résolution intelligente
+- **🎬 Audio & vidéo** : Lecteurs HTML5 intégrés (`.mp3 .wav .flac .mp4 .webm`…) avec streaming HTTP Range (lecture, déplacement, plein écran) et **lecture persistante** (mini-lecteur flottant / mini-fenêtre vidéo, retour au média ou arrêt à tout moment, contrôles écran verrouillé via Media Session), repli téléchargement si le format n'est pas lisible par le navigateur
 - **🎨 Diagrammes Excalidraw** : Visualiseur/éditeur natif des fichiers `.excalidraw` et `.excalidraw.md` (iframe sandboxée, auto-save, thème clair/sombre, texte des diagrammes indexé pour la recherche)
+- **📊 Tableurs Excel** : les fichiers `.xlsx` et `.xlsm` s'ouvrent dans un visualiseur dédié — un tableau par feuille avec onglets, en-têtes A1 et édition directe des cellules (`PUT /api/file/{vault}/xlsx/save`, backup automatique, écriture atomique), plus le téléchargement du fichier d'origine. Le visualiseur rend polices, couleurs, cellules fusionnées et volets figés, et offre navigation et raccourcis clavier (`Ctrl+S`, `Suppr`, `F2`, `Ctrl+Origine/Fin`, `PgPréc/PgSuiv`, `Ctrl+flèches`), barre de formule avec noms de fonctions, zone Nom éditable (« Atteindre » `A1:B3`), presse-papiers de plage (copier/couper/coller un bloc, depuis ou vers Excel), un menu **Mise en forme** (gras/italique/souligné, alignements, couleurs, formats de nombre, fusions, volets figés, largeur/hauteur — `PUT /api/file/{vault}/xlsx/style`), tri/filtre/recherche sur toutes les feuilles, export CSV/Markdown/HTML et impression (sélection ou feuille), édition de la structure (feuilles, lignes, colonnes) et un tableau de bord du classeur (plages nommées, détection graphiques/TCD, stats par feuille) ; un `.csv` s'édite dans la même grille (RFC 4180) tandis que `.xls` et `.ods` s'ouvrent en lecture seule. Les classeurs contenant des éléments qu'ObsiGate ne peut pas conserver (valeurs calculées, segments, contrôles de formulaire, signature…) affichent un **avertissement** et demandent confirmation avant l'enregistrement ; une saisie commençant par `=` ou `@` est stockée comme texte sauf activation du bouton `f(x)`, et les écritures concurrentes d'un autre poste sont détectées (`If-Match` → « Réessayer »). L'assistant IA peut lister les feuilles, injecter un tableau borné dans son contexte, rechercher dans le classeur, analyser une plage, modifier des cellules et ajouter des lignes — sur `.xlsx`, `.xlsm` et `.csv`. Sur mobile (≤ 768 px), la barre de menus et le ruban sont **repliés par défaut** — un bouton ☰ les déplie — pour que la grille occupe toute la hauteur d'écran
 - **🎨 Syntax highlight** : Coloration syntaxique des blocs de code
 - **🌓 Thème clair/sombre** : Toggle persisté en localStorage
 - **📡 Synchronisation temps réel** : Surveillance automatique des fichiers via watchdog avec mise à jour incrémentale de l'index
@@ -205,6 +222,7 @@ Les vaults sont configurées par paires `VAULT_N_NAME` / `VAULT_N_PATH` (N = 1,
 | `VAULT_1_PATH` | Chemin dans le conteneur | `/vaults/Obsidian-RECETTES` |
 | `VAULT_1_ATTACHMENTS_PATH` | Dossier d'attachements (optionnel) | `06_Boite_a_Outils/6.2_Attachments` |
 | `VAULT_1_SCAN_ATTACHMENTS` | Scan d'images au démarrage (défaut : true) | `true` |
+| `OBSIGATE_HOME_ROOT` | Racine des dossiers personnels (un vault `home-<user>` par compte). Absente = fonctionnalité désactivée. | `/vaults/Home` |
 
 **Règles de nommage :** lettres, chiffres et tirets uniquement ; pas d'espaces ; le nom doit correspondre au chemin dans le conteneur.
 
@@ -281,7 +299,18 @@ Un compte **admin** connecté voit une icône 🛡️ dans le header : liste, cr
 | `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP` | Autoriser les webhooks non HTTPS | `false` |
 | `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE` | Autoriser les webhooks vers des adresses privées/boucle | `false` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_MAX_SIZE_MB` | Taille max des PDF extraits (text indexation) | `50` |
+| `OBSIGATE_MEDIA_MAX_INLINE_MB` | Taille max pour la lecture audio/vidéo intégrée (au-delà : téléchargement) | `500` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_EXTRACT_TIMEOUT` | Timeout extraction PDF (secondes) | `30` |
+| `OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY` / `OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY` / `OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY` / `OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY` | Fournisseurs de recherche web à clé (essayés avant SearXNG) | — |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEB_PROVIDERS` | Ordre des fournisseurs de recherche (ex. `brave,searxng`) | — |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEB_RETRY` | Réessais réseau des outils web (backoff maison) | `1` |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_TTL` | Durée du cache SQLite des résultats web (secondes, `0` = off) | `900` |
+| `OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL` / `OBSIGATE_GITEA_TOKEN` | Source connectée Gitea (outil `git_list_repos`…) | — |
+| `OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN` | Jeton GitHub (outil `git_list_repos`…) | — |
+
+> Ces clés peuvent aussi être saisies **depuis l'interface** (menu → Configurations →
+> « Sources connectées & recherche ») : la valeur saisie est stockée dans `data/api_keys.json`
+> et prime sur la variable d'environnement.
 
 ### Volume pour la persistance
 
@@ -381,6 +410,18 @@ ObsiGate supporte **toutes les syntaxes d'images Obsidian** avec résolution int
 6. Index de démarrage (match le plus proche)
 7. Fallback : placeholder stylisé `[image not found: filename.ext]`
 
+### Visionneuse & arborescence
+
+Les images sont de plein droit des fichiers du vault : elles apparaissent dans
+l'arborescence, sont indexées (nom + métadonnées, **jamais les octets**) et
+s'ouvrent dans une **visionneuse dédiée** — zoom molette 0,1×–8×, pan au
+glisser, double-clic pour réinitialiser, navigation ←/→ entre les images du
+dossier (avec pellicule de miniatures WebP), panneau de métadonnées, lightbox
+plein écran, ouverture de l'original et téléchargement. Le filtre de recherche
+`ext:png`/`ext:jpg` est disponible. Formats décodables : PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP,
+BMP, ICO, SVG (SVG servi avec une politique CSP `sandbox`). **HEIC/HEIF**
+(iPhone) n'est pas décodable par les navigateurs et n'est pas pris en charge.
+
 ### Configuration
 
 ```yaml
@@ -401,6 +442,8 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:2020/api/attachments/rescan/MonVault
 
 ## 🖥️ Desktop (Tauri) — Application native
 
+> 📖 Guide complet : [Desktop (Tauri)](docs/GUIDES/DESKTOP.md)
+
 ObsiGate Desktop est une application native construite avec [Tauri](https://tauri.app/) (Rust + webview système). Elle embarque le backend Python et le frontend dans un exécutable standalone — zéro Docker, zéro ligne de commande.
 
 > 🚧 **Version 2.0.0 — binaires en cours de stabilisation.** Pour l'instant, le build depuis les sources est recommandé.
@@ -560,6 +603,8 @@ Cycle de vie : Tauri spawn le backend Python → health check → splash de dém
 
 ## 👥 Collaboration temps réel
 
+> 📖 Guide complet : [Édition & collaboration](docs/GUIDES/COLLABORATION.md)
+
 Plusieurs utilisateurs peuvent éditer le même document markdown simultanément (façon Google Docs) :
 
 - **Fusion sans conflit** grâce à Yjs (CRDT) : deux personnes peuvent taper au même endroit, aucune
@@ -579,6 +624,8 @@ fenêtres) pour voir la collaboration en action.
 
 ## 🔌 API
 
+> 📖 Guide complet : [API REST](docs/GUIDES/API_REST.md) · [Serveur MCP](docs/GUIDES/MCP.md)
+
 ObsiGate expose une API REST complète :
 
 | Endpoint | Description | Méthode | Auth |
@@ -606,6 +653,7 @@ ObsiGate expose une API REST complète :
 | `/api/events` | Flux SSE temps réel | GET | Oui |
 | `/api/vaults/add` / `/api/vaults/{name}` | Gestion dynamique des vaults | POST/DELETE | Admin |
 | `/api/image/{vault}?path=` | Servir une image | GET | Oui |
+| `/api/media/{vault}/thumb?path=&size=` | Miniature WebP (cache disque) | GET | Oui |
 | `/api/config` | Lire / écrire la configuration | GET/POST | Oui/Admin |
 | `/api/diagnostics` | Statistiques index et mémoire | GET | Admin |
 
@@ -626,6 +674,8 @@ curl "http://localhost:2020/api/file/Recettes?path=pizza.md"
 
 ## 🔍 Recherche avancée
 
+> 📖 Guide complet : [Recherche, PDF, Excel & Excalidraw](docs/GUIDES/RECHERCHE_PDF_EXCALIDRAW.md)
+
 ### Syntaxe de requête
 
 | Opérateur | Description | Exemple |
@@ -747,11 +797,13 @@ Configurables via l'interface (Settings) ou l'API `/api/config`.
 
 ## 🛡️ Sécurité
 
+> 📖 Guide complet : [Authentification & sécurité](docs/GUIDES/AUTHENTIFICATION_SECURITE.md)
+
 - **Path traversal** : tous les endpoints fichier valident que le chemin résolu reste dans la vault
 - **Rate limiting** : 10 tentatives de login max par IP sur 15 minutes + lockout par compte (5 tentatives)
 - **Audit log** : écritures/suppressions/config journalisées dans `data/audit.log` (JSON lines, rotation 10 MB)
 - **Backup automatique** : chaque modification/suppression sauvegardée dans `.obsigate-backup/` avec timestamp
-- **Secret redaction** : masquage automatique des JWT, clés API, tokens dans les aperçus
+- **Secret redaction** : masquage automatique des JWT, mots de passe, clés API (OpenAI, GitHub, Google, AWS, Slack, Stripe…), tokens dans les aperçus — cliquez sur un masque pour copier la valeur
 - **Utilisateur non-root** : conteneur Docker sous `obsigate` (UID 1000)
 - **Volumes read-only** : vaults montées en `:ro` par défaut
 - **Secrets dans `.env`** : jamais dans `docker-compose.yml`
@@ -822,7 +874,7 @@ Configurables via l'interface (Settings) ou l'API `/api/config`.
 | Validation des imports frontend | `node tests/frontend/validate-imports.mjs` | `lint` |
 | Tests unitaires frontend | `node tests/frontend/unit.test.mjs` | `lint` |
 | Tests backend | `pytest tests/ -q` | `test` |
-| **E2E Playwright** | `npm run test:e2e` (~5 min) | `e2e` |
+| **E2E Playwright** | `npm run test:e2e` (~10 min) | `e2e` |
 
 #### Tests E2E locaux (`npm run test:e2e`)
 
@@ -845,6 +897,15 @@ bash scripts/run-e2e-local.sh --headed            # navigateur visible
 bash scripts/run-e2e-local.sh -g "reset panes"    # filtre sur un test
 ```
 
+Sous Windows, si `bash` n'est pas exploitable (WSL indisponible, git-bash
+bloqué par une politique de contrôle d'application), utiliser le lanceur
+PowerShell équivalent :
+
+```powershell
+npm run test:e2e:ps
+pwsh -File scripts/run-e2e-local.ps1 -PlaywrightArgs @('-g','reset panes')
+```
+
 La suite doit se terminer sur **tous les tests passant** (60 actuellement),
 sans échec ni dépendance aux retries. En cas d'échec : corriger et relancer
 localement jusqu'à 100 %, puis seulement commiter.
@@ -916,8 +977,8 @@ Ce projet est sous licence **MIT** — voir le fichier [LICENSE](LICENSE) pour l
 
 ## 📝 Changelog
 
-Consultez le [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) pour l'historique complet de toutes les versions (v1.0.0 → v2.7.3).
+Consultez le [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) pour l'historique complet de toutes les versions (v1.0.0 → v2.67.2).
 
 ---
 
-*Projet : ObsiGate | Version : 2.7.3 | Dernière mise à jour : Juin 2026*
+*Projet : ObsiGate | Version : 2.67.2 | Dernière mise à jour : Septembre 2026*

README.md

@@ -2,58 +2,79 @@
 
 **Ultra-light web gateway for your Obsidian vaults** — Access, browse, and search all your Obsidian notes from any device via a modern, responsive web interface.
 
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.7.3-blue.svg)]()
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.67.2-blue.svg)]()
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-Ready-blue.svg)](https://www.docker.com/)
 [![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11+-green.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
 [![CI/CD](https://img.shields.io/badge/CI%2FCD-Gitea_Actions-green.svg)](https://git.dracodev.net/Projets/ObsiGate/actions)
 
-```
-┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
-│  [🔍 Search...]          [☀/🌙 Theme]   ObsiGate      │
-├──────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┤
-│  SIDEBAR     │           CONTENT AREA                   │
-│  ▼ Recipes   │   📄 File Title                          │
-│    📁 Soups  │   Tags: #recipe #quick                  │
-│    📄 Pizza  │   [Rendered Markdown Content]            │
-│  ▼ IT        │                                          │
-│    📁 Docker │                                          │
-│  Tags Cloud  │                                          │
-└──────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────┘
-```
+![ObsiGate interface — statistics dashboard with vaults, tags and keyboard shortcuts](docs/images/obsigate-home.png)
+
+> ObsiGate web interface: multi-vault sidebar, global search, dashboard stats and shortcuts.
+
+---
+
+## 📚 Guides
+
+Step-by-step **user guides** live in [`docs/GUIDES/`](docs/GUIDES/):
+
+| Guide | What it covers |
+|---|---|
+| 🚀 [Getting Started](docs/GUIDES/PRISE_EN_MAIN.md) | First run, interface, navigation, vaults, shortcuts |
+| 🔍 [Search, PDF, Excel & Excalidraw](docs/GUIDES/RECHERCHE_PDF_EXCALIDRAW.md) | Query syntax, semantic search, PDF/Excel viewers, diagrams |
+| 🤖 [AI Assistant & Forge](docs/GUIDES/ASSISTANT_IA_FORGE.md) | Providers, AI editor, BooksLM, Forge, `@` / `/` commands |
+| 📝 [Editing & Collaboration](docs/GUIDES/COLLABORATION.md) | Simultaneous editing, remote cursors, persistence |
+| 📱 [PWA & Offline](docs/GUIDES/PWA_HORS_LIGNE.md) | Install as an app, offline cache, sync queue, push |
+| 🔌 [REST API](docs/GUIDES/API_REST.md) | Authentication, API keys, endpoints, `curl` examples, SSE |
+| 🧩 [MCP Server](docs/GUIDES/MCP.md) | Connect Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline… to your vaults |
+| 🔒 [Auth & Security](docs/GUIDES/AUTHENTIFICATION_SECURITE.md) | Users, MFA, per-vault permissions, hardening |
+| 🐳 [Docker Deployment](docs/GUIDES/DEPLOIEMENT_DOCKER.md) | `docker-compose`, volumes, reverse proxy, updates |
+| 🖥️ [Desktop (Tauri)](docs/GUIDES/DESKTOP.md) | Install, first run, build from source, troubleshooting |
+
+> All guides are currently written in **French**. See the full index:
+> [`docs/GUIDES/README.md`](docs/GUIDES/README.md).
 
 ---
 
 ## 📋 Table of Contents
 
-- [Features](#features)
-- [Architecture](#architecture)
-- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
-- [Quick Installation](#quick-installation)
-- [Detailed Configuration](#detailed-configuration)
-- [Environment Variables](#environment-variables)
-- [🔒 Authentication](#authentication)
-- [Adding a New Vault](#adding-a-new-vault)
-- [Build & Deployment with build.sh](#build--deployment-with-buildsh)
-- [Desktop (Tauri) — Native Application](#desktop-tauri--native-application)
-- [Usage](#usage)
-- [API](#api)
-- [Performance](#performance)
-- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
-- [Tech Stack](#tech-stack)
-- [Changelog](#changelog)
+- ✨ [Features](#features)
+- 📚 [Guides](#guides)
+- 🚀 [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
+- ⚡ [Quick Installation](#quick-installation)
+- ⚙️ [Detailed Configuration](#detailed-configuration)
+- 🌍 [Environment Variables](#environment-variables)
+- 🔒 [Authentication](#authentication)
+- ➕ [Adding a New Vault](#adding-a-new-vault)
+- 🔨 [Build & Deployment with build.sh](#build--deployment-with-buildsh)
+- 🖼️ [Obsidian Image Rendering](#obsidian-image-rendering)
+- 🖥️ [Desktop (Tauri) — Native Application](#desktop-tauri--native-application)
+- 📖 [Usage](#usage)
+- 👥 [Real-time Collaboration](#real-time-collaboration)
+- 🔌 [API](#api)
+- 🔍 [Advanced Search](#advanced-search)
+- 🛡️ [Security](#security)
+- ⚡ [Performance](#performance)
+- 🔧 [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
+- 🏗️ [Tech Stack](#tech-stack)
+- 🏠 [Architecture](#architecture)
+- 📝 [Development](#development)
+- 📄 [License](#license)
+- 🤝 [Support](#support)
+- 📝 [Changelog](#changelog)
 
 ---
 
 ## ✨ Features
 
 - **🤖 Integrated AI Editor** — CodeMirror 6 editor with AI toolbar: improve, correct, translate, generate, custom rewrite, toolbox (list, table, frontmatter, canvas) — multi-provider DeepSeek/OpenRouter/Gemini
-- **🧩 MCP Server & AI Agent** — Built-in Model Context Protocol server (`/mcp`) and tool-calling assistant: read, search and edit your vaults from Claude Desktop, Cursor… with two-step confirmations, per-vault permissions, rate limiting and secret redaction ([guide](docs/MCP_GUIDE.md))
+- **🧩 MCP Server & AI Agent** — Built-in Model Context Protocol server (`/mcp`) and tool-calling assistant: read, search and edit your vaults from Claude Desktop, Cursor… with two-step confirmations, per-vault permissions, rate limiting and secret redaction ([guide](docs/GUIDES/MCP.md))
 - **👥 Real-time Collaboration** — Simultaneous editing of the same document (Yjs/CRDT): colored remote cursors, presence indicator, conflict-free merge, automatic reconnection and server-side persistence ([details](docs/features/collaboration.md))
+- **📖 Built-in User Guide** — Complete FR/EN help from the Options menu: interface, navigation, search, files, AI, security, API & integrations (OpenAPI, MCP), offline, collaboration, desktop, plus an **Architecture** section with a Mermaid diagram; downloadable as **Markdown** and **PDF** in the current language ([details](docs/features/guide-coverage-105.md))
 - **📱 Native Mobile Editor** — Touch-optimised editing: floating Markdown toolbar (bold/italic/code/list/link), persistent Paste button (iOS workaround), pinch-zoom font & adjustable height, swipe shortcuts (backlinks / table of contents) and a full-screen reading mode with page navigation ([details](docs/features/mobile-editor.md))
 - **🗺️ Interactive Graph View** — Canvas force-directed with Barnes-Hut O(n log n), filters (tag, type), depth, focus mode, navigation history ←→↑, export PNG, preview on hover (Ctrl+click)
 - **🗂️ Multi-vault** : View multiple Obsidian vaults simultaneously
-- **🌳 Tree Navigation** : Browse your folders and files in the sidebar
+- **🌳 Tree Navigation** : Browse your folders and files in the sidebar; clicking a folder in the tree opens a dedicated **navigation tab** — path, recents, clickable subfolders, Vaults · Tags · Extensions facets, Pertinence/Date sorting and save-as-search — coexisting with your open files
 - **🔍 Advanced Search** : TF-IDF search engine with French stemming, accent normalization, highlighted snippets, facets, pagination, and sorting — plus an optional **semantic search** (embeddings via `all-MiniLM-L6-v2`, hybrid TF-IDF + RRF fusion) toggled with `~` ([details](docs/features/semantic-search.md))
 - **💡 Smart Autocomplete** : Suggestions for files, tags, and history with keyboard navigation
 - **🧩 Query Syntax** : Operators `tag:`, `#`, `vault:`, `title:`, `path:`, `ext:` with visual chips
@@ -61,7 +82,9 @@
 - **🏷️ Tag Cloud** : Filtering by tags extracted from YAML frontmatters
 - **🔗 Wikilinks** : `[[internal links]]` from Obsidian are clickable
 - **🖼️ Obsidian Images** : Full support for all Obsidian image syntaxes with intelligent resolution
+- **🎬 Audio & video** : Built-in HTML5 players (`.mp3 .wav .flac .mp4 .webm`…) with HTTP Range streaming (play, seek, fullscreen) and **persistent playback** (floating mini-player / mini video window, return to media or stop anytime, lock-screen controls via Media Session), falling back to download when the format is not playable in the browser
 - **🎨 Excalidraw Diagrams** : Native viewer/editor for `.excalidraw` and `.excalidraw.md` files (sandboxed iframe, autosave, dark/light theme, diagram text indexed for search)
+- **📊 Excel Spreadsheets** : `.xlsx` and `.xlsm` files open in a dedicated viewer — one table per sheet with tabs, A1 headers and inline cell editing (`PUT /api/file/{vault}/xlsx/save`, automatic backup, atomic write), plus download of the original file. The viewer renders fonts, colors, merged cells and frozen panes, offers keyboard navigation and shortcuts (`Ctrl+S`, `Delete`, `F2`, `Ctrl+Home/End`, `PgUp/PgDn`, `Ctrl+arrows`), a formula bar with function suggestions, an editable Name Box ("go to" `A1:B3`), a range clipboard (copy/cut/paste a block, from or to Excel), a **Format** menu (bold/italic/underline, alignments, font & fill colours, number formats, merges, frozen panes, column width/row height — `PUT /api/file/{vault}/xlsx/style`), sort/filter/find across every sheet, CSV/Markdown/HTML export and printing (selection or sheet), sheet & row/column structure editing and a workbook dashboard (named ranges, charts/pivot detection, per-sheet stats); `.csv` is edited in the same grid (RFC 4180) while `.xls` and `.ods` open read-only. Workbooks holding elements ObsiGate cannot preserve (cached values, slicers, form controls, signature…) show a **warning** and ask for confirmation before saving; a value starting with `=` or `@` is stored as text unless the `f(x)` toggle is enabled, and concurrent writes from another process are detected (`If-Match` → "Retry"). The AI assistant can list sheets, dump a bounded table to its context, search the workbook, analyze a range, update cells and append rows — on `.xlsx`, `.xlsm` and `.csv`. On mobile (≤ 768 px), the menu bar and ribbon are **collapsed by default** — a single ☰ button expands them — so the grid gets the full screen height
 - **🎨 Syntax Highlight** : Syntax highlighting for code blocks
 - **🌓 Light/Dark Theme** : Toggle persisted in localStorage
 - **📡 Real-time Sync** : Automatic file monitoring via watchdog with incremental index updates
@@ -215,6 +238,7 @@ Vaults are configured using pairs of `VAULT_N_NAME` / `VAULT_N_PATH` variables (
 | `VAULT_1_SCAN_ATTACHMENTS` | Enable image scanning on startup (optional, default: true) | `true` |
 | `VAULT_2_NAME` | Display name of the vault | `IT` |
 | `VAULT_2_PATH` | Path inside the container | `/vaults/Obsidian_IT` |
+| `OBSIGATE_HOME_ROOT` | Root folder for per-user home directories (one `home-<user>` vault per account). Unset = feature disabled. | `/vaults/Home` |
 
 **Naming rules:**
 - Use only letters, numbers, and hyphens
@@ -319,7 +343,18 @@ When an **admin** account is logged in, a 🛡️ icon appears in the header. Cl
 | `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP` | Allow non-HTTPS webhook targets | `false` |
 | `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE` | Allow webhooks to private/loopback addresses | `false` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_MAX_SIZE_MB` | Max PDF size for text extraction | `50` |
+| `OBSIGATE_MEDIA_MAX_INLINE_MB` | Max size for inline audio/video playback (above: download) | `500` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_EXTRACT_TIMEOUT` | PDF extraction timeout (seconds) | `30` |
+| `OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY` / `OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY` / `OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY` / `OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY` | Keyed web-search providers (tried before SearXNG) | — |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEB_PROVIDERS` | Search provider order (e.g. `brave,searxng`) | — |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEB_RETRY` | Web tools network retries (house-made backoff) | `1` |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_TTL` | SQLite cache TTL for web results (seconds, `0` = off) | `900` |
+| `OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL` / `OBSIGATE_GITEA_TOKEN` | Gitea connected source (`git_list_repos`…) | — |
+| `OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN` | GitHub token (`git_list_repos`…) | — |
+
+> These keys can also be entered **from the UI** (menu → Configurations →
+> "Connected sources & search"): the stored value goes to `data/api_keys.json`
+> and takes precedence over the environment variable.
 
 >All these variables are documented in `.env.example`.
 
@@ -485,6 +520,17 @@ ObsiGate uses 7 resolution strategies in order of priority:
 6. **Startup index (closest match)** : If multiple files have the same name
 7. **Fallback** : Display a styled placeholder `[image not found: filename.ext]`
 
+### Viewer & file tree
+
+Images are first-class vault files: they appear in the tree, are indexed (name +
+metadata, **never the bytes**) and open in a **dedicated viewer** — wheel zoom
+0.1×–8×, drag pan, double-click to reset, ←/→ navigation between images in the
+same folder (WebP thumbnail filmstrip), metadata panel, full-screen lightbox,
+open original and download. The `ext:png`/`ext:jpg` search filter is available.
+Decodable formats: PNG, JPEG, GIF, WebP, BMP, ICO, SVG (SVG served with a
+`sandbox` CSP). **HEIC/HEIF** (iPhone) is not decodable by browsers and is not
+supported.
+
 ### Configuration
 
 To optimize resolution, configure the attachments folder for each vault:
@@ -509,6 +555,8 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:2020/api/attachments/rescan/MyVault
 
 ## 🖥️ Desktop (Tauri) — Native Application
 
+> 📖 Full guide: [Desktop (Tauri)](docs/GUIDES/DESKTOP.md)
+
 ObsiGate Desktop is a native application built with [Tauri](https://tauri.app/) (Rust + system webview). It embeds the Python backend and frontend in a standalone executable — zero Docker, zero command line.
 
 > 🚧 **Version 2.0.0 — binaries are being stabilized.** For now, building from source is recommended.
@@ -676,6 +724,8 @@ Lifecycle: Tauri spawns the Python backend → health check → opens the webvie
 
 ## 👥 Real-time Collaboration
 
+> 📖 Full guide: [Editing & Collaboration](docs/GUIDES/COLLABORATION.md)
+
 Multiple users can edit the same markdown document simultaneously (Google Docs style):
 
 - **Conflict-free merge** via Yjs (CRDT): two people can type in the same place, no change is lost.
@@ -692,6 +742,8 @@ No configuration is required: open the same file in two browsers (or two windows
 
 ## 🔌 API
 
+> 📖 Full guide: [REST API](docs/GUIDES/API_REST.md) · [MCP Server](docs/GUIDES/MCP.md)
+
 ObsiGate exposes a complete REST API :
 
 | Endpoint | Description | Method | Auth |
@@ -719,6 +771,7 @@ ObsiGate exposes a complete REST API :
 | `/api/events` | Real-time SSE stream | GET | Yes |
 | `/api/vaults/add` / `/api/vaults/{name}` | Dynamic vault management | POST/DELETE | Admin |
 | `/api/image/{vault}?path=` | Serve an image | GET | Yes |
+| `/api/media/{vault}/thumb?path=&size=` | WebP thumbnail (disk cache) | GET | Yes |
 | `/api/config` | Read / write configuration | GET/POST | Yes/Admin |
 | `/api/diagnostics` | Index and memory statistics | GET | Admin |
 
@@ -752,6 +805,8 @@ curl "http://localhost:2020/api/file/Recipes?path=pizza.md"
 
 ## 🔍 Advanced Search
 
+> 📖 Full guide: [Search, PDF, Excel & Excalidraw](docs/GUIDES/RECHERCHE_PDF_EXCALIDRAW.md)
+
 ### Query Syntax
 
 | Operator | Description | Example |
@@ -904,11 +959,13 @@ These parameters are configurable via the interface (Settings) or the `/api/conf
 
 ## 🛡️ Security
 
+> 📖 Full guide: [Auth & Security](docs/GUIDES/AUTHENTIFICATION_SECURITE.md)
+
 - **Path traversal** : All file endpoints validate that the resolved path stays within the vault
 - **Rate limiting** : 10 login attempts max per IP over 15 minutes + per-account lockout (5 attempts)
 - **Audit log** : All writes, deletions, and config changes are logged in `data/audit.log` (JSON lines, 10 MB rotation)
 - **Automatic backup** : Every file modification or deletion is saved in `.obsigate-backup/` with timestamp
-- **Secret redaction** : Automatic masking of JWTs, API keys, tokens, and connection strings in previews
+- **Secret redaction** : Automatic masking of JWTs, passwords, API keys (OpenAI, GitHub, Google, AWS, Slack, Stripe…), tokens and connection strings in previews — click a mask to copy the value
 - **Non-root user** : The Docker container runs under user `obsigate` (UID 1000)
 - **Read-only volumes** : Vaults are mounted as `:ro` by default in docker-compose
 - **Secrets in `.env`** : Passwords and tokens are never in `docker-compose.yml`
@@ -987,7 +1044,7 @@ These parameters are configurable via the interface (Settings) or the `/api/conf
 | Frontend import validation | `node tests/frontend/validate-imports.mjs` | `lint` |
 | Frontend unit tests | `node tests/frontend/unit.test.mjs` | `lint` |
 | Backend tests | `pytest tests/ -q` | `test` |
-| **E2E Playwright** | `npm run test:e2e` (~5 min) | `e2e` |
+| **E2E Playwright** | `npm run test:e2e` (~10 min) | `e2e` |
 
 #### Local E2E Tests (`npm run test:e2e`)
 
@@ -1010,6 +1067,14 @@ bash scripts/run-e2e-local.sh --headed            # visible browser
 bash scripts/run-e2e-local.sh -g "reset panes"    # filter on a test
 ```
 
+On Windows, when `bash` is unusable (WSL unavailable, git-bash blocked by an
+Application Control policy), use the equivalent PowerShell launcher:
+
+```powershell
+npm run test:e2e:ps
+pwsh -File scripts/run-e2e-local.ps1 -PlaywrightArgs @('-g','reset panes')
+```
+
 The suite must end with **all tests passing** (60 currently), with no failure
 or reliance on retries. In case of failure: fix and re-run locally until 100 %,
 then only commit.
@@ -1059,7 +1124,9 @@ ObsiGate/
 ├── Dockerfile           # Multi-stage, healthcheck, non-root
 ├── docker-compose.yml   # Deployment with healthcheck and auth env vars
 ├── build.sh             # Automated build & deployment (docker compose build + up)
-└── docs/CONTRIBUTING.md # Contribution guide
+└── docs/
+    ├── GUIDES/          # User guides (getting started, API, MCP, desktop…)
+    └── CONTRIBUTING.md  # Contribution guide
 ```
 
 ### Contributing
@@ -1085,8 +1152,8 @@ This project is licensed under the **MIT License** - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE)
 
 ## 📝 Changelog
 
-See [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) for the complete version history (v1.0.0 → v2.7.3).
+See [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) for the complete version history (v1.0.0 → v2.67.2).
 
 ---
 
-*Project: ObsiGate | Version: 2.7.3 | Last updated: May 2026*
+*Project: ObsiGate | Version: 2.67.2 | Last updated: September 2026*

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-2.7.3
+2.67.2

backend/agent/loop.py

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from backend.tools.api import (
     ToolError,
     ToolScope,
     call_tool,
+    get_tool,
     get_tool_schemas,
 )
 from backend.tools.labels import thought_step_label, tool_step_label
@@ -121,12 +122,15 @@ def _assistant_tool_message(content: str | None, tool_calls: list[Any]) -> dict[
 def _deferred_tool_message(call: Any, reason: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Answer a tool call that was not reached because the run stopped early.
 
-    A single LLM response may carry several tool calls. When one of them is
-    mutating and pauses the run for confirmation, the assistant message already
-    lists *all* of them, so every ``tool_call_id`` must get a tool result before
-    the next LLM call (the OpenAI tool protocol rejects dangling ids). The calls
-    that were not reached get a synthetic ``deferred`` result; the model
-    re-issues them once the confirmed call has been applied (BUG-050).
+    A single LLM response may carry several tool calls; when the run stops
+    before reaching some of them (tool-call quota), the assistant message still
+    lists *all* of them, so every ``tool_call_id`` must get a tool result
+    before the next LLM call (the OpenAI tool protocol rejects dangling ids).
+    The calls that were not reached get a synthetic ``deferred`` result.
+
+    Note: mutating calls that pause the run for confirmation are no longer
+    deferred — they are batched and applied together on resume (BUG-075); this
+    helper remains for budget stops (BUG-050/BUG-052).
     """
     return {
         "role": "tool",
@@ -135,13 +139,29 @@ def _deferred_tool_message(call: Any, reason: str | None = None) -> dict[str, An
         "content": json.dumps({
             "status": "deferred",
             "reason": reason or (
-                "Not executed: the run paused to confirm an earlier tool call. "
+                "Not executed: the run stopped before reaching this tool call. "
                 "Re-issue this call if it is still needed."
             ),
         }, ensure_ascii=False),
     }
 
 
+def _action_descriptor(call: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Describe one paused mutating tool call for the confirmation payload.
+
+    A single LLM response may request several mutations (create a folder and
+    the files inside it…). They are batched into one confirmation so the user
+    approves the whole plan in one click (BUG-075). ``step`` reuses the
+    Notion-style label, so the confirmation card reads like the steps block.
+    """
+    return {
+        "id": call.id,
+        "tool": call.name,
+        "arguments": call.arguments,
+        "step": tool_step_label(call.name, call.arguments),
+    }
+
+
 def _fallback_summary(executed: list[ToolCallRecord]) -> str:
     """Deterministic non-empty answer built from the gathered tool results.
 
@@ -212,53 +232,66 @@ def _execute_confirmed(
     executed: list[ToolCallRecord],
     on_tool_call: Callable[[ToolCallRecord], None] | None,
 ) -> None:
-    """Apply a previously-paused mutating tool call and feed its result back.
+    """Apply previously-paused mutating tool calls and feed their results back.
 
     The pending payload is the ``error`` object emitted by a ``confirmation``
-    event. The assistant tool-call message is expected to already be in
+    event, optionally carrying an ``actions`` list with every mutating call of
+    the LLM turn (BUG-075). Each action is applied with a one-shot confirmation
+    and its ``tool_call_id`` answered, keeping the conversation valid for the
+    resumed turn. The assistant tool-call message is expected to already be in
     ``convo`` (it is part of the snapshot returned with the confirmation).
     """
     from backend.ai_chat import ToolCall
 
-    error = confirm_pending.get("error", confirm_pending)
-    name = error.get("tool")
-    arguments = error.get("arguments") or {}
-    call_id = error.get("id") or "call_pending"
+    error = confirm_pending.get("error", confirm_pending) or {}
+    actions = confirm_pending.get("actions")
+    if not isinstance(actions, list) or not actions:
+        # Legacy single-action payload (no ``actions`` list).
+        actions = [{
+            "id": error.get("id") or "call_pending",
+            "tool": error.get("tool"),
+            "arguments": error.get("arguments") or {},
+        }]
 
-    if not name:
-        raise ToolError("Malformed confirmation payload", code="invalid_confirmation")
+    for action in actions:
+        name = action.get("tool")
+        arguments = action.get("arguments") or {}
+        call_id = action.get("id") or "call_pending"
 
-    # Make sure the assistant tool-call message is present in the snapshot.
-    if not any(
-        m.get("role") == "assistant" and any(
-            tc.get("id") == call_id for tc in (m.get("tool_calls") or [])
+        if not name:
+            raise ToolError("Malformed confirmation payload", code="invalid_confirmation")
+
+        # Make sure the assistant tool-call message is present in the snapshot.
+        if not any(
+            m.get("role") == "assistant" and any(
+                tc.get("id") == call_id for tc in (m.get("tool_calls") or [])
+            )
+            for m in convo
+        ):
+            convo.append(_assistant_tool_message(None, [ToolCall(id=call_id, name=name, arguments=arguments)]))
+
+        try:
+            result = call_tool(name, ctx, arguments, confirm=True)
+            payload = result.data
+            ok = True
+        except ToolError as e:
+            payload = e.to_dict()
+            ok = False
+
+        record = ToolCallRecord(
+            name=name, arguments=arguments, ok=ok, result=payload,
+            step=tool_step_label(name, arguments),
         )
-        for m in convo
-    ):
-        convo.append(_assistant_tool_message(None, [ToolCall(id=call_id, name=name, arguments=arguments)]))
+        executed.append(record)
+        if on_tool_call is not None:
+            on_tool_call(record)
 
-    try:
-        result = call_tool(name, ctx, arguments, confirm=True)
-        payload = result.data
-        ok = True
-    except ToolError as e:
-        payload = e.to_dict()
-        ok = False
-
-    record = ToolCallRecord(
-        name=name, arguments=arguments, ok=ok, result=payload,
-        step=tool_step_label(name, arguments),
-    )
-    executed.append(record)
-    if on_tool_call is not None:
-        on_tool_call(record)
-
-    convo.append({
-        "role": "tool",
-        "tool_call_id": call_id,
-        "name": name,
-        "content": json.dumps(_truncate(payload), ensure_ascii=False, default=str),
-    })
+        convo.append({
+            "role": "tool",
+            "tool_call_id": call_id,
+            "name": name,
+            "content": json.dumps(_truncate(payload), ensure_ascii=False, default=str),
+        })
 
 
 async def run_agent(
@@ -315,6 +348,36 @@ async def run_agent(
     convo = [dict(m) for m in (resume_messages if resume_messages is not None else messages)]
     executed: list[ToolCallRecord] = []
 
+    def _run_call(call: Any) -> None:
+        """Execute one tool call, record it and answer its ``tool_call_id``.
+
+        ``ToolConfirmationRequired`` propagates to the caller so the loop can
+        pause and batch the mutating calls of the turn (BUG-075).
+        """
+        try:
+            result = call_tool(call.name, ctx, call.arguments)
+            payload: Any = result.data
+            ok = True
+        except ToolConfirmationRequired:
+            raise
+        except ToolError as e:
+            payload = e.to_dict()
+            ok = False
+        record = ToolCallRecord(
+            name=call.name, arguments=call.arguments, ok=ok, result=payload,
+            step=tool_step_label(call.name, call.arguments),
+        )
+        executed.append(record)
+        steps.append(record.step)
+        if on_tool_call is not None:
+            on_tool_call(record)
+        convo.append({
+            "role": "tool",
+            "tool_call_id": call.id,
+            "name": call.name,
+            "content": json.dumps(_truncate(payload), ensure_ascii=False, default=str),
+        })
+
     if confirm_pending:
         if quota is not None and len(executed) >= quota:
             return AgentResult(
@@ -357,19 +420,25 @@ async def run_agent(
                     llm, convo, executed, steps, iteration, STOP_QUOTA_EXCEEDED
                 )
             try:
-                result = call_tool(call.name, ctx, call.arguments)
-                payload = result.data
-                ok = True
+                _run_call(call)
             except ToolConfirmationRequired as e:
                 logger.info(f"Agent paused: confirmation required for '{call.name}'")
                 pending = e.to_dict()
                 # Include the tool-call id so the client can echo it back.
                 pending["error"]["id"] = call.id
-                # BUG-050: the assistant message lists every tool call of this
-                # batch, so answer the ones we did not reach to keep the
-                # conversation valid for the resumed turn.
-                for skipped in response.tool_calls[index + 1:]:
-                    convo.append(_deferred_tool_message(skipped))
+                # BUG-075: batch every mutating call of this LLM turn so the
+                # user approves the whole plan at once (one resume applies them
+                # all) instead of approving one action after another. Read-only
+                # calls of the batch run immediately and answer their
+                # ``tool_call_id`` so the resumed turn stays valid.
+                actions = [_action_descriptor(call)]
+                for after in response.tool_calls[index + 1:]:
+                    spec = get_tool(after.name)
+                    if spec is not None and spec.requires_confirmation:
+                        actions.append(_action_descriptor(after))
+                    else:
+                        _run_call(after)
+                pending["actions"] = actions
                 return AgentResult(
                     content=response.content or "",
                     messages=convo,
@@ -379,25 +448,6 @@ async def run_agent(
                     stopped=STOP_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
                     pending=pending,
                 )
-            except ToolError as e:
-                payload = e.to_dict()
-                ok = False
-
-            record = ToolCallRecord(
-                name=call.name, arguments=call.arguments, ok=ok, result=payload,
-                step=tool_step_label(call.name, call.arguments),
-            )
-            executed.append(record)
-            steps.append(record.step)
-            if on_tool_call is not None:
-                on_tool_call(record)
-
-            convo.append({
-                "role": "tool",
-                "tool_call_id": call.id,
-                "name": call.name,
-                "content": json.dumps(_truncate(payload), ensure_ascii=False, default=str),
-            })
 
     logger.warning(f"Agent reached max iterations ({max_iterations})")
     return await _finalize_answer(

backend/ai.py

@@ -353,10 +353,13 @@ async def ai_generate_frontmatter(text: str, provider: ProviderName | None = Non
 
 
 async def ai_inline_complete(text: str, provider: ProviderName | None = None) -> str:
-    """Inline completion — suggest continuation."""
+    """Inline completion — suggest a short continuation of the text before the cursor."""
     return await _call_deepseek_openrouter(
-        f"Complete this text naturally. Return only the completion (just the new text, no repetition):\n\n{text}",
-        SYSTEM_PROMPT, provider, temperature=0.3, max_tokens=512,
+        "Continue the text below in the same language. Reply with ONLY the "
+        "continuation: no repetition, no quotes, no explanation, at most one "
+        "short sentence. If the text ends with a partial word, finish that word.\n\n"
+        + text,
+        SYSTEM_PROMPT, provider, temperature=0.2, max_tokens=128,
     )
 
 

backend/attachment_indexer.py

@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@ import threading
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
-logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.attachment_indexer")
+from backend.media_types import IMAGE_EXTENSIONS
 
-# Image file extensions to index
-IMAGE_EXTENSIONS = {".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".svg", ".webp", ".bmp", ".ico"}
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.attachment_indexer")
 
 # Global attachment index: {vault_name: {filename_lower: [absolute_path, ...]}}
 attachment_index: dict[str, dict[str, list[Path]]] = {}

backend/auth/jwt_handler.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 import os
 import secrets
+import threading
 import time
 import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -23,6 +24,22 @@ ALGORITHM = "HS256"
 ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL", "3600"))       # default 1 hour
 REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL", "604800"))   # default 7 days
 
+#: Persistent API/MCP access tokens (user-managed, shown in the config panel).
+API_TOKENS_FILE = Path("data/api_tokens.json")
+#: Accepted values for the expiry selector in the UI (1 day, 1 month, 6 months,
+#: 1 year, never). "never" → no ``exp`` claim → token valid until revoked.
+API_TOKEN_EXPIRY_CHOICES = {
+    "1d": 24 * 3600,
+    "30d": 30 * 24 * 3600,
+    "180d": 180 * 24 * 3600,
+    "365d": 365 * 24 * 3600,
+    "never": None,
+}
+#: Max active tokens per user (anti hoarding; revoking frees a slot).
+API_TOKEN_MAX_PER_USER = 50
+#: AES-GCM key derived once from the JWT secret to encrypt stored tokens.
+_API_TOKEN_KEY: bytes | None = None
+
 # In-memory revoked token set (loaded from disk on startup)
 _revoked_jtis: set = set()
 _revoked_loaded = False
@@ -92,48 +109,197 @@ def decode_token(token: str) -> dict | None:
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Token revocation
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# The store is a dict {jti: valid_until}: the revocation record may be dropped
+# once the underlying token's own expiry has passed (by then the JWT is dead
+# anyway). Long-lived API/MCP tokens (see create_api_token) must therefore be
+# revoked with their real expiry — a 1-year token revoked last week must not
+# silently come back to life when a 7-day cleanup purges the record (BUG in
+# the previous set-based store, fixed with feature #107).
+
+_revoked_map: dict[str, int] = {}
+_revoked_loaded = False
+
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour du read-modify-write du store de
+# révocation (perte de révocations en cas de logouts concurrents).
+_revoked_lock = threading.RLock()
+
 
 def _load_revoked():
     """Load revoked token JTIs from disk into memory (once)."""
-    global _revoked_loaded, _revoked_jtis
-    if _revoked_loaded:
-        return
-    if REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.exists():
-        try:
-            data = json.loads(REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.read_text())
-            # Clean expired entries (older than 7 days)
-            now = int(time.time())
-            _revoked_jtis = {
-                jti for jti, exp in data.items()
-                if exp > now
-            }
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.warning(f"Failed to load revoked tokens: {e}")
-            _revoked_jtis = set()
-    _revoked_loaded = True
+    global _revoked_loaded, _revoked_map
+    with _revoked_lock:
+        if _revoked_loaded:
+            return
+        if REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.exists():
+            try:
+                data = json.loads(REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.read_text())
+                # Drop entries whose underlying token has itself expired.
+                now = int(time.time())
+                _revoked_map = {
+                    jti: int(exp) for jti, exp in data.items()
+                    if int(exp) > now
+                }
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Failed to load revoked tokens: {e}")
+                _revoked_map = {}
+        _revoked_loaded = True
 
 
 def _save_revoked():
-    """Persist revoked JTIs to disk."""
+    """Persist revoked JTIs to disk with their per-token expiry."""
     REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    # Store with expiry timestamp for cleanup
-    now = int(time.time())
-    # Keep entries for 7 days max
-    data = {jti: now + REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS for jti in _revoked_jtis}
     tmp = REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
-    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(data))
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(_revoked_map))
     tmp.replace(REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE)
 
 
-def revoke_token(jti: str):
-    """Add a token JTI to the revocation list."""
-    _load_revoked()
-    _revoked_jtis.add(jti)
-    _save_revoked()
+def revoke_token(jti: str, expires_at: int | None = None):
+    """Add a token JTI to the revocation list.
+
+    ``expires_at`` is the revoked token's own ``exp`` (unix seconds) — the
+    record is kept at least that long so a long-lived API token cannot
+    outlive its revocation. ``None`` means the token never expires (API/MCP
+    "sans fin") → the     record is kept forever (capped at ~100 years, the JWT
+    store's practical infinity). Default keeps 7 days (session tokens).
+    """
+    with _revoked_lock:
+        _load_revoked()
+        now = int(time.time())
+        if expires_at is None:
+            until = now + 100 * 365 * 24 * 3600
+        else:
+            until = max(int(expires_at), now + REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS)
+        _revoked_map[jti] = until
+        _save_revoked()
     logger.debug(f"Revoked token JTI: {jti[:8]}...")
 
 
 def is_token_revoked(jti: str) -> bool:
     """Check if a token JTI has been revoked."""
-    _load_revoked()
-    return jti in _revoked_jtis
+    with _revoked_lock:
+        _load_revoked()
+        return jti in _revoked_map
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# API / MCP tokens (feature #107)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Long-lived access tokens the user creates from the config panel. They are
+# plain HS256 access-type JWTs (``api: true`` claim), so they authenticate
+# against BOTH the REST API and the MCP endpoint (/mcp) — which share
+# ``get_current_user``. The raw token is shown exactly once at creation; the
+# store keeps metadata only (name, owner, expiry, last use) — no secret
+# material is written to disk.
+#
+# File: data/api_tokens.json
+#   {"version": 1, "tokens": {jti: {name, username, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at}}}
+
+_api_tokens_lock = threading.RLock()
+_touch_last_write: dict[str, float] = {}
+
+
+def _load_api_tokens() -> dict:
+    if not API_TOKENS_FILE.exists():
+        return {"version": 1, "tokens": {}}
+    try:
+        return json.loads(API_TOKENS_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as e:
+        logger.error(f"Failed to read api_tokens.json: {e}")
+        return {"version": 1, "tokens": {}}
+
+
+def _save_api_tokens(data: dict):
+    API_TOKENS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = API_TOKENS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2, default=str), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(API_TOKENS_FILE)
+
+
+def create_api_token(user: dict, name: str, expiry_key: str) -> tuple[dict, str]:
+    """Create a persistent API/MCP token. Returns (record, jwt_string).
+
+    ``expiry_key`` must be one of API_TOKEN_EXPIRY_CHOICES; "never" omits the
+    ``exp`` claim (valid until explicitly revoked).
+    """
+    if expiry_key not in API_TOKEN_EXPIRY_CHOICES:
+        raise ValueError("Expiration invalide")
+    seconds = API_TOKEN_EXPIRY_CHOICES[expiry_key]
+    with _api_tokens_lock:
+        data = _load_api_tokens()
+        tokens = data["tokens"]
+        mine = sum(1 for t in tokens.values() if t["username"] == user["username"])
+        if mine >= API_TOKEN_MAX_PER_USER:
+            raise ValueError(f"Maximum {API_TOKEN_MAX_PER_USER} tokens par utilisateur")
+        now = int(time.time())
+        jti = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        payload = {
+            "sub": user["username"],
+            "role": user.get("role", "user"),
+            "vaults": user.get("vaults", []),
+            "jti": jti,
+            "iat": now,
+            "type": "access",
+            "api": True,
+        }
+        if seconds is not None:
+            payload["exp"] = now + seconds
+        token = jwt.encode(payload, get_secret_key(), algorithm=ALGORITHM)
+        record = {
+            "jti": jti,
+            "name": name[:64] or "API token",
+            "username": user["username"],
+            "created_at": now,
+            "expires_at": payload.get("exp"),
+            "expiry_key": expiry_key,
+            "last_used_at": None,
+        }
+        tokens[jti] = record
+        _save_api_tokens(data)
+    return record, token
+
+
+def list_api_tokens(username: str) -> list[dict]:
+    """Token metadata for one user, newest first."""
+    data = _load_api_tokens()
+    now = int(time.time())
+    items = [
+        {**t, "expired": t.get("expires_at") is not None and t["expires_at"] < now}
+        for t in data["tokens"].values()
+        if t["username"] == username
+    ]
+    return sorted(items, key=lambda t: t["created_at"], reverse=True)
+
+
+def delete_api_token(jti: str, username: str) -> dict:
+    """Revoke and remove an API token. Raises KeyError when unknown/not owned."""
+    with _api_tokens_lock:
+        data = _load_api_tokens()
+        record = data["tokens"].get(jti)
+        if not record or record["username"] != username:
+            raise KeyError(jti)
+        # Revoke by jti so the presented JWT stops working even though it is
+        # stateless — kept until its natural expiry (no-expiry → forever).
+        revoke_token(jti, record.get("expires_at"))
+        del data["tokens"][jti]
+        _save_api_tokens(data)
+    return record
+
+
+def maybe_touch_api_token(jti: str | None, created_or_expires: bool = False):
+    """Record last usage of an API token, throttled to one disk write/hour."""
+    if not jti:
+        return
+    now = time.time()
+    if now - _touch_last_write.get(jti, 0) < 3600:
+        return
+    _touch_last_write[jti] = now
+    try:
+        with _api_tokens_lock:
+            data = _load_api_tokens()
+            record = data["tokens"].get(jti)
+            if record is None:
+                return
+            record["last_used_at"] = int(now)
+            _save_api_tokens(data)
+    except Exception as e:  # never fail an authenticated request over stats
+        logger.debug(f"api_token touch failed: {e}")

backend/auth/middleware.py

@@ -4,19 +4,23 @@
 
 import logging
 import os
+import sys
 
 from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
 
 from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
 
-from .jwt_handler import decode_token, is_token_revoked
+from .jwt_handler import decode_token, is_token_revoked, maybe_touch_api_token
 from .user_store import get_user
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.middleware")
 
 security = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
 
+#: Hosts considered safe to bind without authentication (loopback only).
+_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1"}
+
 
 def is_auth_enabled() -> bool:
     """Check if authentication is enabled via environment variable.
@@ -26,6 +30,34 @@ def is_auth_enabled() -> bool:
     return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() != "false"
 
 
+def is_insecure_mode_allowed() -> bool:
+    """True when the operator explicitly accepts running without auth (BUG-037)."""
+    return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE", "false").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
+
+
+def bind_host_from_argv(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> str | None:
+    """Extract the ``--host`` value from the process arguments (uvicorn), if any.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when no explicit host is passed (uvicorn then defaults to
+    loopback ``127.0.0.1``).
+    """
+    args = sys.argv if argv is None else argv
+    for i, arg in enumerate(args):
+        if arg == "--host" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            return args[i + 1]
+        if arg.startswith("--host="):
+            return arg.split("=", 1)[1]
+    return None
+
+
+def is_loopback_host(host: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *host* is a loopback address (or unset → uvicorn default)."""
+    if not host:
+        return True
+    normalized = host.strip().strip("[]").lower()
+    return normalized in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS
+
+
 def get_current_user(
     request: Request,
     credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None = Depends(security),
@@ -83,6 +115,10 @@ def get_current_user(
     user["_token_vaults"] = payload.get("vaults", [])
     # Attach the token id for per-token rate limiting (AI tool layer).
     user["_token_jti"] = payload.get("jti")
+    # Feature #107: track last usage of user-managed API/MCP tokens
+    # (throttled write — this dependency runs on both REST and /mcp paths).
+    if payload.get("api"):
+        maybe_touch_api_token(payload.get("jti"))
     # BUG-030: expose the real client IP to the audit log.
     user["_request_ip"] = get_client_ip(request)
     return user
@@ -106,6 +142,11 @@ def require_admin(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
     return current_user
 
 
+def is_home_vault(vault_name: str) -> bool:
+    """Un dossier personnel (#194) : vault « home-<user> »."""
+    return vault_name.startswith("home-")
+
+
 def check_vault_access(vault_name: str, user: dict) -> bool:
     """Check if a user has access to a specific vault.
 
@@ -113,8 +154,13 @@ def check_vault_access(vault_name: str, user: dict) -> bool:
     - vaults == ["*"] → full access (admin default)
     - vault_name in vaults → access granted
     - otherwise → denied
+
+    #194 : un dossier personnel n'est **jamais** couvert par ``*`` — sinon
+    un admin (``vaults: ["*"]``) verrait le dossier de chaque utilisateur.
     """
     vaults = user.get("_token_vaults") or user.get("vaults", [])
+    if is_home_vault(vault_name):
+        return vault_name in vaults
     if "*" in vaults:
         return True
     return vault_name in vaults

backend/auth/password.py

@@ -1,14 +1,21 @@
 # backend/auth/password.py
 # Argon2id password hashing — OWASP 2024 recommended algorithm.
-# Parameters: time_cost=2, memory_cost=64MB, parallelism=2
+# Parameters (BUG-038): time_cost=2, memory_cost=19 MiB, parallelism=1
+# (OWASP current recommendation for Argon2id). The previous 64 MiB setting
+# allowed memory exhaustion under concurrent login attempts.
 
 from argon2 import PasswordHasher
 from argon2.exceptions import VerificationError, VerifyMismatchError
 
+#: Argon2id cost parameters (OWASP 2024: m=19456 KiB, t=2, p=1).
+ARGON2_TIME_COST = 2
+ARGON2_MEMORY_COST_KIB = 19456  # 19 MiB
+ARGON2_PARALLELISM = 1
+
 ph = PasswordHasher(
-    time_cost=2,
-    memory_cost=65536,  # 64 MB
-    parallelism=2,
+    time_cost=ARGON2_TIME_COST,
+    memory_cost=ARGON2_MEMORY_COST_KIB,
+    parallelism=ARGON2_PARALLELISM,
     hash_len=32,
     salt_len=16,
 )

backend/auth/router.py

@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
 # All /api/auth/* endpoints: login, logout, refresh, me, change-password,
 # and admin user CRUD.
 
+import base64
+import binascii
 import logging
+import os
 import re
 
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response
@@ -13,14 +16,18 @@ from backend.ratelimit import record_account_failure as rl_record_account_failur
 from backend.ratelimit import record_account_success as rl_record_account_success
 from backend.ratelimit import record_failure as rl_record_failure
 from backend.ratelimit import record_success as rl_record_success
-from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
+from backend.services.net import get_client_ip, is_trusted_proxy
 
 from .jwt_handler import (
     ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
+    API_TOKEN_EXPIRY_CHOICES,
     create_access_token,
+    create_api_token,
     create_refresh_token,
     decode_token,
+    delete_api_token,
     is_token_revoked,
+    list_api_tokens,
     revoke_token,
 )
 from .mfa import (
@@ -50,6 +57,34 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.router")
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
 
 
+def is_secure_cookies(request: Request | None = None) -> bool:
+    """True when auth cookies must carry the ``Secure`` flag (#87 T3/T8).
+
+    ``OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES=true|false|auto`` (défaut : ``auto``) :
+    ``true``/``false`` forcent le comportement ; ``auto`` met ``Secure``
+    si la requête arrive en https (production derrière TLS) et l'omet
+    sinon (dev local en http — les navigateurs jettent les cookies
+    ``Secure`` sur http, ce qui casserait silencieusement les logins
+    localhost). Derrière un reverse proxy qui termine TLS, le schéma perçu
+    est http : avec ``OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true``, ``X-Forwarded-Proto``
+    est honoré (même garde que ``get_client_ip``, BUG-030).
+    """
+    forced = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "auto").lower()
+    if forced in ("1", "true", "yes", "on"):
+        return True
+    if forced in ("0", "false", "no", "off"):
+        return False
+    if request is None:
+        return False
+    if request.url.scheme == "https":
+        return True
+    if is_trusted_proxy():
+        proto = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "").split(",")[0].strip().lower()
+        if proto == "https":
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
 # ── Pydantic request models ──────────────────────────────────────────
 
 class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -105,6 +140,43 @@ class UpdateUserRequest(BaseModel):
         return validate_password_strength(v)
 
 
+# ── Profile avatar (#113) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+#: Avatar data-URL pattern — PNG/JPEG/WebP only (no SVG: XSS surface).
+_AVATAR_DATA_URL_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^data:image/(?:png|jpeg|webp);base64,[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$"
+)
+#: ~300 KB of base64 payload (a 256px JPEG is ~15 KB; generous headroom).
+_AVATAR_MAX_CHARS = 400_000
+
+
+def _validate_avatar(data_url: str) -> str | None:
+    """Validate an avatar data-URL for storage on the user profile.
+
+    Returns the normalized data-URL, or ``None`` when clearing the avatar
+    (empty string).  Raises ``HTTPException(400)`` on anything else.
+    """
+    if data_url == "":
+        return None
+    if len(data_url) > _AVATAR_MAX_CHARS:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Avatar image too large")
+    if not _AVATAR_DATA_URL_RE.match(data_url):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Avatar must be a PNG, JPEG or WebP data URL")
+    try:
+        raw = base64.b64decode(data_url.split(",", 1)[1], validate=True)
+    except (ValueError, binascii.Error) as exc:  # pragma: no cover — regex guards
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Avatar payload is not valid base64") from exc
+    # Confirm the decoded bytes really are a supported image (magic numbers).
+    is_png = raw.startswith(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n")
+    is_jpeg = raw.startswith(b"\xff\xd8\xff")
+    is_webp = (
+        len(raw) >= 12 and raw[:4] == b"RIFF" and raw[8:12] == b"WEBP"
+    )
+    if not (is_png or is_jpeg or is_webp):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Avatar payload is not a PNG, JPEG or WebP image")
+    return data_url
+
+
 # ── Public endpoints ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 @router.get("/status")
@@ -124,31 +196,32 @@ async def auth_status():
 async def login(body: LoginRequest, response: Response, request: Request):
     """Authenticate a user. Returns access token and sets refresh cookie.
 
-    Implements timing-safe responses to prevent user enumeration:
-    a failed login with an unknown user takes the same time as one
-    with a known user (dummy hash is computed).
+    Implements timing-safe responses to prevent user enumeration: a failed
+    login with an unknown user takes the same time as one with a known user
+    (dummy hash is computed). BUG-039: unknown, inactive, locked and
+    per-account rate-limited accounts all answer the same ``401`` so the HTTP
+    status can never reveal whether an account exists.
     """
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
+
+    # IP-based rate limiting (10 failures / 15 min per IP). It is not
+    # account-specific, so a 429 here cannot be used to enumerate accounts.
+    if is_rate_limited(client_ip):
+        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives depuis cette adresse IP (15min)")
+
     user = get_user(body.username)
 
-    if not user:
+    # BUG-039: uniform 401 + equivalent timing for every account-state outcome.
+    if not user or not user.get("active"):
         # Timing-safe: simulate hash computation to prevent user enumeration
         hash_password("dummy_timing_protection")
         raise HTTPException(401, "Identifiants invalides")
 
-    if not user.get("active"):
-        raise HTTPException(403, "Compte désactivé")
-
-    # IP-based rate limiting (10 failures / 15 min per IP)
-    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
-    if is_rate_limited(client_ip):
-        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives depuis cette adresse IP (15min)")
-
     # BUG-031: per-account budget still applies when the attacker rotates IPs.
-    if is_account_rate_limited(body.username):
-        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives sur ce compte (15min)")
-
-    if is_locked(body.username):
-        raise HTTPException(429, "Compte temporairement verrouillé (15min)")
+    # Kept indistinguishable from a wrong password (BUG-039).
+    if is_account_rate_limited(body.username) or is_locked(body.username):
+        hash_password("dummy_timing_protection")
+        raise HTTPException(401, "Identifiants invalides")
 
     if not verify_password(body.password, user["password_hash"]):
         attempts = record_login_failure(body.username)
@@ -174,10 +247,11 @@ async def login(body: LoginRequest, response: Response, request: Request):
             "remember_me": body.remember_me,
         }
 
-    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response)
+    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response, request)
 
 
-def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Response) -> dict:
+def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Response,
+                  request: Request | None = None) -> dict:
     """Issue JWT tokens after successful authentication (password or MFA verified)."""
     record_login_success(username)
     rl_record_account_success(username)
@@ -185,9 +259,8 @@ def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Respon
     access_token = create_access_token(user)
     refresh_token, refresh_jti = create_refresh_token(username, remember=remember_me)
 
-    import os
     max_age = 2592000 if remember_me else 604800  # 30d or 7d
-    secure = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
+    secure = is_secure_cookies(request)
     response.set_cookie(
         key="refresh_token",
         value=refresh_token,
@@ -209,13 +282,15 @@ def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Respon
     )
     return {
         "access_token": access_token,
-        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105 — OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe
+        # OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe (B105) :
+        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105
         "expires_in": ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
         "user": {
             "username": user["username"],
             "display_name": user["display_name"],
             "role": user["role"],
             "vaults": user["vaults"],
+            "avatar": user.get("avatar"),
         },
     }
 
@@ -254,9 +329,7 @@ async def refresh_token_endpoint(request: Request, response: Response):
         if stale:
             raise HTTPException(401, "Session expirée, veuillez vous reconnecter")
 
-    import os
-
-    secure = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
+    secure = is_secure_cookies(request)
     remember_me = bool(payload.get("remember", False))
 
     # BUG-027: rotate the refresh token — the old one is now single-use.
@@ -287,7 +360,8 @@ async def refresh_token_endpoint(request: Request, response: Response):
 
     return {
         "access_token": new_access_token,
-        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105 — OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe
+        # OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe (B105) :
+        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105
         "expires_in": ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
     }
 
@@ -338,6 +412,7 @@ async def get_me(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
         "vaults": current_user["vaults"],
         "language": current_user.get("language", "fr"),
         "last_login": current_user.get("last_login"),
+        "avatar": current_user.get("avatar"),
     }
 
 
@@ -345,19 +420,23 @@ class UpdateMeRequest(BaseModel):
     """Fields the user can update on their own profile."""
     display_name: str | None = None
     language: str | None = None
+    #: Image data-URL (PNG/JPEG/WebP), or ``""`` to remove the avatar (#113).
+    avatar: str | None = None
 
 
 @router.patch("/me")
 async def patch_me(req: UpdateMeRequest, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
-    """Update current user's profile fields (display_name, language)."""
+    """Update current user's profile fields (display_name, language, avatar)."""
     from .user_store import update_user
-    updates = {}
+    updates: dict[str, object] = {}
     if req.display_name is not None:
         updates["display_name"] = req.display_name
     if req.language is not None:
         if req.language not in ("fr", "en"):
             raise HTTPException(400, "language must be 'fr' or 'en'")
         updates["language"] = req.language
+    if req.avatar is not None:
+        updates["avatar"] = _validate_avatar(req.avatar)
     if not updates:
         raise HTTPException(400, "No fields to update")
     updated = update_user(current_user["username"], updates)
@@ -368,6 +447,7 @@ async def patch_me(req: UpdateMeRequest, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
         "vaults": updated["vaults"],
         "language": updated.get("language", "fr"),
         "last_login": updated.get("last_login"),
+        "avatar": updated.get("avatar"),
     }
 
 
@@ -375,6 +455,7 @@ async def patch_me(req: UpdateMeRequest, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
 async def change_password(
     req: ChangePasswordRequest,
     response: Response,
+    request: Request,
     current_user=Depends(require_auth),
 ):
     """Change own password.
@@ -390,7 +471,7 @@ async def change_password(
     updated = get_user(current_user["username"])
     result: dict = {"message": "Mot de passe mis à jour"}
     if updated is not None:
-        result.update(_issue_tokens(updated, updated["username"], False, response))
+        result.update(_issue_tokens(updated, updated["username"], False, response, request))
     return result
 
 
@@ -443,7 +524,9 @@ class MfaEnableRequest(BaseModel):
 async def mfa_totp_setup(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
     """Generate a TOTP secret and QR URI for MFA setup.
 
-    Returns the secret and otpauth URI — client displays QR code.
+    Returns the secret, the otpauth URI and a ready-to-display QR code
+    (`qr_data_url`, SVG `data:` URI — no third-party service, CSP-safe).
+
     Does NOT enable MFA yet; call /mfa/totp/enable after first successful verify.
     """
     from .user_store import update_user
@@ -453,10 +536,21 @@ async def mfa_totp_setup(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
     update_user(current_user["username"], {
         "mfa_secret_pending": secret,
     })
+    # BUG-068: the QR code is generated locally (segno, stdlib-free SVG data
+    # URI). The previous client-side https://api.qrserver.com image was blocked
+    # by the CSP (img-src 'self' data: blob:) and leaked the otpauth URI —
+    # including the TOTP secret — to a third party.
+    qr_data_url: str | None = None
+    try:
+        import segno
+        qr_data_url = segno.make(qr_uri).svg_data_uri(scale=5)
+    except Exception:
+        qr_data_url = None
     return {
         "secret": secret,
         "qr_uri": qr_uri,
         "otpauth_uri": qr_uri,
+        "qr_data_url": qr_data_url,
     }
 
 
@@ -558,18 +652,25 @@ class WebauthnRemoveRequest(BaseModel):
 
 
 @router.post("/mfa/webauthn/register/options")
-async def mfa_webauthn_register_options(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+async def mfa_webauthn_register_options(request: Request,
+                                        current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
     """Start WebAuthn key enrolment — returns publicKey creation options for the browser."""
-    from .webauthn_mfa import begin_registration
+    from .webauthn_mfa import begin_registration, resolve_relying_party
 
+    # BUG-070: rp_id/origins derive from the request (exact host incl. port)
+    # unless explicitly configured — the old localhost defaults rejected
+    # every real access URL ("Unexpected client data origin").
+    rp, _ = resolve_relying_party(request)
     options = begin_registration(current_user["username"],
-                                 current_user.get("display_name", ""))
+                                 current_user.get("display_name", ""),
+                                 rp_id_override=rp)
     return {"options": options}
 
 
 @router.post("/mfa/webauthn/register")
 async def mfa_webauthn_register(
     req: WebauthnRegisterRequest,
+    request: Request,
     current_user=Depends(require_auth),
 ):
     """Verify the created credential, store it, and enable MFA if not already on.
@@ -579,14 +680,17 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_register(
     from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
     from .user_store import get_user, update_user
-    from .webauthn_mfa import complete_registration
+    from .webauthn_mfa import complete_registration, resolve_relying_party
 
     user = get_user(current_user["username"])
     if user is None:
         raise HTTPException(404, "Utilisateur introuvable")
+    rp, origins = resolve_relying_party(request)
     try:
         record = complete_registration(current_user["username"], req.credential,
-                                       label=req.label)
+                                       label=req.label,
+                                       rp_id_override=rp,
+                                       origins_override=origins)
     except ValueError as e:
         raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
     except Exception as e:
@@ -665,7 +769,7 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_remove(
 
 
 @router.post("/mfa/webauthn/options")
-async def mfa_webauthn_login_options(body: dict = Body(...)):
+async def mfa_webauthn_login_options(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
     """Unauthenticated: begin the login assertion for a user with registered keys.
 
     Enumeration-safe: always 200 — returns null options (caller falls back to
@@ -677,8 +781,9 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_login_options(body: dict = Body(...)):
     if not user or not user.get("mfa_enabled") or not creds:
         return {"mfa_method": "totp", "options": None}
 
-    from .webauthn_mfa import begin_authentication
-    options = begin_authentication(username, creds)
+    from .webauthn_mfa import begin_authentication, resolve_relying_party
+    rp, _ = resolve_relying_party(request)
+    options = begin_authentication(username, creds, rp_id_override=rp)
     if options is None:
         return {"mfa_method": "totp", "options": None}
     return {"mfa_method": "webauthn", "options": options}
@@ -692,7 +797,7 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_verify(
 ):
     """Unauthenticated: verify the WebAuthn assertion and issue JWT tokens."""
     from .user_store import get_user, update_user
-    from .webauthn_mfa import complete_authentication
+    from .webauthn_mfa import complete_authentication, resolve_relying_party
 
     client_ip = _enforce_mfa_rate_limit(request, body.username)
 
@@ -703,13 +808,16 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_verify(
     if not user.get("mfa_enabled"):
         raise HTTPException(400, "MFA non activé pour cet utilisateur")
 
+    rp, origins = resolve_relying_party(request)
     creds = user.get("webauthn_credentials", [])
     try:
         credential_id = body.credential.get("id", "")
         stored = next((c for c in creds if c.get("credential_id") == credential_id), None)
         if stored is None:
             raise ValueError("Credential non enregistré")
-        new_count = complete_authentication(body.username, body.credential, stored)
+        new_count = complete_authentication(body.username, body.credential, stored,
+                                            rp_id_override=rp,
+                                            origins_override=origins)
     except ValueError as e:
         _record_mfa_failure(client_ip, body.username)
         raise HTTPException(401, str(e))
@@ -726,7 +834,7 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_verify(
 
     rl_record_success(client_ip)
     logger.info(f"User '{body.username}' logged in via WebAuthn")
-    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response)
+    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response, request)
 
 
 @router.get("/mfa/status")
@@ -734,6 +842,16 @@ async def mfa_status(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
     """Return current user's MFA status."""
     from .user_store import get_user
     user = get_user(current_user["username"])
+    if user is None:
+        # BUG-081 : auth désactivée (OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=false) → le
+        # pseudo-user "anonymous" n'a aucune entrée en store : pas de MFA,
+        # et surtout pas de 500 (`AttributeError` sur `user.get`).
+        return {
+            "mfa_enabled": False,
+            "mfa_method": None,
+            "totp_enabled": False,
+            "webauthn_credentials": 0,
+        }
     return {
         "mfa_enabled": user.get("mfa_enabled", False),
         "mfa_method": user.get("mfa_method"),
@@ -769,7 +887,7 @@ async def mfa_totp_verify(body: MfaVerifyRequest, response: Response, request: R
     # Clear IP rate limit on success
     rl_record_success(client_ip)
 
-    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response)
+    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response, request)
 
 
 @router.post("/mfa/recovery")
@@ -807,7 +925,7 @@ async def mfa_recovery_login(body: MfaRecoveryRequest, response: Response, reque
     rl_record_success(client_ip)
 
     logger.info(f"User '{body.username}' logged in via recovery code")
-    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, False, response)
+    return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, False, response, request)
 
 
 # ── Admin endpoints ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -828,9 +946,20 @@ async def create_user_endpoint(
         user = create_user(
             req.username, req.password, req.role, req.vaults, req.display_name
         )
-        return user
     except ValueError as e:
         raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
+    # #194 : dossier perso — best effort, réparé au démarrage si le disque
+    # (NFS) est indisponible (ensure_user_home journalise l'erreur).
+    from backend.auth.user_store import get_user
+    from backend.user_home import ensure_user_home
+
+    await ensure_user_home(req.username)
+    # La réponse doit refléter l'octroi du vault perso (#194) : create_user a
+    # renvoyé un instantané construit avant l'octroi.
+    fresh = get_user(req.username)
+    if fresh:
+        user["vaults"] = fresh.get("vaults", [])
+    return user
 
 
 @router.patch("/admin/users/{username}")
@@ -857,6 +986,65 @@ async def delete_user_endpoint(
         raise HTTPException(400, "Impossible de supprimer son propre compte")
     try:
         delete_user(username)
-        return {"message": f"Utilisateur '{username}' supprimé"}
     except ValueError as e:
         raise HTTPException(404, str(e))
+    # #194 : fermer le vault du dossier perso (le dossier est conservé).
+    from backend.user_home import release_user_home
+
+    await release_user_home(username)
+    return {"message": f"Utilisateur '{username}' supprimé"}
+
+
+# ── API / MCP tokens (feature #107) ──────────────────────────────────
+# One long-lived token authenticates BOTH the REST API and the MCP
+# endpoint (/mcp): the MCP server resolves the caller through the same
+# get_current_user() dependency, so the same Bearer JWT works everywhere.
+
+class CreateApiTokenRequest(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    expiry: str  # 1d | 30d | 180d | 365d | never
+
+
+@router.get("/tokens")
+async def list_user_tokens(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List the caller's API/MCP tokens (metadata only — the secret is never stored)."""
+    return {
+        "tokens": list_api_tokens(current_user["username"]),
+        "expiry_choices": list(API_TOKEN_EXPIRY_CHOICES.keys()),
+    }
+
+
+@router.post("/tokens")
+async def create_user_token(
+    req: CreateApiTokenRequest,
+    request: Request,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Create a long-lived API/MCP token. The raw JWT is returned ONCE."""
+    try:
+        record, token = create_api_token(current_user, req.name.strip(), req.expiry)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
+    from backend.audit import log_config_change
+    log_config_change(current_user["username"],
+                      {"action": "api_token_create", "name": record["name"],
+                       "expiry": record["expiry_key"]}, ip=get_client_ip(request))
+    return {"token": token, **record}
+
+
+@router.delete("/tokens/{jti}")
+async def delete_user_token(
+    jti: str,
+    request: Request,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Revoke + delete an API/MCP token (immediate effect on API and MCP)."""
+    try:
+        record = delete_api_token(jti, current_user["username"])
+    except KeyError:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Token introuvable")
+    from backend.audit import log_config_change
+    log_config_change(current_user["username"],
+                      {"action": "api_token_revoke", "name": record["name"]},
+                      ip=get_client_ip(request))
+    return {"message": f"Token '{record['name']}' révoqué"}

backend/auth/user_store.py

@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ def create_user(
             "vaults": vaults or [],
             "active": True,
             "language": "fr",  # default UI language
+            "avatar": None,  # profile picture data-URL (#113)
             "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
             "password_changed_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp(),
             "last_login": None,

backend/auth/webauthn_mfa.py

@@ -38,8 +38,16 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.webauthn")
 # Challenge lifetime: clients have 3 minutes to complete the ceremony.
 CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 180
 
-# In-memory pending challenges: key -> (challenge_bytes, expires_at)
-_pending: dict[str, tuple[bytes, float]] = {}
+# How many outstanding challenges to keep per key. BUG-070: a single slot made
+# the flow fragile — a double-click on "add key" (or any retry) overwrote the
+# pending challenge and the in-flight ceremony failed with
+# "Client data challenge was not expected challenge". The verifier now accepts
+# any recent challenge for the key.
+MAX_PENDING_PER_KEY = 5
+
+# In-memory pending challenges: key -> [(challenge_bytes, expires_at), ...]
+# (newest last)
+_pending: dict[str, list[tuple[bytes, float]]] = {}
 
 
 def rp_id() -> str:
@@ -55,24 +63,100 @@ def expected_origins() -> list[str]:
     return [o.strip() for o in raw.split(",") if o.strip()]
 
 
+def resolve_relying_party(request: Any = None) -> tuple[str, list[str]]:
+    """Resolve the WebAuthn (rp_id, expected_origins) for a ceremony.
+
+    BUG-070: the previous defaults (rp_id ``localhost``, origins
+    ``http://localhost``) rejected every real-world access URL — any port
+    (``http://localhost:2020``), ``127.0.0.1``, a LAN host or a public domain
+    failed verification with "Unexpected client data origin".
+
+    Explicit configuration still wins: when ``OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_RP_ID`` /
+    ``OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS`` are set they are used unchanged.  Otherwise
+    the values are derived from the incoming request (exact ``Host``, port
+    included, since the browser origin carries non-default ports).
+
+    Behind a reverse proxy the external host/proto come from
+    ``X-Forwarded-Host`` / ``X-Forwarded-Proto``, honored only when
+    ``OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true`` (same rule as ``get_client_ip``).
+    """
+    env_rp = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_RP_ID")
+    env_raw = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS")
+    if request is None:
+        return (env_rp or "localhost",
+                [o.strip() for o in env_raw.split(",") if o.strip()]
+                if env_raw else ["http://localhost"])
+
+    from backend.services.net import is_trusted_proxy
+
+    if is_trusted_proxy():
+        fwd_host = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")
+        host = fwd_host.split(",")[0].strip() or request.headers.get("host", "")
+        fwd_proto = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "")
+        scheme = fwd_proto.split(",")[0].strip() or request.url.scheme
+    else:
+        host = request.headers.get("host", "")
+        scheme = request.url.scheme
+    if not host:
+        url = request.url
+        host = url.netloc or url.hostname or ""
+        scheme = scheme or url.scheme or "http"
+    rp = env_rp or _hostname_only(host) or "localhost"
+    if env_raw:
+        origins = [o.strip() for o in env_raw.split(",") if o.strip()]
+    else:
+        origins = [f"{scheme or 'http'}://{host}"] if host else ["http://localhost"]
+    return rp, origins
+
+
+def _hostname_only(host: str) -> str:
+    """Strip the port (and IPv6 brackets) from a Host header value."""
+    host = host.strip()
+    if host.startswith("["):  # [::1]:8080 or [::1]
+        end = host.find("]")
+        return host[1:end] if end > 0 else host
+    if host.count(":") == 1:
+        name, _, port = host.partition(":")
+        return name if port.isdigit() else host
+    return host
+
+
 def _prune_expired() -> None:
     now = time.time()
-    for key in [k for k, (_, exp) in _pending.items() if exp < now]:
-        _pending.pop(key, None)
+    for key in list(_pending):
+        remaining = [(c, exp) for c, exp in _pending[key] if exp >= now]
+        if remaining:
+            _pending[key] = remaining
+        else:
+            _pending.pop(key, None)
 
 
 def _store_challenge(key: str) -> bytes:
     _prune_expired()
     challenge = secrets.token_bytes(32)
-    _pending[key] = (challenge, time.time() + CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS)
+    slot = _pending.setdefault(key, [])
+    slot.append((challenge, time.time() + CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS))
+    del slot[:-MAX_PENDING_PER_KEY]  # keep only the most recent ones
     return challenge
 
 
 def _take_challenge(key: str) -> bytes | None:
-    """Pop a challenge (single-use). Returns None if missing/expired."""
+    """Pop the newest challenge (single-use). Returns None if missing/expired."""
     _prune_expired()
-    entry = _pending.pop(key, None)
-    return entry[0] if entry else None
+    slot = _pending.get(key)
+    if not slot:
+        return None
+    challenge, _ = slot.pop()
+    if not slot:
+        _pending.pop(key, None)
+    return challenge
+
+
+def _take_all_challenges(key: str) -> list[bytes]:
+    """Pop every outstanding challenge for *key* (newest last)."""
+    _prune_expired()
+    slot = _pending.pop(key, None)
+    return [c for c, _ in slot] if slot else []
 
 
 def clear_pending(username: str) -> None:
@@ -83,9 +167,12 @@ def clear_pending(username: str) -> None:
 
 # ── Registration (enrol a key in settings) ─────────────────────────────
 
-def begin_registration(username: str, display_name: str) -> dict:
+def begin_registration(username: str, display_name: str,
+                       rp_id_override: str | None = None,
+                       origins_override: list[str] | None = None) -> dict:
+    _ = origins_override  # origins only matter at verification time
     options = generate_registration_options(
-        rp_id=rp_id(),
+        rp_id=rp_id_override or rp_id(),
         rp_name=rp_name(),
         user_name=username,
         user_display_name=display_name or username,
@@ -98,19 +185,44 @@ def begin_registration(username: str, display_name: str) -> dict:
     return _finalize_options(options)
 
 
-def complete_registration(username: str, credential_json: dict[str, Any],
-                          label: str = "") -> dict:
-    challenge = _take_challenge(f"{username}:register")
-    if challenge is None:
-        raise ValueError("Session d'enregistrement expirée — recommencez")
+def _verify_with_any_challenge(key: str, verify_one: Any, empty_message: str) -> Any:
+    """Run *verify_one(challenge)* against every outstanding challenge.
 
+    Returns the first success; re-raises the last error when all fail.
+    BUG-070: lets an in-flight ceremony survive a re-requested options call
+    (double-click / retry) that stored a newer challenge afterwards.
+    """
+    challenges = _take_all_challenges(key)
+    if not challenges:
+        raise ValueError(empty_message)
+    last_error: Exception | None = None
+    for challenge in challenges:
+        try:
+            return verify_one(challenge)
+        except Exception as e:  # try the next candidate challenge
+            last_error = e
+    assert last_error is not None
+    raise last_error
+
+
+def complete_registration(username: str, credential_json: dict[str, Any],
+                          label: str = "", rp_id_override: str | None = None,
+                          origins_override: list[str] | None = None) -> dict:
     credential = parse_registration_credential_json(credential_json)
-    verification = verify_registration_response(
-        credential=credential,
-        expected_challenge=challenge,
-        expected_rp_id=rp_id(),
-        expected_origin=expected_origins(),
-    )
+    effective_rp = rp_id_override or rp_id()
+    effective_origins = origins_override or expected_origins()
+
+    def _verify(challenge: bytes) -> Any:
+        return verify_registration_response(
+            credential=credential,
+            expected_challenge=challenge,
+            expected_rp_id=effective_rp,
+            expected_origin=effective_origins,
+        )
+
+    verification = _verify_with_any_challenge(
+        f"{username}:register", _verify,
+        "Session d'enregistrement expirée — recommencez")
 
     transports = credential.response.transports or []
     label = (label or str(credential_json.get("label") or "")).strip() or "Security key"
@@ -126,9 +238,12 @@ def complete_registration(username: str, credential_json: dict[str, Any],
 
 # ── Authentication (assertion at login) ────────────────────────────────
 
-def begin_authentication(username: str, credentials: list[dict]) -> dict | None:
+def begin_authentication(username: str, credentials: list[dict],
+                       rp_id_override: str | None = None,
+                       origins_override: list[str] | None = None) -> dict | None:
     if not credentials:
         return None
+    _ = origins_override  # origins only matter at verification time
     from webauthn.helpers.structs import PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor
 
     allow = [
@@ -136,7 +251,7 @@ def begin_authentication(username: str, credentials: list[dict]) -> dict | None:
         for c in credentials
     ]
     options = generate_authentication_options(
-        rp_id=rp_id(),
+        rp_id=rp_id_override or rp_id(),
         challenge=_store_challenge(f"{username}:login"),
         allow_credentials=allow,
     )
@@ -147,21 +262,27 @@ def complete_authentication(
     username: str,
     credential_json: dict[str, Any],
     stored: dict,
+    rp_id_override: str | None = None,
+    origins_override: list[str] | None = None,
 ) -> int:
-    """Verify an assertion. Returns the new sign_count. Raises ValueError on failure."""
-    challenge = _take_challenge(f"{username}:login")
-    if challenge is None:
-        raise ValueError("Session expirée — rechargez la page")
-
+    """Verify an assertion. Returns the new sign_count. Raises on failure."""
     credential = parse_authentication_credential_json(credential_json)
-    verification = verify_authentication_response(
-        credential=credential,
-        expected_challenge=challenge,
-        expected_rp_id=rp_id(),
-        expected_origin=expected_origins(),
-        credential_public_key=base64url_to_bytes(stored["public_key"]),
-        credential_current_sign_count=int(stored.get("sign_count", 0)),
-    )
+    effective_rp = rp_id_override or rp_id()
+    effective_origins = origins_override or expected_origins()
+
+    def _verify(challenge: bytes) -> Any:
+        return verify_authentication_response(
+            credential=credential,
+            expected_challenge=challenge,
+            expected_rp_id=effective_rp,
+            expected_origin=effective_origins,
+            credential_public_key=base64url_to_bytes(stored["public_key"]),
+            credential_current_sign_count=int(stored.get("sign_count", 0)),
+        )
+
+    verification = _verify_with_any_challenge(
+        f"{username}:login", _verify,
+        "Session expirée — rechargez la page")
     return int(verification.new_sign_count)
 
 

backend/bookslm.py

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import time
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
+from backend.media_types import is_media
 from backend.secret_redactor import redact_file_content
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.bookslm")
@@ -185,6 +186,10 @@ def collect_directory_context(vault_path: Path, directory: str) -> dict[str, Any
 def _file_entry(target: Path, rel_path: str, remaining: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """Read, redact and truncate a single file into a context entry."""
     suffix = target.suffix.lower()
+    # #109-D3 — audio/video (and images) carry no extractable text; never feed
+    # raw bytes to the model. Images are handled separately via vision data URLs.
+    if is_media(suffix):
+        return None
     try:
         if suffix == ".pdf":
             from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_text
@@ -486,12 +491,17 @@ def build_system_prompt(context: dict[str, Any], scope: str = "directory", vault
     return prompt
 
 
-GENERAL_SYSTEM_PROMPT = """Tu es l'assistant intégré d'ObsiGate, une application web auto-hébergée pour consulter, rechercher et éditer des vaults Obsidian (Markdown).
+GENERAL_SYSTEM_HEADER = """Tu es l'assistant intégré d'ObsiGate, une application web auto-hébergée pour consulter, rechercher et éditer des vaults Obsidian (Markdown).
 
 Tes deux rôles :
 1. **Aider sur l'application** : expliquer la navigation, la recherche (full-text, filtres `tag:`, `created:`, `path:`), l'éditeur (CodeMirror, autosave, raccourcis), les onglets et le split view, les sauvegardes et la restauration, le partage public, l'export (HTML/Markdown/ePub/PDF), Mermaid, Excalidraw, les plugins, les thèmes, le mode hors-ligne, le MFA, etc.
 2. **Proposer des actions concrètes** : créer un fichier ou un dossier dans un vault.
+"""
 
+# Text action protocol — used by the classic (non-agent) chat endpoint, where
+# the model has no native tool calling; the frontend turns each block into a
+# clickable “Apply” card.
+GENERAL_ACTION_TEXT_PROTOCOL = """
 Quand l'utilisateur demande explicitement de créer un fichier, inclus un bloc de ce type dans ta réponse (un bloc par fichier, et rien d'autre à l'intérieur du bloc) :
 
 ```obsigate-action
@@ -513,6 +523,25 @@ Règles :
 - Réponds dans la langue de l'utilisateur, de façon concise et structurée (Markdown).
 """
 
+# Agent mode: the model has native tools, so it must call them (function
+# calling) instead of emitting the text `obsigate-action` blocks — otherwise
+# the requested file is never created (BUG-053).
+GENERAL_ACTION_TOOL_PROTOCOL = """
+Tu disposes d'outils natifs (function calling) pour lire, chercher et modifier les vaults : `create_file`, `create_directory`, `append_to_file`, `edit_file`, `read_file`, `search_fulltext`, etc.
+
+Quand l'utilisateur demande explicitement de créer un fichier, **appelle directement l'outil `create_file`** avec `{"vault": "<nom du vault>", "path": "<chemin/relatif.md>", "content": "<contenu markdown>"}`. Pour créer un dossier, appelle `create_directory`.
+
+Règles :
+- N'écris **jamais** de bloc ```obsigate-action``` : en mode agent, toutes les actions passent par les outils natifs.
+- Écris le contenu **complet** demandé dans l'argument `content` (ne le tronque pas, pas de « … » ni de ligne omise).
+- Pour créer un fichier dans un nouveau dossier, un seul appel `create_file` avec le chemin complet suffit (les dossiers parents sont créés automatiquement).
+- N'invente jamais un nom de vault : utilise l'un des vaults disponibles listés ci-dessous.
+- Réponds dans la langue de l'utilisateur, de façon concise et structurée (Markdown).
+"""
+
+# Backwards-compatible alias (classic chat prompt).
+GENERAL_SYSTEM_PROMPT = GENERAL_SYSTEM_HEADER + GENERAL_ACTION_TEXT_PROTOCOL
+
 
 def _format_app_context(app_context: dict[str, Any] | None, recent_files: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> str:
     """Render the live application state for the General assistant prompt.
@@ -588,14 +617,20 @@ def build_general_system_prompt(
     vaults: list[str] | None = None,
     app_context: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
     recent_files: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    agent: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
     """System prompt for the General assistant (app help + actions).
 
     ``app_context`` carries the live UI state (open documents, current
     directory, active search) and ``recent_files`` the last modified files, so
     the assistant knows what the user is doing rather than answering blind.
+
+    ``agent`` selects the action protocol: the classic chat endpoint (no native
+    tools) uses the text ``obsigate-action`` blocks, while the tool-calling
+    agent endpoint must invoke the native tools instead (BUG-053).
     """
-    prompt = GENERAL_SYSTEM_PROMPT
+    protocol = GENERAL_ACTION_TOOL_PROTOCOL if agent else GENERAL_ACTION_TEXT_PROTOCOL
+    prompt = GENERAL_SYSTEM_HEADER + protocol
     if vaults:
         prompt += "\nVaults disponibles : " + ", ".join(sorted(vaults)) + "\n"
     else:

backend/bookslm_routes.py

@@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ class BooksLMChatRequest(BaseModel):
         description="Conversation snapshot returned alongside a ``confirmation`` event, "
                     "echoed back to resume the agent run.",
     )
+    confirm_all: bool = Field(
+        default=False,
+        description="Global approval (BUG-075): apply every pending action of the batch "
+                    "and auto-approve the remaining mutating calls of the same run, "
+                    "so the run does not pause on each action.",
+    )
     app_context: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(
         default=None,
         description="Live client UI state for the General assistant: open_documents, "
@@ -193,10 +199,12 @@ def _recent_files_for_prompt(current_user, limit: int = 10) -> list[dict[str, An
         return []
 
 
-def _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user) -> str:
+def _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user, agent: bool = False) -> str:
     """Resolve the vault access and build the assistant system prompt.
 
     Shared by the classic chat endpoint and the tool-calling agent endpoint.
+    ``agent=True`` selects the native-tool action protocol (no text
+    ``obsigate-action`` blocks) for the General/empty-directory prompts.
     """
     mode = _normalize_mode(req.mode)
     vault_path: Path | None = None
@@ -222,6 +230,7 @@ def _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user) -> str:
             list(index.keys()),
             app_context=_submitted_app_context(req),
             recent_files=_recent_files_for_prompt(current_user),
+            agent=agent,
         )
     elif effective_mode == "documents":
         prompt = build_system_prompt(context, scope="documents", vault_name=req.vault)
@@ -233,6 +242,7 @@ def _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user) -> str:
             list(index.keys()),
             app_context=_submitted_app_context(req),
             recent_files=_recent_files_for_prompt(current_user),
+            agent=agent,
         )
         prompt += (
             f"\n## Dossier vide\nLe dossier « {req.directory or '/'} » "
@@ -243,6 +253,14 @@ def _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user) -> str:
     else:
         prompt = build_system_prompt(context, scope="directory", vault_name=req.vault)
 
+    if agent and effective_mode != "general" and context["file_count"] > 0:
+        prompt += (
+            "\n## Mode agent\n"
+            "Utilise les outils natifs (function calling) pour agir sur les fichiers "
+            "(`create_file`, `create_directory`, `append_to_file`, `edit_file`, …). "
+            "N'écris jamais de bloc ```obsigate-action```."
+        )
+
     skill_id = getattr(req, "skill", None)
     if skill_id:
         skill_prompt = get_skill_prompt(skill_id, current_user)
@@ -494,12 +512,14 @@ async def api_bookslm_agent(
     Same context as ``/chat`` but the model may call tools (read/search the
     vault) through the shared tool layer. Emits one ``tool`` event per executed
     tool call, then a final ``message`` event. Mutating tools pause the run with
-    a ``confirmation`` event (two-step propose/apply) carrying the pending call
-    and the conversation snapshot; the client resumes by echoing them back in
-    ``confirm`` / ``confirm_messages``.
+    a ``confirmation`` event (two-step propose/apply) carrying the pending
+    ``actions`` (every mutating call of the turn) and the conversation snapshot;
+    the client resumes by echoing them back in ``confirm`` / ``confirm_messages``,
+    optionally with ``confirm_all`` to apply the whole batch and auto-approve the
+    rest of the run (BUG-075).
     """
     _validate_vision_support(req)
-    system_prompt = _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user)
+    system_prompt = _resolve_system_prompt(req, current_user, agent=True)
     vault_path = _resolve_optional_vault_path(req, current_user)
 
     messages: list[dict] = [{"role": "system", "content": system_prompt}]
@@ -511,16 +531,10 @@ async def api_bookslm_agent(
     messages.append({"role": "user", "content": _build_user_content(req, vault_path)})
 
     ctx = ToolContext(user=current_user, mode=ToolMode.IN_APP)
-
-    async def _llm(msgs, tool_schemas):
-        return await chat_completion(
-            msgs,
-            tools=tool_schemas,
-            provider=req.provider,
-            model=req.model,
-            temperature=0.3,
-            max_tokens=4096,
-        )
+    if req.confirm_all:
+        # BUG-075: a single global approval authorizes the whole plan, so the
+        # run no longer pauses on every subsequent mutating call.
+        ctx.confirmed = True
 
     async def generate_sse():
         import asyncio
@@ -535,6 +549,23 @@ async def api_bookslm_agent(
                 yield f"event: error\ndata: {error_data}\n\n"
                 return
 
+            # #187: resolve the provider like /chat does — the agent must use
+            # the same engine the SSE "provider" tag reports (the raw
+            # req.provider could name an unavailable provider and silently
+            # fall back to another one via _get_provider_config).
+            async def _llm(msgs, tool_schemas):
+                return await chat_completion(
+                    msgs,
+                    tools=tool_schemas,
+                    provider=cfg_name,
+                    model=req.model,
+                    temperature=0.3,
+                    # Tool-call arguments can carry a whole file body (e.g. a
+                    # generated table): leave more room than the plain-chat
+                    # default.
+                    max_tokens=8192,
+                )
+
             # Stream tool events live: each executed step is pushed on the
             # queue by the loop callback and emitted as soon as it happens,
             # so the UI can grow its « N steps » block while thinking.

backend/collab.py

@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ MAX_UPDATE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
 #: Taille maximale d'un snapshot texte (protection anti-abus).
 MAX_TEXT_CHARS = 8 * 1024 * 1024
 
+#: Taille maximale d'un message brut reçu (protection anti-abus, BUG-036).
+MAX_MESSAGE_CHARS = 16 * 1024 * 1024
+
 #: Palette de couleurs attribuées aux utilisateurs (curseurs + avatars).
 PEER_COLORS = [
     "#e6194b", "#3cb44b", "#4363d8", "#f58231", "#911eb4",
@@ -68,9 +71,13 @@ def authenticate_websocket(websocket: WebSocket) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """Authenticate a WebSocket connection.
 
     Mirrors :func:`backend.auth.middleware.get_current_user` but works on the
-    WebSocket scope: the JWT is read from the ``access_token`` cookie (sent
-    automatically by same-origin browsers during the handshake) or, as a
-    fallback, from the ``token`` query parameter.
+    WebSocket scope: the JWT is read from the ``access_token`` cookie, which
+    same-origin browsers send automatically during the handshake.
+
+    BUG-036: the token is **never** accepted from the query string anymore —
+    URLs end up in access logs, proxies and browser history. Browsers cannot
+    set custom headers on a WebSocket handshake, so the HttpOnly cookie set at
+    login is the only supported transport.
 
     Returns the user dict, or ``None`` if authentication fails.
     """
@@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ def authenticate_websocket(websocket: WebSocket) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
             "_token_vaults": ["*"],
         }
 
-    token = websocket.query_params.get("token") or websocket.cookies.get("access_token")
+    token = websocket.cookies.get("access_token")
     if not token:
         return None
 
@@ -274,6 +281,9 @@ class CollabManager:
 
     # -- message handling ---------------------------------------------------
     async def _on_message(self, room: CollabRoom, client: CollabClient, raw: str) -> None:
+        # BUG-036: drop oversized frames before parsing them.
+        if not isinstance(raw, str) or len(raw) > MAX_MESSAGE_CHARS:
+            return
         try:
             message = json.loads(raw)
         except (ValueError, TypeError):

backend/csp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Content-Security-Policy nonces (ROADMAP #87, tranche 5b).
+
+Chaque réponse HTTP reçoit un nonce frais (``request.state.csp_nonce``)
+injecté dans ``script-src``. Les routes servant du HTML avec des scripts
+inline (index, popout, admin, editor-poc, excalidraw, page de partage)
+l'injectent dans le balisage via :func:`inject_csp_nonce` — mêmes
+emplacements, aucun script déplacé.
+
+Tant que ``'unsafe-inline'`` reste dans la politique (retrait en T5c),
+l'injection est inerte : elle prépare la bascule sans changer le
+comportement.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import secrets
+
+# Balises <script> exécutables sans `src` et sans nonce existant :
+# `<script>`, `<script type="module">`, `<script type="importmap">`.
+# Les blocs non-JS (ex. `type="text/plain"`) et les scripts externes
+# (`src=…`, couverts par 'self'/hôtes CDN) sont laissés intacts.
+_SCRIPT_TAG_RE = re.compile(
+    r"<script(?=>|\s+type=\"(?:module|importmap)\"\s*>)",
+)
+
+
+def new_nonce() -> str:
+    """Generate a fresh per-response CSP nonce."""
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
+
+
+def inject_csp_nonce(html: str, nonce: str) -> str:
+    """Add ``nonce="…"`` to bare executable inline ``<script>`` tags."""
+    return _SCRIPT_TAG_RE.sub(f'<script nonce="{nonce}"', html)

backend/export.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import re
 import unicodedata
 import zipfile
 from pathlib import Path
+from typing import cast
 
 import frontmatter
 import mistune
@@ -246,7 +247,9 @@ def _render_body(md: str, file_dir: Path, vault_path: Path, current: Path) -> st
     """Render raw markdown to an HTML fragment (images inlined, wikilinks resolved)."""
     md = _inline_images(md, file_dir, vault_path)
     md = _convert_wikilinks(md, vault_path, current)
-    return _markdown(md)
+    # mistune 3.3 types `Markdown.__call__` as `str | list[...]` (le renderer
+    # HTML renvoie toujours `str` à l'exécution).
+    return cast(str, _markdown(md))
 
 
 def _build_nav(vault_path: Path, current: Path) -> str:

backend/file_chat.py

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+# backend/file_chat.py — historique de discussion (#169, #190)
+"""Chat history persisted under ``data/chats/``.
+
+One JSON document per ``(vault, path)`` pair, keyed by a SHA-256 of both so
+the filename never carries user-controlled path separators. Writes are
+atomic (tmp + move) and the message list is capped at
+:data:`MAX_MESSAGES` to bound growth.
+
+#190 adds the **general chat**: the same store addressed with the reserved
+sentinels (:data:`GLOBAL_VAULT` / :data:`GLOBAL_PATH`), so no second
+implementation. Messages may carry an ``attachment`` (image/video/url)
+uploaded under ``data/chat_uploads/``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import html
+import json
+import logging
+import re
+import shutil
+import threading
+import time
+import uuid
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
+
+import httpx
+
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.file_chat")
+
+CHAT_DIR = Path("data/chats")
+MAX_MESSAGES = 500  # retention ceiling per file (oldest dropped first)
+MAX_TEXT = 4000  # characters per message
+
+# ponytail: global lock over read-modify-write — chat writes are HTTP-only and
+# serialized anyway, this just makes losing a message to a future thread (or a
+# watcher hook) impossible; per-file locks if it ever becomes contended.
+_LOCK = threading.RLock()
+
+# #190 — general (non file-bound) conversation, stored like any other one.
+GLOBAL_VAULT = "__global__"
+GLOBAL_PATH = "general"
+
+# #191 — private (2 users) conversations reuse the same store: the vault is
+# the reserved sentinel and the path is the sorted username pair, so the
+# storage key never depends on who asks.
+DM_VAULT = "__dm__"
+
+# #190 — attachments (image/video) live outside the vaults.
+UPLOAD_DIR = Path("data/chat_uploads")
+MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024  # 25 MB per attachment
+ALLOWED_ATTACH_EXT = {
+    ".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".webp", ".svg",
+    ".mp4", ".webm", ".ogg", ".mov", ".m4v",
+}
+
+# #191 — link preview fetch budget
+PREVIEW_TIMEOUT = 5.0  # seconds
+PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024  # only the head of the page is parsed
+PREVIEW_IMAGE_MAX = 2 * 1024 * 1024  # ponytail: 2 MB ceiling on a thumbnail
+
+
+def _chat_file(vault: str, path: str) -> Path:
+    """Return the chat file for *(vault, path)* (hashed, traversal-proof)."""
+    CHAT_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    key = hashlib.sha256(f"{vault}\0{path}".encode()).hexdigest()[:32]
+    return CHAT_DIR / f"{key}.json"
+
+
+def _read(vault: str, path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Load the raw chat document (empty structure when missing/corrupt)."""
+    file = _chat_file(vault, path)
+    if not file.exists():
+        return {"vault": vault, "path": path, "messages": []}
+    try:
+        doc = json.loads(file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(doc.get("messages"), list):
+            raise TypeError("messages is not a list")  # caught by the handler below
+        return doc
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error("Failed to read chat for %s/%s: %s", vault, path, e)
+        return {"vault": vault, "path": path, "messages": []}
+
+
+def _write(file: Path, doc: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """Atomically persist *doc* (tmp file + rename)."""
+    try:
+        tmp = file.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        tmp.write_text(json.dumps(doc, ensure_ascii=False, indent=1), encoding="utf-8")
+        shutil.move(str(tmp), str(file))
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error("Failed to write chat %s: %s", file.name, e)
+
+
+def get_messages(vault: str, path: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return the chat history for *(vault, path)* (chronological).
+
+    Every message carries its rendered ``html`` (#193): same markdown pipeline
+    as a document (mistune + sanitizer), computed on read so a template change
+    applies to the whole history without rewriting the JSON store.
+    """
+    return [_decorate(m, vault) for m in _read(vault, path).get("messages", [])]
+
+
+def _decorate(msg: dict[str, Any], vault: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return a copy of *msg* with its sanitized markdown ``html`` (#193).
+
+    The stored message is left untouched (``html`` is never persisted). A
+    rendering failure must never break the chat: the message goes out with an
+    empty ``html`` and the client falls back to plain text.
+    """
+    try:
+        html = _render_markdown(msg.get("text", ""), vault)
+    except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        logger.warning("chat markdown rendering failed: %s", e)
+        html = ""
+    return {**msg, "html": html}
+
+
+def add_message(
+    vault: str,
+    path: str,
+    user: str,
+    text: str,
+    attachment: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    preview: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Append a message and persist it. Returns the stored message.
+
+    The list is capped at :data:`MAX_MESSAGES` (oldest dropped first).
+    *attachment* (#190) is ``{name, url, mime, kind}`` for image/video/url;
+    *preview* (#191) is the OpenGraph card of the first URL in *text*.
+    """
+    text = (text or "").strip()[:MAX_TEXT]
+    msg: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "id": uuid.uuid4().hex[:12],
+        "user": user or "anonyme",
+        "text": text,
+        "ts": time.time(),
+    }
+    if attachment:
+        msg["attachment"] = attachment
+    if preview:
+        msg["preview"] = preview
+    return _append(vault, path, msg)
+
+
+def _append(
+    vault: str,
+    path: str,
+    msg: dict[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Cap, persist and return *msg* (shared by file, global and DM chats).
+
+    The read-modify-write of the whole document happens under ``_LOCK`` so a
+    concurrent writer can never drop a message (same class of bug as
+    BUG-029 on ``users.json``).
+    """
+    with _LOCK:
+        doc = _read(vault, path)
+        messages = list(doc.get("messages", []))
+        messages.append(msg)
+        if len(messages) > MAX_MESSAGES:
+            messages = messages[-MAX_MESSAGES:]
+        doc["messages"] = messages
+        _write(_chat_file(vault, path), doc)
+    return _decorate(msg, vault)  # #193 — le html part avec l'écho SSE
+
+
+# --- #192 : accusé de réception ---------------------------------------------
+
+def get_read(vault: str, path: str) -> dict[str, float]:
+    """Return ``{username: last_read_ts}`` for a conversation (#192)."""
+    return {str(u): float(ts) for u, ts in (_read(vault, path).get("read") or {}).items()}
+
+
+def mark_read(vault: str, path: str, user: str) -> dict[str, float]:
+    """Record that *user* has seen the conversation (#192).
+
+    Returns the whole read map so the caller can broadcast it on SSE: a
+    sender learns their messages were received as soon as the recipient
+    displays the conversation.
+    """
+    if not user:
+        return get_read(vault, path)
+    with _LOCK:
+        doc = _read(vault, path)
+        read = {str(u): float(ts) for u, ts in (doc.get("read") or {}).items()}
+        read[user] = time.time()
+        doc["read"] = read
+        _write(_chat_file(vault, path), doc)
+        return read
+
+
+# --- #191 : messages privés (2 utilisateurs) -------------------------------
+
+def dm_path(user_a: str, user_b: str) -> str:
+    """Storage path for the private conversation between two users.
+
+    The pair is sorted so both participants address the same document.
+    """
+    return "|".join(sorted([user_a, user_b]))
+
+
+def get_dm_messages(user_a: str, user_b: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return the private history between two users (chronological)."""
+    return get_messages(DM_VAULT, dm_path(user_a, user_b))
+
+
+def add_dm_message(
+    user_a: str,
+    user_b: str,
+    author: str,
+    text: str,
+    attachment: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    preview: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Append a private message. Returns the stored message."""
+    return add_message(DM_VAULT, dm_path(user_a, user_b), author, text, attachment, preview)
+
+
+# --- #191 : suppression -----------------------------------------------------
+
+def delete_message(vault: str, path: str, message_id: str) -> bool:
+    """Remove one message from a conversation. True when it existed."""
+    with _LOCK:
+        doc = _read(vault, path)
+        messages = list(doc.get("messages", []))
+        kept = [m for m in messages if m.get("id") != message_id]
+        if len(kept) == len(messages):
+            return False
+        doc["messages"] = kept
+        _write(_chat_file(vault, path), doc)
+    return True
+
+
+# --- #190 : chat général (conversation centrale, hors fichier) -------------
+
+def get_global_messages() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return the general-chat history (chronological)."""
+    return get_messages(GLOBAL_VAULT, GLOBAL_PATH)
+
+
+def add_global_message(
+    user: str,
+    text: str,
+    attachment: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    preview: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Append a message to the general chat. Returns the stored message."""
+    return add_message(GLOBAL_VAULT, GLOBAL_PATH, user, text, attachment, preview)
+
+
+def save_attachment(filename: str, data: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Persist an uploaded attachment under :data:`UPLOAD_DIR`.
+
+    Returns ``{name, url, mime, kind}``. The stored name is a fresh UUID
+    (never the client name), the extension must be in
+    :data:`ALLOWED_ATTACH_EXT` and the size is capped at
+    :data:`MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES`.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: extension refused, empty file or size exceeded.
+    """
+    ext = Path(filename or "").suffix.lower()
+    if ext not in ALLOWED_ATTACH_EXT:
+        raise ValueError(f"extension refusée : {ext or '(aucune)'}")
+    if not data:
+        raise ValueError("fichier vide")
+    if len(data) > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
+        raise ValueError(f"fichier trop lourd (max {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES // (1024 * 1024)} MB)")
+    UPLOAD_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    name = f"{uuid.uuid4().hex}{ext}"
+    (UPLOAD_DIR / name).write_bytes(data)
+    kind = "video" if ext in {".mp4", ".webm", ".ogg", ".mov", ".m4v"} else "image"
+    return {
+        "name": name,
+        "url": f"/api/chat/attachment/{name}",
+        "mime": _MIME_BY_EXT.get(ext, "application/octet-stream"),
+        "kind": kind,
+    }
+
+
+# --- #191 : link preview ----------------------------------------------------
+
+_URL_RE = re.compile(r"https?://[^\s<>\"']+")
+_PREVIEW_CACHE: dict[str, dict[str, Any] | None] = {}
+PREVIEW_CACHE_MAX = 200
+
+
+def _og(content: str, prop: str) -> str:
+    """Extract one OpenGraph/``<title>`` value from an HTML head (regex)."""
+    for pattern in (
+        rf'<meta[^>]+(?:property|name)="{prop}"[^>]+content="([^"]*)"',
+        rf'<meta[^>]+content="([^"]*)"[^>]+(?:property|name)="{prop}"',
+    ):
+        m = re.search(pattern, content, re.IGNORECASE)
+        if m:
+            return html.unescape(m.group(1)).strip()[:300]
+    if prop == "og:title":
+        m = re.search(r"<title[^>]*>([^<]*)</title>", content, re.IGNORECASE)
+        if m:
+            return html.unescape(m.group(1)).strip()[:300]
+    return ""
+
+
+# BUG-109 — content-type → extension (the attachment allow-list decides).
+_IMG_EXT_BY_MIME = {
+    "image/png": ".png",
+    "image/jpeg": ".jpg",
+    "image/gif": ".gif",
+    "image/webp": ".webp",
+    "image/svg+xml": ".svg",
+}
+
+
+def _proxy_image(img_url: str, page_url: str) -> str:
+    """Download *img_url* into ``chat_uploads`` and return a same-origin URL.
+
+    The response CSP is ``img-src 'self' data: blob:``: a remote ``og:image``
+    would be blocked by the browser (BUG-109). Relative and protocol-relative
+    values are resolved against *page_url* first. Raises ``ValueError`` /
+    ``SSRFError`` on any failure — the caller keeps the card and drops only
+    the thumbnail.
+    """
+    from backend.tools.web import USER_AGENT, _assert_public_http_url
+
+    full = urljoin(page_url, img_url)
+    _assert_public_http_url(full)
+    resp = httpx.get(
+        full,
+        headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
+        timeout=PREVIEW_TIMEOUT,
+        follow_redirects=True,
+    )
+    if resp.status_code >= 400:
+        raise ValueError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}")
+    data = resp.content
+    if not data or len(data) > PREVIEW_IMAGE_MAX:
+        raise ValueError("image vide ou trop lourde")
+    mime = (resp.headers.get("content-type") or "").split(";")[0].strip().lower()
+    ext = _IMG_EXT_BY_MIME.get(mime) or Path(urlparse(full).path).suffix.lower()
+    # save_attachment(): allow-list d'extensions + nom UUID (jamais le nom distant)
+    return str(save_attachment(f"preview{ext}", data)["url"])
+
+
+def build_preview(text: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Fetch OpenGraph metadata for the first URL in *text* (#191).
+
+    SSRF-guarded (reuses the web-tool guard), size/time capped, cached in a
+    bounded dict. Returns ``{url, title, description, image, site}`` or
+    ``None`` when there is no URL / the fetch fails (never raises: a dead
+    link must not block the message). ``image`` is a **same-origin**
+    ``/api/chat/attachment/...`` URL (BUG-109), empty when the thumbnail
+    could not be fetched.
+    """
+    m = _URL_RE.search(text or "")
+    if not m:
+        return None
+    url = m.group(0).rstrip(".,;:!?)")
+    if url in _PREVIEW_CACHE:
+        cached = _PREVIEW_CACHE[url]
+        return dict(cached) if cached else None
+    try:
+        from backend.tools.web import USER_AGENT, _assert_public_http_url
+
+        _assert_public_http_url(url)
+        resp = httpx.get(
+            url,
+            headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, "Accept": "text/html,*/*"},
+            timeout=PREVIEW_TIMEOUT,
+            follow_redirects=True,
+        )
+        if resp.status_code >= 400:
+            raise ValueError(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}")
+        body = resp.text[:PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES]
+        # BUG-109 : vignette téléchargée côté serveur — une image distante
+        # échouerait à la CSP. Échec isolé = carte sans vignette.
+        image = _og(body, "og:image")
+        try:
+            image = _proxy_image(image, url) if image else ""
+        except Exception as ie:
+            logger.debug("preview image failed for %s: %s", url, ie)
+            image = ""
+        preview = {
+            "url": url,
+            "title": _og(body, "og:title") or _og(body, "og:site_name"),
+            "description": _og(body, "og:description"),
+            "image": image,
+            "site": _og(body, "og:site_name") or (url.split("/")[2] if "/" in url[8:] else url),
+        }
+        if not preview["title"]:
+            raise ValueError("pas de titre")
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.debug("link preview failed for %s: %s", url, e)
+        preview = None
+    if len(_PREVIEW_CACHE) >= PREVIEW_CACHE_MAX:
+        _PREVIEW_CACHE.pop(next(iter(_PREVIEW_CACHE)))  # oldest first (dict order)
+    _PREVIEW_CACHE[url] = preview
+    return dict(preview) if preview else None
+
+
+def attachment_path(name: str) -> Path | None:
+    """Resolve an attachment by its stored name (UUID+ext only, no traversal)."""
+    p = Path(name)
+    if p.name != name or p.suffix.lower() not in ALLOWED_ATTACH_EXT:
+        return None
+    file = UPLOAD_DIR / p.name
+    return file if file.exists() else None
+
+
+# Extension → MIME (literals only; ``mimetypes`` guesses poorly for a few).
+_MIME_BY_EXT = {
+    ".png": "image/png",
+    ".jpg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".gif": "image/gif",
+    ".webp": "image/webp",
+    ".svg": "image/svg+xml",
+    ".mp4": "video/mp4",
+    ".webm": "video/webm",
+    ".ogg": "video/ogg",
+    ".mov": "video/quicktime",
+    ".m4v": "video/x-m4v",
+}

backend/guide_export.py

@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+"""Génération du Guide d'utilisation téléchargeable en Markdown et PDF (#105).
+
+Source unique de vérité : la modale ``#help-modal`` de ``frontend/index.html``
+(comme dans l'application) + les blocs ``data-i18n`` résolus dans les locales
+``frontend/locales/{fr,en}.json`` — le téléchargement reflète donc exactement
+ce que voit l'utilisateur, dans sa langue.
+
+Le Markdown est produit par un convertisseur HTML→MD minimal (stdlib) ; le
+PDF passe par le moteur d'export existant (WeasyPrint) avec repli reportlab
+quand les bibliothèques natives GTK manquent (Windows).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import hashlib
+import html
+import json
+import logging
+import re
+from html.parser import HTMLParser
+from pathlib import Path
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.guide")
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+INDEX_HTML = ROOT / "frontend" / "index.html"
+LOCALES_DIR = ROOT / "frontend" / "locales"
+VERSION_FILE = ROOT / "VERSION"
+DIAGRAMS_DIR = ROOT / "backend" / "assets" / "guide_diagrams"
+
+
+def diagram_png_for(code: str) -> Path | None:
+    """Chemin du PNG pré-rendu (scripts/build_guide_diagrams.py) pour un code
+    Mermaid, ou None. Le hash doit rester synchrone avec le script de build :
+    sha1(unescape(code).strip())[:16]."""
+    normalized = html.unescape(code).strip()
+    # Identifiant de cache déterministe (pas un usage sécurité).
+    sha = hashlib.sha1(normalized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16]  # nosec B324
+    png = DIAGRAMS_DIR / (sha + ".png")
+    return png if png.exists() else None
+
+# Éléments décoratifs exclus des exports
+_SKIP_CLASSES = {"help-hero-visual", "editor-modal", "help-nav"}
+# En-tête HTML du guide (mode lecture)
+_HEADER_BLOCK = "ObsiGate User Guide"
+
+
+class Node:
+    """Noeud DOM minimal (stdlib only)."""
+
+    __slots__ = ("attrs", "children", "parent", "tag")
+
+    def __init__(self, tag: str, attrs: dict[str, str | None], parent: Node | None = None):
+        self.tag = tag
+        self.attrs = attrs
+        self.children: list[Node | str] = []
+        self.parent = parent
+
+    def cls(self) -> str:
+        return self.attrs.get("class") or ""
+
+    def i18n(self) -> str | None:
+        v = self.attrs.get("data-i18n")
+        return v if isinstance(v, str) else None
+
+    def find_all(self, tag: str) -> list[Node]:
+        out: list[Node] = []
+        for c in self.children:
+            if isinstance(c, Node):
+                if c.tag == tag:
+                    out.append(c)
+                out.extend(c.find_all(tag))
+        return out
+
+
+_VOID_TAGS = {"br", "img", "hr", "input", "meta", "link"}
+
+
+class _TreeBuilder(HTMLParser):
+    """Constructeur d'arbre tolérant (ignore les balises orphelines)."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        super().__init__(convert_charrefs=True)
+        self.root = Node("#root", {})
+        self.cur = self.root
+
+    def handle_starttag(self, tag: str, attrs: list[tuple[str, str | None]]) -> None:
+        a = {k: v for k, v in attrs}
+        node = Node(tag, a, self.cur)
+        self.cur.children.append(node)
+        if tag not in _VOID_TAGS:
+            self.cur = node
+
+    def handle_startendtag(self, tag: str, attrs: list[tuple[str, str | None]]) -> None:
+        a = {k: v for k, v in attrs}
+        self.cur.children.append(Node(tag, a, self.cur))
+
+    def handle_endtag(self, tag: str) -> None:
+        n: Node | None = self.cur
+        while n is not None and n.tag != tag:
+            n = n.parent
+        if n is not None and n.parent is not None:
+            self.cur = n.parent
+
+    def handle_data(self, data: str) -> None:
+        self.cur.children.append(data)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Extraction / cache
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_cache: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[tuple[float, int, float, int], bytes]] = {}
+
+
+def _read_index_html() -> str:
+    return INDEX_HTML.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def _guide_fragment(index_html: str) -> str:
+    """Le HTML de #help-modal…help-content jusqu'au footer du guide."""
+    start = index_html.index('id="help-modal"')
+    cstart = index_html.index('<div class="help-content">', start)
+    end = index_html.index('<div class="help-footer">', cstart)
+    return index_html[cstart:end]
+
+
+def _locale_strings(lang: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    path = LOCALES_DIR / (lang if lang in ("fr", "en") else "fr") 
+    return json.loads(Path(path).with_suffix(".json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+
+def _signature() -> tuple[float, int, float, int]:
+    st = INDEX_HTML.stat()
+    lt = (LOCALES_DIR / "fr.json").stat()
+    return (st.st_mtime, st.st_size, lt.st_mtime, lt.st_size)
+
+
+def _app_version() -> str:
+    try:
+        return VERSION_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip() or "dev"
+    except OSError:
+        return "dev"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Résolution i18n : un node portant data-i18n est REMPLACÉ par le contenu
+# (HTML) de la locale — exactement comme _applyDOM() dans le navigateur.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _resolve_i18n(node: Node, loc: dict[str, str]) -> list[Node | str]:
+    """Retourne les children effectifs d'un node (locale si data-i18n[-html])."""
+    key = node.i18n() or node.attrs.get("data-i18n-html")
+    if not isinstance(key, str):
+        return node.children
+    value = loc.get(key)
+    if value is None:
+        # clé absente de la locale : garder le texte FR inline de index.html
+        return node.children
+    tb = _TreeBuilder()
+    tb.feed(f"<span>{value}</span>")
+    span = tb.root.children[0]
+    assert isinstance(span, Node)
+    return span.children
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Markdown
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_WS_RE = re.compile(r"[ \t]*\n[ \t]*")
+
+
+def _collapse(text: str) -> str:
+    return _WS_RE.sub(" ", text).strip()
+
+
+def _md_inline(node: Node | str, loc: dict[str, str]) -> str:
+    if isinstance(node, str):
+        return _collapse(node)
+    tag = node.tag
+    kids = _resolve_i18n(node, loc)
+    inner = "".join(_md_inline(c, loc) for c in kids)
+    if tag == "br":
+        return " "
+    if tag in ("strong", "b"):
+        t = inner.strip()
+        return f"**{t}**" if t else ""
+    if tag in ("em", "i"):
+        if node.cls().startswith("lucide") or tag == "i" and not inner.strip():
+            return ""
+        t = inner.strip()
+        return f"*{t}*" if t else ""
+    if tag == "code":
+        t = inner.replace("`", "'").strip()
+        return f"`{t}`" if t else ""
+    if tag == "kbd":
+        t = inner.strip()
+        return f"`{t}`" if t else ""
+    if tag == "a":
+        href = node.attrs.get("href") or ""
+        t = inner.strip()
+        if href.startswith("http") and t:
+            return f"[{t}]({href})"
+        return t
+    if tag == "img":
+        alt = node.attrs.get("alt") or ""
+        return f"![{alt}]"
+    return inner
+
+
+def _md_block(node: Node | str, out: list[str], loc: dict[str, str], depth: int = 0) -> None:
+    """Remplit ``out`` (bloc courant) — ``pending`` gère listes imbriquées."""
+    if isinstance(node, str):
+        t = _collapse(node)
+        if t:
+            out.append(t)
+        return
+    if any(c in node.cls().split() for c in _SKIP_CLASSES):
+        return
+    tag = node.tag
+
+    if tag == "pre":
+        raw = _pre_text(node)
+        lang = "mermaid" if "mermaid" in raw[:40] or "language-mermaid" in _pre_classes(node) else ""
+        out.append(f"```{lang}\n{raw.rstrip()}\n```")
+        return
+
+    kids = _resolve_i18n(node, loc)
+
+    if tag in ("h1", "h2", "h3", "h4", "h5", "h6"):
+        level = int(tag[1])
+        text = _collapse("".join(_md_inline(c, loc) for c in kids))
+        if text:
+            out.append("#" * level + " " + text)
+        return
+
+    if tag == "p":
+        text = _collapse("".join(_md_inline(c, loc) for c in kids))
+        if text:
+            out.append(text)
+        return
+
+    if tag in ("ul", "ol"):
+        _md_list(kids, out, loc, tag, depth)
+        return
+
+    if tag == "table":
+        _md_table(node, out, loc)
+        return
+
+    # conteneurs neutres (section, div, span de bloc, li imbriqué…)
+    for c in kids:
+        _md_block(c, out, loc, depth)
+
+
+def _md_list(items: list[Node | str], out: list[str], loc: dict[str, str], kind: str, depth: int) -> None:
+    n = 0
+    for li in items:
+        if isinstance(li, str):
+            continue
+        if li.tag == "li":
+            n += 1
+            marker = "- " if kind == "ul" else f"{n}. "
+            text_parts: list[str] = []
+            nested: list[Node] = []
+            for c in li.children:
+                if isinstance(c, Node) and c.tag in ("ul", "ol"):
+                    nested.append(c)
+                else:
+                    text_parts.append(_md_inline(c, loc))
+            line = _collapse("".join(text_parts))
+            if line:
+                out.append("  " * depth + marker + line)
+            for sub in nested:
+                _md_list(sub.children, out, loc, sub.tag, depth + 1)
+        elif li.tag in ("ul", "ol"):
+            _md_list(li.children, out, loc, li.tag, depth)
+
+
+def _md_table(node: Node, out: list[str], loc: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+    rows = node.find_all("tr")
+    if not rows:
+        return
+    grid: list[list[str]] = []
+    for tr in rows:
+        cells = []
+        for td in tr.children:
+            if isinstance(td, Node) and td.tag in ("td", "th"):
+                cells.append(_collapse("".join(_md_inline(c, loc) for c in td.children)).replace("|", "\\|") or " ")
+        if cells:
+            grid.append(cells)
+    if not grid:
+        return
+    width = max(len(r) for r in grid)
+    grid = [r + [" "] * (width - len(r)) for r in grid]
+    out.append("| " + " | ".join(grid[0]) + " |")
+    out.append("|" + "|".join([" --- "] * width) + "|")
+    for r in grid[1:]:
+        out.append("| " + " | ".join(r) + " |")
+
+
+def _pre_text(node: Node) -> str:
+    """Texte brut préservé d'un <pre> (les locales n'y touchent pas)."""
+    buf: list[str] = []
+
+    def walk(n: Node | str) -> None:
+        if isinstance(n, str):
+            buf.append(n)
+            return
+        for c in n.children:
+            walk(c)
+
+    walk(node)
+    return "".join(buf).strip("\n")
+
+
+def _pre_classes(node: Node) -> str:
+    cls = node.cls()
+    for c in node.find_all("code"):
+        cls += " " + c.cls()
+    return cls
+
+
+def build_guide_markdown(lang: str = "fr") -> bytes:
+    """Guide complet en Markdown (UTF-8), dans la langue demandée."""
+    index_html = _read_index_html()
+    loc = _locale_strings(lang)
+    tree = _TreeBuilder()
+    tree.feed(_guide_fragment(index_html))
+    root = tree.root.children[0]
+    assert isinstance(root, Node)
+
+    blocks: list[str] = []
+    content = _guide_title_fr if lang == "fr" else _guide_title_en
+    blocks.append("# " + content)
+    for section in root.find_all("section"):
+        _md_block(section, blocks, loc)
+    blocks.append(
+        "---\n\n"
+        + _export_footer(lang)
+    )
+    md = "\n\n".join(b for b in blocks if b.strip()) + "\n"
+    return md.encode("utf-8")
+
+
+_guide_title_fr = "Guide d'utilisation ObsiGate"
+_guide_title_en = "ObsiGate User Guide"
+
+
+def _export_footer(lang: str) -> str:
+    loc = _locale_strings(lang)
+    template = loc.get("guide105.export_footer", "")
+    if "%s" not in template and "{" not in template:
+        template = "ObsiGate {version}"
+    today = datetime.datetime.now(tz=datetime.timezone.utc).date().isoformat()
+    return _collapse(template).format(version=_app_version(), date=today)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# HTML (pour le PDF) — mêmes règles, sortie balisée propre
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _html_inline(node: Node | str, loc: dict[str, str]) -> str:
+    if isinstance(node, str):
+        return html.escape(_collapse(node), quote=False)
+    tag = node.tag
+    kids = _resolve_i18n(node, loc)
+    inner = "".join(_html_inline(c, loc) for c in kids)
+    if tag == "br":
+        return " "
+    if tag in ("strong", "b") and inner.strip():
+        return f"<strong>{inner}</strong>"
+    if tag in ("em",) and inner.strip():
+        return f"<em>{inner}</em>"
+    if tag == "code":
+        t = inner.strip()
+        return f"<code>{t}</code>" if t else ""
+    if tag == "kbd":
+        t = inner.strip()
+        return f"<code>{t}</code>" if t else ""
+    if tag == "a":
+        href = node.attrs.get("href") or ""
+        if href.startswith("http"):
+            return f'<a href="{html.escape(href, quote=True)}">{inner}</a>'
+        return inner
+    return inner
+
+
+def _html_block(node: Node | str, out: list[str], loc: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+    if isinstance(node, str):
+        t = _collapse(node)
+        if t:
+            out.append(f"<p>{html.escape(t, quote=False)}</p>")
+        return
+    if any(c in node.cls().split() for c in _SKIP_CLASSES):
+        return
+    tag = node.tag
+
+    if tag == "pre":
+        raw = _pre_text(node)
+        classes = _pre_classes(node)
+        if "language-mermaid" in classes:
+            png = diagram_png_for(raw)
+            if png is not None:
+                url = "file:///" + str(png).replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
+                out.append(f'<img src="{url}" style="max-width: 100%" />')
+                return
+        out.append(f"<pre><code>{html.escape(raw, quote=False)}</code></pre>")
+        return
+
+    kids = _resolve_i18n(node, loc)
+
+    if tag in ("h2", "h3", "h4"):
+        text = _collapse("".join(_html_inline(c, loc) for c in kids))
+        if text:
+            out.append(f"<{tag}>{text}</{tag}>")
+        return
+
+    if tag == "p":
+        text = "".join(_html_inline(c, loc) for c in kids).strip()
+        if text:
+            out.append(f"<p>{text}</p>")
+        return
+
+    if tag in ("ul", "ol"):
+        out.append(_html_list(kids, loc, tag))
+        return
+
+    if tag == "table":
+        out.append(_html_table(node, loc))
+        return
+
+    for c in kids:
+        _html_block(c, out, loc)
+
+
+def _html_list(items: list[Node | str], loc: dict[str, str], kind: str) -> str:
+    parts: list[str] = []
+    n = 0
+    for li in items:
+        if isinstance(li, str):
+            continue
+        if li.tag == "li":
+            n += 1
+            text_parts: list[str] = []
+            nested: list[Node] = []
+            for c in li.children:
+                if isinstance(c, Node) and c.tag in ("ul", "ol"):
+                    nested.append(c)
+                else:
+                    text_parts.append(_html_inline(c, loc))
+            line = "".join(text_parts).strip()
+            inner = line + "".join(_html_list(s.children, loc, s.tag) for s in nested)
+            if inner:
+                parts.append(f"<li>{inner}</li>")
+        elif li.tag in ("ul", "ol"):
+            parts.append(_html_list(li.children, loc, li.tag))
+    body = "".join(parts)
+    return f"<{kind}>{body}</{kind}>"
+
+
+def _html_table(node: Node, loc: dict[str, str]) -> str:
+    rows_html: list[str] = []
+    for tr in node.find_all("tr"):
+        cells: list[str] = []
+        for td in tr.children:
+            if isinstance(td, Node) and td.tag in ("td", "th"):
+                tag = td.tag
+                inner = _collapse("".join(_html_inline(c, loc) for c in td.children))
+                cells.append(f"<{tag}>{inner}</{tag}>")
+        if cells:
+            rows_html.append("<tr>{}</tr>".format("".join(cells)))
+    return "<table>{}</table>".format("".join(rows_html))
+
+
+def build_guide_html(lang: str = "fr") -> str:
+    """Corps HTML autonome du guide (pour rendu PDF)."""
+    index_html = _read_index_html()
+    loc = _locale_strings(lang)
+    tree = _TreeBuilder()
+    tree.feed(_guide_fragment(index_html))
+    root = tree.root.children[0]
+    assert isinstance(root, Node)
+
+    blocks: list[str] = []
+    for section in root.find_all("section"):
+        _html_block(section, blocks, loc)
+    return "\n".join(blocks)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PDF (WeasyPrint, repli reportlab)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def build_guide_pdf(lang: str = "fr") -> bytes:
+    lang_norm = lang if lang in ("fr", "en") else "fr"
+    title = _guide_title_fr if lang_norm == "fr" else _guide_title_en
+    loc = _locale_strings(lang_norm)
+    note = loc.get("guide105.arch_diagram_note", "")
+    footer = _export_footer(lang_norm)
+    try:
+        from backend.pdf_export import build_pdf_html, generate_pdf
+
+        body = build_guide_html(lang_norm)
+        body += (
+            f"<hr><p style='color:#777;font-size:11px'>{html.escape(note, quote=False)} — {html.escape(footer, quote=False)}</p>"
+        )
+        return generate_pdf(build_pdf_html(body, title), title)
+    except Exception as e:  # WeasyPrint lève à l'import OU au rendu (GTK absent)
+        logger.warning("WeasyPrint indisponible pour le guide PDF (%s) — repli reportlab", e)
+        md = build_guide_markdown(lang_norm).decode("utf-8")
+        from backend.tools.documents import _render_reportlab_pdf
+
+        return _render_reportlab_pdf(md, title)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Point d'entrée + cache
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def get_guide_document(fmt: str, lang: str) -> tuple[bytes, str, str]:
+    """Retourne (octets, media_type, filename) pour le format demandé.
+
+    ``fmt`` : ``md`` | ``pdf``. Résultat mis en cache tant que index.html et
+    fr.json ne changent pas (les locales en ne divergent jamais sur les
+    structures ; la signature couvre l'essentiel).
+    """
+    fmt = "pdf" if fmt == "pdf" else "md"
+    lang = "en" if lang == "en" else "fr"
+    key = (fmt, lang)
+    sig = _signature()
+    hit = _cache.get(key)
+    if hit and hit[0] == sig:
+        payload = hit[1]
+    else:
+        payload = build_guide_pdf(lang) if fmt == "pdf" else build_guide_markdown(lang)
+        _cache[key] = (sig, payload)
+    fname = f"ObsiGate-Guide-{_app_version()}-{lang}.{fmt}"
+    media = "application/pdf" if fmt == "pdf" else "text/markdown; charset=utf-8"
+    return payload, media, fname

backend/indexer.py

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ from typing import Any
 
 import frontmatter
 
+from backend.media_types import AUDIO_EXTENSIONS, IMAGE_EXTENSIONS, VIDEO_EXTENSIONS, is_media
+
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.indexer")
 
 # Global in-memory index
@@ -35,6 +37,12 @@ _last_full_index_ts: str = ""
 # Hook for incremental inverted index updates: called as (action, vault, path, file_info)
 _on_index_change: Callable[..., None] | None = None
 
+# Registre des vaults ajoutés à la volée (#194) : les env VAULT_N_*/DIR_N_*
+# ne couvrent que le déploiement, tout ce qui est créé à runtime
+# (/api/vaults/add, dossiers perso) vivrait uniquement en mémoire sinon et
+# disparaîtrait au prochain rebuild ou redémarrage.
+DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE = Path("data/vaults.json")
+
 
 def set_index_change_hook(hook):
     """Register a callback for incremental inverted index updates.
@@ -63,13 +71,14 @@ SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS = {
     ".sh", ".bash", ".zsh", ".fish", ".bat", ".cmd", ".ps1",
     ".json", ".yaml", ".yml", ".toml", ".xml", ".csv",
     ".cfg", ".ini", ".conf", ".env", ".pdf",
+    ".xlsx",
     ".html", ".css", ".scss", ".less",
     ".java", ".c", ".cpp", ".h", ".hpp", ".cs", ".go", ".rs", ".rb",
     ".php", ".sql", ".r", ".m", ".swift", ".kt",
     ".dockerfile", ".makefile", ".cmake",
     ".excalidraw",
     ".excalidraw.md",
-}
+} | set(IMAGE_EXTENSIONS) | set(AUDIO_EXTENSIONS) | set(VIDEO_EXTENSIONS)
 
 
 # Ignored directories (configurable via OBSIGATE_IGNORED_DIRS env var)
@@ -131,7 +140,64 @@ def load_vault_config() -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
         }
         n += 1
 
-    return vaults
+    # Registre dynamique (#194) : les vaults créés à runtime (dossiers
+    # persos, /api/vaults/add) sont chargés en premier, les env gagnent en
+    # cas de collision de nom (vérité du déploiement).
+    merged = _load_dynamic_vaults()
+    merged.update(vaults)
+    return merged
+
+
+def _load_dynamic_vaults() -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Read vaults registered at runtime from ``data/vaults.json`` (#194)."""
+    if not DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE.exists():
+        return {}
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        vaults = data.get("vaults", {})
+        return vaults if isinstance(vaults, dict) else {}
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as e:
+        logger.error(f"Failed to read {DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE}: {e}")
+        return {}
+
+
+def _save_dynamic_vaults(vaults: dict[str, dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+    """Atomic write of the dynamic vault registry (tmp + rename, as users.json)."""
+    try:
+        DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        tmp = DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        tmp.write_text(
+            json.dumps({"version": 1, "vaults": vaults}, indent=2, default=str),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        os.replace(tmp, DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE)
+    except OSError as e:
+        # Le registre est un filet : vault_config mémoire reste valable
+        # jusqu'au prochain rebuild, qui se reparera du dossier manquant.
+        logger.error(f"Failed to write {DYNAMIC_VAULTS_FILE}: {e}")
+
+
+def persist_vault(vault_name: str) -> None:
+    """Persist *vault_name* so it survives rebuild/restart (#194).
+
+    Idempotent. Env-declared vaults are re-added by :func:`load_vault_config`
+    anyway; persisting them too is harmless (single source after merge).
+    """
+    cfg = vault_config.get(vault_name)
+    if not cfg:
+        return
+    vaults = _load_dynamic_vaults()
+    vaults[vault_name] = cfg
+    _save_dynamic_vaults(vaults)
+
+
+def unpersist_vault(vault_name: str) -> None:
+    """Drop *vault_name* from the dynamic registry (#194). No-op if absent."""
+    vaults = _load_dynamic_vaults()
+    if vault_name not in vaults:
+        return
+    vaults.pop(vault_name, None)
+    _save_dynamic_vaults(vaults)
 
 
 
@@ -348,6 +414,23 @@ def _decompress_excalidraw(compressed: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     return data
 
 
+def extract_xlsx_indexable(file_path: Path) -> str:
+    """Return searchable text for a workbook (#153 A5).
+
+    Lazy wrapper: ``openpyxl`` is only imported when a spreadsheet is actually
+    indexed, so a vault without workbooks never pays the import. Errors are
+    swallowed — a corrupt or encrypted file still gets indexed by name.
+    """
+    try:
+        from backend.xlsx_reader import extract_indexable_text
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - openpyxl missing
+        return ""
+    try:
+        return extract_indexable_text(file_path)
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        return ""
+
+
 def extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw: str) -> str:
     """Return indexable text content for a raw .excalidraw / .excalidraw.md file.
 
@@ -397,31 +480,52 @@ def parse_markdown_file(raw: str) -> frontmatter.Post:
         return frontmatter.Post(content)
 
 
-def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+def _scan_vault(
+    vault_name: str,
+    vault_path: str,
+    vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    previous_files: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Synchronously scan a single vault directory and build file index.
 
     Walks the vault tree, reads supported files, extracts metadata
     (tags, title, content preview) and stores a capped content snapshot
     for in-memory full-text search.
-    
+
     All files and directories are indexed, including hidden files (starting with '.').
 
+    Differential scan (#86): when ``previous_files`` maps a relative path to
+    its previous ``file_info`` dict, entries whose ``size`` and ``modified``
+    timestamp are unchanged are reused verbatim (no disk read, no re-parse).
+    Only the cheap ``os.walk`` + ``stat`` runs on every pass; heavy content
+    extraction (PDF metadata excepted — always cheap) is skipped for
+    unchanged files. This replaces the full ``rglob`` re-read on rebuilds.
+
+    Excalidraw diagrams (#86, like PDFs since BUG-040) are deferred: the scan
+    only records the title and sets ``excalidraw_text_pending``; the expensive
+    JSON/lz-string text extraction runs in ``enrich_pdf_texts()`` after the
+    index is queryable.
+
     Args:
         vault_name: Display name of the vault.
         vault_path: Absolute filesystem path to the vault root.
         vault_cfg: Optional vault configuration dict (unused for indexing, kept for compatibility).
+        previous_files: Optional ``{relative_path: file_info}`` snapshot from a
+            previous scan used for differential reuse.
 
     Returns:
-        Dict with keys ``files`` (list), ``tags`` (counter dict), ``path`` (str), ``paths`` (list).
+        Dict with keys ``files`` (list), ``tags`` (counter dict), ``path`` (str),
+        ``paths`` (list) and ``reused`` (int, differential hits).
     """
     vault_root = Path(vault_path)
     files: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
     tag_counts: dict[str, int] = {}
     paths: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    reused = 0
 
     if not vault_root.exists():
         logger.warning(f"Vault path does not exist: {vault_path}")
-        return {"files": [], "tags": {}, "path": vault_path, "paths": []}
+        return {"files": [], "tags": {}, "path": vault_path, "paths": [], "reused": 0}
 
     root_resolved = vault_root.resolve(strict=False)
 
@@ -479,18 +583,69 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
                 stat = fpath.stat()
                 modified = datetime.fromtimestamp(stat.st_mtime, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
 
+                # #86 differential scan: reuse the previous entry when neither
+                # size nor mtime changed — skips the disk read + parse below.
+                if previous_files:
+                    prev = previous_files.get(rel_path_str)
+                    if (
+                        prev is not None
+                        and prev.get("size") == stat.st_size
+                        and prev.get("modified") == modified
+                    ):
+                        file_info = {**prev, "tags": list(prev.get("tags", []))}
+                        files.append(file_info)
+                        for tag in file_info.get("tags", []):
+                            tag_counts[tag] = tag_counts.get(tag, 0) + 1
+                        reused += 1
+                        # The global backlink index is rebuilt on every scan,
+                        # so re-register this file's wikilinks from its
+                        # (cached) content instead of re-reading the disk.
+                        if file_info.get("extension") == ".md" and file_info.get("content"):
+                            try:
+                                _extract_wikilinks_for_backlinks(
+                                    vault_name, file_info["path"],
+                                    file_info.get("title", ""), file_info["content"],
+                                )
+                            except Exception:
+                                pass
+                        continue
+
                 # PDF handling — special path (binary, uses pdf_reader)
                 tags: list[str] = []
+                pdf_text_pending = False
+                excalidraw_text_pending = False
                 if ext == ".pdf":
-                    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata, extract_pdf_text
-                    raw = extract_pdf_text(fpath, max_chars=100000)
+                    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata
+                    # BUG-040: only the (cheap) metadata is read during the
+                    # scan. Full-text extraction is deferred to a background
+                    # pass (``enrich_pdf_texts``) so a vault with many/large
+                    # PDFs no longer blocks startup and index rebuilds.
                     pdf_meta = extract_pdf_metadata(fpath)
                     title = pdf_meta.get("title") or fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
-                    content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
+                    raw = ""
+                    content_preview = ""
+                    pdf_text_pending = True
                 elif ext == ".excalidraw" or fpath.name.lower().endswith(".excalidraw.md"):
-                    raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
-                    raw = extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw)
+                    # #86: defer the expensive JSON/lz-string text extraction
+                    # (read + decompress + element walk) to ``enrich_pdf_texts``
+                    # so the scan stays cheap; title comes from the filename.
+                    raw = ""
                     title = fpath.stem.replace(".excalidraw", "").replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
+                    content_preview = ""
+                    excalidraw_text_pending = True
+                elif is_media(ext):
+                    # #108 — images (and future media, #109) are binary: index
+                    # name/size/mtime only and never read the bytes. ``content``
+                    # stays empty so the TF-IDF index remains clean.
+                    raw = ""
+                    title = fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
+                    content_preview = ""
+                elif ext == ".xlsx":
+                    # #153 A5 — a workbook stays rendered by the viewer, but its
+                    # cell values are now indexed as text so a spreadsheet is
+                    # findable by its content (parity with _index_single_file_sync).
+                    raw = extract_xlsx_indexable(fpath)
+                    title = fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
                     content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
                 else:
                     raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
@@ -510,7 +665,7 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
                             title, post.content
                         )
 
-                files.append({
+                file_info = {
                     "path": str(relative).replace("\\", "/"),
                     "title": title,
                     "tags": tags,
@@ -519,7 +674,12 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
                     "size": stat.st_size,
                     "modified": modified,
                     "extension": ext,
-                })
+                }
+                if pdf_text_pending:
+                    file_info["pdf_text_pending"] = True
+                if excalidraw_text_pending:
+                    file_info["excalidraw_text_pending"] = True
+                files.append(file_info)
 
                 for tag in tags:
                     tag_counts[tag] = tag_counts.get(tag, 0) + 1
@@ -531,8 +691,89 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
                 logger.error(f"Error indexing {fpath}: {e}")
                 continue
 
-    logger.info(f"Vault '{vault_name}': indexed {len(files)} files, {len(paths)} paths, {len(tag_counts)} unique tags")
-    return {"files": files, "tags": tag_counts, "path": vault_path, "paths": paths, "config": {}}
+    logger.info(
+        f"Vault '{vault_name}': indexed {len(files)} files "
+        f"({reused} reused), {len(paths)} paths, {len(tag_counts)} unique tags"
+    )
+    return {"files": files, "tags": tag_counts, "path": vault_path, "paths": paths, "config": {}, "reused": reused}
+
+
+def _read_excalidraw_indexable_text(file_path: Path) -> str:
+    """Read an excalidraw file and return its indexable text (blocking helper).
+
+    Runs inside an executor via ``enrich_pdf_texts`` so the lz-string
+    decompression of large diagrams never blocks the event loop.
+    """
+    try:
+        raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except OSError:
+        return ""
+    try:
+        return extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw)
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        return ""
+
+
+async def enrich_pdf_texts(vault_name: str | None = None) -> int:
+    """Extract text deferred during the scan: PDFs (BUG-040) + excalidraw (#86).
+
+    ``_scan_vault`` only reads PDF metadata and excalidraw filenames so a vault
+    with many or large heavy files starts serving immediately. This coroutine
+    runs *after* the index (and the inverted index) is ready, extracts the
+    missing text off the event loop and updates the in-memory entry plus the
+    incremental index hooks.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Restrict the pass to a single vault; ``None`` covers every
+            indexed vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        Number of deferred files (PDF + excalidraw) whose text extraction was
+        attempted.
+    """
+    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_text
+
+    pending: list[tuple[str, dict[str, Any], Path, str]] = []
+    with _index_lock:
+        for name, vault_data in index.items():
+            if vault_name is not None and name != vault_name:
+                continue
+            vault_root = Path(vault_data.get("path", ""))
+            for file_info in vault_data.get("files", []):
+                if file_info.get("pdf_text_pending"):
+                    pending.append((name, file_info, vault_root / file_info["path"], "pdf"))
+                elif file_info.get("excalidraw_text_pending"):
+                    pending.append((name, file_info, vault_root / file_info["path"], "excalidraw"))
+
+    if not pending:
+        return 0
+
+    loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    enriched = 0
+    for name, file_info, file_path, kind in pending:
+        try:
+            if kind == "pdf":
+                raw = await loop.run_in_executor(None, extract_pdf_text, file_path, 100000)
+            else:
+                raw = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _read_excalidraw_indexable_text, file_path)
+        except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+            logger.warning("Deferred text enrichment failed for %s: %s", file_path, exc)
+            raw = ""
+        file_info["content"] = raw[:SEARCH_CONTENT_LIMIT]
+        file_info["content_preview"] = raw[:200].strip()
+        file_info.pop("pdf_text_pending", None)
+        file_info.pop("excalidraw_text_pending", None)
+        enriched += 1
+        if _on_index_change:
+            try:
+                _on_index_change("add", name, file_info["path"], file_info)
+            except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Index hook failed after deferred enrichment for %s: %s", file_path, exc
+                )
+
+    logger.info("Deferred text enrichment: extracted text for %d file(s)", enriched)
+    return enriched
 
 
 async def build_index(progress_callback=None) -> None:
@@ -540,16 +781,24 @@ async def build_index(progress_callback=None) -> None:
 
     Runs vault scans concurrently, inserting them incrementally into the global index.
     Notifies progress via the provided callback.
+
+    #86 differential rebuild: the previous per-vault ``{path: file_info}``
+    snapshots are captured before the clear and handed to ``_scan_vault`` so
+    unchanged files (same size + mtime) are reused without disk re-reads.
     """
     global index, vault_config
     vault_config.clear()
     vault_config.update(load_vault_config())
-    
+
     # Note: vault_settings are now only used for UI display preferences (hideHiddenFiles)
     # Indexing always includes all files regardless of settings
-    
+
     global _index_generation
     with _index_lock:
+        previous_snapshot: dict[str, dict[str, dict[str, Any]]] = {
+            name: {f["path"]: f for f in vdata.get("files", [])}
+            for name, vdata in index.items()
+        }
         index.clear()
         _file_lookup.clear()
         path_index.clear()
@@ -568,8 +817,13 @@ async def build_index(progress_callback=None) -> None:
     loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
 
     async def _process_vault(name: str, config: dict[str, Any]):
+        import functools
+
         vault_path = config["path"]
-        vault_data = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _scan_vault, name, vault_path, config)
+        scan = functools.partial(
+            _scan_vault, name, vault_path, config, previous_snapshot.get(name)
+        )
+        vault_data = await loop.run_in_executor(None, scan)
         vault_data["config"] = config
 
         # Build lookup entries for the new vault
@@ -632,6 +886,15 @@ async def reload_index() -> dict[str, Any]:
         Dict mapping vault names to their file/tag counts.
     """
     await build_index()
+    # BUG-040/#86: complete the deferred PDF + excalidraw extraction.
+    await enrich_pdf_texts()
+    # The inverted index is NOT updated by the hooks here: the rebuild above
+    # replaces whole vault entries, so the incremental notifications are not
+    # emitted for the files that only changed content. Without this, a manual
+    # reindex left TF-IDF search serving a stale index (BUG-089).
+    from backend.search import init_inverted_index
+
+    init_inverted_index()
     stats = {}
     for name, data in index.items():
         stats[name] = {"file_count": len(data["files"]), "tag_count": len(data["tags"])}
@@ -659,14 +922,26 @@ async def reload_single_vault(vault_name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         raise ValueError(f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found in configuration")
     
     config = vault_config[vault_name]
-    
+
+    # #86 differential rescan: snapshot this vault's entries before removal so
+    # unchanged files are reused without disk re-reads.
+    with _index_lock:
+        _previous = {f["path"]: f for f in index.get(vault_name, {}).get("files", [])}
+
     # Remove old vault data from index structures
     await remove_vault_from_index(vault_name)
-    
+    # remove_vault_from_index a poppé la config : la remettre, sinon le vault
+    # disparaît de vault_config jusqu'au prochain reload complet (#194 — les
+    # vaults dynamiques n'y reviennent que par data/vaults.json).
+    vault_config[vault_name] = config
+
     # Re-add the vault with updated configuration
+    import functools
+
     vault_path = config["path"]
     loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
-    vault_data = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _scan_vault, vault_name, vault_path, config)
+    scan = functools.partial(_scan_vault, vault_name, vault_path, config, _previous)
+    vault_data = await loop.run_in_executor(None, scan)
     vault_data["config"] = config
     
     # Build lookup entries for the vault
@@ -695,7 +970,17 @@ async def reload_single_vault(vault_name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     # Rebuild attachment index for this vault only
     from backend.attachment_indexer import build_attachment_index
     await build_attachment_index({vault_name: config})
-    
+
+    # BUG-040/#86: complete the deferred PDF + excalidraw extraction.
+    await enrich_pdf_texts(vault_name)
+
+    # Same as reload_index: the vault entry was replaced wholesale, so rebuild
+    # the inverted index or TF-IDF search keeps serving stale postings
+    # (BUG-089).
+    from backend.search import init_inverted_index
+
+    init_inverted_index()
+
     stats = {"file_count": len(vault_data["files"]), "tag_count": len(vault_data["tags"])}
     logger.info(f"Vault '{vault_name}' reindexed: {stats['file_count']} files, {stats['tag_count']} tags")
     return stats
@@ -764,6 +1049,14 @@ def _index_single_file_sync(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, file_path: str, va
             raw = extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw)
             title = fpath.stem.replace(".excalidraw", "").replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
             content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
+        elif is_media(ext):
+            # #108 — binary media: metadata only, never read the bytes.
+            raw = ""
+            content_preview = ""
+        elif ext == ".xlsx":
+            # #153 A5 — index sheet names + header rows as text (see _scan_vault).
+            raw = extract_xlsx_indexable(fpath)
+            content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
         else:
             raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
             content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
@@ -1032,6 +1325,12 @@ async def remove_vault_from_index(vault_name: str):
                 if not _file_lookup[key]:
                     _file_lookup.pop(key, None)
 
+            # Notify the inverted index, otherwise every document of the vault
+            # stays in it as a ghost (postings, doc_info, doc_vault, vault_docs)
+            # and keeps matching searches for a vault that no longer exists.
+            if _on_index_change:
+                _on_index_change('remove', vault_name, rel_path, f)  # type: ignore[misc]
+
         # Clean path_index
         path_index.pop(vault_name, None)
 

backend/media_thumbs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+"""Image thumbnail generation and disk cache (roadmap #108-C).
+
+Thumbnails are generated on demand with Pillow and cached under
+``<OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR>/.obsigate-cache/thumbs/<sha1>.webp``. The cache key
+embeds the source path, mtime (ns) and size, so an edited image naturally
+invalidates its stale thumbnail without any explicit cleanup.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+DEFAULT_THUMB_SIZE = 256
+
+# Extensions Pillow cannot decode without extra native libraries: served as-is.
+_UNDECODABLE = {".svg"}
+
+
+def thumbs_cache_dir() -> Path:
+    """Return (and create) the thumbnail cache directory."""
+    base = Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR", "data")) / ".obsigate-cache" / "thumbs"
+    base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    return base
+
+
+def thumb_cache_path(file_path: Path, size: int) -> Path:
+    """Compute the deterministic cache path for *file_path* at *size*."""
+    try:
+        st = file_path.stat()
+        stamp = f"{st.st_mtime_ns}:{st.st_size}"
+    except OSError:
+        stamp = "0:0"
+    # Clé de cache miniature (pas un usage sécurité).
+    key = hashlib.sha1(f"{file_path}:{stamp}:{size}".encode()).hexdigest()  # nosec B324
+    return thumbs_cache_dir() / f"{key}.webp"
+
+
+def is_decodable(file_path: Path) -> bool:
+    """True when Pillow can be expected to decode *file_path*."""
+    return file_path.suffix.lower() not in _UNDECODABLE
+
+
+def generate_thumbnail(file_path: Path, size: int = DEFAULT_THUMB_SIZE) -> Path | None:
+    """Generate (or reuse) a WebP thumbnail and return its path.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when the file cannot be decoded (e.g. SVG) or Pillow is
+    unavailable, so the caller can fall back to serving the original.
+    """
+    cache_path = thumb_cache_path(file_path, size)
+    if cache_path.exists():
+        return cache_path
+
+    try:
+        from PIL import Image, ImageOps
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - Pillow is an optional runtime dep
+        return None
+
+    try:
+        with Image.open(file_path) as opened:
+            # Animated formats: keep only the first frame.
+            if getattr(opened, "is_animated", False):
+                opened.seek(0)
+            img = ImageOps.exif_transpose(opened) or opened
+            if img.mode not in ("RGB", "RGBA"):
+                img = img.convert("RGBA")
+            img.thumbnail((size, size))
+
+            tmp = cache_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+            img.save(tmp, "WEBP", quality=80)
+        os.replace(tmp, cache_path)
+        return cache_path
+    except Exception:
+        return None

backend/media_types.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""Shared media type constants and helpers.
+
+Single source of truth for the file extensions and MIME types handled by the
+image support (roadmap #108) and reused by the audio/video players (#109).
+Keeping these sets here avoids the previous duplication (``indexer.py``,
+``attachment_indexer.py`` and ``main.py`` each carried their own copy).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import mimetypes
+
+# Image extensions viewable in the browser (HEIC/HEIF deliberately excluded —
+# no browser decodes them natively; see roadmap #108).
+IMAGE_EXTENSIONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
+    ".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".svg", ".webp", ".bmp", ".ico",
+})
+
+# Audio extensions (socle for #109, not wired into the index yet).
+AUDIO_EXTENSIONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
+    ".mp3", ".m4a", ".aac", ".wav", ".ogg", ".oga", ".opus", ".flac",
+})
+
+# Video extensions (socle for #109, not wired into the index yet).
+VIDEO_EXTENSIONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
+    ".mp4", ".webm", ".mov", ".m4v",
+})
+
+MEDIA_EXTENSIONS: frozenset[str] = IMAGE_EXTENSIONS | AUDIO_EXTENSIONS | VIDEO_EXTENSIONS
+
+# Explicit MIME types for extensions ``mimetypes`` gets wrong or does not know.
+_MIME_OVERRIDES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ".jpg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".svg": "image/svg+xml",
+    ".ico": "image/x-icon",
+    ".webp": "image/webp",
+    ".m4a": "audio/mp4",
+    ".oga": "audio/ogg",
+    ".opus": "audio/ogg",
+    ".mov": "video/quicktime",
+    ".m4v": "video/mp4",
+}
+
+
+def is_image(ext: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *ext* (with leading dot, any case) is an image."""
+    return ext.lower() in IMAGE_EXTENSIONS
+
+
+def is_audio(ext: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *ext* is an audio extension."""
+    return ext.lower() in AUDIO_EXTENSIONS
+
+
+def is_video(ext: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *ext* is a video extension."""
+    return ext.lower() in VIDEO_EXTENSIONS
+
+
+def is_media(ext: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *ext* is any supported image/audio/video extension."""
+    return ext.lower() in MEDIA_EXTENSIONS
+
+
+def media_mime_type(path: str) -> str:
+    """Return the best MIME type for *path* (extension based).
+
+    Falls back to ``application/octet-stream`` when the type is unknown.
+    """
+    lower = path.lower()
+    for ext, mime in _MIME_OVERRIDES.items():
+        if lower.endswith(ext):
+            return mime
+    guessed, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(path)
+    return guessed or "application/octet-stream"

backend/notify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+"""External notifications — Discord, Telegram, SMTP, generic webhook (#168).
+
+Configuration is persisted in ``data/notify_channels.json``; secrets live in
+``data/notify_secrets.json`` (0600) or in ``OBSIGATE_NOTIFY_SECRET_<ID>``
+environment variables — never in the public config file (same pattern as
+``backend/webhooks.py``, BUG-026).
+
+Supported channel types:
+
+* ``discord`` — Discord webhook URL (``POST {"content": ...}``).
+* ``telegram`` — Bot API (``POST https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage``).
+* ``smtp`` — Email via stdlib ``smtplib`` (STARTTLS, auth login).
+* ``webhook`` — generic JSON ``POST`` (SSRF-safe, same policy as #9).
+
+Each channel declares ``triggers`` chosen among :data:`VALID_TRIGGERS`.
+The scheduler (#170) broadcasts on ``schedule_failure``; file-event fan-out
+stays on the historical ``backend/webhooks.py`` path.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import smtplib
+import threading
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from email.message import EmailMessage
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.notify")
+
+DATA_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR", "data"))
+CHANNELS_FILE = DATA_DIR / "notify_channels.json"
+SECRETS_FILE = DATA_DIR / "notify_secrets.json"
+
+CHANNEL_TYPES = ("discord", "telegram", "smtp", "webhook")
+VALID_TRIGGERS = ("manual", "schedule_failure", "schedule_success", "duplicate_found")
+
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+
+# ── Store helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _read_channels() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    if not CHANNELS_FILE.exists():
+        return []
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(CHANNELS_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        return data if isinstance(data, list) else []
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError):
+        return []
+
+
+def _write_channels(channels: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+    CHANNELS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = CHANNELS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(channels, indent=2, default=str), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(CHANNELS_FILE)
+
+
+def _read_secrets() -> dict[str, str]:
+    if not SECRETS_FILE.exists():
+        return {}
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(SECRETS_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError):
+        return {}
+
+
+def _write_secrets(secrets: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+    SECRETS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = SECRETS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(secrets, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(SECRETS_FILE)
+    try:
+        SECRETS_FILE.chmod(0o600)
+    except OSError:
+        pass  # Windows: pas de permissions Unix
+
+
+def _secret_key(channel_id: str) -> str:
+    return "OBSIGATE_NOTIFY_SECRET_" + channel_id.replace("-", "_").upper()
+
+
+def _get_secret(channel_id: str) -> str | None:
+    """Resolve a channel secret: env > dedicated store > legacy inline config."""
+    env_val = os.environ.get(_secret_key(channel_id))
+    if env_val:
+        return env_val
+    stored = _read_secrets().get(channel_id)
+    if stored:
+        return stored
+    for ch in _read_channels():
+        if ch.get("id") == channel_id:
+            cfg = ch.get("config", {})
+            for key in ("webhook_url", "bot_token", "password"):
+                if cfg.get(key):
+                    return str(cfg[key])
+    return None
+
+
+def _public_view(channel: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    clean = {k: v for k, v in channel.items() if k != "config"}
+    cfg = dict(channel.get("config", {}))
+    for secret_field in ("webhook_url", "bot_token", "password"):
+        if cfg.get(secret_field):
+            cfg[secret_field] = "***"
+    clean["config"] = cfg
+    clean["has_secret"] = bool(_get_secret(channel["id"]))
+    return clean
+
+
+# ── CRUD ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _validate_config(channel_type: str, config: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Validate (sans secret) and normalize a channel config. Raises ValueError."""
+    config = dict(config or {})
+    if channel_type == "discord":
+        url = str(config.get("webhook_url") or config.get("url") or "").strip()
+        if not url.startswith(("https://discord.com/api/webhooks/", "https://discordapp.com/api/webhooks/")):
+            # Laisse passer les URLs de test locales quand le mode privé est ouvert.
+            from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+
+            validate_webhook_url(url)
+            if "discord" not in url and not os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE"):
+                raise ValueError("URL Discord invalide (webhook discord.com attendu)")
+        config["webhook_url"] = url
+    elif channel_type == "telegram":
+        if not str(config.get("chat_id") or "").strip():
+            raise ValueError("chat_id Telegram requis")
+        config["chat_id"] = str(config["chat_id"]).strip()
+        if config.get("bot_token"):
+            config["bot_token"] = str(config["bot_token"]).strip()
+    elif channel_type == "smtp":
+        for field in ("host", "from_addr", "to_addr"):
+            if not str(config.get(field) or "").strip():
+                raise ValueError(f"Champ SMTP requis : {field}")
+        config["port"] = int(config.get("port") or 587)
+        config["use_tls"] = bool(config.get("use_tls", True))
+        config["username"] = str(config.get("username") or "").strip()
+    elif channel_type == "webhook":
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+
+        url = str(config.get("url") or "").strip()
+        validate_webhook_url(url)
+        config["url"] = url
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f"Type de canal inconnu : {channel_type}")
+    triggers = [t for t in (config.get("triggers") or ["manual"]) if t in VALID_TRIGGERS]
+    config["triggers"] = triggers or ["manual"]
+    return config
+
+
+def list_channels() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return public views of all notification channels."""
+    return [_public_view(ch) for ch in _read_channels()]
+
+
+def create_channel(name: str, channel_type: str, config: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Create a notification channel. Secrets are split into the secret store."""
+    if channel_type not in CHANNEL_TYPES:
+        raise ValueError(f"Type de canal inconnu : {channel_type}")
+    with _lock:
+        channels = _read_channels()
+        channel_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        normalized = _validate_config(channel_type, config)
+        secrets = _read_secrets()
+        for field in ("webhook_url", "bot_token", "password"):
+            if normalized.get(field) and len(str(normalized[field])) > 8:
+                secrets[channel_id] = str(normalized[field])
+                normalized[field] = "***"  # placeholder : le secret vit dans le store dédié
+        _write_secrets(secrets)
+        channel = {
+            "id": channel_id,
+            "name": (name or channel_type).strip() or channel_type,
+            "type": channel_type,
+            "enabled": True,
+            "config": normalized,
+            "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "last_sent_at": None,
+            "last_error": None,
+        }
+        channels.append(channel)
+        _write_channels(channels)
+    logger.info(f"Created notify channel '{name}' ({channel_type})")
+    return _public_view(channel)
+
+
+def update_channel(channel_id: str, updates: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Update a channel (name/enabled/config). Returns None when unknown."""
+    with _lock:
+        channels = _read_channels()
+        for channel in channels:
+            if channel.get("id") != channel_id:
+                continue
+            if updates.get("name"):
+                channel["name"] = str(updates["name"])
+            if "enabled" in updates:
+                channel["enabled"] = bool(updates["enabled"])
+            if "config" in updates and isinstance(updates["config"], dict):
+                merged = {**channel.get("config", {}), **updates["config"]}
+                normalized = _validate_config(channel["type"], merged)
+                secrets = _read_secrets()
+                for field in ("webhook_url", "bot_token", "password"):
+                    if updates["config"].get(field):
+                        secrets[channel_id] = str(updates["config"][field])
+                        normalized[field] = "***"
+                _write_secrets(secrets)
+                channel["config"] = normalized
+            _write_channels(channels)
+            return _public_view(channel)
+    return None
+
+
+def delete_channel(channel_id: str) -> bool:
+    """Delete a channel and its secret. Returns False when unknown."""
+    with _lock:
+        channels = _read_channels()
+        remaining = [c for c in channels if c.get("id") != channel_id]
+        if len(remaining) == len(channels):
+            return False
+        _write_channels(remaining)
+        secrets = _read_secrets()
+        if secrets.pop(channel_id, None) is not None:
+            _write_secrets(secrets)
+    return True
+
+
+# ── Dispatch ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _send_discord(webhook_url: str, title: str, message: str) -> None:
+    import httpx
+
+    content = f"**{title}**\n{message}"[:2000]
+    resp = httpx.post(webhook_url, json={"content": content}, timeout=10.0)
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+
+
+def _send_telegram(bot_token: str, chat_id: str, title: str, message: str) -> None:
+    import httpx
+
+    from backend.webhooks import is_safe_target
+
+    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
+    if not is_safe_target(url):
+        raise RuntimeError("Cible Telegram bloquée par la politique SSRF")
+    text = f"*{title}*\n{message}"[:4000]
+    resp = httpx.post(
+        url,
+        json={"chat_id": chat_id, "text": text, "parse_mode": "Markdown"},
+        timeout=10.0,
+    )
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+
+
+def _send_smtp(config: dict[str, Any], password: str | None, title: str, message: str) -> None:
+    msg = EmailMessage()
+    msg["Subject"] = f"[ObsiGate] {title}"
+    msg["From"] = config["from_addr"]
+    msg["To"] = config["to_addr"]
+    msg.set_content(message)
+    with smtplib.SMTP(str(config["host"]), int(config.get("port", 587)), timeout=10) as client:
+        if config.get("use_tls", True):
+            client.starttls()
+        if config.get("username") and password:
+            client.login(str(config["username"]), password)
+        client.send_message(msg)
+
+
+def _send_webhook(url: str, title: str, message: str, trigger: str) -> None:
+    import httpx
+
+    from backend.webhooks import is_safe_target
+
+    if not is_safe_target(url):
+        raise RuntimeError("Cible webhook bloquée par la politique SSRF")
+    resp = httpx.post(
+        url,
+        json={
+            "event": trigger,
+            "title": title,
+            "message": message,
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "source": "obsigate-notify",
+        },
+        timeout=10.0,
+    )
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+
+
+def send_via_channel(channel: dict[str, Any], title: str, message: str, trigger: str = "manual") -> None:
+    """Send a notification through one raw channel record. Raises on failure."""
+    channel_type = channel.get("type")
+    cfg = dict(channel.get("config", {}))
+    secret = _get_secret(channel["id"])
+    if channel_type == "discord":
+        url = secret or cfg.get("webhook_url") or ""
+        if not url or url == "***":
+            raise RuntimeError("URL webhook Discord manquante")
+        _send_discord(url, title, message)
+    elif channel_type == "telegram":
+        token = secret or cfg.get("bot_token") or os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN") or ""
+        if not token or token == "***":
+            raise RuntimeError("Token bot Telegram manquant")
+        _send_telegram(token, str(cfg.get("chat_id", "")), title, message)
+    elif channel_type == "smtp":
+        _send_smtp(cfg, secret, title, message)
+    elif channel_type == "webhook":
+        url = str(cfg.get("url") or "").strip()
+        if not url:
+            raise RuntimeError("URL webhook manquante")
+        _send_webhook(url, title, message, trigger)
+    else:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Type de canal inconnu : {channel_type}")
+
+
+def broadcast(trigger: str, title: str, message: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Send to every enabled channel subscribed to *trigger*. Never raises."""
+    results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for channel in _read_channels():
+        if not channel.get("enabled", True):
+            continue
+        if trigger not in channel.get("config", {}).get("triggers", ["manual"]):
+            continue
+        try:
+            send_via_channel(channel, title, message, trigger)
+            results.append({"channel_id": channel["id"], "ok": True})
+            _mark_sent(channel["id"], None)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Notify channel '{channel.get('name')}' failed: {e}")
+            results.append({"channel_id": channel["id"], "ok": False, "error": str(e)})
+            _mark_sent(channel["id"], str(e))
+    return results
+
+
+def _mark_sent(channel_id: str, error: str | None) -> None:
+    with _lock:
+        channels = _read_channels()
+        for channel in channels:
+            if channel.get("id") == channel_id:
+                channel["last_sent_at"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+                channel["last_error"] = error
+        _write_channels(channels)

backend/openapi_docs.py

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ TAGS_METADATA: list[dict[str, str]] = [
     {"name": "Bookmarks", "description": "Recently opened files, bookmarks and saved searches."},
     {"name": "Backups", "description": "Automatic file backups, diffs, restore, compression and purge."},
     {"name": "Export", "description": "Export notes or whole vaults to HTML, Markdown bundle or ePub."},
+    {"name": "Guide", "description": "Download the in-app user guide as Markdown or PDF (mirrors the help modal, FR/EN)."},
     {"name": "AI", "description": "AI-powered editor actions, provider status and model discovery."},
     {"name": "BooksLM", "description": "Directory-scoped AI chat (NotebookLM-style) over a vault folder."},
     {"name": "MCP", "description": "Model Context Protocol server (Streamable HTTP) exposing the shared AI tool layer to external clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor…)."},
@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ TAGS_METADATA: list[dict[str, str]] = [
     {"name": "Admin", "description": "Admin-only system monitoring: stats, audit log, backup stats and live stream."},
     {"name": "Plugins", "description": "Install, enable and manage user plugins."},
     {"name": "Push", "description": "Web Push (VAPID) subscription management and test notifications."},
+    {"name": "Duplicates", "description": "Duplicate-note detection and confirmed merge (#166)."},
+    {"name": "Notify", "description": "External notifications: Discord, Telegram, SMTP and generic webhooks (#168)."},
+    {"name": "Scheduler", "description": "Scheduled automatic tasks reusing the vault mutation services (#170)."},
     {"name": "Frontend", "description": "Static assets and SPA fallback routes."},
 ]
 
@@ -94,10 +98,14 @@ _TAG_RULES: list[tuple[re.Pattern[str], str]] = [
     (re.compile(r"^/api/shares"), "Sharing"),
     (re.compile(r"^/s/"), "Sharing"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/webhooks"), "Webhooks"),
+    (re.compile(r"^/api/duplicates"), "Duplicates"),
+    (re.compile(r"^/api/notify"), "Notify"),
+    (re.compile(r"^/api/scheduler"), "Scheduler"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/conflicts"), "Conflicts"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/backups"), "Backups"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/file/[^/]+/(backups|diff|restore)"), "Backups"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/export"), "Export"),
+    (re.compile(r"^/api/guide"), "Guide"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/file/[^/]+/pdf"), "PDF"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/search"), "Search"),
     (re.compile(r"^/api/tags"), "Search"),
@@ -146,6 +154,9 @@ _TAG_ALIASES: dict[str, str] = {
     "export": "Export",
     "sharing": "Sharing",
     "webhooks": "Webhooks",
+    "duplicates": "Duplicates",
+    "notify": "Notify",
+    "scheduler": "Scheduler",
     "conflicts": "Conflicts",
     "system": "System",
     "frontend": "Frontend",
@@ -179,6 +190,41 @@ _ENDPOINT_EXAMPLES: dict[tuple[str, str], dict[str, Any]] = {
         "request": {"path": "notes/Accueil.md", "content": "# Accueil\n\nMis à jour."},
         "response": {"status": "ok", "vault": "TestVault", "path": "notes/Accueil.md", "size": 26},
     },
+    ("put", "/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/save"): {
+        "request": {"sheet": "Budget", "cells": {"B1": "250"}, "allow_formula": False, "force": False},
+        "response": {"status": "ok", "vault": "TestVault", "path": "data/budget.xlsx", "size": 1},
+    },
+    ("put", "/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/style"): {
+        "request": {
+            "ops": [
+                {"op": "cell", "sheet": "Budget", "range": "A1:B1", "style": {"bold": True, "fill_color": "#ffe08a"}},
+                {"op": "col_width", "sheet": "Budget", "col": "A", "width": 24},
+            ],
+            "force": False,
+            "if_match": "18f2c0ab-1f4",
+        },
+        "response": {"status": "ok", "vault": "TestVault", "path": "data/budget.xlsx", "size": 2, "revision": "18f2c0ab-1f6"},
+    },
+    # GET : pas d'exemple de requête (un requestBody sur un GET serait un OpenAPI
+    # invalide) — les paramètres sont documentés par leurs Query().
+    ("get", "/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/sheet"): {
+        "response": {
+            "vault": "TestVault",
+            "path": "data/budget.xlsx",
+            "sheet": "Budget",
+            "offset": 0,
+            "limit": 200,
+            "rows": 2,
+            "cols": 2,
+            "total_rows": 640,
+            "total_cols": 12,
+            "max_rows": 500,
+            "max_cols": 40,
+            "truncated": True,
+            "has_more": True,
+            "html": "<table>…</table>",
+        },
+    },
     ("post", "/api/search/replace"): {
         "request": {"query": "Python", "replacement": "Python 3", "vault": "all", "dry_run": True},
         "response": {"matches": [{"vault": "TestVault", "path": "note1.md", "title": "Python", "match_count": 3}], "total_matches": 3, "dry_run": True},

backend/pdf_export.py

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ def build_pdf_html(body_html: str, title: str, theme: str = "light") -> str:
 <head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>{title}</title>
 <style>
 body {{
-  font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif;
+  font-family: Georgia, "Times New Roman", serif, "Noto Color Emoji";
   max-width: 720px;
   margin: 40px auto;
   padding: 0 20px;

backend/push.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from typing import Any
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 
-from backend.auth.middleware import require_auth
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.push")
 
@@ -167,9 +167,9 @@ async def subscribe_push(
     """Subscribe to push notifications for a vault."""
     username = current_user.get("username", "unknown")
     
-    # Check if user has access to this vault
-    user_vaults = current_user.get("_token_vaults") or current_user.get("vaults", [])
-    if "*" not in user_vaults and request.vault not in user_vaults:
+    # Check if user has access to this vault (#194 : "*" n'inclut pas les
+    # dossiers persos, check_vault_access est la source unique).
+    if not check_vault_access(request.vault, current_user):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="No access to this vault")
     
     # Check if subscription already exists

backend/ratelimit.py

@@ -12,14 +12,24 @@ the per-account lockout in ``user_store.py``.
    deployment, front this service with a shared store (Redis) or a single
    worker.  This limitation is intentional and documented (BUG-031).
 
+   Opt-in persistence (ROADMAP #85 T10b) : if ``OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB`` points
+   to a SQLite file, counters are stored there instead (WAL mode, one short
+   connection per call — safe across threads, processes and restarts sharing
+   the same file).  Semantics (windows, budgets, success reset) are identical
+   to the in-memory store, which remains the default when the variable is
+   unset.
+
 Configuration via environment variables:
     OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS     Max failures per IP (default: 10)
     OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS   Max failures per account (default: 10)
     OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS   Lockout window in seconds (default: 900)
+    OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB           SQLite file for shared/persistent counters (default: unset = memory)
 """
 
 import logging
 import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
 import time
 from collections import defaultdict
 
@@ -37,6 +47,127 @@ _last_cleanup = time.time()
 CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 60  # seconds
 
 
+def _db_path() -> str | None:
+    """SQLite file for shared counters, or ``None`` for the in-memory store."""
+    path = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB", "").strip()
+    return path or None
+
+
+def _db_connect(path: str) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+    """Open a short-lived connection (WAL + busy timeout for concurrent workers)."""
+    _db_ensure_schema(path)
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10.0)
+    conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=10000")
+    return conn
+
+
+_schema_ready: set[str] = set()
+_schema_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def _db_ensure_schema(path: str) -> None:
+    """Create the store schema once per file (DDL under a process-wide lock)."""
+    with _schema_lock:
+        if path in _schema_ready:
+            return
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10.0)
+        try:
+            conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS attempts"
+                " (kind TEXT NOT NULL, key TEXT NOT NULL, ts REAL NOT NULL, success INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_attempts_kind_key_ts"
+                " ON attempts (kind, key, ts)"
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        _schema_ready.add(path)
+
+
+def _db_write(fn, *args):
+    """Run a write op, retrying once on lock contention (concurrent workers)."""
+    try:
+        return fn(*args)
+    except sqlite3.OperationalError as e:
+        if "locked" not in str(e).lower():
+            raise
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+        return fn(*args)
+
+
+def _db_prune(conn: sqlite3.Connection, cutoff: float) -> None:
+    """Drop expired entries (best-effort cap on disk growth)."""
+    conn.execute("DELETE FROM attempts WHERE ts <= ?", (cutoff,))
+
+
+def _db_record(kind: str, key: str, success: bool) -> int:
+    """Record one attempt in SQLite; return the live failure count."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    now = time.time()
+    cutoff = now - WINDOW_SECONDS
+
+    def _write() -> int:
+        with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+            _db_prune(conn, cutoff)
+            if success:
+                # Mirror the in-memory reset: replace history with one success.
+                conn.execute("DELETE FROM attempts WHERE kind = ? AND key = ?", (kind, key))
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO attempts (kind, key, ts, success) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                (kind, key, now, int(success)),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            (failures,) = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts WHERE kind = ? AND key = ? AND ts > ? AND success = 0",
+                (kind, key, cutoff),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return failures
+
+    return _db_write(_write)
+
+
+def _db_failures(kind: str, key: str) -> int:
+    """Live failure count in SQLite (expired entries never count)."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    cutoff = time.time() - WINDOW_SECONDS
+    with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+        (failures,) = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts WHERE kind = ? AND key = ? AND ts > ? AND success = 0",
+            (kind, key, cutoff),
+        ).fetchone()
+    return failures
+
+
+def _db_tracked(kind: str) -> int:
+    """Number of distinct keys ever seen for one budget (SQLite)."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+        (n,) = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT key) FROM attempts WHERE kind = ?", (kind,)
+        ).fetchone()
+    return n
+
+
+def _db_limited_count(kind: str, max_attempts: int) -> int:
+    """Number of keys currently over budget (SQLite)."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    cutoff = time.time() - WINDOW_SECONDS
+    with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+        rows = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT key, COUNT(*) FROM attempts"
+            " WHERE kind = ? AND ts > ? AND success = 0 GROUP BY key",
+            (kind, cutoff),
+        ).fetchall()
+    return sum(1 for _, n in rows if n >= max_attempts)
+
+
 def _prune(store: dict[str, list], cutoff: float) -> None:
     """Drop expired entries from one store in place."""
     expired = []
@@ -66,6 +197,12 @@ def record_failure(ip: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
     Returns:
         (current_failure_count, remaining_attempts)
     """
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        failures = _db_record("ip", ip, False)
+        remaining = max(0, MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
+        if failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS:
+            logger.warning(f"IP {ip} rate-limited after {failures} failed logins")
+        return failures, remaining
     _cleanup_expired()
     _ip_attempts[ip].append((time.time(), False))
     failures = sum(1 for _, success in _ip_attempts[ip] if not success)
@@ -77,12 +214,17 @@ def record_failure(ip: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
 
 def record_success(ip: str):
     """Clear rate limit state for an IP after successful login."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        _db_record("ip", ip, True)
+        return
     _cleanup_expired()
     _ip_attempts[ip] = [(time.time(), True)]
 
 
 def is_rate_limited(ip: str) -> bool:
     """Check if an IP has exceeded the rate limit."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        return _db_failures("ip", ip) >= MAX_ATTEMPTS
     _cleanup_expired()
     failures = sum(1 for _, success in _ip_attempts.get(ip, []) if not success)
     return failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS
@@ -94,8 +236,14 @@ def record_account_failure(account: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
     Returns:
         (current_failure_count, remaining_attempts)
     """
-    _cleanup_expired()
     key = account.lower()
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        failures = _db_record("account", key, False)
+        remaining = max(0, ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
+        if failures >= ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS:
+            logger.warning(f"Account {account} rate-limited after {failures} failed attempts")
+        return failures, remaining
+    _cleanup_expired()
     _account_attempts[key].append((time.time(), False))
     failures = sum(1 for _, success in _account_attempts[key] if not success)
     remaining = max(0, ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
@@ -106,12 +254,17 @@ def record_account_failure(account: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
 
 def record_account_success(account: str):
     """Clear the per-account rate limit state after a successful login."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        _db_record("account", account.lower(), True)
+        return
     _cleanup_expired()
     _account_attempts[account.lower()] = [(time.time(), True)]
 
 
 def is_account_rate_limited(account: str) -> bool:
     """Check if an account has exceeded the per-account rate limit."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        return _db_failures("account", account.lower()) >= ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS
     _cleanup_expired()
     failures = sum(
         1 for _, success in _account_attempts.get(account.lower(), []) if not success
@@ -121,6 +274,24 @@ def is_account_rate_limited(account: str) -> bool:
 
 def get_status(ip: str | None = None) -> dict:
     """Get rate limit status for an IP (for diagnostics)."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        if ip:
+            failures = _db_failures("ip", ip)
+            return {
+                "ip": ip,
+                "failures": failures,
+                "max": MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+                "limited": failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+                "window_seconds": WINDOW_SECONDS,
+            }
+        return {
+            "tracked_ips": _db_tracked("ip"),
+            "tracked_accounts": _db_tracked("account"),
+            "max_attempts": MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+            "account_max_attempts": ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+            "window_seconds": WINDOW_SECONDS,
+            "limited_ips": _db_limited_count("ip", MAX_ATTEMPTS),
+        }
     _cleanup_expired()
     if ip:
         attempts = _ip_attempts.get(ip, [])

backend/render.py

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+"""Markdown rendering pipeline (ROADMAP #85, tranche 9).
+
+Helpers extraits de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de comportement :
+slugification des headings, IDs d'ancrage, rendu mistune singleton,
+wikilinks, normalisation des sauts de ligne et pipeline complet
+:func:`_render_markdown` (rendu + sanitizer XSS BUG-021).
+
+Les noms gardent leur préfixe ``_`` d'origine pour un déplacement
+strictement verbatim (tests et routers pointent ici désormais).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html as html_mod
+import re
+import unicodedata
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import cast
+
+import mistune
+
+from backend.image_processor import preprocess_images
+from backend.indexer import find_file_in_index, get_vault_data
+from backend.secret_redactor import redact_with_placeholders, restore_masks
+from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+
+
+def _heading_slugify(text: str) -> str:
+    """Generate a URL-safe slug from heading text.
+
+    Matches the JavaScript slugify algorithm exactly using
+    Unicode-aware character classification:
+    1. Strip HTML tags (e.g. wikilink spans rendered inside headings)
+    2. Decode HTML entities (e.g. ``&`` → ``&``)
+    3. Lowercase
+    4. NFD normalize + strip combining marks
+    5. Keep only Unicode letters, numbers, spaces, hyphens
+    6. Replace spaces with hyphens, collapse multiple hyphens
+
+    Args:
+        text: The heading text content (may contain inline HTML).
+
+    Returns:
+        A URL-safe slug string.
+    """
+    # Strip any inline HTML so it does not pollute the slug
+    text = re.sub(r"<[^>]+>", "", text)
+    # Decode HTML entities so &amp; becomes & before slugification
+    text = html_mod.unescape(text)
+    text = text.lower()
+    text = unicodedata.normalize("NFD", text)
+    text = "".join(ch for ch in text if not unicodedata.combining(ch))
+    # Unicode-aware: keep letters (L*), numbers (N*), spaces, and hyphens
+    cleaned = []
+    for ch in text:
+        cat = unicodedata.category(ch)
+        if cat.startswith('L') or cat.startswith('N') or ch in (' ', '-'):
+            cleaned.append(ch)
+    text = "".join(cleaned)
+    text = re.sub(r"\s+", "-", text)
+    text = re.sub(r"-+", "-", text)
+    result = text.strip("-")
+    return result if result else "heading"
+
+
+def _add_heading_ids(html: str) -> str:
+    """Post-process rendered HTML to add IDs to heading tags.
+
+    Adds an ``id`` attribute to every ``<h1>`` through ``<h6>`` tag
+    using a slug generated from the heading's text content.
+    Duplicate slugs get a ``-2``, ``-3``, etc. suffix.
+
+    Args:
+        html: Rendered HTML string.
+
+    Returns:
+        HTML with heading IDs injected.
+    """
+    used_ids: dict[str, int] = {}
+
+    def _replace_heading(match):
+        tag = match.group(1)
+        content = match.group(2)
+        slug = _heading_slugify(content)
+        count = used_ids.get(slug, 0)
+        used_ids[slug] = count + 1
+        if count > 0:
+            slug = f"{slug}-{count + 1}"
+        return f'<{tag} id="{slug}">{content}</{tag}>'
+
+    # Match h1-h6 tags with text content (no existing id attribute)
+    return re.sub(
+        r'<(h[1-6])>([^<]*(?:<(?!/?h[1-6])[^<]*)*)</h[1-6]>',
+        _replace_heading,
+        html,
+    )
+
+
+# Cached mistune renderer — avoids re-creating on every request
+_markdown_renderer = mistune.create_markdown(
+    escape=False,
+    plugins=["table", "strikethrough", "footnotes", "task_lists"],
+)
+
+
+def _convert_wikilinks(content: str, current_vault: str) -> str:
+    """Convert ``[[wikilinks]]`` and ``[[target|display]]`` to clickable HTML.
+
+    Supports:
+    - Internal file links: ``[[My Note]]`` / ``[[My Note|display]]``
+    - Same-document anchors: ``[[#Heading]]`` / ``[[#Heading|display]]``
+
+    Resolved file links get a ``data-vault`` / ``data-path`` attribute pair.
+    Anchor links target the slugified heading ID in the current document.
+    Unresolved links are rendered as ``<span class="wikilink-missing">``.
+
+    Args:
+        content: Markdown string potentially containing wikilinks.
+        current_vault: Active vault name for resolution priority.
+
+    Returns:
+        Markdown string with wikilinks replaced by HTML anchors.
+    """
+    def _replace(match):
+        target = match.group(1).strip()
+        display = match.group(2).strip() if match.group(2) else target
+
+        # Same-document anchor link: [[#Heading|display]]
+        if target.startswith("#"):
+            anchor_text = target[1:].strip()
+            anchor_slug = _heading_slugify(anchor_text)
+            link_display = display if display != target else anchor_text
+            return f'<a class="wikilink-anchor" href="#{anchor_slug}">{link_display}</a>'
+
+        found = find_file_in_index(target, current_vault)
+        if found:
+            return (
+                f'<a class="wikilink" href="#" '
+                f'data-vault="{found["vault"]}" '
+                f'data-path="{found["path"]}">{display}</a>'
+            )
+        return f'<span class="wikilink-missing">{display}</span>'
+
+    pattern = r'\[\[([^\]|]+)(?:\|([^\]]+))?\]\]'
+    return re.sub(pattern, _replace, content)
+
+
+def _normalize_line_breaks(text: str) -> str:
+    """Convert single newlines to hard breaks (matching Obsidian default behavior).
+
+    In standard Markdown, a single ``\\n`` is a "soft break" — it renders as a space,
+    not a visible line break.  Obsidian defaults to treating single newlines as hard
+    breaks (equivalent to ``<br>``).  This function pre-processes the Markdown source
+    so that mistune renders standalone lines on separate rows, while still honouring
+    blank lines as paragraph separators.
+
+    Fenced code blocks (`` ``` ``) are left untouched so their internal newlines are
+    preserved verbatim.
+    """
+    parts = re.split(r"(```[\s\S]*?```)", text)
+    for i, part in enumerate(parts):
+        if part.startswith("```"):
+            continue  # Protect fenced code blocks
+        # Single \n (not preceded or followed by another \n) → two spaces + \n
+        parts[i] = re.sub(r"(?<!\n)\n(?!\n)", "  \n", part)
+    return "".join(parts)
+
+
+def _render_markdown(
+    raw_md: str,
+    vault_name: str,
+    current_file_path: Path | None = None,
+    *,
+    click_to_copy: bool = False,
+) -> str:
+    """Render a markdown string to HTML with wikilink and image support.
+
+    Uses the cached singleton mistune renderer for performance.
+
+    Args:
+        raw_md: Raw markdown text (frontmatter already stripped).
+        vault_name: Current vault for wikilink resolution context.
+        current_file_path: Absolute path to the current markdown file.
+        click_to_copy: Restore masked secrets as clickable badges carrying
+            the real value (authenticated app preview, feature #188).
+            Public shares and PDF exports keep plain labels: the secret
+            never reaches their HTML.
+
+    Returns:
+        HTML string.
+    """
+    # Get vault data for image resolution
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"]) if vault_data else None
+    attachments_path = vault_data.get("config", {}).get("attachmentsPath") if vault_data else None
+
+    # Redact secrets before rendering (P0 security). Placeholders survive
+    # the markdown conversion (fenced code blocks included) and are turned
+    # back into visible masks — clickable badges when click_to_copy — right
+    # after the HTML is produced (feature #188).
+    raw_md, secret_entries = redact_with_placeholders(
+        raw_md, str(current_file_path) if current_file_path else ""
+    )
+
+    # Preprocess images first
+    if vault_root:
+        raw_md = preprocess_images(raw_md, vault_name, vault_root, current_file_path, attachments_path)
+
+    # Convert wikilinks
+    converted = _convert_wikilinks(raw_md, vault_name)
+
+    # Normalize line breaks to match Obsidian behavior (single \n → hard break)
+    converted = _normalize_line_breaks(converted)
+
+    # mistune 3.3 types `Markdown.__call__` as `str | list[...]` (les
+    # renderers HTML renvoient toujours `str` à l'exécution).
+    rendered = cast(str, _markdown_renderer(converted))
+
+    # Restore secret masks (plain labels, or clickable badges carrying the
+    # real value on the authenticated app preview — feature #188).
+    rendered = restore_masks(rendered, secret_entries, click_to_copy=click_to_copy)
+
+    # Add heading IDs for TOC navigation
+    rendered = _add_heading_ids(rendered)
+
+    # Sanitize: raw HTML in vault content must never reach the DOM (BUG-021).
+    rendered = sanitize_html(rendered)
+
+    return rendered

backend/requirements.txt

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-fastapi==0.110.3
-uvicorn==0.30.0
+fastapi==0.141.1
+uvicorn==0.54.0
 websockets>=12.0
 python-frontmatter==1.1.0
-mistune==3.0.2
-python-multipart==0.0.9
+mistune==3.3.3
+python-multipart==0.0.31
 aiofiles==23.2.1
 aiohttp>=3.9.0
 watchdog>=4.0.0
@@ -11,12 +11,36 @@ argon2-cffi>=23.1.0
 python-jose>=3.3.0
 sortedcontainers>=2.4.0
 snowballstemmer>=2.2.0
-weasyprint>=60.0
+weasyprint>=70.0
 httpx>=0.27.0
-pypdf>=4.0
+# Plancher de sécurité (BUG-093) : 6.16.0 est vulnérable à deux DoS de
+# ressources (PYSEC-2026-3910 outlines, PYSEC-2026-3911 XForm, fix 6.16.1),
+# atteignables via backend/pdf_reader.py (PDF fournis par l'utilisateur).
+# Le plancher doit être >= 6.16.1 : l'image Act du runner embarque 6.16.0
+# dans sa toolcache Python, donc un plancher trop bas est « already satisfied »
+# et n'est jamais mis à niveau.
+pypdf>=6.16.1
 pyotp>=2.10.0
+segno>=1.5.0
 webauthn==2.6.0
 psutil>=5.9
 pywebpush>=2.3.0
-mcp==1.9.4
+mcp==1.28.1
+# Plancher de sécurité (BUG-091, BUG-095) : pyjwt est une dépendance transitive
+# (mcp). 2.12.x → PYSEC-2026-178 (fix 2.13.0) ; 2.13.0 → CVE-2026-102274
+# (fix 2.14.0). pip-audit étant bloquant, on reste au-dessus du dernier correctif.
+pyjwt[crypto]>=2.14.0
 sse-starlette==2.1.3
+openpyxl>=3.1
+xlrd==2.0.2
+odfpy==1.4.1
+python-docx>=1.1
+reportlab>=4.0
+pillow>=10.0
+# Plancher urllib3 >= 2.8.0 (CVE-2026-97687, CVE-2026-97688, CVE-2026-97689)
+urllib3>=2.8.0
+# Plancher de sécurité (CVE-2026-104874, fix 6.9.1) : multidict est transitive
+# (aiohttp/yarl). 6.7.x est la version pré-installée dans la toolcache de
+# l'image du runner — sans plancher, pip répond « already satisfied » et
+# n'aligne jamais (même piège que pypdf, BUG-093).
+multidict>=6.9.1

backend/routers/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+"""ObsiGate — routers FastAPI par domaine (ROADMAP #85).
+
+Découpage progressif du monolithe ``backend/main.py`` : chaque module de ce
+paquet expose un ``APIRouter`` monté par ``main.py``. Les handlers sont
+déplacés sans changement de comportement (mêmes chemins, mêmes modèles de
+réponse, mêmes dépendances d'authentification).
+"""

backend/routers/backups.py

@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+"""Backup endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 4).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/file/{vault}/backups|diff|restore``,
+``/api/backups*``), mêmes modèles de réponse, mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification. La logique métier vit déjà dans
+:mod:`backend.services.backups`.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` / ``_backup_file`` / ``_list_backup_files`` de
+  ``main`` n'étaient que des wrappers directs : appelés ici via
+  :mod:`backend.services.paths` et :mod:`backend.services.backups`.
+- ``RestoreRequest`` / ``RestoreResponse`` / ``DiffResponse`` ont déménagé
+  dans :mod:`backend.schemas`.
+- Le singleton SSE vit désormais dans :mod:`backend.sse` (partagé avec
+  ``main`` : les clients ``/api/events`` reçoivent les mêmes broadcasts).
+"""
+
+import logging
+import os
+import time
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import get_vault_data, index, update_single_file
+from backend.schemas import (
+    BackupContentResponse,
+    BackupsAutoResponse,
+    BackupsCompressResponse,
+    BackupsDeletedResponse,
+    BackupsListResponse,
+    BackupsResponse,
+    DiffResponse,
+    RestoreRequest,
+    RestoreResponse,
+)
+from backend.services.backups import (
+    create_backup,
+)
+from backend.services.backups import (
+    diff_backup as service_diff_backup,
+)
+from backend.services.backups import (
+    list_backup_files as service_list_backup_files,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    restore_backup as service_restore_backup,
+)
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+from backend.webhooks import dispatch_webhooks
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["backups"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/backups", response_model=BackupsResponse)
+async def api_file_backups(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """List all available backups for a file.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative path of the file within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        BackupListResponse with backups sorted newest first.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+
+    try:
+        backups = service_list_backup_files(vault_name, path)
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Error listing backups for {vault_name}/{path}: {type(e).__name__}: {e}", exc_info=True)
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Erreur lors de la lecture des backups: {e!s}")
+
+    return {"vault": vault_name, "path": path, "backups": backups}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/diff", response_model=DiffResponse)
+async def api_file_diff(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    version: int = Query(..., description="Timestamp of the backup version (left/old side)"),
+    compare_with: int | None = Query(default=None, description="Timestamp of another backup (right/new side). If omitted, compares with the current file."),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Generate a unified diff between a backup version and another version or the current file.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative path of the file within the vault.
+        version: Timestamp of the backup to use as the old/left side.
+        compare_with: Optional timestamp of another backup as the new/right side.
+                       If omitted, the current file on disk is used.
+
+    Returns:
+        DiffResponse containing the unified diff string.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    return service_diff_backup(vault_name, path, version, compare_with)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/file/{vault_name}/restore", response_model=RestoreResponse)
+async def api_file_restore(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    body: RestoreRequest = ..., # type: ignore
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Restore a file from a backup version.
+
+    The current file is backed up before being overwritten (so the operation is reversible).
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative path of the file within the vault.
+        body: RestoreRequest with the backup version timestamp.
+
+    Returns:
+        RestoreResponse confirming the restore.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_restore_backup(vault_name, path, body.version)
+    current_backed_up = result["current_backed_up"]
+
+    # Update index
+    await update_single_file(vault_name, path)
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("file_restored", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": path,
+        "restored_from": body.version,
+        "current_backed_up": current_backed_up,
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("file_restored", {"vault": vault_name, "path": path, "restored_from": body.version})
+
+    return {
+        "success": True,
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": path,
+        "restored_from": body.version,
+        "current_backed_up": current_backed_up,
+    }
+
+
+@router.get("/api/backups", response_model=BackupsListResponse)
+async def api_backups_list(
+    vault: str | None = Query(None, description="Filter by vault name"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """List all backups across vaults, grouped by file."""
+    result: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    try:
+      for vault_name in index:
+        if vault and vault_name != vault:
+            continue
+        if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+            continue
+        vd = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+        if not vd:
+            continue
+        vault_root = Path(vd["path"])
+        backup_root = Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_BACKUP_DIR", ".obsigate-backup"))
+        if not backup_root.is_absolute():
+            backup_root = vault_root / backup_root
+        vault_backup_dir = backup_root / vault_name
+        if not vault_backup_dir.exists():
+            continue
+        for fpath in vault_backup_dir.rglob("*.bak"):
+            if not fpath.is_file():
+                continue
+            st = fpath.stat()
+            fsize = st.st_size
+            ts_part = fpath.name.rsplit(".", 2)
+            if len(ts_part) < 3 or not ts_part[-2].isdigit():
+                continue
+            ts = int(ts_part[-2])
+            rel_dir = str(fpath.parent.relative_to(vault_backup_dir)).replace("\\", "/")
+            rel_file = rel_dir + "/" + ts_part[0] if rel_dir != "." else ts_part[0]
+            result.append({
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "file": rel_file,
+                "backup_file": fpath.name,
+                "timestamp": ts,
+                "datetime": datetime.fromtimestamp(ts, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+                "size": fsize,
+                "full_path": str(fpath),
+            })
+
+      result.sort(key=lambda x: x["timestamp"], reverse=True)
+      total_size = sum(r["size"] for r in result)
+      return {"backups": result, "total": len(result), "total_size_bytes": total_size}
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Error listing backups: {type(e).__name__}: {e}", exc_info=True)
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Erreur listing backups: {e!s}")
+
+
+@router.post("/api/backups/delete", response_model=BackupsDeletedResponse)
+async def api_backups_delete(
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Delete one or more backup files."""
+    paths = body.get("paths", [])
+    if not paths:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="No backup paths provided")
+
+    deleted = 0
+    for p in paths:
+        try:
+            fpath = Path(p)
+            # Security: ensure path is within a backup directory
+            if ".obsigate-backup" not in str(fpath):
+                continue
+            if fpath.exists() and fpath.is_file():
+                fpath.unlink()
+                deleted += 1
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Failed to delete backup {p}: {e}")
+
+    return {"deleted": deleted}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/backups/purge", response_model=BackupsDeletedResponse)
+async def api_backups_purge(
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Purge all backups for a specific file or entire vault."""
+    vault_name = body.get("vault")
+    file_path = body.get("file")  # optional
+
+    if not vault_name:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Vault name required")
+
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
+
+    vd = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vd:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Vault not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vd["path"])
+    backup_root = Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_BACKUP_DIR", ".obsigate-backup"))
+    if not backup_root.is_absolute():
+        backup_root = vault_root / backup_root
+
+    if file_path:
+        # Delete backups for specific file
+        backup_dir = backup_root / vault_name / Path(file_path).parent
+        if backup_dir.exists():
+            fname = Path(file_path).name
+            deleted = 0
+            for f in backup_dir.iterdir():
+                if f.is_file() and f.name.startswith(fname + ".") and f.name.endswith(".bak"):
+                    f.unlink()
+                    deleted += 1
+            return {"deleted": deleted}
+        return {"deleted": 0}
+    else:
+        # Delete all backups for vault
+        vault_backup_dir = backup_root / vault_name
+        if vault_backup_dir.exists():
+            deleted = 0
+            for f in vault_backup_dir.rglob("*.bak"):
+                if f.is_file():
+                    f.unlink()
+                    deleted += 1
+            return {"deleted": deleted}
+        return {"deleted": 0}
+
+
+
+@router.get("/api/backups/content", response_model=BackupContentResponse)
+async def api_backups_content(
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Full path to backup file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return the content of a specific backup file."""
+    try:
+        fpath = Path(path)
+        if ".obsigate-backup" not in str(fpath):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
+        if not fpath.exists() or not fpath.is_file():
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup not found")
+        content = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+        # Truncate large files to 100KB
+        if len(content) > 102400:
+            content = content[:102400] + "\n\n... (tronque a 100 Ko)"
+        return {"content": content, "name": fpath.name, "size": len(content)}
+    except HTTPException:
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
+
+
+@router.post("/api/backups/compress", response_model=BackupsCompressResponse)
+async def api_backups_compress(
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Compress backups older than N days. Body: {older_than_days: 30, dry_run: false}"""
+    import gzip as gz_mod
+    older_than = body.get("older_than_days", 30)
+    dry_run = body.get("dry_run", False)
+    cutoff = time.time() - (older_than * 86400)
+    compressed = 0
+    saved_bytes = 0
+
+    for vault_name in index:
+        if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+            continue
+        vd = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+        if not vd:
+            continue
+        vault_root = Path(vd["path"])
+        backup_root = Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_BACKUP_DIR", ".obsigate-backup"))
+        if not backup_root.is_absolute():
+            backup_root = vault_root / backup_root
+        vault_dir = backup_root / vault_name
+        if not vault_dir.exists():
+            continue
+        for fpath in vault_dir.rglob("*.bak"):
+            if not fpath.is_file():
+                continue
+            if fpath.name.endswith(".bak.gz"):
+                continue
+            mtime = fpath.stat().st_mtime
+            if mtime > cutoff:
+                continue
+            if not dry_run:
+                try:
+                    gz_path = fpath.with_suffix(fpath.suffix + ".gz")
+                    data = fpath.read_bytes()
+                    with gz_mod.open(str(gz_path), "wb", compresslevel=6) as gzf:
+                        gzf.write(data)
+                    orig_size = len(data)
+                    gz_size = gz_path.stat().st_size
+                    if gz_size < orig_size:
+                        fpath.unlink()
+                        saved_bytes += (orig_size - gz_size)
+                    else:
+                        gz_path.unlink()  # compression didn't help
+                    compressed += 1
+                except Exception as e:
+                    logger.warning(f"Failed to compress {fpath}: {e}")
+            else:
+                compressed += 1
+
+    return {"compressed": compressed, "saved_bytes": saved_bytes, "dry_run": dry_run}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/backups/auto", response_model=BackupsAutoResponse)
+async def api_backups_auto(
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Create backups for files modified since a given time. Body: {since_hours: 24}"""
+    since_hours = body.get("since_hours", 24)
+    cutoff = time.time() - (since_hours * 3600)
+    backed_up = 0
+
+    for vault_name in index:
+        if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+            continue
+        vd = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+        if not vd:
+            continue
+        vault_root = Path(vd["path"])
+        for fpath in vault_root.rglob("*"):
+            if not fpath.is_file():
+                continue
+            if fpath.name.startswith('.'):
+                continue
+            if any(p.startswith('.') or p in {'.obsidian', '.trash', '.git', '.obsigate-backup', '__pycache__', 'node_modules'} for p in fpath.relative_to(vault_root).parts):
+                continue
+            mtime = fpath.stat().st_mtime
+            if mtime < cutoff:
+                continue
+            try:
+                rel = str(fpath.relative_to(vault_root)).replace("\\", "/")
+                create_backup(fpath, vault_name, rel)
+                backed_up += 1
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Auto-backup failed for {rel}: {e}")
+
+    return {"backed_up": backed_up, "since_hours": since_hours}

backend/routers/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+"""Configuration, AI keys, diagnostics & dashboard endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 7).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/config*``, ``/api/diagnostics``,
+``/api/dashboard``), mêmes modèles de réponse, mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_load_config`` / ``_save_config`` / ``_DEFAULT_CONFIG`` /
+  ``_CONFIG_PATH`` / ``_BASE_DIR`` ont déménagé ici : ``main`` les
+  réimporte pour son lifespan (pas de cycle : ce module ne dépend pas de
+  ``main``).
+- ``AI_KEYS_FILE`` / ``_write_ai_keys`` / ``_FALLBACK_MODELS`` ont déménagé
+  ici (``AI_KEYS_FILE`` garde son chemin relatif ``data/api_keys.json``,
+  résolu depuis le même CWD au runtime).
+"""
+
+import json as _json
+import logging
+import os
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.ai import PROVIDERS, _read_ai_keys, get_ai_key
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import index
+from backend.media_types import IMAGE_EXTENSIONS
+from backend.schemas import (
+    AIKeyDeleteResponse,
+    AIKeysResponse,
+    AIModelsResponse,
+    AITestResponse,
+    AppConfigResponse,
+    DashboardResponse,
+    DiagnosticsResponse,
+    StatusResponse,
+)
+from backend.search_executor import get_search_executor
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    TOOL_KEY_NAMES as _TOOL_KEY_NAMES,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    delete_tool_key as _delete_tool_key,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    get_tool_key as _get_tool_key,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    mask_value as _mask_tool_value,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    set_tool_key as _set_tool_key,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["System"])
+
+_BASE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
+_CONFIG_PATH = _BASE_DIR / "data" / "config.json"
+
+_DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
+    "search_workers": 2,
+    "debounce_ms": 300,
+    "results_per_page": 50,
+    "min_query_length": 2,
+    "search_timeout_ms": 30000,
+    "max_content_size": 100000,
+    "snippet_context_chars": 120,
+    "max_snippet_highlights": 5,
+    "title_boost": 3.0,
+    "path_boost": 1.5,
+    "watcher_enabled": True,
+    "watcher_use_polling": False,
+    "watcher_polling_interval": 5.0,
+    "watcher_debounce": 2.0,
+    "tag_boost": 2.0,
+    "prefix_max_expansions": 50,
+    "recent_files_limit": 20,
+    "max_backups_per_file": 10,
+    "ai_default_provider": "deepseek",
+    "ai_default_models": {},
+}
+
+
+def _load_config() -> dict:
+    """Load config from disk, merging with defaults."""
+    config = dict(_DEFAULT_CONFIG)
+    if _CONFIG_PATH.exists():
+        try:
+            stored = _json.loads(_CONFIG_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            config.update(stored)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Failed to read config.json: {e}")
+    return config
+
+
+def _save_config(config: dict) -> None:
+    """Persist config to disk."""
+    try:
+        _CONFIG_PATH.write_text(
+            _json.dumps(config, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Failed to write config.json: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to save config: {e}")
+
+
+AI_KEYS_FILE = Path("data/api_keys.json")
+
+def _write_ai_keys(data: dict):
+    AI_KEYS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = AI_KEYS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(_json.dumps(data, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(AI_KEYS_FILE)
+
+@router.get("/api/config", response_model=AppConfigResponse)
+async def api_get_config(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return current configuration with defaults for missing keys."""
+    return _load_config()
+
+
+@router.post("/api/config", response_model=AppConfigResponse)
+async def api_set_config(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Update configuration. Only known keys are accepted.
+
+    Keys matching ``_DEFAULT_CONFIG`` are validated and persisted.
+    Unknown keys are silently ignored.
+    Returns the full merged config after update.
+    """
+    current = _load_config()
+    updated_keys = []
+    for key, value in body.items():
+        if key in _DEFAULT_CONFIG:
+            expected_type = type(_DEFAULT_CONFIG[key])
+            if isinstance(value, expected_type) or (expected_type is float and isinstance(value, (int, float))):
+                current[key] = value
+                updated_keys.append(key)
+            else:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=400,
+                    detail=f"Invalid type for '{key}': expected {expected_type.__name__}, got {type(value).__name__}",
+                )
+    _save_config(current)
+    if any(k.startswith("ai_") for k in updated_keys):
+        try:
+            from backend.ai import reload_ai_config
+            reload_ai_config()
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Failed to reload AI config: {e}")
+    logger.info(f"Config updated: {updated_keys}")
+    return current
+
+
+@router.get("/api/config/ai-keys", response_model=AIKeysResponse)
+async def api_get_ai_keys(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Return stored AI keys (values masked)."""
+    keys = _read_ai_keys()
+    masked = {}
+    for k in ["DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY", "NVIDIA_API_KEY", "QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY"]:
+        val = keys.get(k, "") or os.environ.get(k, "")
+        if val:
+            masked[k] = val[:4] + "..." + val[-4:] if len(val) > 8 else "***"
+        else:
+            masked[k] = ""
+    return masked
+
+@router.post("/api/config/ai-keys", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_set_ai_keys(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Save AI keys. Pass {"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY":"sk-...","OPENROUTER_API_KEY":"...","GEMINI_API_KEY":"..."}"""
+    keys = _read_ai_keys()
+    for k in ["DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY", "NVIDIA_API_KEY", "QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY"]:
+        if body.get(k):
+            keys[k] = body[k]
+    _write_ai_keys(keys)
+    logger.info("AI keys updated")
+    return {"status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/config/ai-keys/{provider_env}", response_model=AIKeyDeleteResponse)
+async def api_delete_ai_key(provider_env: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Delete a specific AI provider key from storage."""
+    allowed = {"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY",
+               "NVIDIA_API_KEY", "QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY"}
+    key_name = provider_env.upper()
+    if key_name not in allowed:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Clé inconnue: {provider_env}")
+    keys = _read_ai_keys()
+    if key_name in keys:
+        del keys[key_name]
+        _write_ai_keys(keys)
+    # Also clear from env at runtime so get_ai_key() no longer finds it
+    os.environ.pop(key_name, None)
+    logger.info(f"AI key deleted: {key_name}")
+    return {"status": "deleted", "key": key_name}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/config/tool-keys", response_model=AIKeysResponse)
+async def api_get_tool_keys(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Return tool/connected-source configuration (tokens masked, URLs clear)."""
+    masked = {}
+    for name in _TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+        masked[name] = _mask_tool_value(name, _get_tool_key(name))
+    return masked
+
+
+@router.post("/api/config/tool-keys", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_set_tool_keys(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Save tool/connected-source keys.
+
+    Only whitelisted names (``backend.tools.secrets.TOOL_KEY_NAMES``) are
+    accepted: Tavily/Brave/SerpAPI/Exa API keys, Gitea URL + token, GitHub
+    token. Empty values delete the stored entry.
+    """
+    updated = []
+    for name, value in body.items():
+        if name not in _TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Clé inconnue: {name}")
+        if value is not None and not isinstance(value, str):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Type invalide pour {name}")
+        _set_tool_key(name, value or "")
+        updated.append(name)
+    logger.info(f"Tool keys updated: {updated}")
+    return {"status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/config/tool-keys/{name}", response_model=AIKeyDeleteResponse)
+async def api_delete_tool_key(name: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Delete a stored tool key (the environment fallback still applies)."""
+    key_name = name.upper()
+    try:
+        existed = _delete_tool_key(key_name)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
+    logger.info(f"Tool key deleted: {key_name} (existed={existed})")
+    return {"status": "deleted", "key": key_name}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/config/ai-keys/test", response_model=AITestResponse)
+async def api_test_ai_keys(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Test which AI providers are configured.
+
+    Each provider has a dedicated (URL, header-name) test pair.
+    - Most OpenAI-compatible APIs use `Authorization: Bearer KEY`
+    - Xiaomi MiMo uses `api-key: KEY`
+    - Gemini uses a query-string key
+    """
+    results = {}
+    for key_name, label, test_url_tmpl, header_name in [
+        # OpenAI-compatible — Authorization: Bearer
+        ("DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",  "deepseek",   "https://api.deepseek.com/v1/models",                   "Authorization"),
+        ("OPENROUTER_API_KEY","openrouter", "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/models",                   "Authorization"),
+        ("NVIDIA_API_KEY",    "nvidia",     "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models",           "Authorization"),
+        ("QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "qwencloud",  "https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1/models", "Authorization"),
+        ("MISTRAL_API_KEY",   "mistral",    "https://api.mistral.ai/v1/models",                     "Authorization"),
+        # Xiaomi MiMo — dedicated api-key header (NOT Authorization: Bearer)
+        ("XIAOMI_API_KEY",    "xiaomi",     "https://api.xiaomimimo.com/v1/models",                 "api-key"),
+        # Gemini — key in query string
+        ("GEMINI_API_KEY",    "gemini",     "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models?key={key}", None),
+    ]:
+        key = get_ai_key(key_name)
+        if not key:
+            results[label] = "non configuré"
+            continue
+        try:
+            url = test_url_tmpl.replace("{key}", key) if "{key}" in test_url_tmpl else test_url_tmpl
+            if header_name:
+                req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={header_name: key})
+            else:
+                req = urllib.request.Request(url)
+            urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5)
+            results[label] = "ok"
+        except Exception as e:
+            # Truncate the error to keep the response small.
+            results[label] = "erreur: " + str(e)[:80]
+    return results
+
+
+@router.get("/api/config/ai-models", response_model=AIModelsResponse)
+async def api_list_ai_models(provider: str = Query(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """List available models for a given AI provider.
+
+    Strategy:
+    1. Try the provider's public models endpoint (OpenAI-compatible /v1/models or Gemini).
+    2. If the network call fails (timeout, 4xx, 5xx, DNS, etc.), fall back to a
+       curated static list of known-good models for that provider.
+    3. Always return a non-empty list when the provider is known, so the UI
+       dropdown is never empty.
+    """
+    provider = provider.lower()
+
+    from backend.model_capabilities import get_capabilities_for_models
+    from backend.provider_capabilities import remember_declared_capabilities
+
+    all_providers = ("deepseek", "openrouter", "gemini", "nvidia", "qwencloud", "xiaomi", "mistral")
+    if provider not in all_providers:
+        return {"models": [], "error": f"Unknown provider: {provider}", "source": "validation"}
+
+    key_name = f"{provider.upper()}_API_KEY"
+    key = get_ai_key(key_name)
+    if not key:
+        # No key configured — return curated fallback list so the UI can
+        # still show what WOULD be available once a key is set.
+        fallback = _FALLBACK_MODELS.get(provider, [])
+        return {"models": fallback, "source": "fallback",
+                "capabilities": get_capabilities_for_models(provider, fallback),
+                "note": "API key not configured — showing default model list"}
+
+    # Build URL
+    if provider == "gemini":
+        url = f"https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models?key={key}"
+    elif provider == "deepseek":
+        url = "https://api.deepseek.com/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "openrouter":
+        url = "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "nvidia":
+        url = "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "qwencloud":
+        url = "https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "xiaomi":
+        # Xiaomi MiMo — dedicated api-key header (NOT Authorization: Bearer).
+        # Endpoint: https://api.xiaomimimo.com/v1/models
+        url = "https://api.xiaomimimo.com/v1/models"
+        models = []  # parsed below with the custom header
+    elif provider == "mistral":
+        url = "https://api.mistral.ai/v1/models"
+
+    try:
+        if provider == "gemini":
+            req = urllib.request.Request(url)
+        elif provider == "xiaomi":
+            # Xiaomi MiMo uses a dedicated api-key header.
+            req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"api-key": key})
+        else:
+            req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + key})
+
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
+            data = _json.loads(resp.read().decode())
+
+        if provider == "gemini":
+            models = [m.get("name", "") for m in data.get("models", []) if m.get("name")]
+            # Gemini returns names like "models/gemini-1.5-flash" — strip prefix
+            models = [m.replace("models/", "") for m in models]
+        else:
+            models = [m.get("id", "") for m in data.get("data", []) if m.get("id")]
+
+        # Cache the capabilities the provider declares for these models
+        # (BUG-044) — get_capabilities_for_models() below then returns the
+        # provider's own truth for the flags it declares, the curated table
+        # for the rest. Providers that declare nothing are left untouched.
+        remember_declared_capabilities(provider, data)
+
+        if models:
+            # Prepend the configured default if not already present
+            default = PROVIDERS.get(provider, {}).get("model")
+            if default and default not in models:
+                models = [default] + models
+            return {"models": models, "source": "live", "count": len(models),
+                    "capabilities": get_capabilities_for_models(provider, models)}
+        # Empty list from API — fall through to fallback
+        raise ValueError("empty model list from provider API")
+    except Exception as e:
+        # Network error, auth error, parsing error — use curated fallback
+        fallback = _FALLBACK_MODELS.get(provider, [])
+        return {"models": fallback, "source": "fallback", "error": str(e)[:200],
+                "capabilities": get_capabilities_for_models(provider, fallback),
+                "note": "Could not reach provider API — showing default model list"}
+
+
+# ── Curated fallback model lists ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# Used when the provider API is unreachable or returns empty.
+# Keep these short and focused on models known to work with the
+# OpenAI-compatible chat completions interface (or Gemini's generateContent).
+_FALLBACK_MODELS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
+    "deepseek": [
+        "deepseek-chat",
+        "deepseek-reasoner",
+    ],
+    "openrouter": [
+        "openai/gpt-4o-mini",
+        "openai/gpt-4o",
+        "anthropic/claude-3.5-sonnet",
+        "anthropic/claude-3-haiku",
+        "google/gemini-2.0-flash-exp:free",
+        "meta-llama/llama-3.1-70b-instruct",
+        "meta-llama/llama-3.1-8b-instruct:free",
+        "mistralai/mistral-large-latest",
+    ],
+    "gemini": [
+        "gemini-2.0-flash",
+        "gemini-2.0-flash-exp",
+        "gemini-1.5-pro",
+        "gemini-1.5-flash",
+        "gemini-1.5-flash-8b",
+    ],
+    "nvidia": [
+        "meta/llama-3.1-405b-instruct",
+        "meta/llama-3.1-70b-instruct",
+        "meta/llama-3.1-8b-instruct",
+        "mistralai/mistral-large",
+        "google/gemma-2-27b-it",
+        "nvidia/llama-3.1-nemotron-70b-instruct",
+    ],
+    "qwencloud": [
+        "qwen-max",
+        "qwen-plus",
+        "qwen-turbo",
+        "qwen-long",
+        "qwen-vl-max",
+        "qwen-vl-plus",
+    ],
+    "xiaomi": [
+        # Xiaomi MiMo models — the public /v1/models endpoint requires the
+        # `api-key` custom header (NOT Authorization: Bearer), so the live
+        # call often fails with 401 even with the right key. We ship a
+        # known-good list as fallback. See https://mimo.mi.com/docs/
+        "mimo-v2.5-pro",
+        "mimo-v2.5",
+        "mimo-v2.5-asr",
+        "mimo-v2.5-tts",
+        "mimo-v2.5-tts-voiceclone",
+        "mimo-v2.5-tts-voicedesign",
+    ],
+    "mistral": [
+        "mistral-large-latest",
+        "mistral-medium-latest",
+        "mistral-small-latest",
+        "open-mistral-7b",
+        "open-mixtral-8x7b",
+        "codestral-latest",
+    ],
+}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/diagnostics", response_model=DiagnosticsResponse)
+async def api_diagnostics(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Return index statistics and system diagnostics.
+
+    Includes document counts, token counts, memory estimates,
+    and inverted index status.
+    """
+    import sys
+
+    from backend.search import get_inverted_index
+
+    inv = get_inverted_index()
+
+    # Per-vault stats
+    vault_stats = {}
+    total_files = 0
+    total_tags = 0
+    # Snapshot both dicts first: the indexer mutates them from background
+    # threads, and iterating a live dict raises "dictionary changed size".
+    for vname, vdata in list(index.items()):
+        file_count = len(vdata.get("files", []))
+        tag_count = len(vdata.get("tags", {}))
+        vault_stats[vname] = {"file_count": file_count, "tag_count": tag_count}
+        total_files += file_count
+        total_tags += tag_count
+
+    # Memory estimate for inverted index
+    word_index = inv.word_index.copy()
+    word_index_entries = sum(len(docs) for docs in word_index.values())
+    mem_estimate_mb = round(
+        (sys.getsizeof(inv.word_index) + word_index_entries * 80
+         + len(inv.doc_info) * 200
+         + len(inv._sorted_tokens) * 60) / (1024 * 1024), 2
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "index": {
+            "total_files": total_files,
+            "total_tags": total_tags,
+            "vaults": vault_stats,
+        },
+        "inverted_index": {
+            "unique_tokens": len(word_index),
+            "total_postings": word_index_entries,
+            "documents": inv.doc_count,
+            "sorted_tokens": len(inv._sorted_tokens),
+            "is_ready": inv.is_ready(),
+            "memory_estimate_mb": mem_estimate_mb,
+        },
+        "config": _load_config(),
+        "search_executor": {
+            "active": get_search_executor() is not None,
+            "max_workers": get_search_executor()._max_workers if get_search_executor() else 0,
+        },
+    }
+
+
+@router.get("/api/dashboard", response_model=DashboardResponse)
+async def api_dashboard(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Aggregated dashboard statistics across all accessible vaults."""
+    vault_stats = []
+    total_files = 0
+    total_tags = set()
+    total_size = 0
+    total_images = 0
+    for vname, vdata in index.items():
+        if not check_vault_access(vname, current_user):
+            continue
+        files = vdata.get("files", [])
+        fc = len(files)
+        total_files += fc
+        vtags = set()
+        vsize = 0
+        vimages = 0
+        for f in files:
+            vtags.update(f.get("tags", []))
+            vsize += f.get("size", 0)
+            if (f.get("extension") or "").lower() in IMAGE_EXTENSIONS:
+                vimages += 1
+        total_tags.update(vtags)
+        total_size += vsize
+        total_images += vimages
+        vault_stats.append({
+            "name": vname, "file_count": fc, "tag_count": len(vtags),
+            "total_size_bytes": vsize, "image_count": vimages,
+        })
+    return {
+        "vaults": vault_stats,
+        "total_files": total_files,
+        "total_tags": len(total_tags),
+        "total_size_bytes": total_size,
+        "total_images": total_images,
+    }

backend/routers/conflicts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+"""Syncthing conflict endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/conflicts*``), mêmes modèles de
+réponse, mêmes dépendances d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` / ``_backup_file`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths`
+  et :mod:`backend.services.backups` (pass-through).
+"""
+
+import logging
+import shutil
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+
+from backend.audit import log_file_delete
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import get_conflicts, get_vault_data, remove_single_file
+from backend.schemas import ConflictResolveResponse, ConflictsResponse
+from backend.services.backups import create_backup
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["conflicts"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/conflicts", response_model=ConflictsResponse)
+async def api_conflicts(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List sync-conflict files across accessible vaults."""
+    all_conflicts = get_conflicts()
+    # #194 : filtrage via check_vault_access ("*" n'inclut pas les homes).
+    all_conflicts = [c for c in all_conflicts if check_vault_access(c["vault"], current_user)]
+    return {"conflicts": all_conflicts, "total": len(all_conflicts)}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/conflicts/resolve", response_model=ConflictResolveResponse)
+async def api_conflict_resolve(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Resolve a conflict: keep_local (delete conflict file) or keep_conflict (replace original)."""
+    vault_name = body.get("vault")
+    conflict_path = body.get("conflict_path")
+    original_path = body.get("original_path")
+    action = body.get("action")  # "keep_local" or "keep_conflict"
+    # mypy: narrow down from dict values
+    assert isinstance(vault_name, str), "'vault' is required and must be a string"
+    assert isinstance(conflict_path, str), "'conflict_path' is required and must be a string"
+    assert isinstance(original_path, str), "'original_path' is required and must be a string"
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Vault not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    conf_file = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, conflict_path)
+    orig_file = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, original_path)
+    if not conf_file.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Conflict file not found")
+    try:
+        if action == "keep_conflict":
+            create_backup(orig_file, vault_name, original_path)
+            shutil.copy2(conf_file, orig_file)
+            logger.info(f"Conflict resolved (keep_conflict): {conflict_path} → {original_path}")
+        conf_file.unlink()
+        await remove_single_file(vault_name, conflict_path)
+        log_file_delete(current_user["username"], vault_name, conflict_path)
+        await sse_manager.broadcast("file_deleted", {"vault": vault_name, "path": conflict_path})
+        return {"status": "resolved", "action": action}
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise HTTPException(500, f"Error resolving conflict: {e!s}")

backend/routers/duplicates.py

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+"""Duplicate detection & merge endpoints (#166).
+
+Read endpoints require vault access; the merge endpoint is destructive
+(backup first in the service layer) and additionally requires the
+confirmation token pattern used by mutating routes — here enforced by an
+explicit ``confirm=true`` body flag, mirroring the agent two-step flow.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.services import duplicates as _duplicates
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/duplicates", tags=["duplicates"])
+
+
+class DuplicatePair(BaseModel):
+    """One candidate duplicate pair."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    file_a: str = Field(description="First file (vault-relative)")
+    file_b: str = Field(description="Second file (vault-relative)")
+    score: float = Field(description="Blended similarity in [0, 1]")
+
+
+class DuplicatesResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response for GET /api/duplicates."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    threshold: float = Field(description="Applied threshold")
+    files_scanned: int = Field(description="Markdown files compared")
+    truncated: bool = Field(description="True when the scan hit the file cap")
+    pairs: list[DuplicatePair] = Field(description="Candidate pairs, best score first")
+
+
+class MergeResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response for POST /api/duplicates/merge."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    strategy: str = Field(description="Applied merge strategy")
+    target: str = Field(description="Surviving note")
+    deleted: str = Field(description="Absorbed note (deleted after merge)")
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=DuplicatesResponse)
+async def api_duplicates_list(
+    vault: str = Query(..., description="Vault name"),
+    threshold: float = Query(0.75, ge=0.3, le=1.0, description="Minimum similarity"),
+    limit: int = Query(20, ge=1, le=200, description="Max pairs"),
+    subdir: str = Query("", description="Directory scope"),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """List candidate duplicate notes ordered by descending score."""
+    if not check_vault_access(vault, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"No access to vault '{vault}'")
+    try:
+        return _duplicates.find_duplicate_pairs(vault, threshold=threshold, limit=limit, subdir=subdir)
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(e.status or 400, e.message) from e
+
+
+@router.post("/merge", response_model=MergeResponse)
+async def api_duplicates_merge(
+    body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Merge *source_path* into *target_path* (``confirm: true`` required)."""
+    vault = str(body.get("vault") or "")
+    if not check_vault_access(vault, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"No access to vault '{vault}'")
+    if body.get("confirm") is not True:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Fusion destructive : confirmez avec {confirm: true}")
+    try:
+        return _duplicates.merge_duplicates(
+            vault,
+            str(body.get("source_path") or ""),
+            str(body.get("target_path") or ""),
+            strategy=str(body.get("strategy") or "append"),
+        )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(e.status or 400, e.message) from e

backend/routers/file_chat.py

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+# backend/routers/file_chat.py — chat (#169, #190)
+"""Chat endpoints: history read + message post with SSE fan-out.
+
+- ``GET/POST /api/file/{vault_name}/chat`` — per-file chat: auth + vault
+  access + path traversal check (``resolve_safe_path`` raises
+  ``ServiceError`` mapped by the app-level handler).
+- ``GET/POST /api/chat`` — the **general chat** (#190), not bound to a file.
+- ``POST /api/chat/upload`` / ``GET /api/chat/attachment/{name}`` (#190):
+  image/video attachments (extension allow-list, size cap, UUID name).
+
+Every post is broadcast on the existing SSE channel (``chat_message``) so
+all connected clients update live without a second WebSocket.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, File, HTTPException, UploadFile
+from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
+
+from backend import file_chat as _store
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.auth.user_store import get_all_users, get_user
+from backend.indexer import get_vault_data
+from backend.schemas import ChatHistoryResponse, ChatMessageResponse, ChatReadResponse, StatusResponse
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+router = APIRouter()  # tags dérivés de `tag_for_path` → « Files »
+
+
+def _check(vault_name: str, path: str, current_user: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """Authz + traversal guard shared by both verbs."""
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Vault not found")
+    resolve_safe_path(Path(vault_data["path"]), path)  # ServiceError → 403/500
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/chat", response_model=ChatHistoryResponse)
+async def api_file_chat_history(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str,
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return the chat history for a file (chronological)."""
+    _check(vault_name, path, current_user)
+    return {"messages": _store.get_messages(vault_name, path), "read": _store.get_read(vault_name, path)}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/file/{vault_name}/chat", response_model=ChatMessageResponse)
+async def api_file_chat_post(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Post a chat message and broadcast it on SSE (``chat_message``)."""
+    path = str(body.get("path") or "")
+    text = str(body.get("text") or "")
+    if not path:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "path is required")
+    if not text.strip():
+        raise HTTPException(400, "text is required")
+    _check(vault_name, path, current_user)
+    msg = _store.add_message(vault_name, path, current_user.get("username", ""), text)
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("chat_message", {"vault": vault_name, "path": path, "message": msg})
+    return {"message": msg, "status": "ok"}
+
+
+# --- #190 : chat général ----------------------------------------------------
+
+def _attachment(body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Validate the optional ``attachment`` object sent by the client."""
+    raw = body.get("attachment")
+    if not raw or not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return None
+    name = str(raw.get("name") or "")
+    # Only an already-uploaded file (or an http(s) URL) may travel along.
+    if not _store.attachment_path(name) and not str(raw.get("url", "")).startswith(("http://", "https://", "/api/")):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "attachment inconnu")
+    return {
+        "name": name,
+        "url": str(raw.get("url") or ""),
+        "mime": str(raw.get("mime") or ""),
+        "kind": str(raw.get("kind") or "file"),
+    }
+
+
+@router.get("/api/chat", response_model=ChatHistoryResponse)
+async def api_chat_history(current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return the general chat history (#190, chronological)."""
+    return {
+        "messages": _store.get_global_messages(),
+        "read": _store.get_read(_store.GLOBAL_VAULT, _store.GLOBAL_PATH),
+    }
+
+
+# --- #192 : accusé de réception ---------------------------------------------
+
+def _check_read(vault: str, path: str, current_user: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """Authorization for marking a conversation read (#192).
+
+    General chat is open to any member, a DM only to the two participants,
+    a file chat follows the vault ACL.
+    """
+    if vault == _store.GLOBAL_VAULT:
+        return
+    if vault == _store.DM_VAULT:
+        if current_user.get("username") not in str(path).split("|"):
+            raise HTTPException(403, "Accès refusé à cette conversation privée")
+        return
+    _check(vault, path, current_user)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/chat/read", response_model=ChatReadResponse)
+async def api_chat_read(
+    body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Record that the caller has seen a conversation (#192).
+
+    Broadcast on SSE (``chat_read``) so the sender's own messages flip to
+    ✓✓ live on every connected client.
+    """
+    vault = str(body.get("vault") or "")
+    path = str(body.get("path") or "")
+    if not vault or not path:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "vault and path are required")
+    _check_read(vault, path, current_user)
+    username = current_user.get("username", "")
+    read = _store.mark_read(vault, path, username)
+    await sse_manager.broadcast(
+        "chat_read",
+        {"vault": vault, "path": path, "user": username, "ts": read.get(username, 0.0), "read": read},
+    )
+    return {"read": read, "status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/chat", response_model=ChatMessageResponse)
+async def api_chat_post(
+    body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Post to the general chat and broadcast it on SSE (``chat_message``)."""
+    text = str(body.get("text") or "")
+    if not text.strip():
+        raise HTTPException(400, "text is required")
+    # #191 — best-effort link preview: a dead/slow URL never blocks the post.
+    msg = _store.add_global_message(
+        current_user.get("username", ""), text, _attachment(body),
+        _store.build_preview(text),
+    )
+    await sse_manager.broadcast(
+        "chat_message",
+        {"vault": _store.GLOBAL_VAULT, "path": _store.GLOBAL_PATH, "message": msg},
+    )
+    return {"message": msg, "status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/chat/upload")
+async def api_chat_upload(
+    file: UploadFile = File(...),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Store an image/video attachment (#190). Returns ``{attachment}``."""
+    data = await file.read()
+    try:
+        info = _store.save_attachment(file.filename or "", data)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
+    return {"attachment": info}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/chat/attachment/{name}")
+async def api_chat_attachment(name: str, current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Serve an uploaded attachment (name validated against the allow-list)."""
+    path = _store.attachment_path(name)
+    if not path:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Attachment not found")
+    info = _store._MIME_BY_EXT.get(path.suffix.lower(), "application/octet-stream")
+    return FileResponse(str(path), media_type=info)
+
+
+# --- #191 : suppression + messages privés -----------------------------------
+
+def _owner_or_admin(msg_user: str, current_user: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """A post may be deleted by its author or by an admin."""
+    if current_user.get("role") != "admin" and current_user.get("username") != msg_user:
+        raise HTTPException(403, "Seul l'auteur ou un administrateur peut supprimer ce message")
+
+
+def _find_and_authorize(vault: str, path: str, message_id: str, current_user: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Locate *message_id* in the conversation and check the delete right."""
+    for m in _store.get_messages(vault, path):
+        if m.get("id") == message_id:
+            _owner_or_admin(m.get("user", ""), current_user)
+            return m
+    raise HTTPException(404, "Message not found")
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/chat/{message_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_chat_delete(message_id: str, current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Delete a message from the general chat (author or admin, #191)."""
+    _find_and_authorize(_store.GLOBAL_VAULT, _store.GLOBAL_PATH, message_id, current_user)
+    if not _store.delete_message(_store.GLOBAL_VAULT, _store.GLOBAL_PATH, message_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Message not found")
+    await sse_manager.broadcast(
+        "chat_deleted",
+        {"vault": _store.GLOBAL_VAULT, "path": _store.GLOBAL_PATH, "id": message_id},
+    )
+    return {"status": "deleted"}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/chat/users", response_model=list[dict[str, Any]])
+async def api_chat_users(current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Usernames available for a private conversation (chat DM picker, #191).
+
+    Every authenticated member may see who else is around — this is a
+    self-hosted portal, not a directory that needs hiding.
+    """
+    me = current_user.get("username", "")
+    return [
+        {"username": u.get("username", ""), "display_name": u.get("display_name") or u.get("username", "")}
+        for u in get_all_users()
+        if u.get("username") and u.get("username") != me
+    ]
+
+
+def _dm_peer(username: str, current_user: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Validate the DM peer exists and is not ourselves."""
+    if not username or username == current_user.get("username"):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Destinataire invalide")
+    if not get_user(username):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Utilisateur inconnu")
+    return username
+
+
+@router.get("/api/chat/dm/{username}", response_model=ChatHistoryResponse)
+async def api_chat_dm_history(username: str, current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Private history with *username* (#191)."""
+    peer = _dm_peer(username, current_user)
+    return {
+        "messages": _store.get_dm_messages(current_user["username"], peer),
+        "read": _store.get_read(_store.DM_VAULT, _store.dm_path(current_user["username"], peer)),
+    }
+
+
+@router.post("/api/chat/dm/{username}", response_model=ChatMessageResponse)
+async def api_chat_dm_post(
+    username: str,
+    body: dict[str, Any] = Body(...),
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Post a private message and broadcast it to both participants (#191)."""
+    peer = _dm_peer(username, current_user)
+    text = str(body.get("text") or "")
+    if not text.strip():
+        raise HTTPException(400, "text is required")
+    msg = _store.add_dm_message(
+        current_user["username"], peer, current_user.get("username", ""), text,
+        _attachment(body), _store.build_preview(text),
+    )
+    # Same shape as the general chat so the client routes on vault/path.
+    await sse_manager.broadcast(
+        "chat_message",
+        {"vault": _store.DM_VAULT, "path": _store.dm_path(current_user["username"], peer), "message": msg},
+    )
+    return {"message": msg, "status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/chat/dm/{username}/{message_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_chat_dm_delete(
+    username: str,
+    message_id: str,
+    current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Delete one private message (author or admin, #191)."""
+    peer = _dm_peer(username, current_user)
+    vault, path = _store.DM_VAULT, _store.dm_path(current_user["username"], peer)
+    _find_and_authorize(vault, path, message_id, current_user)
+    if not _store.delete_message(vault, path, message_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Message not found")
+    await sse_manager.broadcast(
+        "chat_deleted", {"vault": vault, "path": path, "id": message_id}
+    )
+    return {"status": "deleted"}

backend/routers/files_media.py

@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
+"""Media, PDF, export & vault-settings endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 6c).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/file/*/pdf*``, ``/api/export/*``,
+``/api/guide/download``, ``/api/image/*``, ``/api/media*``,
+``/api/attachments/*``, ``/api/vaults/*/settings``, ``/api/vault/*/files``,
+``/api/vaults/settings/all``), mêmes modèles de réponse, mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths` (pass-through).
+- ``_render_markdown`` vient de :mod:`backend.render` (#85 T9, sans cycle
+  d'import).
+- ``_resolve_export_target`` / ``_safe_export_name`` (export uniquement)
+  sont définis ici ; ``stream_file_with_range`` vit dans
+  :mod:`backend.routers.helpers` (partagé).
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Request
+from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, Response
+
+from backend.attachment_indexer import get_attachment_stats, rescan_vault_attachments
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.export import ExportError, export_epub, export_html, export_md_bundle
+from backend.history import record_open
+from backend.indexer import get_vault_data, index, parse_markdown_file
+from backend.media_thumbs import generate_thumbnail, is_decodable
+from backend.media_types import is_audio, is_image, is_video, media_mime_type
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
+from backend.routers.helpers import media_max_inline_bytes, stream_file_with_range
+from backend.schemas import (
+    AllVaultSettingsResponse,
+    AttachmentRescanResponse,
+    AttachmentStatsResponse,
+    PdfInfoResponse,
+    VaultFilesResponse,
+    VaultSettingsResponse,
+)
+from backend.secret_redactor import redact_file_content
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.vaults import list_all_files
+from backend.vault_settings import get_vault_setting, update_vault_setting
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+# Lazy import: WeasyPrint PDF export (requires GTK, may not be available everywhere)
+try:
+    from backend.pdf_export import build_pdf_html, generate_pdf
+except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - WeasyPrint/GTK missing
+    generate_pdf = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+    build_pdf_html = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+    logging.getLogger("obsigate").warning("PDF export unavailable (WeasyPrint/GTK not found)")
+
+router = APIRouter()  # pas de tags : assignation par chemin via openapi_docs.tag_for_path (comme avant)
+
+
+def _resolve_export_target(vault_name: str, path: str, current_user: dict) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
+    """Resolve a vault + relative path into (vault_root, absolute file path).
+
+    Enforces auth (vault access) and path traversal protection.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    target = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    return vault_root, target
+
+
+def _safe_export_name(name: str) -> str:
+    """ASCII-safe, filename-safe download name (falls back to 'document')."""
+    cleaned = "".join(c for c in name if c.isascii() and (c.isalnum() or c in " _-.")).strip()
+    return cleaned or "document"
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/file/{vault_name}/pdf",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"application/pdf": {}}, "description": "PDF document"}},
+)
+async def api_file_pdf(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Download a markdown file as PDF."""
+    if generate_pdf is None:
+        raise HTTPException(501, "PDF export unavailable (WeasyPrint/GTK not available)")
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    if not file_path.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(404, f"File not found: {path}")
+    try:
+        raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except Exception:
+        raise HTTPException(500, "Cannot read file")
+    record_open(current_user.get("username"), vault_name, path)
+    raw = redact_file_content(raw, str(file_path))
+    post = parse_markdown_file(raw)
+    html = _render_markdown(post.content, vault_name, file_path)
+    title = post.metadata.get("title", file_path.stem)
+    pdf_html = build_pdf_html(html, str(title))
+    pdf_bytes = generate_pdf(pdf_html, str(title))
+    safe_name = "".join(c for c in str(title) if c.isascii() and (c.isalnum() or c in " _-.")).strip() or "document"
+    return Response(content=pdf_bytes, media_type="application/pdf", headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{safe_name}.pdf"'})
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/export/html",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"text/html": {}}, "description": "Standalone HTML file"}},
+)
+async def api_export_html(
+    vault: str = Query(..., description="Vault name"),
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Export a markdown note as a standalone HTML file."""
+    try:
+        vault_root, target = _resolve_export_target(vault, path, current_user)
+        html_bytes = export_html(vault_root, target)
+    except ExportError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
+    record_open(current_user.get("username"), vault, path)
+    safe_name = _safe_export_name(target.stem)
+    return Response(
+        content=html_bytes,
+        media_type="text/html; charset=utf-8",
+        headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{safe_name}.html"'},
+    )
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/export/md-bundle",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"application/zip": {}}, "description": "Markdown ZIP bundle"}},
+)
+async def api_export_md_bundle(
+    vault: str = Query(..., description="Vault name"),
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to directory or file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Export a directory (or single file) of markdown as a ZIP bundle."""
+    try:
+        vault_root, target = _resolve_export_target(vault, path, current_user)
+        zip_bytes = export_md_bundle(vault_root, target)
+    except ExportError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
+    safe_name = _safe_export_name(target.name)
+    return Response(
+        content=zip_bytes,
+        media_type="application/zip",
+        headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{safe_name}.zip"'},
+    )
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/export/epub",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"application/epub+zip": {}}, "description": "ePub document"}},
+)
+async def api_export_epub(
+    vault: str = Query(..., description="Vault name"),
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Export a markdown note as an ePub document."""
+    try:
+        vault_root, target = _resolve_export_target(vault, path, current_user)
+        epub_bytes = export_epub(vault_root, target)
+    except ExportError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
+    record_open(current_user.get("username"), vault, path)
+    safe_name = _safe_export_name(target.stem)
+    return Response(
+        content=epub_bytes,
+        media_type="application/epub+zip",
+        headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{safe_name}.epub"'},
+    )
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/guide/download",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"application/pdf": {}, "text/markdown": {}}}},
+)
+async def api_guide_download(
+    format: str = Query("md", description="Download format: 'md' or 'pdf'"),
+    lang: str = Query("fr", description="Guide language: 'fr' or 'en'"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Download the in-app user guide as Markdown or PDF (#105).
+
+    The document is generated from the live help modal in index.html resolved
+    through the locale files, so it always mirrors exactly what the user sees.
+    """
+    from backend.guide_export import get_guide_document
+
+    if format not in ("md", "pdf"):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="format doit être 'md' ou 'pdf'")
+    try:
+        payload, media, fname = get_guide_document(format, lang)
+    except Exception as e:  # weasyprint/reportlab unavailable
+        logger.exception("guide export failed")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Export impossible: {e}") from e
+    return Response(
+        content=payload,
+        media_type=media,
+        headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{fname}"'},
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/pdf/stream", response_class=FileResponse)
+async def api_pdf_stream(
+    request: Request,
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Stream a PDF file with Content-Type: application/pdf for inline browser viewing.
+
+    Supports HTTP Range requests (206 Partial Content) so browsers can
+    progressively render large PDFs in the native viewer.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+    if file_path.suffix.lower() != ".pdf":
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Not a PDF file")
+
+    return stream_file_with_range(file_path, request, "application/pdf")
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/pdf/info", response_model=PdfInfoResponse)
+async def api_pdf_info(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to PDF file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return PDF metadata (pages, title, author, size) without the document content.
+
+    Lets the UI display file info before loading a heavy PDF into the viewer.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+    if file_path.suffix.lower() != ".pdf":
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Not a PDF file")
+
+    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata
+    meta = extract_pdf_metadata(file_path)
+    stat = file_path.stat()
+    return {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": path,
+        "pages": meta.get("pages", 0),
+        "title": meta.get("title") or file_path.name,
+        "author": meta.get("author", ""),
+        "size_bytes": stat.st_size,
+    }
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/image/{vault_name}",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"application/octet-stream": {}}, "description": "Image bytes"}},
+)
+async def api_image(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to image"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Serve an image file with proper MIME type.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative file path within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        Image file with appropriate content-type header.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Image not found: {path}")
+
+    mime_type = media_mime_type(str(file_path))
+
+    # #108-B3 — a standalone SVG opened in a tab executes its embedded JS
+    # (same-origin XSS). ``sandbox`` forces a unique opaque origin with no
+    # script execution; inside an <img> tag the header is irrelevant.
+    headers = {"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff"}
+    if file_path.suffix.lower() == ".svg":
+        headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "sandbox"
+
+    try:
+        # Read and return the image file
+        content = file_path.read_bytes()
+        return Response(content=content, media_type=mime_type, headers=headers)
+    except PermissionError:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Permission denied")
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Error serving image {vault_name}/{path}: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error serving image: {e!s}")
+
+
+@router.get("/api/media/{vault_name}", response_class=FileResponse)
+async def api_media_stream(
+    request: Request,
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to audio/video file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Stream an audio/video file with HTTP Range support (roadmap #109-A2).
+
+    Serves the bytes with the correct MIME type and honours ``Range`` requests
+    (``206 Partial Content`` + ``Content-Range``/``Accept-Ranges``), which is
+    what enables scrubbing in ``<audio>``/``<video>`` and is required by Safari
+    for MP4. Files above ``OBSIGATE_MEDIA_MAX_INLINE_MB`` (default 500 MB) are
+    refused with ``413`` — the viewer falls back to the download button.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Media not found: {path}")
+
+    ext = file_path.suffix.lower()
+    if not (is_audio(ext) or is_video(ext)):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Not an audio/video file")
+
+    if file_path.stat().st_size > media_max_inline_bytes():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Media too large for inline streaming")
+
+    return stream_file_with_range(file_path, request, media_mime_type(str(file_path)))
+
+
+@router.get("/api/media/{vault_name}/thumb", response_class=FileResponse)
+async def api_media_thumb(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to image"),
+    size: int = Query(256, ge=32, le=1024, description="Max thumbnail edge in pixels"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Serve a cached WebP thumbnail of an image (roadmap #108-C).
+
+    SVG (and any format Pillow cannot decode) falls back to the original
+    bytes. Generation runs in a thread and is capped at 2 s; on timeout or
+    failure the original is served so the UI never breaks.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Image not found: {path}")
+    if not is_image(file_path.suffix.lower()):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Not an image file")
+
+    mime_type = media_mime_type(str(file_path))
+    if not is_decodable(file_path):
+        # SVG: never let a standalone navigation execute embedded JS (#108-B3).
+        svg_headers = {"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff"}
+        if file_path.suffix.lower() == ".svg":
+            svg_headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "sandbox"
+        return FileResponse(str(file_path), media_type=mime_type, headers=svg_headers)
+
+    loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    thumb: Path | None = None
+    try:
+        thumb = await asyncio.wait_for(
+            loop.run_in_executor(None, generate_thumbnail, file_path, size),
+            timeout=2.0,
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        thumb = None
+
+    if thumb is not None and thumb.exists():
+        return FileResponse(str(thumb), media_type="image/webp")
+    return FileResponse(str(file_path), media_type=mime_type)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/attachments/rescan/{vault_name}", response_model=AttachmentRescanResponse)
+async def api_rescan_attachments(vault_name: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Rescan attachments for a specific vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault to rescan.
+
+    Returns:
+        Dict with status and attachment count.
+    """
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_path = vault_data["path"]
+    count = await rescan_vault_attachments(vault_name, vault_path)
+
+    logger.info(f"Rescanned attachments for vault '{vault_name}': {count} attachments")
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": vault_name, "attachment_count": count}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/attachments/stats", response_model=AttachmentStatsResponse)
+async def api_attachment_stats(vault: str | None = Query(None, description="Vault filter"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Get attachment statistics for vaults.
+
+    Args:
+        vault: Optional vault name to filter stats.
+
+    Returns:
+        Dict with vault names as keys and attachment counts as values.
+    """
+    stats = get_attachment_stats(vault)
+    return {"vaults": stats}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vaults/{vault_name}/settings", response_model=VaultSettingsResponse)
+async def api_get_vault_settings(vault_name: str, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Get UI display settings for a specific vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        Dict with vault settings including hideHiddenFiles.
+    """
+    if vault_name not in index:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    # Get persisted settings
+    persisted = get_vault_setting(vault_name) or {}
+
+    # Default settings
+    settings = {
+        "hideHiddenFiles": False,
+    }
+    settings.update(persisted)
+
+    return settings
+
+
+@router.post("/api/vaults/{vault_name}/settings", response_model=VaultSettingsResponse)
+async def api_update_vault_settings(vault_name: str, body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Update UI display settings for a specific vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        body: Dict with settings to update (hideHiddenFiles).
+
+    Returns:
+        Updated settings dict.
+    """
+    if vault_name not in index:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    # Validate settings
+    settings_to_update = {}
+
+    if "hideHiddenFiles" in body:
+        if not isinstance(body["hideHiddenFiles"], bool):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="hideHiddenFiles must be a boolean")
+        settings_to_update["hideHiddenFiles"] = body["hideHiddenFiles"]
+
+    # Update persisted settings
+    try:
+        updated = update_vault_setting(vault_name, settings_to_update)
+    except PermissionError as e:
+        logger.error(f"Permission error saving settings for vault '{vault_name}': {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=500,
+            detail="Permission denied: Cannot write to settings file. Check /app/data permissions."
+        )
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Error saving settings for vault '{vault_name}': {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=500,
+            detail=f"Failed to save settings: {e!s}"
+        )
+
+    logger.info(f"Updated settings for vault '{vault_name}': {settings_to_update}")
+
+    return updated
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vault/{vault_name}/files", response_model=VaultFilesResponse)
+async def api_vault_recent_files(
+    vault_name: str,
+    dir: str = Query("", description="Directory path within the vault (empty = root)"),
+    limit: int = Query(200, description="Maximum number of files to return"),
+    recursive: bool = Query(True, description="If true, list files recursively from directory and all subdirectories"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """List files in a vault directory sorted by modification time (newest first).
+
+    Returns file metadata suitable for a vault home page display.
+    Unlike /api/browse, this endpoint sorts by mtime and returns
+    additional metadata (size, modified time, extension).
+
+    When recursive=True (default), lists files from the directory
+    AND all its subdirectories, with a ``rel_dir`` field indicating
+    the subdirectory path relative to the requested directory.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        dir: Relative directory path within the vault (empty for root).
+        limit: Maximum files to return (default 200).
+        recursive: If true, recursively list files in subdirectories (default true).
+
+    Returns:
+        JSON with vault, directory, count, recursive flag, and list of file entries.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    return list_all_files(vault_name, dir=dir, limit=limit, recursive=recursive)
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vaults/settings/all", response_model=AllVaultSettingsResponse)
+async def api_get_all_vault_settings(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Get UI display settings for all vaults.
+
+    Returns:
+        Dict mapping vault names to their settings.
+    """
+    all_settings = {}
+
+    for vault_name in index:
+        persisted = get_vault_setting(vault_name) or {}
+
+        settings = {
+            "hideHiddenFiles": False,
+        }
+        settings.update(persisted)
+        all_settings[vault_name] = settings
+
+    return all_settings

backend/routers/files_read.py

@@ -0,0 +1,744 @@
+"""File browsing & reading endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 6a).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/browse/*``, ``/api/file/*`` en
+lecture), mêmes modèles de réponse (déménagés dans
+:mod:`backend.schemas`), mêmes dépendances d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths` (pass-through).
+- ``_render_markdown`` vient de :mod:`backend.render` (#85 T9, sans cycle
+  d'import).
+- ``_content_disposition`` / ``_media_max_inline_bytes`` / ``EXT_TO_LANG``
+  ont déménagé : helpers partagés dans :mod:`backend.routers.helpers`
+  (``EXT_TO_LANG`` n'était utilisé que par la vue fichier).
+"""
+
+import html as html_mod
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.parse import quote
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.history import record_open
+from backend.indexer import (
+    _extract_tags,
+    get_backlinks,
+    get_vault_data,
+    parse_markdown_file,
+)
+from backend.media_types import is_audio, is_image, is_video, media_mime_type
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
+from backend.routers.helpers import media_max_inline_bytes
+from backend.schemas import (
+    BacklinksResponse,
+    BrowseResponse,
+    FileContentResponse,
+    FileRawResponse,
+    XlsxDashboardResponse,
+    XlsxSheetWindowResponse,
+)
+from backend.services.files import read_raw_file
+from backend.services.mutations import file_revision
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.vaults import browse_directory, get_vault_root
+from backend.share import list_shares
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+
+def _resolve_shared_file(vault_name: str, path: str, username: str | None):
+    """#196 — resolve ``home-<user>/Partage/<file>`` to the real source file.
+
+    Returns ``(real_vault, real_path)`` when *path* is a received share
+    mounted in the user's personal folder, else ``None``. Read-only: only a
+    recipient (or the share creator, whose own file is already accessible)
+    gets a mapping — a share directed to someone else never resolves here.
+
+    Chemin canonique : ``Partage/<token>/<nom>`` (token = lève l'ambiguïté
+    de deux partages au même nom). Fallback par nom seul pour les liens
+    ne transportant pas le token.
+    """
+    if not username or not vault_name.startswith("home-") or not path.startswith("Partage/"):
+        return None
+    owner = vault_name[len("home-"):]
+    if owner != username:
+        return None
+    # Chemin virtuel canonique : Partage/<token>/<nom> — le token lève
+    # l'ambiguïté (deux partages, même nom de base). Fallback : match par
+    # nom pour les liens ne portant pas le token.
+    rest = path.split("/", 1)[1]
+    parts = rest.split("/", 1)
+    if len(parts) == 2 and len(parts[0]) >= 20:  # token (64 hex) vs nom de fichier
+        token, _name = parts
+        for s in list_shares(user=username):
+            if s.get("token") == token and s.get("created_by") != username:
+                return s["vault"], s["path"]
+        return None
+    for s in list_shares(user=username):
+        if s.get("created_by") == username:
+            continue
+        if (s.get("path") or "").split("/")[-1] == rest:
+            return s["vault"], s["path"]
+    return None
+
+# Map file extensions to highlight.js language hints
+EXT_TO_LANG = {
+    ".py": "python", ".js": "javascript", ".ts": "typescript",
+    ".jsx": "jsx", ".tsx": "tsx", ".sh": "bash", ".bash": "bash",
+    ".zsh": "bash", ".fish": "fish", ".bat": "batch", ".cmd": "batch",
+    ".ps1": "powershell", ".json": "json", ".yaml": "yaml", ".yml": "yaml",
+    ".toml": "toml", ".xml": "xml", ".csv": "plaintext",
+    ".cfg": "ini", ".ini": "ini", ".conf": "ini", ".env": "bash",
+    ".html": "html", ".css": "css", ".scss": "scss", ".less": "less",
+    ".java": "java", ".c": "c", ".cpp": "cpp", ".h": "c", ".hpp": "cpp",
+    ".cs": "csharp", ".go": "go", ".rs": "rust", ".rb": "ruby",
+    ".php": "php", ".sql": "sql", ".r": "r", ".swift": "swift",
+    ".kt": "kotlin", ".txt": "plaintext", ".log": "plaintext",
+    ".lua": "lua", ".pl": "perl", ".pm": "perl", ".ex": "elixir", ".exs": "elixir",
+    ".dart": "dart", ".tf": "haskell", ".gradle": "groovy", ".groovy": "groovy",
+    ".graphql": "graphql", ".gql": "graphql", ".prisma": "sql", ".proto": "c",
+    ".vb": "basic", ".asm": "x86asm", ".s": "armasm",
+    ".vue": "xml", ".svelte": "xml", ".astro": "xml",
+    ".properties": "ini", ".service": "ini", ".hosts": "ini",
+    ".ksh": "bash", ".dockerfile": "dockerfile",
+    ".makefile": "makefile", ".cmake": "cmake",
+}
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["files"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/browse/{vault_name}", response_model=BrowseResponse)
+async def api_browse(vault_name: str, path: str = "", current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Browse directories and files in a vault at a given path level.
+
+    Returns sorted entries (directories first, then files) with metadata.
+    Hidden files/directories (starting with ``"."`` ) are excluded.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault to browse.
+        path: Relative directory path within the vault (empty = root).
+
+    Returns:
+        ``BrowseResponse`` with vault name, path, and item list.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    return browse_directory(vault_name, path)
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/raw", response_model=FileRawResponse)
+async def api_file_raw(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return raw file content as plain text.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative file path within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileRawResponse`` with vault, path, and raw text content.
+    """
+    shared = _resolve_shared_file(vault_name, path, current_user.get("username"))
+    if shared:
+        # Partage dirigé = autorisation (cf. api_file).
+        vault_name, path = shared
+    elif not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    return read_raw_file(vault_name, path)
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/download", response_class=FileResponse)
+async def api_file_download(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Download a file as an attachment.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative file path within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileResponse`` with ``application/octet-stream`` content-type.
+    """
+    shared = _resolve_shared_file(vault_name, path, current_user.get("username"))
+    if shared:
+        # Partage dirigé = autorisation (cf. api_file).
+        vault_name, path = shared
+    elif not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+
+    # Record history
+    record_open(current_user.get("username"), vault_name, path)
+
+    return FileResponse(
+        path=str(file_path),
+        filename=file_path.name,
+        media_type="application/octet-stream",
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}/backlinks", response_model=BacklinksResponse)
+async def api_file_backlinks(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Get backlinks (files linking to this file via wikilinks).
+
+    Returns a list of files that contain `[[wikilinks]]` pointing
+    to the requested file, across all accessible vaults.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault containing the target file.
+        path: Relative path of the target file within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``{"vault": str, "path": str, "backlinks": [...]}``
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    backlinks = get_backlinks(vault_name, path)
+
+    # Filter by user-accessible vaults (#194 : check_vault_access, "*" sans
+    # les dossiers persos).
+    backlinks = [b for b in backlinks if check_vault_access(b["vault"], current_user)]
+
+    return {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": path,
+        "backlinks": backlinks,
+        "total": len(backlinks),
+    }
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/dashboard", response_model=XlsxDashboardResponse
+)
+def api_file_xlsx_dashboard(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to the .xlsx workbook"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return the dashboard metadata of an .xlsx workbook (#153 A17).
+
+    Named ranges (workbook- or sheet-scoped), chart/pivot object counts and
+    per-sheet KPI stats (non-empty cells, rows/cols coverage, formulas,
+    numeric cells, first numeric values as KPI cards). Read-only, bounded by
+    the 500x40 render caps; never raises for an unreadable workbook — an
+    empty payload comes back and the viewer hides the panel.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    _vault_root = get_vault_root(vault_name)
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(_vault_root, path)
+    if not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+    if file_path.suffix.lower() not in (".xlsx", ".xlsm"):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=415, detail="Le fichier n'est pas un classeur .xlsx/.xlsm"
+        )
+
+    from backend.xlsx_reader import read_workbook_dashboard
+
+    try:
+        dashboard = read_workbook_dashboard(file_path)
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"XLSX dashboard read error for {path}: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading XLSX: {e!s}")
+    return {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": path,
+        **dashboard,
+    }
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/sheet", response_model=XlsxSheetWindowResponse
+)
+def api_file_xlsx_sheet(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to the .xlsx/.xlsm file"),
+    sheet: str = Query(..., description="Sheet name (as shown in the viewer tab)"),
+    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0, description="0-based index of the first row to return"),
+    limit: int = Query(
+        200, ge=1, le=1000, description="Rows to return (server-capped)"
+    ),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return a window of rows of one sheet of an .xlsx/.xlsm workbook (#153 A9).
+
+    Backs the viewer's lazy loading: instead of every sheet in a single JSON
+    payload, the client asks for the block it is about to display. The row
+    numbers and the ``data-cell`` references are the real A1 coordinates of the
+    sheet, so a window behaves like the full render (editing a cell in it
+    targets the right cell).
+
+    The response also carries ``total_rows``/``total_cols`` and the ``truncated``
+    flag, so the client can say what is hidden behind the 500x40 render caps
+    instead of silently hiding it.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative path of the .xlsx file within the vault.
+        sheet: Sheet name; **404** if the workbook has no such sheet.
+        offset: 0-based index of the first row to return.
+        limit: Rows to return, capped server-side at 1000.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``XlsxSheetWindowResponse`` with the rendered ``html`` of the window.
+
+    Raises:
+        HTTPException: 403 (vault access), 404 (vault, file or sheet unknown),
+            415 (not an .xlsx/.xlsm file), 500 (unreadable workbook).
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(Path(vault_data["path"]), path)
+    if not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+    # BUG-097 — a .xlsm rides the same editable viewer (and its lazy loading),
+    # so its row windows must be servable too; other formats stay refused.
+    if file_path.suffix.lower() not in (".xlsx", ".xlsm"):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=415, detail="Le fichier n'est pas un classeur .xlsx/.xlsm"
+        )
+
+    # Import tardif : openpyxl n'est chargé que si un .xlsx est réellement demandé.
+    from backend.xlsx_reader import read_sheet_window
+
+    try:
+        window = read_sheet_window(file_path, sheet, offset=offset, limit=limit)
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"XLSX sheet read error for {path}: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading XLSX: {e!s}")
+    if window is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Feuille introuvable: {sheet}")
+
+    return {"vault": vault_name, "path": path, **window}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/file/{vault_name}", response_model=FileContentResponse)
+async def api_file(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return rendered HTML and metadata for a file.
+
+    Markdown files are parsed for frontmatter, rendered with wikilink
+    support, and returned with extracted tags. Other supported file
+    types are syntax-highlighted as code blocks.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative file path within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileContentResponse`` with HTML, metadata, and tags.
+    """
+    # #196 — fichier reçu par partage dirigé : home-<user>/Partage/<fichier>
+    # est résolu vers le fichier source (lecture seule, viewer standard).
+    # Résolu AVANT l'ACL vault : le dossier est virtuel, l'autorisation réelle
+    # est l'appartenance au partage (vérifiée dans le resolver).
+    shared = _resolve_shared_file(vault_name, path, current_user.get("username"))
+    if shared:
+        # Le partage dirigé EST l'autorisation : le destinataire n'a par
+        # définition pas accès au vault source — on ne passe PAS par l'ACL.
+        vault_name, path = shared
+    elif not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"File not found: {path}")
+
+    # Record history
+    record_open(current_user.get("username"), vault_name, path, title=file_path.name)
+
+    ext = file_path.suffix.lower()
+
+    # === PDF: special handling before read_text (binary file) ===
+    if ext == ".pdf":
+        try:
+            from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata, extract_pdf_text, extract_pdf_toc
+            pdf_text = extract_pdf_text(file_path, max_chars=100000)
+            pdf_meta = extract_pdf_metadata(file_path)
+            pdf_toc = extract_pdf_toc(file_path)
+            size = file_path.stat().st_size
+            return {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+                "title": pdf_meta.get("title") or file_path.name,
+                "tags": [],
+                "frontmatter": {},
+                "html": f"<div class='pdf-viewer'><p>PDF — {pdf_meta.get('pages', '?')} pages</p><pre>{pdf_text[:5000]}</pre></div>",
+                "raw_length": size,
+                "extension": ext,
+                "is_markdown": False,
+                "is_pdf": True,
+                "unsupported": False,
+                "pdf_metadata": pdf_meta,
+                "pdf_toc": pdf_toc,
+                "size_bytes": size,
+            }
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"PDF read error for {path}: {e}")
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading PDF: {e!s}")
+
+    # === Excel .xlsx: render sheets as HTML tables (binary, before read_text) ===
+    if ext == ".xlsx":
+        try:
+            from backend.xlsx_reader import inspect_workbook, render_sheets
+
+            # #153 A15 — every sheet dict already carries its styles, aligns,
+            # merges and freeze anchor (read_workbook_meta, one normal-mode
+            # load inside render_sheets).
+            sheets = render_sheets(file_path)
+            size = file_path.stat().st_size
+            return {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+                "title": file_path.name,
+                "tags": [],
+                "frontmatter": {},
+                "html": sheets[0]["html"] if sheets else "",
+                "raw_length": size,
+                "extension": ext,
+                "is_markdown": False,
+                "is_xlsx": True,
+                "xlsx_sheets": sheets,
+                # #156-A12 — optimistic-concurrency token: the viewer sends it
+                # back as `if_match` so another writer cannot be overwritten in
+                # silence (409 `conflict` instead).
+                "xlsx_revision": file_revision(file_path),
+                # #153 A1 — parts a save would drop; the viewer warns and asks
+                # for an explicit confirmation before forcing the write.
+                "xlsx_lossy_features": inspect_workbook(file_path),
+                "unsupported": False,
+                "size_bytes": size,
+            }
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"XLSX read error for {path}: {e}")
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading XLSX: {e!s}")
+
+    # === Images: return as viewable image ===
+    if is_image(ext):
+        size = file_path.stat().st_size
+        mime = media_mime_type(str(file_path))
+        # #108-B1 — the raw endpoint returns JSON (FileRawResponse), so the
+        # standalone <img> must point to /api/image, which serves the bytes
+        # with the right MIME type. Paths are URL-encoded (accents, spaces).
+        img_url = f"/api/image/{quote(vault_name, safe='')}?path={quote(path, safe='')}"
+        html = (
+            f'<div class="image-viewer">'
+            f'<img src="{img_url}" '
+            f'alt="{html_mod.escape(file_path.name, quote=True)}" '
+            f'style="max-width:100%;max-height:80vh;object-fit:contain" />'
+            f'</div>'
+        )
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "path": path,
+            "title": file_path.name,
+            "tags": [],
+            "frontmatter": {},
+            "html": html,
+            "raw_length": size,
+            "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": False,
+            "is_image": True,
+            "image_mime": mime,
+            "size_bytes": size,
+        }
+
+    # === Audio / Video: HTML5 players streamed from /api/media (roadmap #109) ===
+    if is_audio(ext) or is_video(ext):
+        size = file_path.stat().st_size
+        mime = media_mime_type(str(file_path))
+        media_kind = "audio" if is_audio(ext) else "video"
+
+        # #109-A3 — beyond the inline limit the viewer falls back to download
+        # (a single uvicorn worker must not be pinned by multi-GB media).
+        if size > media_max_inline_bytes():
+            return {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+                "title": file_path.name,
+                "tags": [],
+                "frontmatter": {},
+                "html": "",
+                "raw_length": size,
+                "extension": ext,
+                "is_markdown": False,
+                "unsupported": True,
+                "media_too_large": True,
+                "size_bytes": size,
+            }
+
+        # #109-A2 — byte-range endpoint: enables scrub and is required by Safari.
+        stream_url = f"/api/media/{quote(vault_name, safe='')}?path={quote(path, safe='')}"
+        if media_kind == "audio":
+            html = (
+                f'<div class="audio-viewer">'
+                f'<audio controls preload="metadata" src="{stream_url}"></audio>'
+                f'</div>'
+            )
+        else:
+            html = (
+                f'<div class="video-viewer">'
+                f'<video controls playsinline preload="metadata" src="{stream_url}"></video>'
+                f'</div>'
+            )
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "path": path,
+            "title": file_path.name,
+            "tags": [],
+            "frontmatter": {},
+            "html": html,
+            "raw_length": size,
+            "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": False,
+            "is_audio": media_kind == "audio",
+            "is_video": media_kind == "video",
+            "media_mime": mime,
+            "stream_url": stream_url,
+            "size_bytes": size,
+        }
+
+    try:
+        raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except PermissionError as e:
+        logger.error(f"Permission denied reading file {path}: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Permission denied: cannot read file {path}")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError:
+        # Binary / unsupported file — return structured info with download option
+        size = file_path.stat().st_size
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "path": path,
+            "title": file_path.name,
+            "tags": [],
+            "frontmatter": {},
+            "html": "",
+            "raw_length": size,
+            "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": False,
+            "unsupported": True,
+            "size_bytes": size,
+        }
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Unexpected error reading file {path}: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading file: {e!s}")
+
+    # === Excel .xlsm: same editable viewer as .xlsx, macros preserved on save ===
+    if ext == ".xlsm":
+        try:
+            from backend.xlsx_reader import inspect_workbook, render_sheets
+
+            sheets = render_sheets(file_path)
+            size = file_path.stat().st_size
+            return {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+                "title": file_path.name,
+                "tags": [],
+                "frontmatter": {},
+                "html": sheets[0]["html"] if sheets else "",
+                "raw_length": size,
+                "extension": ext,
+                "is_markdown": False,
+                "is_xlsx": True,
+                "xlsx_sheets": sheets,
+                "xlsx_revision": file_revision(file_path),
+                # Macros are NOT lossy for .xlsm: keep_vba re-serializes them
+                # (an empty LOSSY probe is what makes the save gate pass).
+                "xlsx_lossy_features": [],
+                "unsupported": False,
+                "size_bytes": size,
+            }
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"XLSX read error for {path}: {e}")
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading XLSX: {e!s}")
+
+    # === Legacy/ODF spreadsheets (.xls, .ods): read-only table view ===
+    if ext in (".xls", ".ods"):
+        try:
+            from backend.xlsx_reader import render_legacy_workbook
+
+            sheets = render_legacy_workbook(file_path, ext)
+            size = file_path.stat().st_size
+            return {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+                "title": file_path.name,
+                "tags": [],
+                "frontmatter": {},
+                "html": sheets[0]["html"] if sheets else "",
+                "raw_length": size,
+                "extension": ext,
+                "is_markdown": False,
+                "is_xlsx": True,
+                "xlsx_readonly": True,
+                "xlsx_sheets": sheets,
+                "unsupported": False,
+                "size_bytes": size,
+            }
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"Spreadsheet read error for {path}: {e}")
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Error reading spreadsheet: {e!s}")
+
+    # === CSV: spreadsheet-style table (same shape as the xlsx viewer) ===
+    if ext == ".csv":
+        from backend.xlsx_reader import render_csv_table
+
+        html = render_csv_table(raw)
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name, "path": path,
+            "title": file_path.name, "tags": [], "frontmatter": {},
+            "html": html, "raw_length": len(raw), "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": False, "is_csv": True,
+            # #156-A12 — same stale-write guard as the workbooks.
+            "xlsx_revision": file_revision(file_path),
+        }
+
+    # === JSON: syntax-highlighted display ===
+    if ext == ".json":
+        import json as json_mod
+        try:
+            parsed = json_mod.loads(raw)
+            formatted = json_mod.dumps(parsed, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
+        except json_mod.JSONDecodeError:
+            formatted = raw
+        html = f"<pre class='json-viewer'><code>{html_mod.escape(formatted)}</code></pre>"
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name, "path": path,
+            "title": file_path.name, "tags": [], "frontmatter": {},
+            "html": html, "raw_length": len(raw), "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": False, "is_json": True,
+        }
+
+    # === Excalidraw .excalidraw.md (Obsidian plugin format) ===
+    if path.lower().endswith(".excalidraw.md"):
+        import re as re_mod
+        raw_lower = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+        # Check for excalidraw-plugin in frontmatter or body
+        if "excalidraw-plugin:" in raw_lower:
+            # Extract compressed JSON block
+            match = re_mod.search(r'```compressed-json\n(.*?)\n```', raw_lower, re_mod.DOTALL)
+            if match:
+                compressed = match.group(1).strip()
+                return {
+                    "vault": vault_name, "path": path,
+                    "title": file_path.name.replace(".excalidraw.md", ""),
+                    "tags": [], "frontmatter": {},
+                    "html": "", "raw_length": len(raw_lower),
+                    "extension": ".excalidraw.md",
+                    "is_markdown": False,
+                    "is_excalidraw": True,
+                    "excalidraw_data_compressed": compressed,
+                }
+        # Fallback: treat as regular markdown
+        raw = raw_lower
+    if ext == ".excalidraw":
+        import json as json_mod
+        try:
+            parsed = json_mod.loads(raw)
+        except json_mod.JSONDecodeError:
+            parsed = None
+        if parsed and parsed.get("type") == "excalidraw":
+            return {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+                "title": parsed.get("appState", {}).get("name") or file_path.name,
+                "tags": [],
+                "frontmatter": {},
+                "html": "",
+                "raw_length": len(raw),
+                "extension": ext,
+                "is_markdown": False,
+                "is_excalidraw": True,
+                "excalidraw_data": {
+                    "elements": parsed.get("elements", []),
+                    "appState": parsed.get("appState", {}),
+                    "files": parsed.get("files", {}),
+                },
+            }
+        else:
+            # Not a valid Excalidraw file — fall through to text viewer
+            pass
+
+    # === Plain text / other readable files ===
+    TEXT_EXTENSIONS = {".txt", ".log", ".yml", ".yaml", ".toml", ".ini", ".cfg",
+                       ".sh", ".bash", ".py", ".js", ".ts", ".html", ".css",
+                       ".xml", ".rst", ".tex", ".sql", ".conf", ".env"}
+    if ext in TEXT_EXTENSIONS or ext == ".md":
+        pass  # handled below or by markdown section
+
+    if ext == ".md":
+        post = parse_markdown_file(raw)
+
+        # Extract metadata using shared indexer logic
+        tags = _extract_tags(post)
+
+        title = post.metadata.get("title", file_path.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " "))
+        html_content = _render_markdown(post.content, vault_name, file_path, click_to_copy=True)
+
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "path": path,
+            "title": str(title),
+            "tags": tags,
+            "frontmatter": dict(post.metadata) if post.metadata else {},
+            "html": html_content,
+            "raw_length": len(raw),
+            "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": True,
+        }
+    else:
+        # Non-markdown: wrap in syntax-highlighted code block
+        lang = EXT_TO_LANG.get(ext, "")
+        if not lang:
+            # Fichiers sans extension usuels (Dockerfile, Makefile, etc.)
+            NAME_TO_LANG = {
+                "dockerfile": "dockerfile", "makefile": "makefile",
+                "cmakelists.txt": "cmake", "jenkinsfile": "groovy",
+                "vagrantfile": "ruby", "rakefile": "ruby", "gemfile": "ruby",
+                "procfile": "plaintext", "bashrc": "bash", "bash_profile": "bash",
+                "zshrc": "bash", "profile": "bash", "gitignore": "plaintext",
+            }
+            lang = NAME_TO_LANG.get(file_path.name.lower(), "plaintext")
+        escaped = html_mod.escape(raw)
+        html_content = f'<pre><code class="language-{lang}">{escaped}</code></pre>'
+
+        return {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "path": path,
+            "title": file_path.name,
+            "tags": [],
+            "frontmatter": {},
+            "html": html_content,
+            "raw_length": len(raw),
+            "extension": ext,
+            "is_markdown": False,
+        }

backend/routers/files_write.py

@@ -0,0 +1,735 @@
+"""File & directory mutation endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 6b).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``PUT/DELETE/PATCH/POST /api/file/*``,
+``/api/directory/*``, ``/api/move/*``, ``/api/vault/*/batch-upload``),
+mêmes modèles de requête/réponse (déménagés dans :mod:`backend.schemas`),
+mêmes dépendances d'authentification et mêmes effets de bord (audit, index
+incrémental, SSE, webhooks, plugins, historique).
+
+La logique métier vit déjà dans :mod:`backend.services.mutations`.
+"""
+
+import logging
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.audit import log_file_delete, log_file_save
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.history import (
+    remove_recent,
+    update_bookmarks_after_rename,
+    update_history_after_rename,
+)
+from backend.indexer import handle_file_move, remove_single_file, update_single_file
+from backend.schemas import (
+    BatchUploadRequest,
+    BatchUploadResponse,
+    DirectoryCreateRequest,
+    DirectoryCreateResponse,
+    DirectoryDeleteResponse,
+    DirectoryRenameRequest,
+    DirectoryRenameResponse,
+    FileCreateRequest,
+    FileCreateResponse,
+    FileDeleteResponse,
+    FileMoveRequest,
+    FileMoveResponse,
+    FileRenameRequest,
+    FileRenameResponse,
+    FileSaveResponse,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    batch_upload_files as service_batch_upload_files,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    create_directory as service_create_directory,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    create_file as service_create_file,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    delete_directory as service_delete_directory,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    delete_file as service_delete_file,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    edit_file as service_edit_file,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    edit_xlsx_cells as service_edit_xlsx_cells,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    move_path as service_move_path,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    mutate_xlsx_structure as service_mutate_xlsx_structure,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    mutate_xlsx_style as service_mutate_xlsx_style,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    rename_directory as service_rename_directory,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    rename_file as service_rename_file,
+)
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    save_csv_cells as service_save_csv_cells,
+)
+from backend.share import update_shares_after_rename
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+from backend.webhooks import dispatch_webhooks
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["files"])
+
+
+@router.put("/api/file/{vault_name}/save", response_model=FileSaveResponse)
+async def api_file_save(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"),
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    backup: bool = Query(True, description="Create a backup before saving (default true, set false for auto-save)"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Save (overwrite) a file's content.
+
+    Expects a JSON body with a ``content`` key containing the new text.
+    The path is validated against traversal attacks before writing.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative file path within the vault.
+        body: JSON body with ``content`` string.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileSaveResponse`` confirming the write.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    content = body.get("content", "")
+    result = service_edit_file(vault_name, path, content, backup=backup)
+
+    # Audit log
+    client_ip = current_user.get("_request_ip", "unknown")
+    log_file_save(current_user["username"], vault_name, path, len(content), client_ip)
+
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": result["vault"], "path": result["path"], "size": result["size"]}
+
+
+@router.put("/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/save", response_model=FileSaveResponse)
+def api_file_xlsx_save(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to the .xlsx file"),
+    body: dict = Body(
+        ...,
+        description=(
+            '{"sheet": str, "cells": {"A1": value}, '
+            '"allow_formula": false, "force": false, "if_match": str}'
+        ),
+    ),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Apply cell edits to an .xlsx workbook.
+
+    Expects a JSON body with ``sheet`` and ``cells`` (A1 references to new
+    scalar values, max 500 per request) plus two optional boolean flags:
+
+    * ``allow_formula`` — keep values starting with ``=``/``@`` as real
+      formulas. Off by default (#153 A4): such a value is stored as text so a
+      later Excel session cannot execute it (DDE).
+    * ``force`` — write a workbook carrying features openpyxl cannot re-serialize
+      (slicers, form controls, connections, custom XML, signature, cached formula
+      results). Without it the call fails **409** ``xlsx_lossy_content`` and the
+      client asks the user to confirm (#153 A1).
+    * ``if_match`` — revision token returned by the read (#156-A12). When it no
+      longer matches the file on disk the write is refused with **409**
+      ``conflict`` (``reason=stale_revision``) instead of overwriting a change
+      made by another writer. Omitted: last writer wins (curl, AI tools).
+
+    A backup is created before the workbook is rewritten, and the new archive
+    swaps in atomically. Declared as a sync endpoint on purpose: the openpyxl
+    round-trip and the per-file lock wait (#153 A3) then run in the threadpool
+    instead of blocking the event loop.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    sheet = body.get("sheet")
+    cells = body.get("cells")
+    if not isinstance(sheet, str) or not sheet:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Feuille manquante")
+    if not isinstance(cells, dict) or not cells or len(cells) > 500:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cellules invalides (1 à 500 par requête)")
+    for ref, value in cells.items():
+        if not isinstance(ref, str) or not isinstance(value, (str, int, float, bool, type(None))):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Cellule invalide: {ref!r}")
+    flags: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    for name in ("allow_formula", "force"):
+        raw = body.get(name, False)
+        if not isinstance(raw, bool):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Flag invalide: {name}")
+        flags[name] = raw
+    if_match = body.get("if_match")
+    if if_match is not None and not isinstance(if_match, str):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Jeton invalide: if_match")
+
+    result = service_edit_xlsx_cells(
+        vault_name, path, sheet, cells, expected_revision=if_match, **flags
+    )
+    log_file_save(
+        current_user["username"], vault_name, path,
+        sum(len(str(v)) for v in cells.values()),
+        current_user.get("_request_ip", "unknown"),
+    )
+    return {
+        "status": "ok", "vault": result["vault"], "path": result["path"],
+        "size": result["size"], "revision": result.get("revision"),
+    }
+
+
+@router.put("/api/file/{vault_name}/csv/save", response_model=FileSaveResponse)
+def api_file_csv_save(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to the .csv file"),
+    body: dict = Body(
+        ...,
+        description=(
+            '{"cells": {"A1": value}, "if_match": str} — A1-addressed text '
+            'edits (#153 A16). `if_match` is the revision token of the read '
+            '(#156-A12): a stale token fails with 409 `conflict`.'
+        ),
+    ),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Apply A1-addressed cell edits to a ``.csv`` file (#153 A16).
+
+    The grid is re-parsed with :mod:`csv`, patched and re-serialized
+    (RFC 4180 quoting). References beyond the extent grow the grid. Values
+    are stored verbatim as text — a CSV has no formula engine.
+
+    ``if_match`` (optional, #156-A12) is the revision the client read: when the
+    file changed in the meantime the write is refused with **409** ``conflict``.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    cells = body.get("cells")
+    if not isinstance(cells, dict) or not cells or len(cells) > 500:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cellules invalides (1 à 500 par requête)")
+    for ref, value in cells.items():
+        if not isinstance(ref, str) or not isinstance(value, (str, int, float, bool, type(None))):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Cellule invalide: {ref!r}")
+
+    if_match = body.get("if_match")
+    if if_match is not None and not isinstance(if_match, str):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Jeton invalide: if_match")
+
+    result = service_save_csv_cells(vault_name, path, cells, expected_revision=if_match)
+    log_file_save(
+        current_user["username"], vault_name, path,
+        sum(len(str(v)) for v in cells.values()),
+        current_user.get("_request_ip", "unknown"),
+    )
+    return {
+        "status": "ok", "vault": result["vault"], "path": result["path"],
+        "size": result["size"], "revision": result.get("revision"),
+    }
+
+
+@router.put("/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/structure", response_model=FileSaveResponse)
+def api_file_xlsx_structure(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to the .xlsx file"),
+    body: dict = Body(
+        ...,
+        description=(
+            '{"actions": [{"op": "sheet_add", "name": "X"}, '
+            '{"op": "row_insert", "sheet": "X", "at": 2, "count": 1}], '
+            '"force": false, "if_match": str}'
+        ),
+    ),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Apply structural changes to an .xlsx workbook (#153 A14).
+
+    ``actions`` is an ordered list applied in one locked, atomic rewrite:
+    ``sheet_add`` (``name``, optional ``at`` 0-based), ``sheet_rename``
+    (``from``/``to``), ``sheet_delete`` (refused on the last sheet),
+    ``sheet_duplicate`` (``name``/``as``) and ``row_insert``/``row_delete``/
+    ``col_insert``/``col_delete`` (``sheet``, 1-based ``at``, ``count``).
+
+    Without ``force`` the call fails **409** ``xlsx_lossy_content`` when the
+    workbook carries features openpyxl cannot rewrite (same gate as the cell
+    edits). A backup is created before the archive is replaced. The optional
+    ``if_match`` revision (#156-A12) refuses a structural rewrite on a file that
+    changed since it was read (**409** ``conflict``).
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative path to the ``.xlsx`` file.
+        body: JSON body with ``actions`` (1 to 50) and optional ``force``.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileSaveResponse`` confirming the write.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    actions = body.get("actions")
+    if not isinstance(actions, list) or not actions or len(actions) > 50:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Actions invalides (1 à 50 par requête)")
+    raw_force = body.get("force", False)
+    if not isinstance(raw_force, bool):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Flag invalide: force")
+    if_match = body.get("if_match")
+    if if_match is not None and not isinstance(if_match, str):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Jeton invalide: if_match")
+
+    result = service_mutate_xlsx_structure(
+        vault_name, path, actions, force=raw_force, expected_revision=if_match
+    )
+    log_file_save(
+        current_user["username"], vault_name, path,
+        len(actions),
+        current_user.get("_request_ip", "unknown"),
+    )
+    return {
+        "status": "ok", "vault": result["vault"], "path": result["path"],
+        "size": len(result["applied"]), "revision": result.get("revision"),
+    }
+
+
+@router.put("/api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/style", response_model=FileSaveResponse)
+def api_file_xlsx_style(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to the .xlsx/.xlsm file"),
+    body: dict = Body(
+        ...,
+        description=(
+            '{"ops": [{"op": "cell", "sheet": "X", "range": "A1:B2", '
+            '"style": {"bold": true, "fill_color": "#ffe08a"}}], '
+            '"force": false, "if_match": str}'
+        ),
+    ),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Write formatting on an .xlsx/.xlsm workbook (#156-A8).
+
+    ``ops`` is an ordered list applied in one locked, atomic rewrite:
+    ``cell`` (``sheet``, ``range``/``cell``, ``style`` with ``bold``,
+    ``italic``, ``underline``, ``strike``, ``font_size`` (6-72),
+    ``font_color``/``fill_color`` as ``#rrggbb``, ``align``
+    (left/center/right/justify), ``valign`` (top/middle/bottom), ``wrap``,
+    ``rotation`` (-90..90), ``border`` (all/outer/none) + ``border_style`` /
+    ``border_color`` and ``number_format``), ``merge``/``unmerge`` (``range``),
+    ``col_width`` (``col``, ``width``), ``row_height`` (``row``, ``height``),
+    ``comment_set`` (``ref``, ``text``) / ``comment_clear`` (``ref``)
+    and ``freeze`` (``cell``, empty to release).
+
+    Without ``force`` the call fails **409** ``xlsx_lossy_content`` when the
+    workbook carries features openpyxl cannot rewrite (same gate as the cell
+    edits). A backup is created before the archive is replaced; the optional
+    ``if_match`` revision (#156-A12) refuses a rewrite on a file that changed
+    since it was read (**409** ``conflict``).
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative path to the ``.xlsx``/``.xlsm`` file.
+        body: JSON body with ``ops`` (1 to 50) and optional ``force``.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileSaveResponse`` confirming the write.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    ops = body.get("ops")
+    if not isinstance(ops, list) or not ops or len(ops) > 50:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Ops invalides (1 à 50 par requête)")
+    raw_force = body.get("force", False)
+    if not isinstance(raw_force, bool):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Flag invalide: force")
+    if_match = body.get("if_match")
+    if if_match is not None and not isinstance(if_match, str):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Jeton invalide: if_match")
+
+    result = service_mutate_xlsx_style(
+        vault_name, path, ops, force=raw_force, expected_revision=if_match
+    )
+    log_file_save(
+        current_user["username"], vault_name, path,
+        len(ops),
+        current_user.get("_request_ip", "unknown"),
+    )
+    return {
+        "status": "ok", "vault": result["vault"], "path": result["path"],
+        "size": len(result["applied"]), "revision": result.get("revision"),
+    }
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/file/{vault_name}", response_model=FileDeleteResponse)
+async def api_file_delete(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Delete a file from the vault.
+
+    The path is validated against traversal attacks before deletion.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative file path within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``FileDeleteResponse`` confirming the deletion.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_delete_file(vault_name, path)
+
+    # Audit log
+    client_ip = current_user.get("_request_ip", "unknown")
+    log_file_delete(current_user["username"], vault_name, path, client_ip)
+
+    # Update index
+    await remove_single_file(vault_name, path)
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("file_deleted", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": path,
+    })
+
+    from backend.plugins import emit_file_deleted
+    emit_file_deleted(vault_name, path)
+
+    # Remove from recent files
+    remove_recent(current_user["username"], vault_name, path)
+
+    # Dispatch webhooks
+    await dispatch_webhooks("file_deleted", {"vault": vault_name, "path": path})
+
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": result["vault"], "path": result["path"]}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/directory/{vault_name}", response_model=DirectoryCreateResponse)
+async def api_directory_create(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: DirectoryCreateRequest,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Create a new directory in a vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        body: Request body with directory path.
+
+    Returns:
+        DirectoryCreateResponse confirming creation.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_create_directory(vault_name, body.path)
+
+    # Update path_index with the new directory
+    from backend.indexer import _index_lock
+    from backend.indexer import path_index as _path_idx
+    with _index_lock:
+        if vault_name not in _path_idx:
+            _path_idx[vault_name] = []
+        existing = {p["path"] for p in _path_idx[vault_name]}
+        # Build all parent segments
+        parts = body.path.split("/")
+        for i in range(1, len(parts) + 1):
+            seg_path = "/".join(parts[:i])
+            if seg_path and seg_path not in existing:
+                existing.add(seg_path)
+                _path_idx[vault_name].append({
+                    "path": seg_path,
+                    "name": parts[i - 1],
+                    "type": "directory",
+                })
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("directory_created", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": result["path"],
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("directory_created", {"vault": vault_name, "path": result["path"]})
+
+    return {"success": True, "path": result["path"]}
+
+
+@router.patch("/api/directory/{vault_name}", response_model=DirectoryRenameResponse)
+async def api_directory_rename(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: DirectoryRenameRequest,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Rename a directory in a vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        body: Request body with current path and new name.
+
+    Returns:
+        DirectoryRenameResponse with old and new paths.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_rename_directory(vault_name, body.path, body.new_name)
+    old_path_str = result["old_path"]
+    new_path_str = result["new_path"]
+
+    # Update index for all files in the directory
+    from backend.indexer import reload_single_vault
+    await reload_single_vault(vault_name)
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("directory_renamed", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "old_path": old_path_str,
+        "new_path": new_path_str,
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("directory_renamed", {"vault": vault_name, "old_path": old_path_str, "new_path": new_path_str})
+
+    return {"success": True, "old_path": old_path_str, "new_path": new_path_str}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/directory/{vault_name}", response_model=DirectoryDeleteResponse)
+async def api_directory_delete(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to directory"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Delete a directory and all its contents from a vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative directory path within the vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        DirectoryDeleteResponse with count of deleted files.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_delete_directory(vault_name, path, recursive=True)
+    file_count = result["deleted_count"]
+
+    # Update index
+    from backend.indexer import reload_single_vault
+    await reload_single_vault(vault_name)
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("directory_deleted", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": result["path"],
+        "deleted_count": file_count,
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("directory_deleted", {"vault": vault_name, "path": result["path"]})
+
+    return {"success": True, "deleted_count": file_count}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/file/{vault_name}", response_model=FileCreateResponse)
+async def api_file_create(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: FileCreateRequest,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Create a new file in a vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        body: Request body with file path and initial content.
+
+    Returns:
+        FileCreateResponse confirming creation.
+
+    Note:
+        A ``.xlsx`` path creates an empty workbook (one ``Feuille1`` sheet) built
+        with openpyxl: the payload is binary, so ``content`` is ignored (#186).
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_create_file(vault_name, body.path, body.content)
+
+    # Update index
+    await update_single_file(vault_name, result["path"])
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("file_created", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "path": result["path"],
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("file_created", {"vault": vault_name, "path": result["path"]})
+    from backend.plugins import emit_file_created
+    emit_file_created(vault_name, result["path"])
+
+    return {"success": True, "path": result["path"]}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/vault/{vault_name}/batch-upload", response_model=BatchUploadResponse)
+async def api_batch_upload(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: BatchUploadRequest,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Upload multiple files and directories (recursively) into a vault.
+
+    Accepts base64 encoded or plain text files with relative directory paths.
+    Creates missing parent folders safely.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Target vault name.
+        body: BatchUploadRequest with target_dir and files list.
+
+    Returns:
+        BatchUploadResponse with summary of uploaded files and errors.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    import base64
+
+    items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for f in body.files:
+        if f.is_dir:
+            items.append({"path": f.path, "is_dir": True})
+            continue
+
+        raw_bytes = b""
+        if f.content is not None:
+            # Check if content is base64 encoded data URI or raw base64
+            content_str = f.content
+            if content_str.startswith("data:") and ";base64," in content_str:
+                content_str = content_str.split(";base64,", 1)[1]
+            try:
+                raw_bytes = base64.b64decode(content_str)
+            except Exception:
+                # Fallback to utf-8 text encoding
+                raw_bytes = f.content.encode("utf-8")
+
+        items.append({"path": f.path, "content": raw_bytes, "is_dir": False})
+
+    result = service_batch_upload_files(
+        vault_name,
+        body.target_dir,
+        items,
+        overwrite=body.overwrite,
+    )
+
+    # Update index and SSE notifications for uploaded files
+    for path in result["uploaded"]:
+        try:
+            await update_single_file(vault_name, path)
+            await sse_manager.broadcast("file_created", {
+                "vault": vault_name,
+                "path": path,
+            })
+            await dispatch_webhooks("file_created", {"vault": vault_name, "path": path})
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Failed to post-process upload of {path}: {e}")
+
+    # SSE notification for tree refresh
+    if result["uploaded"] or result["created_dirs"]:
+        await sse_manager.broadcast("tree_updated", {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "target_dir": result["target_dir"],
+        })
+
+    return result
+
+
+@router.patch("/api/file/{vault_name}", response_model=FileRenameResponse)
+async def api_file_rename(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: FileRenameRequest,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Rename a file in a vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        body: Request body with current path and new name.
+
+    Returns:
+        FileRenameResponse with old and new paths.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_rename_file(vault_name, body.path, body.new_name)
+    old_path_str = result["old_path"]
+    new_path_str = result["new_path"]
+
+    # Update index
+    await handle_file_move(vault_name, old_path_str, new_path_str)
+
+    # Update bookmarks, history, and shares
+    update_bookmarks_after_rename(vault_name, old_path_str, new_path_str)
+    update_history_after_rename(vault_name, old_path_str, new_path_str)
+    update_shares_after_rename(vault_name, old_path_str, new_path_str)
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("file_renamed", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "old_path": old_path_str,
+        "new_path": new_path_str,
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("file_renamed", {"vault": vault_name, "old_path": old_path_str, "new_path": new_path_str})
+
+    return {"success": True, "old_path": old_path_str, "new_path": new_path_str}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/move/{vault_name}", response_model=FileMoveResponse)
+async def api_file_move(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: FileMoveRequest,
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Move a file or directory to a different parent directory within the same vault.
+
+    Supports both files and directories. The item keeps its original name;
+    only the parent directory changes.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        body: Request body with source_path and destination_dir.
+
+    Returns:
+        FileMoveResponse with old and new paths.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    result = service_move_path(vault_name, body.source_path, body.destination_dir)
+    old_path_str = result["old_path"]
+    new_path_str = result["new_path"]
+    item_type = result["item_type"]
+
+    # Update index
+    if item_type == "directory":
+        from backend.indexer import reload_single_vault
+        await reload_single_vault(vault_name)
+    else:
+        await handle_file_move(vault_name, old_path_str, new_path_str)
+
+    # Broadcast SSE event
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("item_moved", {
+        "vault": vault_name,
+        "old_path": old_path_str,
+        "new_path": new_path_str,
+        "item_type": item_type,
+    })
+    await dispatch_webhooks("item_moved", {"vault": vault_name, "old_path": old_path_str, "new_path": new_path_str, "item_type": item_type})
+
+    return {"success": True, "old_path": old_path_str, "new_path": new_path_str, "item_type": item_type}

backend/routers/health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""System health endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 1).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/health``, ``/api/health/detailed``),
+même ``response_model`` (:class:`backend.schemas.HealthResponse`), même
+dépendance admin. Seule différence : la version est lue via
+:func:`backend.version.get_version` au lieu de ``app.version`` (valeur
+identique, figée au démarrage depuis le fichier ``VERSION``).
+
+Note : ``uptime_seconds`` reprend l'expression d'origine
+(``'_SERVER_START_TIME' in globals()``), qui vaut toujours 0 — le global
+n'est défini nulle part dans ``backend.main`` (voir ``backend.admin`` qui
+possède son propre compteur). Ce comportement est préservé tel quel ; le
+corriger fera l'objet d'une tranche ultérieure avec test dédié.
+"""
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import require_admin
+from backend.indexer import index
+from backend.schemas import HealthResponse
+from backend.version import get_git_commit, get_git_describe, get_version
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["System"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/health", response_model=HealthResponse)
+async def api_health():
+    """Health check endpoint for Docker and monitoring.
+
+    Returns:
+        Application status, version, vault count and total file count.
+    """
+    total_files = sum(len(v["files"]) for v in index.values())
+    total_tokens = sum(len(v.get("files", [])) * 1000 for v in index.values())  # rough approx
+    import time
+
+    from backend.indexer import _last_full_index_ts
+    # `_SERVER_START_TIME` n'existe dans aucun module (comportement d'origine
+    # préservé : uptime toujours 0 — voir docstring du module).
+    uptime = int(time.time() - _SERVER_START_TIME) if '_SERVER_START_TIME' in globals() else 0  # noqa: F821
+    return {
+        "status": "ok",
+        "version": get_version(),
+        "vaults": len(index),
+        "total_files": total_files,
+        "total_tokens": total_tokens,
+        "last_full_index_ts": _last_full_index_ts,
+        "uptime_seconds": uptime,
+        "git_describe": get_git_describe(),
+        "git_commit": get_git_commit(),
+    }
+
+
+@router.get("/api/health/detailed", response_model=HealthResponse)
+async def api_health_detailed(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Detailed health check — admin only.
+
+    Returns enriched metrics including memory, disk, SSE connections, and backup stats.
+    """
+
+    import psutil
+
+    from backend.admin import _count_active_sessions, _get_disk_stats
+    from backend.indexer import _last_full_index_ts, index
+
+    total_files = sum(len(v["files"]) for v in index.values())
+    total_tokens = sum(len(v.get("files", [])) * 1000 for v in index.values())
+    import time
+    uptime = int(time.time() - _SERVER_START_TIME) if '_SERVER_START_TIME' in globals() else 0  # noqa: F821 — voir ci-dessus
+
+    # Memory
+    vm = psutil.virtual_memory()
+    mem_used_mb = round(vm.used / (1024 ** 2), 1)
+    mem_total_mb = round(vm.total / (1024 ** 2), 1)
+    mem_pct = round(vm.percent, 1)
+
+    # CPU
+    cpu_pct = psutil.cpu_percent(interval=None)
+
+    # Disk
+    disk_used_gb, disk_total_gb = _get_disk_stats()
+    disk_free_gb = round(disk_total_gb - disk_used_gb, 2)
+    disk_pct = round((disk_used_gb / disk_total_gb * 100) if disk_total_gb > 0 else 0, 1)
+
+    # SSE connections (approximation)
+    active_sessions = _count_active_sessions()
+
+    # Backups
+    from backend.admin import _scan_backups
+    backup_rows = _scan_backups()
+    total_backups = len(backup_rows)
+    total_backup_size_mb = round(sum(r["size"] for r in backup_rows) / (1024 ** 2), 2)
+    oldest_backup_age_days = 0.0
+    if backup_rows:
+        now_ts = int(time.time())
+        oldest_ts = min(r["timestamp"] for r in backup_rows)
+        oldest_backup_age_days = round((now_ts - oldest_ts) / 86400, 2)
+
+    # Index details
+    index_detail = {}
+    for name, data in index.items():
+        index_detail[name] = {
+            "file_count": len(data["files"]),
+            "tag_count": len(data.get("tags", [])),
+            "token_count_approx": len(data.get("files", [])) * 1000,
+        }
+
+    return {
+        "status": "ok",
+        "version": get_version(),
+        "vaults": len(index),
+        "total_files": total_files,
+        "total_tokens": total_tokens,
+        "last_full_index_ts": _last_full_index_ts,
+        "uptime_seconds": uptime,
+        "git_describe": get_git_describe(),
+        "git_commit": get_git_commit(),
+        # Enriched fields
+        "memory": {
+            "used_mb": mem_used_mb,
+            "total_mb": mem_total_mb,
+            "percent": mem_pct,
+        },
+        "cpu": {
+            "percent": cpu_pct,
+        },
+        "disk": {
+            "used_gb": disk_used_gb,
+            "total_gb": disk_total_gb,
+            "free_gb": disk_free_gb,
+            "percent": disk_pct,
+        },
+        "connections": {
+            "active_sse": active_sessions,
+        },
+        "backups": {
+            "total_count": total_backups,
+            "total_size_mb": total_backup_size_mb,
+            "oldest_age_days": oldest_backup_age_days,
+        },
+        "index": index_detail,
+    }

backend/routers/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+"""Shared helpers for the file routers (ROADMAP #85, tranche 6a).
+
+Petites fonctions pures extraites de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement
+de comportement. Regroupées ici car utilisées par plusieurs routers
+(``files_read`` aujourd'hui, ``files_media`` / mutations ensuite) :
+- :func:`content_disposition` — aussi utilisée par ``_stream_file_with_range``
+  (resté dans ``main`` jusqu'à la tranche media).
+- :func:`media_max_inline_bytes` — aussi utilisée par ``/api/media``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import os
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
+from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, StreamingResponse
+
+
+def content_disposition(disposition: str, filename: str) -> str:
+    """Build a header-safe Content-Disposition value.
+
+    HTTP header values must be ASCII. Unicode filenames are sent per
+    RFC 5987 via ``filename*`` (percent-encoded UTF-8) with a pure-ASCII
+    ``filename`` fallback. This avoids a UnicodeDecodeError / HTTP 500 when
+    the filename contains accented characters (e.g. 'Bière blonde…pdf').
+    """
+    from urllib.parse import quote
+    ascii_name = "".join(c for c in filename if c.isascii() and (c.isalnum() or c in " _-.")).strip() or "file"
+    ext = Path(filename).suffix
+    if ext and not Path(ascii_name).suffix:
+        ascii_name = ascii_name + ext
+    return f"{disposition}; filename=\"{ascii_name}\"; filename*=UTF-8''{quote(filename)}"
+
+
+def media_max_inline_bytes() -> int:
+    """Maximum size (bytes) for inline audio/video playback (roadmap #109-A3).
+
+    Configurable via ``OBSIGATE_MEDIA_MAX_INLINE_MB`` (default 500 MB). Files
+    above the limit are not streamed in the viewer (the UI falls back to the
+    download button), which keeps a single uvicorn worker from being pinned by
+    multi-gigabyte media. Invalid or non-positive values fall back to default.
+    """
+    default_mb = 500
+    raw = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_MEDIA_MAX_INLINE_MB", "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return default_mb * 1024 * 1024
+    try:
+        mb = float(raw)
+    except ValueError:
+        return default_mb * 1024 * 1024
+    if mb <= 0:
+        return default_mb * 1024 * 1024
+    return int(mb * 1024 * 1024)
+
+
+def stream_file_with_range(file_path: Path, request: Request, media_type: str):
+    """Return a file response honouring the HTTP ``Range`` header (roadmap #109).
+
+    Extrait de :mod:`backend.main` (``_stream_file_with_range``) sans
+    changement de comportement. Shared by ``pdf/stream`` and ``/api/media``:
+    a plain :class:`FileResponse` with ``Accept-Ranges: bytes`` when no range
+    is requested, or a :class:`StreamingResponse` (206 Partial Content,
+    64 KiB chunks) for a valid single range. An unsatisfiable range yields
+    ``416`` with a ``Content-Range: bytes */size`` header.
+
+    Reads are offloaded to threads so the event loop is never blocked
+    (ASYNC230), matching the previous inline implementation.
+    """
+    file_size = file_path.stat().st_size
+    range_header = request.headers.get("range")
+    disposition = content_disposition("inline", file_path.name)
+
+    if range_header:
+        # Parse "bytes=start-end" (single range only; multi-range is not used by viewers)
+        m = re.match(r"bytes=(\d*)-(\d*)", range_header)
+        if not m:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=416,
+                                headers={"Content-Range": f"bytes */{file_size}"})
+        start_s, end_s = m.group(1), m.group(2)
+        if start_s == "" and end_s == "":
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=416,
+                                headers={"Content-Range": f"bytes */{file_size}"})
+        if start_s == "":
+            # suffix range: last N bytes
+            length = min(int(end_s), file_size)
+            start = file_size - length
+            end = file_size - 1
+        else:
+            start = int(start_s)
+            end = int(end_s) if end_s else file_size - 1
+            end = min(end, file_size - 1)
+        if start > end or start >= file_size:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=416,
+                                headers={"Content-Range": f"bytes */{file_size}"})
+
+        chunk_size = end - start + 1
+
+        async def _partial():
+            f = await asyncio.to_thread(open, str(file_path), "rb")
+            try:
+                await asyncio.to_thread(f.seek, start)
+                remaining = chunk_size
+                while remaining > 0:
+                    data = await asyncio.to_thread(f.read, min(64 * 1024, remaining))
+                    if not data:
+                        break
+                    remaining -= len(data)
+                    yield data
+            finally:
+                await asyncio.to_thread(f.close)
+
+        return StreamingResponse(
+            _partial(),
+            status_code=206,
+            media_type=media_type,
+            headers={
+                "Content-Range": f"bytes {start}-{end}/{file_size}",
+                "Accept-Ranges": "bytes",
+                "Content-Length": str(chunk_size),
+                "Content-Disposition": disposition,
+            },
+        )
+
+    return FileResponse(str(file_path), media_type=media_type, headers={
+        "Accept-Ranges": "bytes",
+        "Content-Disposition": disposition})

backend/routers/history.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"""History endpoints — recent, bookmarks, saved searches (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins, mêmes modèles (``BookmarkToggleRequest``
+déménagé dans :mod:`backend.schemas`), mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` / ``_backup_file`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths`
+  et :mod:`backend.services.backups` (pass-through).
+- ``_load_config`` vient de :mod:`backend.routers.config`.
+"""
+
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import frontmatter
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.history import get_bookmarks, toggle_bookmark
+from backend.indexer import find_file_in_index, get_vault_data, update_single_file
+from backend.routers.config import _load_config
+from backend.saved_searches import delete_saved, get_saved, save_search
+from backend.schemas import (
+    BookmarksResponse,
+    BookmarkToggleRequest,
+    BookmarkToggleResponse,
+    RecentResponse,
+    SavedSearch,
+    StatusResponse,
+)
+from backend.services.backups import create_backup
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime, list_recent
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["Bookmarks"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/recent", response_model=RecentResponse)
+async def api_recent(limit: int | None = Query(None), vault: str | None = Query(None), mode: str | None = Query("opened"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    config = _load_config()
+    actual_limit = limit if limit is not None else config.get("recent_files_limit", 20)
+
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    user_vaults = current_user.get("_token_vaults") or current_user.get("vaults", [])
+
+    return list_recent(
+        username,
+        user_vaults,
+        vault=vault,
+        limit=actual_limit,
+        mode=mode or "opened",
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/api/bookmarks", response_model=BookmarksResponse)
+async def api_bookmarks(vault: str | None = Query(None), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+
+    if not username:
+        return {"files": []}
+
+    history = get_bookmarks(username, vault_filter=vault)
+    files_resp = []
+    for item in history:
+        v_name = item["vault"]
+        # #194 : check_vault_access — "*" n'inclut pas les dossiers persos.
+        if not check_vault_access(v_name, current_user):
+            continue
+
+        # Find in index to get metadata
+        f_idx = find_file_in_index(item["path"], v_name)
+        if f_idx:
+            files_resp.append({
+                "path": f_idx["path"],
+                "title": f_idx.get("title") or item["path"].split("/")[-1],
+                "vault": v_name,
+                "mtime": item["bookmarked_at"],
+                "mtime_human": humanize_mtime(item["bookmarked_at"]),
+                "size_bytes": f_idx.get("size", 0),
+                "tags": [f"#{t}" for t in f_idx.get("tags", [])][:5],
+                "bookmarked": True
+            })
+        else:
+            files_resp.append({
+                "path": item["path"],
+                "title": item.get("title") or item["path"].split("/")[-1],
+                "vault": v_name,
+                "mtime": item["bookmarked_at"],
+                "mtime_human": humanize_mtime(item["bookmarked_at"]),
+                "tags": [],
+                "bookmarked": True
+            })
+    return {
+        "files": files_resp,
+        "total": len(files_resp)
+    }
+
+
+@router.post("/api/bookmarks/toggle", response_model=BookmarkToggleResponse)
+async def api_toggle_bookmark(req: BookmarkToggleRequest, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
+
+    # Check vault access
+    if not check_vault_access(req.vault, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied to vault")
+
+    is_now_bookmarked = toggle_bookmark(username, req.vault, req.path, req.title or "")
+
+    # Update the file's YAML frontmatter: favoris: true/false
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(req.vault)
+    if vault_data:
+        file_path = resolve_safe_path(Path(vault_data["path"]), req.path)
+        if file_path.exists() and file_path.suffix == ".md":
+            try:
+                raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+                post = frontmatter.loads(raw)
+                if is_now_bookmarked:
+                    post.metadata["favoris"] = True
+                elif "favoris" in post.metadata:
+                    del post.metadata["favoris"]
+                new_raw = frontmatter.dumps(post)
+                create_backup(file_path, req.vault, req.path)
+                file_path.write_text(new_raw, encoding="utf-8")
+                await update_single_file(req.vault, str(file_path))
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Failed to update favoris metadata on {req.vault}/{req.path}: {e}")
+
+    return {"bookmarked": is_now_bookmarked}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/saved-searches", response_model=list[SavedSearch])
+async def api_saved_searches(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(401)
+    return get_saved(username)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/saved-searches", response_model=SavedSearch)
+async def api_save_search(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(401)
+    return save_search(username, body)
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/saved-searches/{search_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_delete_saved_search(search_id: str, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(401)
+    if not delete_saved(username, search_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Not found")
+    return {"status": "deleted"}

backend/routers/notify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""External notification channels endpoints (#168).
+
+Channel CRUD is admin-only (secrets involved); sending a test notification
+requires authentication. Responses mask secrets (``***`` + ``has_secret``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+
+from backend import notify as _notify
+from backend.auth.middleware import require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.schemas import StatusResponse
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/notify", tags=["notify"])
+
+
+class NotifyChannel(BaseModel):
+    """Public view of a notification channel (secrets masked)."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    id: str = Field(description="Channel id")
+    name: str = Field(description="Display name")
+    type: str = Field(description="discord | telegram | smtp | webhook")
+    enabled: bool = Field(description="Whether the channel receives broadcasts")
+    config: dict[str, Any] = Field(description="Channel config (secrets masked)")
+    has_secret: bool = Field(description="True when a secret is configured")
+
+
+class NotifySendResult(BaseModel):
+    """Outcome of a test send / broadcast."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    ok: bool = Field(description="True when every delivery succeeded")
+    deliveries: list[dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list)
+
+
+@router.get("/channels", response_model=list[NotifyChannel])
+async def api_notify_list(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """List notification channels (admin)."""
+    return _notify.list_channels()
+
+
+@router.post("/channels", response_model=NotifyChannel)
+async def api_notify_create(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Create a channel (``{name, type, config}``). Secrets go to the secret store."""
+    try:
+        return _notify.create_channel(
+            str(body.get("name") or ""),
+            str(body.get("type") or ""),
+            dict(body.get("config") or {}),
+        )
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
+
+
+@router.patch("/channels/{channel_id}", response_model=NotifyChannel)
+async def api_notify_update(channel_id: str, body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Update a channel (name / enabled / config)."""
+    try:
+        result = _notify.update_channel(channel_id, body)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
+    if result is None:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Channel not found")
+    return result
+
+
+@router.delete("/channels/{channel_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_notify_delete(channel_id: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Delete a channel and its secret."""
+    if not _notify.delete_channel(channel_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Channel not found")
+    return {"status": "deleted"}
+
+
+@router.post("/test", response_model=NotifySendResult)
+async def api_notify_test(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Send a test notification (broadcast or single ``channel_id``)."""
+    title = str(body.get("title") or "Test ObsiGate")
+    message = str(body.get("message") or "Notification de test.")
+    channel_id = str(body.get("channel_id") or "")
+    if channel_id:
+        channel = next((c for c in _notify._read_channels() if c.get("id") == channel_id), None)
+        if channel is None:
+            raise HTTPException(404, "Channel not found")
+        try:
+            _notify.send_via_channel(channel, title, message, "manual")
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise HTTPException(502, f"Envoi échoué : {e}") from e
+        return {"ok": True, "deliveries": [{"channel_id": channel_id, "ok": True}]}
+    deliveries = _notify.broadcast("manual", title, message)
+    return {"ok": all(d.get("ok") for d in deliveries), "deliveries": deliveries}

backend/routers/realtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+"""Real-time endpoints — SSE stream & collaboration WebSocket (ROADMAP #85, tranche 9).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/events``,
+``/ws/collab/{vault}/{path}``), même authentification (Depend pour le SSE,
+manuelle pour le WebSocket — les ``Depends`` FastAPI ne s'exécutent pas sur
+les routes WebSocket).
+
+Pas de tags déclarés : assignation par chemin via
+``openapi_docs.tag_for_path`` comme avant (``/api/events`` → System).
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import json as _json
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, WebSocket
+from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.collab import authenticate_websocket, collab_manager
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.vaults import get_vault_root
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/events",
+    response_class=StreamingResponse,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"text/event-stream": {}}, "description": "Server-Sent Events stream"}},
+)
+async def api_events(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """SSE stream for real-time index update notifications.
+
+    Sends keepalive comments every 30s. Events:
+    - ``index_updated``: partial index change (file create/modify/delete/move)
+    - ``index_reloaded``: full re-index completed
+    - ``vault_added``: new vault added dynamically
+    - ``vault_removed``: vault removed dynamically
+    """
+    queue = await sse_manager.connect()
+
+    async def event_generator():
+        try:
+            # Send initial connection event
+            yield f"event: connected\ndata: {_json.dumps({'sse_clients': sse_manager.client_count})}\n\n"
+            while True:
+                try:
+                    msg = await asyncio.wait_for(queue.get(), timeout=30.0)
+                    yield f"event: {msg['event']}\ndata: {msg['data']}\n\n"
+                except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+                    # Keepalive comment
+                    yield ": keepalive\n\n"
+                except asyncio.CancelledError:
+                    break
+        finally:
+            sse_manager.disconnect(queue)
+
+    return StreamingResponse(
+        event_generator(),
+        media_type="text/event-stream",
+        headers={
+            "Cache-Control": "no-cache",
+            "Connection": "keep-alive",
+            "X-Accel-Buffering": "no",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+@router.websocket("/ws/collab/{vault_name}/{path:path}")
+async def collab_websocket(websocket: WebSocket, vault_name: str, path: str):
+    """Real-time collaborative editing over WebSocket (ROADMAP #62).
+
+    One *room* is created per ``vault::path``; all clients editing the same
+    file share Yjs/CRDT updates, awareness (cursors/selection) and a debounced
+    server-side persistence of the markdown content.
+
+    Authentication is performed manually (FastAPI ``Depends`` do not run for
+    WebSocket routes) and vault access is enforced per connection.
+    """
+    from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+
+    user = authenticate_websocket(websocket)
+    if user is None:
+        await websocket.close(code=4401)
+        return
+
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, user):
+        await websocket.close(code=4403)
+        return
+
+    try:
+        vault_root = get_vault_root(vault_name)
+        file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    except ServiceError:
+        await websocket.close(code=4404)
+        return
+
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        await websocket.close(code=4404)
+        return
+
+    await websocket.accept()
+    await collab_manager.connect(websocket, vault_name, path, file_path, user)

backend/routers/scheduler.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+"""Scheduled tasks endpoints (#170).
+
+Tasks reuse the existing mutation/notification services — this router only
+validates, persists and triggers. File-writing actions check vault access
+at creation time; the background tick re-checks nothing (system context) but
+records failures and notifies on ``schedule_failure`` (#168).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+
+from backend import scheduler as _scheduler
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.schemas import StatusResponse
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/scheduler", tags=["scheduler"])
+
+
+class ScheduledTask(BaseModel):
+    """A programmed automatic task."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    id: str = Field(description="Task id")
+    name: str = Field(description="Display name")
+    action: dict[str, Any] = Field(description="{kind, params}")
+    schedule: dict[str, Any] = Field(description="{kind, ...}")
+    enabled: bool = Field(description="Whether the tick executes it")
+    created_by: str = Field(description="Owner username")
+    created_at: str = Field(description="ISO-8601 creation time")
+    last_run_at: str | None = Field(default=None)
+    last_status: str | None = Field(default=None)
+    last_error: str | None = Field(default=None)
+    run_count: int = Field(default=0)
+    next_run_at: str = Field(description="ISO-8601 next due time")
+
+
+class TaskRunResult(BaseModel):
+    """Outcome of a manual or due run."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    task_id: str = Field(description="Task id")
+    ok: bool = Field(description="True on success")
+    result: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(default=None)
+    error: str | None = Field(default=None)
+
+
+def _check_action_vault(action: dict[str, Any], user: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+    from backend.services.vaults import get_vault_root
+
+    kind = (action or {}).get("kind")
+    params = (action or {}).get("params") or {}
+    if kind in ("create_file", "append_to_file"):
+        vault = str(params.get("vault") or "")
+        if not check_vault_access(vault, user):
+            raise HTTPException(403, f"No access to vault '{vault}'")
+        try:
+            get_vault_root(vault)
+        except ServiceError as e:
+            raise HTTPException(404, f"Unknown vault '{vault}'") from e
+
+
+@router.get("/tasks", response_model=list[ScheduledTask])
+async def api_scheduler_list(current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List scheduled tasks (newest first)."""
+    return _scheduler.list_tasks()
+
+
+@router.post("/tasks", response_model=ScheduledTask)
+async def api_scheduler_create(body: dict = Body(...), current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Create a task (``{name, action, schedule, enabled?}``)."""
+    action = dict(body.get("action") or {})
+    _check_action_vault(action, current_user)
+    try:
+        return _scheduler.create_task(
+            str(body.get("name") or ""),
+            action,
+            dict(body.get("schedule") or {}),
+            created_by=str(current_user.get("username", "api")),
+            enabled=bool(body.get("enabled", True)),
+        )
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
+
+
+@router.patch("/tasks/{task_id}", response_model=ScheduledTask)
+async def api_scheduler_update(task_id: str, body: dict = Body(...), current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Update a task (name / enabled / action / schedule)."""
+    if "action" in body:
+        _check_action_vault(dict(body["action"] or {}), current_user)
+    try:
+        result = _scheduler.update_task(task_id, body)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
+    if result is None:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Task not found")
+    return result
+
+
+@router.delete("/tasks/{task_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_scheduler_delete(task_id: str, current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Delete a task."""
+    if not _scheduler.delete_task(task_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Task not found")
+    return {"status": "deleted"}
+
+
+@router.post("/tasks/{task_id}/run", response_model=TaskRunResult)
+async def api_scheduler_run(task_id: str, current_user: dict[str, Any] = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Execute a task immediately (manual run)."""
+    try:
+        return _scheduler.run_task(task_id, manual=True)
+    except KeyError:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Task not found") from None

backend/routers/search.py

@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+"""Search, suggest, graph & index-reload endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 5).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins, mêmes modèles de réponse (déménagés dans
+:mod:`backend.schemas`), mêmes dépendances d'authentification. La logique
+métier vit déjà dans :mod:`backend.services.search`,
+:mod:`backend.search`, :mod:`backend.services.graph` et
+:mod:`backend.services.mutations`.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- Le pool ``_search_executor`` de ``main`` vit désormais dans
+  :mod:`backend.search_executor` (même dimensionnement, même cycle de vie
+  géré par le lifespan de ``main``) : accès via
+  :func:`get_search_executor`.
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import logging
+from functools import partial
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.audit import log_file_save
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import get_vault_data, reload_index, update_single_file
+from backend.schemas import (
+    AdvancedSearchResponse,
+    GraphResponse,
+    ReloadResponse,
+    ReplaceResponse,
+    SearchResponse,
+    SuggestResponse,
+    TagsResponse,
+    TagSuggestResponse,
+    TreeSearchResponse,
+    VaultPathsResponse,
+    VaultStatsResponse,
+)
+from backend.search import suggest_tags, suggest_titles
+from backend.search_executor import get_search_executor
+from backend.services.graph import get_graph as service_get_graph
+from backend.services.mutations import (
+    replace_in_files as service_replace_in_files,
+)
+from backend.services.search import advanced_search_vaults, list_paths, search_paths, search_vaults
+from backend.services.search import list_tags as service_list_tags
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["search"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/search", response_model=SearchResponse)
+async def api_search(
+    q: str = Query("", description="Search query"),
+    vault: str = Query("all", description="Vault filter"),
+    tag: str | None = Query(None, description="Tag filter"),
+    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200, description="Results per page"),
+    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0, description="Pagination offset"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Full-text search across vaults with relevance scoring.
+
+    Supports combining free-text queries with tag filters.
+    Results are ranked by a multi-factor scoring algorithm.
+    Pagination via ``limit`` and ``offset`` (defaults preserve backward compat).
+
+    Args:
+        q: Free-text search string.
+        vault: Vault name or ``"all"`` to search everywhere.
+        tag: Comma-separated tag names to require.
+        limit: Max results per page (1–200).
+        offset: Pagination offset.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``SearchResponse`` with ranked results and snippets.
+    """
+    loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
+    # Fetch the full result set (capped at DEFAULT_SEARCH_LIMIT internally) and
+    # paginate in the shared service so routes and tools share the same logic.
+    return await loop.run_in_executor(
+        get_search_executor(),
+        # #194 : filtre par vault accessible AVANT pagination ("*" sans les
+        # dossiers persos) — sinon un user voyait les notes des autres.
+        # #196 : les documents reçus par partage dirigé sont ajoutés aux
+        # résultats (vault virtuel "home-<user>/Partage").
+        partial(
+            search_vaults, q, vault, tag, limit, offset,
+            is_allowed=lambda v: check_vault_access(v, current_user),
+            username=current_user["username"],
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/api/tags", response_model=TagsResponse)
+async def api_tags(vault: str | None = Query(None, description="Vault filter"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return all unique tags with occurrence counts.
+
+    Args:
+        vault: Optional vault name to restrict tag aggregation.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``TagsResponse`` with tags sorted by descending count.
+    """
+    return {"vault_filter": vault, "tags": service_list_tags(vault)}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/tree-search", response_model=TreeSearchResponse)
+async def api_tree_search(
+    q: str = Query("", description="Search query"),
+    vault: str = Query("all", description="Vault filter"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Search for files and directories in the tree structure using pre-built index.
+
+    Uses the in-memory path index for instant filtering without filesystem access.
+
+    Args:
+        q: Search string to match against file/directory paths.
+        vault: Vault name or "all" to search everywhere.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``TreeSearchResponse`` with matching paths.
+    """
+    return search_paths(q, vault)
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vault/{vault_name}/paths", response_model=VaultPathsResponse)
+async def api_vault_paths(
+    vault_name: str,
+    limit: int = Query(5000, ge=1, le=20000, description="Maximum number of indexed paths to return"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return a flat list of every indexed file and directory in a vault.
+
+    Used by the AI assistant ``@`` mention menu to filter paths instantly on
+    the client (one request instead of one per keystroke).
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        limit: Maximum number of entries returned.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``VaultPathsResponse`` with the vault's indexed paths.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    return list_paths(vault_name, limit=limit)
+
+
+@router.get("/api/search/advanced", response_model=AdvancedSearchResponse)
+async def api_advanced_search(
+    q: str = Query("", description="Advanced search query (supports tag:, vault:, title:, path:, ext: operators)"),
+    vault: str = Query("all", description="Vault filter"),
+    tag: str | None = Query(None, description="Comma-separated tag filter"),
+    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200, description="Results per page"),
+    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0, description="Pagination offset"),
+    sort: str = Query("relevance", description="Sort by 'relevance' or 'modified'"),
+    case_sensitive: bool = Query(False, description="Match case"),
+    whole_word: bool = Query(False, description="Match whole words only"),
+    regex: bool = Query(False, description="Treat query as regex"),
+    include_paths: str | None = Query(None, description="Comma-separated glob patterns to include"),
+    exclude_paths: str | None = Query(None, description="Comma-separated glob patterns to exclude"),
+    created: str | None = Query(None, description="Created date filter (>date, <date, date..date)"),
+    modified: str | None = Query(None, description="Modified date filter (>date, <date, date..date, <Nd)"),
+    size: str | None = Query(None, description="Size filter (>size, <size, size..size, e.g. >1MB, <10KB)"),
+    semantic: bool = Query(False, description="Fuse TF-IDF with semantic embeddings (RRF)"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Advanced full-text search with TF-IDF scoring, facets, and pagination.
+
+    Supports advanced query operators:
+    - ``tag:<name>`` or ``#<name>`` — filter by tag
+    - ``vault:<name>`` — filter by vault
+    - ``title:<text>`` — filter by title substring
+    - ``path:<text>`` — filter by path substring
+    - ``ext:<type>`` — filter by file extension
+    - ``created:>2024-01-01`` — filter by creation date
+    - ``modified:<7d`` or ``modified:2024-01-01..2024-06-01`` — filter by modification date
+    - ``size:>1MB`` or ``size:100KB..1MB`` — filter by file size
+    - Remaining text is scored using TF-IDF with accent normalization.
+    - Toggles: case_sensitive, whole_word, regex
+    - Path filters: include_paths, exclude_paths (glob patterns)
+    - ``semantic=true`` — fuse the TF-IDF ranking with the semantic (embedding)
+      ranking via Reciprocal Rank Fusion and expose ``semantic_score`` per result.
+
+    Results include ``<mark>``-highlighted snippets and faceted tag/vault counts.
+    """
+    loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
+    search_fn = partial(advanced_search_vaults, q, vault=vault, tag=tag,
+                limit=limit, offset=offset, sort=sort,
+                case_sensitive=case_sensitive, whole_word=whole_word, regex=regex,
+                include_paths=include_paths, exclude_paths=exclude_paths,
+                created=created, modified=modified, size=size, semantic=semantic)
+    try:
+        return await loop.run_in_executor(get_search_executor(), search_fn)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
+
+
+@router.post("/api/search/replace", response_model=ReplaceResponse)
+async def api_search_replace(
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Find and replace across vault files."""
+    query = body.get("query", "")
+    replacement = body.get("replacement", "")
+    vault_filter = body.get("vault", "all")
+    case_sensitive = body.get("case_sensitive", False)
+    whole_word = body.get("whole_word", False)
+    regex_mode = body.get("regex", False)
+    include_paths = body.get("include_paths")
+    exclude_paths = body.get("exclude_paths")
+    replace_all = body.get("replace_all", False)
+    dry_run = body.get("dry_run", not replace_all)
+
+    if not query:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Query is required")
+
+    result = service_replace_in_files(
+        query,
+        replacement,
+        vault=vault_filter,
+        case_sensitive=case_sensitive,
+        whole_word=whole_word,
+        regex=regex_mode,
+        include_paths=include_paths,
+        exclude_paths=exclude_paths,
+        replace_all=replace_all,
+        dry_run=dry_run,
+        is_vault_allowed=lambda v: check_vault_access(v, current_user),
+    )
+
+    if dry_run:
+        return result
+
+    # Side effects for applied replacements (audit + incremental index).
+    for match in result.get("replaced", []):
+        log_file_save(current_user["username"], match["vault"], match["path"], match.get("size", 0))
+        vault_data = get_vault_data(match["vault"])
+        if vault_data:
+            abs_path = str(Path(vault_data["path"]) / match["path"])
+            await update_single_file(match["vault"], abs_path)
+
+    return result
+
+
+@router.get("/api/suggest", response_model=SuggestResponse)
+async def api_suggest(
+    q: str = Query("", description="Prefix to search for in file titles"),
+    vault: str = Query("all", description="Vault filter"),
+    limit: int = Query(10, ge=1, le=50, description="Max suggestions"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Suggest file titles matching a prefix (accent-insensitive).
+
+    Used for autocomplete in the search input.
+
+    Args:
+        q: User-typed prefix (minimum 2 characters).
+        vault: Vault name or ``"all"``.
+        limit: Max number of suggestions.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``SuggestResponse`` with matching file title suggestions.
+    """
+    suggestions = suggest_titles(q, vault_filter=vault, limit=limit)
+    return {"query": q, "suggestions": suggestions}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/tags/suggest", response_model=TagSuggestResponse)
+async def api_tags_suggest(
+    q: str = Query("", description="Prefix to search for in tags"),
+    vault: str = Query("all", description="Vault filter"),
+    limit: int = Query(10, ge=1, le=50, description="Max suggestions"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Suggest tags matching a prefix (accent-insensitive).
+
+    Used for autocomplete when typing ``tag:`` or ``#`` in the search input.
+
+    Args:
+        q: User-typed prefix (with or without ``#``, minimum 2 characters).
+        vault: Vault name or ``"all"``.
+        limit: Max number of suggestions.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``TagSuggestResponse`` with matching tag suggestions and counts.
+    """
+    suggestions = suggest_tags(q, vault_filter=vault, limit=limit)
+    return {"query": q, "suggestions": suggestions}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/index/reload", response_model=ReloadResponse)
+async def api_reload(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Force a full re-index of all configured vaults.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``ReloadResponse`` with per-vault file and tag counts.
+    """
+    stats = await reload_index()
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("index_reloaded", {
+        "vaults": list(stats.keys()),
+        "stats": stats,
+    })
+    return {"status": "ok", "vaults": stats}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/graph/{vault_name}", response_model=GraphResponse)
+async def api_graph(
+    vault_name: str,
+    path: str = Query("", description="Relative path to focus on"),
+    depth: int = Query(1, ge=0, le=3, description="How many levels deep to expand"),
+    scope: str = Query("directory", description="'directory' (default) or 'full' for entire vault"),
+    tag: str = Query("", description="Filter: only show files with this tag"),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Return graph data (nodes and edges) for a vault or directory.
+
+    Nodes represent files and directories. Edges represent parent-child
+    relationships and wikilinks between markdown files.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault.
+        path: Relative directory path to focus on (empty = root).
+        depth: Expansion depth (0 = only direct children, 1-3 = deeper).
+        scope: 'directory' for subtree, 'full' for entire vault.
+        tag: Optional tag filter (only files with this tag appear).
+
+    Returns:
+        ``GraphResponse`` with nodes and edges.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+
+    return service_get_graph(vault_name, path=path, depth=depth, scope=scope, tag=tag)
+
+
+@router.get("/api/index/reload/{vault_name}", response_model=VaultStatsResponse)
+async def api_reload_vault(vault_name: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Force a re-index of a single vault.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault to reindex.
+
+    Returns:
+        Dict with vault statistics.
+    """
+    try:
+        from backend.indexer import reload_single_vault
+        stats = await reload_single_vault(vault_name)
+        await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_reloaded", {
+            "vault": vault_name,
+            "stats": stats,
+        })
+        return {"status": "ok", "vault": vault_name, "stats": stats}
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=str(e))

backend/routers/sharing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+"""Public share endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 3).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/share/*``, ``/api/shares``,
+``/s/{token}*``), mêmes modèles de réponse, mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification (les pages ``/s/*`` restent publiques). La logique
+métier vit déjà dans :mod:`backend.share`.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes (pas de changement de comportement) :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` / ``_backup_file`` de ``main`` n'étaient que des
+  wrappers directs : appelés ici via :mod:`backend.services.paths` et
+  :mod:`backend.services.backups` (mêmes signatures, mêmes exceptions
+  ``ServiceError`` toujours mappées par le handler global de ``main``).
+- ``_render_markdown`` vient de :mod:`backend.render` (#85 T9, sans cycle
+  d'import).
+"""
+
+import html as html_mod
+import json as _json
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import frontmatter
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Request
+from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, Response
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, get_current_user, require_auth
+from backend.auth.user_store import get_user
+from backend.indexer import get_vault_data, parse_markdown_file, update_single_file
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
+from backend.schemas import ShareModel, StatusResponse
+from backend.secret_redactor import redact_file_content
+from backend.services.backups import create_backup
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.share import (
+    create_share,
+    get_share_by_token,
+    list_shares,
+    record_access,
+    revoke_share,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+# Lazy import: WeasyPrint PDF export (requires GTK, may not be available everywhere)
+try:
+    from backend.pdf_export import build_pdf_html, generate_pdf
+except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - WeasyPrint/GTK missing
+    generate_pdf = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+    build_pdf_html = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+    logging.getLogger("obsigate").warning("PDF export unavailable (WeasyPrint/GTK not found)")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["sharing"])
+
+
+def _gate_share(share: dict | None, user: dict | None) -> dict:
+    """#196 — directed shares: auth + membership check for ``/s/*`` pages.
+
+    Public share (``shared_with`` empty) → pass-through, no auth required.
+    Directed share → requires an authenticated user who is the creator, an
+    admin, or listed in ``shared_with``. Anything else answers **404** (never
+    403) so an outsider cannot learn that a token exists.
+    """
+    if share is None:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Share not found or expired")
+    recipients = share.get("shared_with") or []
+    if not recipients:
+        return share
+    if user is None:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Share not found or expired")
+    if user["username"] == share.get("created_by") or user.get("role") == "admin" \
+            or user["username"] in recipients:
+        return share
+    raise HTTPException(404, "Share not found or expired")
+
+
+@router.post("/api/share/{vault_name}", response_model=ShareModel)
+async def api_share_create(
+    vault_name: str,
+    body: dict = Body(...),
+    current_user=Depends(require_auth),
+):
+    """Create a public share link for a document.
+
+    Also sets ``publish: true`` in the file's YAML frontmatter so the
+    frontend can visually indicate the file is publicly shared.
+    """
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    path = body.get("path") or ""
+    if not path:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Chemin de fichier requis")
+    expires = body.get("expires_in_hours")
+    # #196 — directed share: validate recipients before creating anything.
+    recipients = body.get("shared_with") or []
+    if not isinstance(recipients, list):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "shared_with doit être une liste d'utilisateurs")
+    for name in recipients:
+        if not isinstance(name, str) or not get_user(name):
+            raise HTTPException(400, f"Utilisateur inconnu : {name}")
+    share = create_share(vault_name, path, current_user["username"], expires, recipients)
+    share["url"] = f"/s/{share['token']}"
+
+    # Set publish: true in the file's frontmatter
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if vault_data:
+        file_path = resolve_safe_path(Path(vault_data["path"]), path)
+        if file_path.exists() and file_path.suffix == ".md":
+            try:
+                raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+                post = frontmatter.loads(raw)
+                if not post.metadata.get("publish"):
+                    post.metadata["publish"] = True
+                    new_raw = frontmatter.dumps(post)
+                    create_backup(file_path, vault_name, path)
+                    file_path.write_text(new_raw, encoding="utf-8")
+                    await update_single_file(vault_name, str(file_path))
+                    logger.info(f"Set publish:true on {vault_name}/{path}")
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Failed to set publish metadata on {vault_name}/{path}: {e}")
+
+    return share
+
+
+@router.get("/api/shares", response_model=list[ShareModel])
+async def api_shares_list(vault: str | None = Query(None), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List shares (optionally filtered by vault).
+
+    #196 : un non-admin ne voit que SES partages (créés ou reçus) ; un admin
+    voit tout (comportement historique).
+    """
+    username = None if current_user.get("role") == "admin" else current_user["username"]
+    shares = list_shares(vault, username)
+    for s in shares:
+        s["url"] = f"/s/{s['token']}"
+    return shares
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/share/{share_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_share_revoke(share_id: str, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    # #196 — only the creator or an admin may revoke; a recipient cannot.
+    from backend.share import _read
+    share = _read()["shares"].get(share_id)
+    if share and current_user.get("role") != "admin" \
+            and share.get("created_by") != current_user["username"]:
+        raise HTTPException(403, "Seul le créateur du partage peut le révoquer")
+    if not revoke_share(share_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Share not found")
+    return {"status": "revoked"}
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/s/{token}/pdf",
+    response_class=Response,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"application/pdf": {}}, "description": "Shared document as PDF"}},
+)
+async def public_share_pdf_download(token: str, current_user=Depends(get_current_user)):
+    """Download shared document as real PDF via WeasyPrint."""
+    if generate_pdf is None:
+        raise HTTPException(501, "PDF export unavailable (WeasyPrint/GTK not available)")
+    share = get_share_by_token(token)
+    share = _gate_share(share, current_user)
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(share["vault"])
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Vault not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, share["path"])
+    if not file_path.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(404, "File not found")
+    try:
+        raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except Exception:
+        raise HTTPException(500, "Cannot read file")
+    record_access(token)
+    raw = redact_file_content(raw, str(file_path))
+    post = parse_markdown_file(raw)
+    ext = file_path.suffix.lower()
+    if ext == ".md":
+        html = _render_markdown(post.content, share["vault"], file_path)
+    else:
+        html = f'<pre style="font-family:monospace;font-size:12px;line-height:1.6;white-space:pre-wrap">{html_mod.escape(raw)}</pre>'
+    title = post.metadata.get("title", file_path.stem)
+    pdf_html = build_pdf_html(html, str(title))
+    pdf_bytes = generate_pdf(pdf_html, str(title))
+    safe_name = "".join(c for c in str(title) if c.isascii() and (c.isalnum() or c in " _-.")).strip() or "document"
+    return Response(content=pdf_bytes, media_type="application/pdf", headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{safe_name}.pdf"'})
+
+
+@router.get("/s/{token}/raw", response_class=FileResponse)
+async def public_share_raw(token: str, current_user=Depends(get_current_user)):
+    """Download the raw (original) shared document."""
+    share = get_share_by_token(token)
+    share = _gate_share(share, current_user)
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(share["vault"])
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Vault not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, share["path"])
+    if not file_path.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(404, "File not found")
+    record_access(token)
+    return FileResponse(path=str(file_path), filename=file_path.name, media_type="application/octet-stream")
+
+
+@router.get("/s/{token}", response_class=HTMLResponse)
+async def public_share_view(request: Request, token: str, current_user=Depends(get_current_user)):
+    """Public share view — no authentication required (unless directed #196)."""
+    from backend.csp import inject_csp_nonce
+
+    share = get_share_by_token(token)
+    share = _gate_share(share, current_user)
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(share["vault"])
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Vault not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, share["path"])
+    if not file_path.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(404, "File not found")
+    try:
+        raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except Exception:
+        raise HTTPException(500, "Cannot read file")
+    record_access(token)
+    raw = redact_file_content(raw, str(file_path))
+    post = parse_markdown_file(raw)
+    ext = file_path.suffix.lower()
+
+    if ext == ".md":
+        html = _render_markdown(post.content, share["vault"], file_path)
+    else:
+        escaped = html_mod.escape(raw)
+        html = f'<pre style="background:var(--bg-card);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:8px;padding:16px;overflow-x:auto;font-size:0.85rem;line-height:1.6"><code>{escaped}</code></pre>'
+
+    title = post.metadata.get("title", file_path.stem)
+
+    # Escape everything user-controlled before embedding in HTML/JS (BUG-022).
+    title_esc = html_mod.escape(str(title))
+    # Neutralise ``</script>`` in the JS string literal too.
+    title_download_js = (
+        _json.dumps(f"{title}.md")
+        .replace("<", "\\u003c")
+        .replace(">", "\\u003e")
+        .replace("&", "\\u0026")
+    )
+
+    # JSON-escape raw content for embedding in HTML, and neutralise ``</script>``.
+    raw_json = (
+        _json.dumps(raw)
+        .replace("<", "\\u003c")
+        .replace(">", "\\u003e")
+        .replace("&", "\\u0026")
+    )
+    fm_html = ""
+    if post.metadata:
+        fm_items = []
+        skip_keys = {"title", "titre"}
+        for k, v in post.metadata.items():
+            if k in skip_keys:
+                continue
+            if isinstance(v, list):
+                v = ", ".join(str(x) for x in v)
+            elif isinstance(v, bool):
+                v = "✓" if v else "✗"
+            elif v is None:
+                v = "—"
+            fm_items.append(
+                f'<div class="fm-row"><span class="fm-key">{html_mod.escape(str(k))}</span>'
+                f'<span class="fm-val">{html_mod.escape(str(v))}</span></div>'
+            )
+        if fm_items:
+            fm_html = f'<div class="fm-section"><div class="fm-header">Frontmatter</div><div class="fm-body">{"".join(fm_items)}</div></div>'
+
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        inject_csp_nonce(
+            f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="fr" data-theme="dark"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
+<title>{title_esc} — ObsiGate Share</title>
+<style>
+:root {{ --bg:#1a1a2e; --bg-card:#16213e; --text:#e0e0e0; --text-muted:#888; --accent:#6366f1; --border:#2a2a4a; --banner-bg:var(--accent); --banner-text:#fff; }}
+[data-theme="light"] {{ --bg:#f8f9fa; --bg-card:#fff; --text:#1a1a2e; --text-muted:#666; --accent:#4f46e5; --border:#ddd; --banner-bg:#eef2ff; --banner-text:#4338ca; }}
+*{{box-sizing:border-box;margin:0;padding:0}}
+body{{font-family:system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif;background:var(--bg);color:var(--text);line-height:1.7;min-height:100vh}}
+.toolbar{{position:sticky;top:0;z-index:10;background:var(--bg-card);border-bottom:1px solid var(--border);padding:8px 16px;display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;flex-wrap:wrap}}
+.toolbar-title{{font-weight:600;font-size:0.9rem;margin-right:auto;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;white-space:nowrap}}
+.toolbar-btn{{padding:6px 12px;border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:6px;background:var(--bg);color:var(--text);cursor:pointer;font-size:0.8rem;display:flex;align-items:center;gap:5px;transition:all .15s}}
+.toolbar-btn:hover{{background:var(--accent);color:#fff;border-color:var(--accent)}}
+.toolbar-btn svg{{width:15px;height:15px;flex-shrink:0}}
+.toolbar-btn:hover svg{{stroke:#fff}}
+.share-banner{{background:var(--banner-bg);color:var(--banner-text);padding:6px 16px;font-size:0.8rem;text-align:center;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;gap:6px}}
+.share-banner svg{{width:14px;height:14px;flex-shrink:0}}
+.content{{max-width:820px;margin:0 auto;padding:24px 20px 60px}}
+.content h1{{font-size:1.8rem;margin-bottom:16px;border-bottom:2px solid var(--border);padding-bottom:8px}}
+.content h2{{font-size:1.4rem;margin:24px 0 12px}}
+.content h3{{font-size:1.15rem;margin:20px 0 8px}}
+.content p{{margin:8px 0}}
+.content pre{{background:var(--bg-card);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:8px;padding:12px 16px;overflow-x:auto;font-size:0.85rem}}
+.content code{{font-size:0.9em;background:var(--bg-card);padding:1px 4px;border-radius:3px}}
+.content pre code{{background:none;padding:0}}
+.content a{{color:var(--accent)}}.content img{{max-width:100%;border-radius:6px}}
+.fm-section{{background:var(--bg-card);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:8px;padding:12px 16px;margin-bottom:20px}}
+.fm-header{{font-weight:600;font-size:0.8rem;color:var(--text-muted);text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;margin-bottom:8px}}
+.fm-body{{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 2fr;gap:4px 12px;font-size:0.85rem}}
+.fm-row{{display:contents}}
+.fm-key{{color:var(--accent);font-weight:500}}
+.fm-val{{color:var(--text);word-break:break-word}}
+.content blockquote{{border-left:3px solid var(--accent);padding-left:16px;color:var(--text-muted);margin:12px 0}}
+.content table{{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;margin:12px 0}}
+.content th,.content td{{border:1px solid var(--border);padding:8px 12px;text-align:left}}
+.content th{{background:var(--bg-card)}}
+@media print{{.toolbar,.share-banner{{display:none}}body{{background:#fff;color:#000}}}}
+@media(max-width:600px){{.content{{padding:16px 12px 40px}}.toolbar{{gap:4px}}.toolbar-btn{{padding:4px 8px;font-size:0.7rem}}}}
+</style></head>
+<body>
+<div class="share-banner">
+  <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="14" height="14" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M14.5 2H6a2 2 0 0 0-2 2v16a2 2 0 0 0 2 2h12a2 2 0 0 0 2-2V7.5L14.5 2z"/><polyline points="14 2 14 8 20 8"/></svg>
+  Document partagé via ObsiGate
+</div>
+<div class="toolbar">
+  <span class="toolbar-title">{title_esc}</span>
+  <button class="toolbar-btn" data-share-theme title="Thème clair/sombre">
+    <svg id="theme-icon-dark" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M21 12.79A9 9 0 1 1 11.21 3 7 7 0 0 0 21 12.79z"/></svg>
+    <svg id="theme-icon-light" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" style="display:none"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="5"/><line x1="12" y1="1" x2="12" y2="3"/><line x1="12" y1="21" x2="12" y2="23"/><line x1="4.22" y1="4.22" x2="5.64" y2="5.64"/><line x1="18.36" y1="18.36" x2="19.78" y2="19.78"/><line x1="1" y1="12" x2="3" y2="12"/><line x1="21" y1="12" x2="23" y2="12"/><line x1="4.22" y1="19.78" x2="5.64" y2="18.36"/><line x1="18.36" y1="5.64" x2="19.78" y2="4.22"/></svg>
+  </button>
+  <button class="toolbar-btn" data-share-md title="Télécharger en Markdown">
+    <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M21 15v4a2 2 0 0 1-2 2H5a2 2 0 0 1-2-2v-4"/><polyline points="7 10 12 15 17 10"/><line x1="12" y1="15" x2="12" y2="3"/></svg>
+    .md
+  </button>
+  <button class="toolbar-btn" data-share-pdf title="Télécharger en PDF">
+    <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M14 2H6a2 2 0 0 0-2 2v16a2 2 0 0 0 2-2V8z"/><polyline points="14 2 14 8 20 8"/><line x1="16" y1="13" x2="8" y2="13"/><line x1="16" y1="17" x2="8" y2="17"/><polyline points="10 9 9 9 8 9"/></svg>
+    PDF
+  </button>
+</div>
+<div class="content" id="content">{fm_html}{html}</div>
+<script id="raw-content" type="text/plain" style="display:none">{raw_json}</script>
+<script>
+function toggleTheme(){{var t=document.documentElement;var isDark=t.dataset.theme==="dark";t.dataset.theme=isDark?"light":"dark";document.getElementById("theme-icon-dark").style.display=isDark?"none":"";document.getElementById("theme-icon-light").style.display=isDark?"":"none";localStorage.setItem("obsigate-share-theme",t.dataset.theme)}}
+(function(){{var s=localStorage.getItem("obsigate-share-theme");if(!s)s="dark";document.documentElement.dataset.theme=s;var isDark=s==="dark";document.getElementById("theme-icon-dark").style.display=isDark?"":"none";document.getElementById("theme-icon-light").style.display=isDark?"none":""}})();
+function exportMD(){{var raw=JSON.parse(document.getElementById("raw-content").textContent);var b=new Blob([raw],{{type:"text/markdown"}});var a=document.createElement("a");a.href=URL.createObjectURL(b);a.download={title_download_js};a.click()}}
+document.querySelector("[data-share-theme]").addEventListener("click",toggleTheme);
+document.querySelector("[data-share-md]").addEventListener("click",exportMD);
+document.querySelector("[data-share-pdf]").addEventListener("click",function(){{location.href=location.pathname+"/pdf"}});
+</script></body></html>""",
+            request.state.csp_nonce,
+        ),
+    )

backend/routers/vaults.py

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+"""Vault management endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/vaults*``), mêmes modèles de réponse
+(``VaultInfo`` déménagé dans :mod:`backend.schemas`), mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Le handle du file-watcher vit désormais dans :mod:`backend.watcher_state`
+(partagé avec le lifespan de ``main``) au lieu du global de ``main``.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import add_vault_to_index, index, remove_vault_from_index
+from backend.schemas import VaultActionResponse, VaultInfo, VaultsStatusResponse, VaultStatsResponse
+from backend.services.vaults import list_accessible_vaults
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+from backend.watcher_state import get_watcher
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["vaults"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vaults", response_model=list[VaultInfo])
+async def api_vaults(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List configured vaults the user has access to.
+
+    Returns:
+        List of vault summary objects filtered by user permissions.
+    """
+    return list_accessible_vaults(current_user)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/vaults/add", response_model=VaultStatsResponse)
+async def api_add_vault(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Add a new vault dynamically without restarting.
+
+    Body:
+        name: Display name for the vault.
+        path: Absolute filesystem path to the vault directory.
+    """
+    name = body.get("name", "").strip()
+    vault_path = body.get("path", "").strip()
+
+    if not name or not vault_path:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Both 'name' and 'path' are required")
+
+    if name in index:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=f"Vault '{name}' already exists")
+
+    if not Path(vault_path).exists():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Path does not exist: {vault_path}")
+
+    stats = await add_vault_to_index(name, vault_path)
+
+    # #194 : persister, sinon ce vault disparaît au prochain rebuild/redémarrage.
+    from backend.indexer import persist_vault
+
+    persist_vault(name)
+
+    # Start watching the new vault
+    watcher = get_watcher()
+    if watcher:
+        await watcher.add_vault(name, vault_path)
+
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_added", {"vault": name, "stats": stats})
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": name, "stats": stats}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/vaults/{vault_name}", response_model=VaultActionResponse)
+async def api_remove_vault(vault_name: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Remove a vault from the index and stop watching it.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault to remove.
+    """
+    if vault_name not in index:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    # Stop watching
+    watcher = get_watcher()
+    if watcher:
+        await watcher.remove_vault(vault_name)
+
+    await remove_vault_from_index(vault_name)
+    # #194 : plus de trace au redémarrage (les vaults d'env, eux, reviennent).
+    from backend.indexer import unpersist_vault
+
+    unpersist_vault(vault_name)
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_removed", {"vault": vault_name})
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": vault_name}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vaults/status", response_model=VaultsStatusResponse)
+async def api_vaults_status(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Detailed status of all vaults including watcher state.
+
+    Returns per-vault: file count, tag count, watching status, vault path.
+    """
+    watcher = get_watcher()
+    statuses = {}
+    for vname, vdata in index.items():
+        watching = watcher is not None and vname in watcher.observers
+        statuses[vname] = {
+            "file_count": len(vdata.get("files", [])),
+            "tag_count": len(vdata.get("tags", {})),
+            "path": vdata.get("path", ""),
+            "watching": watching,
+        }
+    return {
+        "vaults": statuses,
+        "watcher_active": watcher is not None,
+        "sse_clients": sse_manager.client_count,
+    }

backend/routers/webhooks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Webhook CRUD endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 2).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/webhooks``), même modèle de réponse
+(:class:`backend.schemas.WebhookModel`), même dépendance admin. La logique
+métier vit déjà dans :mod:`backend.webhooks` (validation d'URL anti-SSRF,
+store ``webhook_secrets.json`` — BUG-026).
+"""
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import require_admin
+from backend.schemas import StatusResponse, WebhookModel
+from backend.webhooks import (
+    create_webhook,
+    delete_webhook,
+    get_webhooks,
+    update_webhook,
+)
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/webhooks", tags=["webhooks"])
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=list[WebhookModel])
+async def api_webhooks_list(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    return get_webhooks()
+
+
+@router.post("", response_model=WebhookModel)
+async def api_webhooks_create(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    name = body.get("name", "Unnamed")
+    url = body.get("url", "")
+    events = body.get("events", [])
+    secret = body.get("secret")
+    if not url:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "URL is required")
+    return create_webhook(name, url, events, secret)
+
+
+@router.patch("/{webhook_id}", response_model=WebhookModel)
+async def api_webhooks_update(
+    webhook_id: str, body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)
+):
+    result = update_webhook(webhook_id, body)
+    if not result:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
+    return result
+
+
+@router.delete("/{webhook_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_webhooks_delete(webhook_id: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    if not delete_webhook(webhook_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
+    return {"status": "deleted"}

backend/scheduler.py

@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+"""Scheduled tasks — automatic agent actions, type cron (#170).
+
+Tasks are persisted in ``data/scheduled_tasks.json`` (guarded by an RLock,
+same pattern as the other JSON stores). Supported actions reuse the existing
+mutation/notification services — no new write path:
+
+* ``create_file`` → ``backend.services.mutations.create_file``;
+* ``append_to_file`` → ``backend.services.mutations.append_to_file``;
+* ``notify`` → ``backend.notify.broadcast`` (trigger ``manual``).
+
+Supported schedules:
+
+* ``interval_hours`` — every N hours (N >= 0.25);
+* ``daily_time`` — once a day at ``HH:MM`` (local server time);
+* ``once_at`` — one shot at an ISO-8601 datetime (past = due immediately).
+
+On failure the task records ``last_error`` and a ``schedule_failure``
+broadcast is emitted to the notification channels (#168) — best effort,
+never recursive (a failing ``notify`` action does not rebroadcast).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import threading
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.scheduler")
+
+DATA_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR", "data"))
+TASKS_FILE = DATA_DIR / "scheduled_tasks.json"
+
+ACTION_KINDS = ("create_file", "append_to_file", "notify")
+SCHEDULE_KINDS = ("interval_hours", "daily_time", "once_at")
+
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+
+# ── Store ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _read_tasks() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    if not TASKS_FILE.exists():
+        return []
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(TASKS_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        return data if isinstance(data, list) else []
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError):
+        return []
+
+
+def _write_tasks(tasks: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+    TASKS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = TASKS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(tasks, indent=2, default=str), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(TASKS_FILE)
+
+
+def list_tasks() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return all scheduled tasks (newest first)."""
+    return sorted(_read_tasks(), key=lambda t: t.get("created_at", ""), reverse=True)
+
+
+def get_task(task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Return one task by id, or None."""
+    for task in _read_tasks():
+        if task.get("id") == task_id:
+            return task
+    return None
+
+
+# ── Validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _validate_action(action: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    kind = action.get("kind")
+    if kind not in ACTION_KINDS:
+        raise ValueError(f"Action inconnue : {kind} (attendu : {', '.join(ACTION_KINDS)})")
+    params = dict(action.get("params") or {})
+    if kind in ("create_file", "append_to_file"):
+        if not str(params.get("vault") or "").strip():
+            raise ValueError("params.vault requis pour create_file/append_to_file")
+        if not str(params.get("path") or "").strip():
+            raise ValueError("params.path requis pour create_file/append_to_file")
+        if kind == "append_to_file" and not str(params.get("content") or ""):
+            raise ValueError("params.content requis pour append_to_file")
+    elif kind == "notify":
+        if not str(params.get("title") or "").strip():
+            raise ValueError("params.title requis pour notify")
+        if not str(params.get("message") or "").strip():
+            raise ValueError("params.message requis pour notify")
+    return {"kind": kind, "params": params}
+
+
+def _validate_schedule(schedule: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    kind = schedule.get("kind")
+    if kind not in SCHEDULE_KINDS:
+        raise ValueError(f"Planification inconnue : {kind} (attendu : {', '.join(SCHEDULE_KINDS)})")
+    if kind == "interval_hours":
+        hours = float(schedule.get("hours") or 0)
+        if hours < 0.25:
+            raise ValueError("hours doit être >= 0.25")
+        return {"kind": kind, "hours": hours}
+    if kind == "daily_time":
+        at = str(schedule.get("at") or "").strip()
+        try:
+            datetime.strptime(at, "%H:%M")
+        except ValueError:
+            raise ValueError("at doit être au format HH:MM (ex. 08:30)") from None
+        return {"kind": kind, "at": at}
+    # once_at
+    at = str(schedule.get("at") or "").strip()
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(at)
+        if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+            parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise ValueError("at doit être une date ISO-8601 (ex. 2026-10-05T08:30:00)") from None
+    return {"kind": kind, "at": parsed.isoformat()}
+
+
+# ── CRUD ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def create_task(
+    name: str,
+    action: dict[str, Any],
+    schedule: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    created_by: str = "api",
+    enabled: bool = True,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Create a scheduled task. Raises ValueError on invalid action/schedule."""
+    validated_action = _validate_action(action)
+    validated_schedule = _validate_schedule(schedule)
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    with _lock:
+        tasks = _read_tasks()
+        task = {
+            "id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
+            "name": (name or validated_action["kind"]).strip() or validated_action["kind"],
+            "action": validated_action,
+            "schedule": validated_schedule,
+            "enabled": bool(enabled),
+            "created_by": created_by,
+            "created_at": now.isoformat(),
+            "last_run_at": None,
+            "last_status": None,
+            "last_error": None,
+            "run_count": 0,
+            "next_run_at": compute_next_run(
+                {"schedule": validated_schedule, "last_run_at": None}, now
+            ).isoformat(),
+        }
+        tasks.append(task)
+        _write_tasks(tasks)
+    logger.info(f"Scheduled task created: '{task['name']}' ({validated_schedule['kind']})")
+    return task
+
+
+def update_task(task_id: str, updates: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Update name/enabled/action/schedule. Returns None when unknown."""
+    with _lock:
+        tasks = _read_tasks()
+        for task in tasks:
+            if task.get("id") != task_id:
+                continue
+            if updates.get("name"):
+                task["name"] = str(updates["name"])
+            if "enabled" in updates:
+                task["enabled"] = bool(updates["enabled"])
+            if "action" in updates:
+                task["action"] = _validate_action(updates["action"])
+            if "schedule" in updates:
+                task["schedule"] = _validate_schedule(updates["schedule"])
+            task["next_run_at"] = compute_next_run(task).isoformat()
+            _write_tasks(tasks)
+            return task
+    return None
+
+
+def delete_task(task_id: str) -> bool:
+    """Delete a task. Returns False when unknown."""
+    with _lock:
+        tasks = _read_tasks()
+        remaining = [t for t in tasks if t.get("id") != task_id]
+        if len(remaining) == len(tasks):
+            return False
+        _write_tasks(remaining)
+    return True
+
+
+# ── Scheduling ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def compute_next_run(task: dict[str, Any], now: datetime | None = None) -> datetime:
+    """Compute the next due datetime for *task*."""
+    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    if now.tzinfo is None:
+        now = now.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    schedule = task.get("schedule", {})
+    kind = schedule.get("kind")
+    last_run_at = task.get("last_run_at")
+    last = None
+    if last_run_at:
+        try:
+            last = datetime.fromisoformat(str(last_run_at))
+            if last.tzinfo is None:
+                last = last.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        except ValueError:
+            last = None
+    if kind == "interval_hours":
+        hours = float(schedule.get("hours", 24))
+        base = last or now
+        nxt = base + timedelta(hours=hours)
+        # Première planification : due dès maintenant + intervalle ? Non —
+        # la tâche démarre au prochain intervalle, sauf retard déjà accumulé.
+        if last is None:
+            nxt = now + timedelta(hours=hours)
+        return max(now, nxt)
+    if kind == "daily_time":
+        hour, minute = (str(schedule.get("at", "08:00")) + ":00").split(":")[:2]
+        candidate = now.replace(hour=int(hour), minute=int(minute), second=0, microsecond=0)
+        if candidate <= now:
+            candidate += timedelta(days=1)
+        return candidate
+    if kind == "once_at":
+        try:
+            at = datetime.fromisoformat(str(schedule.get("at")))
+            if at.tzinfo is None:
+                at = at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        except ValueError:
+            return now
+        if task.get("last_run_at"):
+            return datetime.max.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)  # déjà exécutée
+        return at
+    return now + timedelta(hours=24)
+
+
+def _execute_action(task: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    action = task["action"]
+    kind = action["kind"]
+    params = action["params"]
+    if kind == "create_file":
+        from backend.services.mutations import create_file
+
+        return create_file(
+            params["vault"],
+            params["path"],
+            params.get("content", ""),
+            overwrite=bool(params.get("overwrite", False)),
+        )
+    if kind == "append_to_file":
+        from backend.services.mutations import append_to_file
+
+        return append_to_file(params["vault"], params["path"], params.get("content", ""))
+    if kind == "notify":
+        from backend.notify import broadcast
+
+        results = broadcast("manual", str(params["title"]), str(params.get("message", "")))
+        return {"broadcast": results}
+    raise ValueError(f"Action inconnue : {kind}")
+
+
+def run_task(task_id: str, *, manual: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Execute one task now (manual or due). Records status; notifies on failure."""
+    with _lock:
+        tasks = _read_tasks()
+        task = next((t for t in tasks if t.get("id") == task_id), None)
+        if task is None:
+            raise KeyError(task_id)
+        if not task.get("enabled", True) and not manual:
+            return {"task_id": task_id, "skipped": True, "reason": "disabled"}
+        try:
+            result = _execute_action(task)
+            task["last_run_at"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+            task["last_status"] = "ok"
+            task["last_error"] = None
+            task["run_count"] = int(task.get("run_count", 0)) + 1
+            if task.get("schedule", {}).get("kind") == "once_at":
+                task["enabled"] = False  # one-shot consommé
+            task["next_run_at"] = compute_next_run(task).isoformat()
+            _write_tasks(tasks)
+            if manual:
+                from backend.notify import broadcast
+
+                broadcast("schedule_success", f"Tâche « {task['name']} » OK", "Exécution manuelle réussie.")
+            return {"task_id": task_id, "ok": True, "result": result}
+        except Exception as e:
+            task["last_run_at"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+            task["last_status"] = "error"
+            task["last_error"] = str(e)
+            task["run_count"] = int(task.get("run_count", 0)) + 1
+            task["next_run_at"] = compute_next_run(task).isoformat()
+            _write_tasks(tasks)
+            logger.warning(f"Scheduled task '{task.get('name')}' failed: {e}")
+            if task["action"]["kind"] != "notify":
+                try:
+                    from backend.notify import broadcast
+
+                    broadcast(
+                        "schedule_failure",
+                        f"Échec tâche « {task.get('name')} »",
+                        f"{e}",
+                    )
+                except Exception:
+                    logger.debug("Failure notification broadcast failed", exc_info=True)
+            return {"task_id": task_id, "ok": False, "error": str(e)}
+
+
+def tick(now: datetime | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Run every due task. Returns per-task outcomes (empty when idle)."""
+    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    outcomes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for task in _read_tasks():
+        if not task.get("enabled", True):
+            continue
+        try:
+            next_run = datetime.fromisoformat(str(task.get("next_run_at") or ""))
+            if next_run.tzinfo is None:
+                next_run = next_run.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        except ValueError:
+            next_run = compute_next_run(task, now)
+        if next_run <= now:
+            outcomes.append(run_task(task["id"]))
+    return outcomes

backend/schemas.py

@@ -151,6 +151,54 @@ class BacklinksResponse(BaseModel):
     total: int
 
 
+class ChatMessageItem(BaseModel):
+    """One chat message (``GET/POST /api/file/{vault}/chat`` + ``/api/chat``)."""
+
+    id: str = Field(description="Message id")
+    user: str = Field(description="Author username")
+    text: str = Field(description="Message body")
+    ts: float = Field(description="Unix timestamp")
+    attachment: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description="Optional image/video/url attachment {name, url, mime, kind}",
+    )
+    preview: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description="Link preview card {url, title, description, image, site} (#191)",
+    )
+    html: str = Field(
+        default="",
+        description=(
+            "Rendered (mistune + sanitized) HTML of ``text``, like a document "
+            "preview — tables, lists, fenced code blocks (#193)"
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+class ChatHistoryResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response for ``GET /api/file/{vault}/chat``."""
+
+    messages: list[ChatMessageItem] = Field(description="Messages, chronological")
+    read: dict[str, float] = Field(
+        default_factory=dict,
+        description="{username: last read unix ts} per participant (#192)",
+    )
+
+
+class ChatReadResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response for ``POST /api/chat/read`` (#192 read receipts)."""
+
+    read: dict[str, float] = Field(description="{username: last read unix ts}")
+    status: str = Field(description="'ok'")
+
+
+class ChatMessageResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response for ``POST /api/file/{vault}/chat``."""
+
+    message: ChatMessageItem
+    status: str = Field(description="'ok'")
+
+
 class BackupsListResponse(BaseModel):
     """Response for ``GET /api/backups``."""
 
@@ -188,6 +236,549 @@ class BackupsAutoResponse(BaseModel):
     since_hours: int | float = Field(description="Look-back window in hours")
 
 
+class DiffResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response containing a unified diff between two file versions (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    version: int = Field(description="Backup version timestamp (left/old side)")
+    compare_with: int | None = Field(default=None, description="Other backup version or null for current file (right/new side)")
+    diff: str = Field(description="Unified diff (empty if no changes)")
+
+
+class RestoreRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to restore a file from a backup (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    version: int = Field(description="Timestamp of the backup version to restore")
+
+
+class RestoreResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after restoring a file from backup (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether restore succeeded")
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    restored_from: int = Field(description="Timestamp of the backup used")
+    current_backed_up: int | None = Field(default=None, description="Timestamp of the backup created from the current version before restore, if any")
+
+
+class BackupEntry(BaseModel):
+    """A single backup version of a file (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    timestamp: int = Field(description="Unix timestamp of when the backup was created")
+    datetime: str = Field(description="ISO 8601 datetime string")
+    size: int = Field(description="File size in bytes")
+    filename: str = Field(description="Backup filename on disk")
+
+
+class BackupListResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response listing all available backups for a file (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    backups: list[BackupEntry] = Field(description="Available backups, newest first")
+
+
+class DiffRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request parameters for generating a diff (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    version: int = Field(description="Timestamp of the backup version to compare")
+    compare_with: int | None = Field(default=None, description="Timestamp of another backup version. If omitted, compares with the current file.")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Files — browse / read (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class BrowseItem(BaseModel):
+    """A single entry (file or directory) returned by the browse endpoint."""
+
+    name: str = Field(description="File or directory name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative path within vault")
+    type: str = Field(description="'file' or 'directory'")
+    children_count: int | None = Field(default=None, description="Number of children (directories only)")
+    size: int | None = Field(default=None, description="File size in bytes")
+    extension: str | None = Field(default=None, description="File extension")
+
+
+class BrowseResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Paginated directory listing for a vault."""
+
+    vault: str
+    path: str
+    items: list[BrowseItem]
+
+
+class FileContentResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Rendered file content with metadata."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path within the vault")
+    title: str = Field(description="File title (from frontmatter or filename)")
+    tags: list[str] = Field(description="Extracted tags from frontmatter and inline #tags")
+    frontmatter: dict[str, Any] = Field(description="YAML frontmatter as key-value dict")
+    html: str = Field(description="Rendered HTML content")
+    raw_length: int = Field(description="Length of raw file content in characters")
+    extension: str = Field(description="File extension (e.g. .md, .txt)")
+    is_markdown: bool = Field(description="Whether the file is markdown")
+    unsupported: bool | None = Field(default=False, description="True for binary/unsupported files")
+    size_bytes: int | None = Field(default=None, description="File size in bytes (for unsupported files)")
+    is_pdf: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for PDF files")
+    is_image: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for image files")
+    is_audio: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for audio files (HTML5 <audio>, roadmap #109)")
+    is_video: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for video files (HTML5 <video>, roadmap #109)")
+    media_too_large: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True when audio/video exceeds the inline streaming limit")
+    stream_url: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Byte-range streaming URL under /api/media (audio/video)")
+    media_mime: str | None = Field(default=None, description="MIME type for audio/video files")
+    is_csv: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for CSV files")
+    is_xlsx: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for Excel .xlsx files")
+    xlsx_readonly: bool | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description=(
+            "True when the table is served read-only (.xls/.ods, #153 A16): "
+            "the viewer hides the editable-cell wiring and the save/structure "
+            "endpoints refuse the format"
+        ),
+    )
+    xlsx_sheets: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description=(
+            "Rendered xlsx sheets [{name, html, rows, cols, total_rows, "
+            "total_cols, max_rows, max_cols, truncated}] — `truncated` is true "
+            "when the sheet exceeds the 500x40 render caps (#153 A8)"
+        ),
+    )
+    xlsx_revision: str | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description=(
+            "Optimistic-concurrency token of the spreadsheet (#156-A12): the "
+            "client sends it back as the `if_match` of a write so a change made "
+            "elsewhere is refused (409 `conflict`) instead of overwritten"
+        ),
+    )
+    xlsx_lossy_features: list[str] | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description=(
+            "Workbook parts an openpyxl save would drop (#153 A1) — e.g. "
+            "cached_values, slicers, form_controls, connections, custom_xml, "
+            "signature, rich_comments, macros. Empty/absent = nothing at risk."
+        ),
+    )
+    is_json: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for JSON files")
+    is_excalidraw: bool | None = Field(default=None, description="True for Excalidraw diagram files")
+    excalidraw_data: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(default=None, description="Excalidraw diagram data (elements, appState, files)")
+    excalidraw_data_compressed: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Compressed Excalidraw data for .excalidraw.md files")
+    pdf_metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(default=None, description="PDF metadata")
+    pdf_toc: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = Field(default=None, description="PDF table of contents")
+    image_mime: str | None = Field(default=None, description="MIME type for image files")
+
+
+class XlsxDashboardNamedRange(BaseModel):
+    """One named range of a workbook (#153 A17)."""
+
+    name: str = Field(description="Range name as declared in the workbook")
+    scope: str = Field(description="Sheet name when sheet-scoped, empty when workbook-wide")
+    ref: str = Field(description="Formula-style reference, e.g. Data!$A$1:$B$5")
+
+
+class XlsxDashboardSheetKpi(BaseModel):
+    """One KPI card of a sheet dashboard (#153 A17)."""
+
+    label: str = Field(description="A1 reference of the numeric cell")
+    value: float = Field(description="Numeric value of the cell")
+
+
+class XlsxDashboardSheet(BaseModel):
+    """Per-sheet KPI stats of a workbook dashboard (#153 A17)."""
+
+    name: str = Field(description="Sheet name")
+    cells: int = Field(description="Non-empty cells inside the 500x40 caps")
+    rows: int = Field(description="Rows carrying at least one non-empty cell")
+    cols: int = Field(description="Columns carrying at least one non-empty cell")
+    formulas: int = Field(description="Cells whose value is a formula")
+    numeric: int = Field(description="Cells carrying a numeric value")
+    kpi: list[XlsxDashboardSheetKpi] = Field(description="First numeric cells as KPI cards")
+
+
+class XlsxDashboardResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Dashboard metadata of an .xlsx workbook (#153 A17)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path within the vault")
+    named_ranges: list[XlsxDashboardNamedRange] = Field(description="Named ranges, sorted by name")
+    objects: dict[str, int] = Field(description="Object counts: {charts, pivots}")
+    sheets: list[XlsxDashboardSheet] = Field(description="Per-sheet KPI stats")
+
+
+class XlsxSheetWindowResponse(BaseModel):
+    """One window of rows of a single .xlsx sheet (lazy loading, #153 A9).
+
+    Served by ``GET /api/file/{vault_name}/xlsx/sheet``; the row numbers and
+    the ``data-cell`` references in ``html`` are the real A1 coordinates of the
+    sheet, whatever the window.
+    """
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path within the vault")
+    sheet: str = Field(description="Sheet name (as shown in the tab)")
+    offset: int = Field(description="0-based index of the first returned row")
+    limit: int = Field(description="Maximum number of rows returned (capped server-side)")
+    rows: int = Field(description="Rows actually returned in this window")
+    cols: int = Field(description="Columns of the rendered window")
+    total_rows: int = Field(description="Rows the sheet declares")
+    total_cols: int = Field(description="Columns the sheet declares")
+    max_rows: int = Field(description="Row cap of the renderer (500) — the coverage of this window")
+    max_cols: int = Field(description="Column cap of the renderer (40)")
+    truncated: bool = Field(
+        description="True when the sheet exceeds the 500x40 render caps"
+    )
+    has_more: bool = Field(description="True when rows remain after this window")
+    html: str = Field(description="Rendered HTML table for the window")
+
+
+class FileRawResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Raw text content of a file."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path within the vault")
+    raw: str = Field(description="Raw file content as text")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Files — mutations (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class FileSaveResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Confirmation after saving a file."""
+
+    status: str = Field(description="Always 'ok'")
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path within the vault")
+    size: int = Field(description="Size of saved content in characters")
+    # #156-A12 — optimistic-concurrency token of the file AFTER the write, so a
+    # client can chain writes without re-reading (absent on non-spreadsheets).
+    revision: str | None = Field(
+        default=None,
+        description="Opaque revision of the saved spreadsheet (send it back as `if_match`)",
+    )
+
+
+class FileDeleteResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Confirmation after deleting a file."""
+
+    status: str = Field(description="Always 'ok'")
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path within the vault")
+
+
+class DirectoryCreateRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to create a new directory."""
+
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative path of the new directory")
+
+
+class DirectoryCreateResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after creating a directory."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether creation succeeded")
+    path: str = Field(description="Path of the created directory")
+
+
+class DirectoryRenameRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to rename a directory."""
+
+    path: str = Field(description="Current path of the directory")
+    new_name: str = Field(description="New name for the directory")
+
+
+class DirectoryRenameResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after renaming a directory."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether rename succeeded")
+    old_path: str = Field(description="Original directory path")
+    new_path: str = Field(description="New directory path")
+
+
+class DirectoryDeleteResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after deleting a directory."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether deletion succeeded")
+    deleted_count: int = Field(description="Number of files recursively deleted")
+
+
+class FileCreateRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to create a new file."""
+
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative path of the new file")
+    content: str = Field(default="", description="Initial content")
+
+
+class FileCreateResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after creating a file."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether creation succeeded")
+    path: str = Field(description="Path of the created file")
+
+
+class BatchUploadFileItem(BaseModel):
+    """A single file/dir entry in a batch upload request."""
+
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative path of the item within the batch")
+    content: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Base64 encoded or text content for files")
+    is_dir: bool = Field(default=False, description="True if entry represents an empty directory")
+
+
+class BatchUploadRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request payload for batch file/directory upload."""
+
+    target_dir: str = Field(default="", description="Base directory in vault to upload into (empty for root)")
+    files: list[BatchUploadFileItem] = Field(description="List of files and directories to upload")
+    overwrite: bool = Field(default=True, description="Whether to overwrite existing files (creates backups)")
+
+
+class BatchUploadResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response from batch file/directory upload."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="True if all files uploaded without error")
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    target_dir: str = Field(description="Target directory")
+    uploaded: list[str] = Field(description="List of created/updated file paths")
+    created_dirs: list[str] = Field(description="List of created directory paths")
+    errors: list[dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="List of items that failed")
+    total_files: int = Field(description="Total uploaded files count")
+
+
+class FileRenameRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to rename a file."""
+
+    path: str = Field(description="Current path of the file")
+    new_name: str = Field(description="New name for the file")
+
+
+class FileRenameResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after renaming a file."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether rename succeeded")
+    old_path: str
+    new_path: str
+
+
+class FileMoveRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to move a file or directory to a different parent directory."""
+
+    source_path: str = Field(description="Current relative path of the file/directory")
+    destination_dir: str = Field(description="Target directory relative path (empty string for vault root)")
+
+
+class FileMoveResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response after moving a file or directory."""
+
+    success: bool = Field(description="Whether move succeeded")
+    old_path: str = Field(description="Original path")
+    new_path: str = Field(description="New path after move")
+    item_type: str = Field(description="Type of item moved: 'file' or 'directory'")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Vaults & history (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class VaultInfo(BaseModel):
+    """Summary information about a configured vault."""
+
+    name: str = Field(description="Display name of the vault")
+    file_count: int = Field(description="Number of indexed files")
+    tag_count: int = Field(description="Number of unique tags")
+    type: str = Field(default="VAULT", description="Type of the vault mapping (VAULT or DIR)")
+
+
+class BookmarkToggleRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to toggle a bookmark on a file."""
+
+    vault: str
+    path: str
+    title: str | None = None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Search / suggest / graph (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class SearchResultItem(BaseModel):
+    """A single search result."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    title: str = Field(description="File title")
+    tags: list[str] = Field(description="File tags")
+    score: int = Field(description="Relevance score")
+    snippet: str = Field(description="Content excerpt with highlights")
+    modified: str | None = Field(default=None, description="ISO 8601 modification timestamp")
+    share_token: str | None = Field(default=None, description="#196 token de partage dirigé (document reçu)")
+
+
+class SearchResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Full-text search response with optional pagination."""
+
+    query: str = Field(description="Original search query")
+    vault_filter: str = Field(description="Vault filter applied ('all' or vault name)")
+    tag_filter: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Tag filter applied")
+    count: int = Field(description="Number of results in this response")
+    total: int = Field(default=0, description="Total results before pagination")
+    offset: int = Field(default=0, description="Current pagination offset")
+    limit: int = Field(default=200, description="Page size")
+    results: list[SearchResultItem] = Field(description="Search result items")
+
+
+class TagsResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Tag aggregation response."""
+
+    vault_filter: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Vault filter applied")
+    tags: dict[str, int] = Field(description="Tag name → count mapping")
+
+
+class TreeSearchResult(BaseModel):
+    """A single tree search result item."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Full relative path")
+    name: str = Field(description="File or directory name")
+    type: str = Field(description="'file' or 'directory'")
+    matched_path: str = Field(description="Path segment that matched the query")
+
+
+class TreeSearchResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Tree search response with matching paths."""
+
+    query: str = Field(description="Search query")
+    vault_filter: str = Field(description="Vault filter applied")
+    results: list[TreeSearchResult] = Field(description="Matching files and directories")
+
+
+class VaultPathEntry(BaseModel):
+    """A single indexed path (file or directory) in a vault."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Full relative path")
+    name: str = Field(description="File or directory name")
+    type: str = Field(description="'file' or 'directory'")
+
+
+class VaultPathsResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Flat list of every indexed path in a vault (capped)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    count: int = Field(description="Number of returned entries")
+    results: list[VaultPathEntry] = Field(description="Indexed files and directories")
+
+
+class AdvancedSearchResultItem(BaseModel):
+    """A single advanced search result with highlighted snippet."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    title: str = Field(description="File title")
+    tags: list[str] = Field(description="File tags")
+    score: float = Field(description="TF-IDF relevance score (or fused RRF score in semantic mode)")
+    semantic_score: float = Field(default=0.0, description="Cosine similarity from the semantic index (0 when unavailable)")
+    snippet: str = Field(description="Content excerpt with <mark> highlights")
+    modified: str = Field(description="ISO 8601 modification timestamp")
+    extension: str = Field(default="", description="File extension")
+
+
+class SearchFacets(BaseModel):
+    """Faceted counts for search results."""
+
+    tags: dict[str, int] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+    vaults: dict[str, int] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+    extensions: dict[str, int] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Counts per file extension, dotless and lowercase (query-ready for the ext: operator)")
+
+
+class AdvancedSearchResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Advanced search response with TF-IDF scoring, facets, and pagination."""
+
+    results: list[AdvancedSearchResultItem] = Field(description="Search results")
+    total: int = Field(description="Total number of matching results")
+    offset: int = Field(description="Current pagination offset")
+    limit: int = Field(description="Page size")
+    facets: SearchFacets = Field(description="Faceted counts by tag, vault and file extension")
+    query_time_ms: float = Field(default=0, description="Server-side query time in milliseconds")
+    semantic_available: bool = Field(default=False, description="True when the semantic (embedding) index is ready")
+
+
+class TitleSuggestion(BaseModel):
+    """A file title suggestion for autocomplete."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    title: str = Field(description="File title")
+    tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="File tags")
+
+
+class SuggestResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Autocomplete suggestions for file titles."""
+
+    query: str = Field(description="Original query string")
+    suggestions: list[TitleSuggestion] = Field(description="Matching file suggestions")
+
+
+class TagSuggestion(BaseModel):
+    """A tag suggestion for autocomplete."""
+
+    tag: str = Field(description="Tag name")
+    count: int = Field(description="Number of files with this tag")
+
+
+class TagSuggestResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Autocomplete suggestions for tags."""
+
+    query: str = Field(description="Original query string")
+    suggestions: list[TagSuggestion] = Field(description="Matching tag suggestions")
+
+
+class GraphNode(BaseModel):
+    """A single node in the graph view."""
+
+    id: str = Field(description="Unique node identifier")
+    name: str = Field(description="Display name")
+    type: str = Field(description="'vault', 'directory', or 'file'")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative path within vault")
+    size: int = Field(default=0, description="File size in bytes")
+    tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Tags from frontmatter")
+    incoming_count: int = Field(default=0, description="Number of incoming wikilinks")
+    outgoing_count: int = Field(default=0, description="Number of outgoing wikilinks")
+
+
+class GraphEdge(BaseModel):
+    """An edge between two nodes in the graph view."""
+
+    source: str = Field(description="Source node ID")
+    target: str = Field(description="Target node ID")
+    relation: str = Field(description="'parent', 'wikilink', or 'backlink'")
+
+
+class GraphResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Graph data for a vault or directory."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Root path for the graph")
+    scope: str = Field(default="directory", description="'directory' or 'full'")
+    nodes: list[GraphNode] = Field(description="Graph nodes (files and directories)")
+    edges: list[GraphEdge] = Field(description="Graph edges (parent and wikilink relations)")
+
+
+class ReloadResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Index reload confirmation with per-vault stats."""
+
+    status: str = Field(description="Reload status ('ok' or 'error')")
+    vaults: dict[str, Any] = Field(description="Per-vault file counts after reload")
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # PDF
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -322,6 +913,7 @@ class VaultFileEntry(BaseModel):
     modified_iso: str | None = None
     extension: str = ""
     rel_dir: str | None = None
+    tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Tags de l'index (#158)")
 
 
 class VaultFilesResponse(BaseModel):
@@ -395,6 +987,7 @@ class DashboardVaultStat(BaseModel):
     file_count: int
     tag_count: int
     total_size_bytes: int
+    image_count: int = 0
 
 
 class DashboardResponse(BaseModel):
@@ -404,6 +997,32 @@ class DashboardResponse(BaseModel):
     total_files: int
     total_tags: int
     total_size_bytes: int
+    total_images: int = 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# System / health (#85 — extrait de backend.main, comportement inchangé)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class HealthResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Application health status.
+
+    Déplacé depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans modification : pas de
+    ``extra="allow"`` ici, pour préserver la validation actuelle des
+    réponses (les champs enrichis de ``/api/health/detailed`` restent
+    filtrés comme avant).
+    """
+
+    status: str = Field(description="Health status ('ok' or 'error')")
+    version: str = Field(description="Application version (x.y.z — latest release tag)")
+    vaults: int = Field(description="Number of configured vaults")
+    total_files: int = Field(description="Total indexed files across all vaults")
+    total_tokens: int = Field(description="Total indexed tokens (approx.) across all vaults", default=0)
+    last_full_index_ts: str = Field(description="ISO timestamp of last full index rebuild", default="")
+    uptime_seconds: int = Field(description="Server uptime in seconds", default=0)
+    git_describe: str = Field(default="", description="Full git describe string (commits beyond tag), empty if no git")
+    git_commit: str = Field(default="", description="Short HEAD commit hash, empty if no git")
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -439,6 +1058,7 @@ class ShareModel(BaseModel):
     expires_at: str | None = None
     access_count: int = 0
     last_accessed: str | None = None
+    shared_with: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="#196 destinataires (partage dirigé)")
 
 
 class ConflictEntry(BaseModel):

backend/search.py

@@ -12,7 +12,12 @@ from sortedcontainers import SortedList
 
 from backend import indexer as _indexer
 from backend import semantic_search as _semantic
-from backend.indexer import index
+
+# NOTE: the shared index is read through ``_indexer.index`` everywhere, never
+# via ``from backend.indexer import index``. That import binds the dict object
+# once, so a module reload of ``backend.indexer`` (tests, dev reload) rebinds
+# the module-level name to a FRESH dict while this module keeps writing to the
+# stale one — the inverted index then silently indexes nothing (BUG-089).
 from backend.services.regex_safety import (
     MAX_REGEX_MATCHES,
     truncate_for_regex,
@@ -368,12 +373,19 @@ class InvertedIndex:
         self.doc_vault: dict[str, str] = {}
         self.vault_docs: dict[str, set] = defaultdict(set)
         self.tag_docs: dict[str, set] = defaultdict(set)
+        self.doc_tags: dict[str, set] = defaultdict(set)
         self._sorted_tokens: SortedList = SortedList()
         self._ready: bool = False  # True after initial build
 
-    def is_stale(self) -> bool:
-        """Return True if the index has not been built yet."""
-        return not self._ready
+    def is_ready(self) -> bool:
+        """Return True once the initial build has completed.
+
+        The index is then kept current incrementally by ``add_document()`` /
+        ``remove_document()``, so it never goes stale: there is no generation
+        counter, no cooldown and no lazy rebuild. Searches simply fall back to
+        a full scan while this is False (see ``search()``).
+        """
+        return self._ready
 
     def rebuild(self) -> None:
         """Rebuild inverted index from the global ``index`` dict.
@@ -392,8 +404,9 @@ class InvertedIndex:
         self.doc_vault = {}
         self.vault_docs = defaultdict(set)
         self.tag_docs = defaultdict(set)
+        self.doc_tags = defaultdict(set)
 
-        for vault_name, vault_data in index.items():
+        for vault_name, vault_data in _indexer.index.items():
             for file_info in vault_data.get("files", []):
                 doc_key = f"{vault_name}::{file_info['path']}"
                 self.doc_count += 1
@@ -406,6 +419,7 @@ class InvertedIndex:
                 # --- Per-document tag index ---
                 for tag in file_info.get("tags", []):
                     self.tag_docs[tag.lower()].add(doc_key)
+                    self.doc_tags[file_info['path']].add(tag.lower())
 
                 # --- Title tokens ---
                 title_tokens = tokenize(file_info.get("title", ""))
@@ -537,6 +551,10 @@ class InvertedIndex:
         self.doc_vault.pop(doc_key, None)
         if vault_name in self.vault_docs:
             self.vault_docs[vault_name].discard(doc_key)
+            # Drop the empty entry so a fully removed vault leaves no trace
+            # (it is a defaultdict: a bare lookup would recreate the key).
+            if not self.vault_docs[vault_name]:
+                del self.vault_docs[vault_name]
         # Tags (per-document, NOT the global tag_norm_map)
         for tag in file_info.get("tags", []):
             td = self.tag_docs.get(tag.lower())
@@ -678,7 +696,7 @@ _indexer.set_index_change_hook(_on_index_change_hook)
 
 def init_inverted_index():
     """Force initial inverted index build. Called after build_index completes on startup."""
-    if any(vdata.get("files") for vdata in index.values()):
+    if any(vdata.get("files") for vdata in _indexer.index.values()):
         _inverted_index.rebuild()
         logger.info("Inverted index initialized.")
 
@@ -739,7 +757,7 @@ def search(
     results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
 
     inv = get_inverted_index()
-    use_index = (not inv.is_stale()) and inv.doc_count > 0
+    use_index = inv.is_ready() and inv.doc_count > 0
 
     if use_index:
         # BUG-033: retrieve candidates from the inverted index instead of
@@ -774,7 +792,7 @@ def search(
     else:
         candidates = [
             (vault_name, file_info)
-            for vault_name, vault_data in index.items()
+            for vault_name, vault_data in _indexer.index.items()
             if vault_filter == "all" or vault_name == vault_filter
             for file_info in vault_data["files"]
         ]
@@ -1309,6 +1327,7 @@ def advanced_search(
     scored_results: list[tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = []
     facet_tags: dict[str, int] = defaultdict(int)
     facet_vaults: dict[str, int] = defaultdict(int)
+    facet_extensions: dict[str, int] = defaultdict(int)
 
     # Pre-compute prefix expansions once per term (avoid repeated binary search)
     prefix_expansions: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
@@ -1408,6 +1427,11 @@ def advanced_search(
         facet_vaults[result["vault"]] = facet_vaults.get(result["vault"], 0) + 1
         for tag in result.get("tags", []):
             facet_tags[tag] = facet_tags.get(tag, 0) + 1
+        # Extension normalised without leading dot ("md", not ".md") so it can be
+        # fed back directly as the `ext:` query operator.
+        ext = str(result.get("extension") or "").lower().lstrip(".")
+        if ext:
+            facet_extensions[ext] = facet_extensions.get(ext, 0) + 1
 
     total = len(scored_results)
     page = scored_results[offset: offset + limit]
@@ -1421,6 +1445,7 @@ def advanced_search(
         "facets": {
             "tags": dict(sorted(facet_tags.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1])[:20]),
             "vaults": dict(sorted(facet_vaults.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1])),
+            "extensions": dict(sorted(facet_extensions.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1])),
         },
         "query_time_ms": elapsed_ms,
         "semantic_available": semantic_available,
@@ -1523,7 +1548,7 @@ def suggest_titles(
     prefix: str,
     vault_filter: str = "all",
     limit: int = SUGGEST_LIMIT,
-) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
     """Suggest file titles matching a prefix (accent-insensitive).
 
     Args:
@@ -1532,7 +1557,7 @@ def suggest_titles(
         limit: Maximum suggestions.
 
     Returns:
-        List of ``{"vault", "path", "title"}`` dicts.
+        List of ``{"vault", "path", "title", "tags"}`` dicts.
     """
     if not prefix or len(prefix) < MIN_PREFIX_LENGTH:
         return []
@@ -1550,7 +1575,10 @@ def suggest_titles(
                 key = f"{entry['vault']}::{entry['path']}"
                 if key not in seen:
                     seen.add(key)
-                    results.append(entry)
+                    # Add tags from the index
+                    entry_with_tags: dict[str, Any] = dict(entry)
+                    entry_with_tags["tags"] = list(inv.doc_tags.get(entry["path"], set()))
+                    results.append(entry_with_tags)
                     if len(results) >= limit:
                         return results
 
@@ -1603,7 +1631,7 @@ def get_all_tags(vault_filter: str | None = None) -> dict[str, int]:
         Dict mapping tag names to their total occurrence count.
     """
     merged: dict[str, int] = {}
-    for vault_name, vault_data in index.items():
+    for vault_name, vault_data in _indexer.index.items():
         if vault_filter and vault_filter != "all" and vault_name != vault_filter:
             continue
         for tag, count in vault_data.get("tags", {}).items():

backend/search_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Shared thread pool for CPU-bound search (ROADMAP #85, tranche 5).
+
+Holder extrait de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de comportement :
+un seul pool (2 workers, préfixe ``"search"``) créé au démarrage et arrêté
+à l'extinction par le lifespan de ``main``. Les routers et les endpoints
+restants y accèdent via :func:`get_search_executor` au lieu du global de
+``main`` (plus d'import circulaire potentiel).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+_executor: ThreadPoolExecutor | None = None
+
+
+def init_search_executor(max_workers: int = 2) -> ThreadPoolExecutor:
+    """Create (or reuse) the shared search thread pool."""
+    global _executor
+    if _executor is None:
+        _executor = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max_workers, thread_name_prefix="search")
+    return _executor
+
+
+def shutdown_search_executor() -> None:
+    """Stop the shared search thread pool (best-effort, non-blocking)."""
+    global _executor
+    if _executor is not None:
+        _executor.shutdown(wait=False)
+        _executor = None
+
+
+def get_search_executor() -> ThreadPoolExecutor | None:
+    """Return the shared search thread pool (``None`` before startup)."""
+    return _executor

backend/secret_redactor.py

@@ -1,52 +1,183 @@
 """
 Secret redactor: masks sensitive patterns in rendered text.
 
-Scans for common secret patterns and replaces them with [MASQUÉ]
-before content is served to the frontend. Prevents accidental
-exposure of API keys, tokens, and passwords in previews.
+Scans for common secret patterns and replaces them with a French mask
+label (``[CLÉ API MASQUÉE]``, ``[MOT DE PASSE MASQUÉ]``, …) before content
+is served to the frontend. Prevents accidental exposure of API keys,
+tokens, and passwords in previews.
 
 Patterns detected:
-    - Generic API keys (long alphanumeric strings with key/secret/token prefix)
+    - Generic API keys (``api_key=…``, ``token: …`` — values of 8+ chars)
+    - Passwords (``password=…``, ``"passwd": "…"`` — any length)
     - JWT tokens (eyJ... base64url)
-    - AWS-style keys (AKIA..., sk-..., etc.)
+    - Provider key formats: OpenAI/Anthropic/OpenRouter (``sk-``), Stripe,
+      GitLab, Google (``AIza…`` / ``ya29.``), AWS, GitHub, Slack, SendGrid,
+      Hugging Face, npm, Docker, Resend, Square, Atlassian, Discord,
+      Telegram, ``Bearer …`` tokens
     - Private key blocks (-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----)
     - Connection strings with passwords
+    - Bare hex secrets next to a secret keyword (BUG-035)
+
+Interactive masking (feature #188): :func:`redact_with_placeholders`
+returns the text with every mask replaced by an opaque placeholder plus
+the list of ``(label, secret)`` entries; :func:`restore_masks` turns the
+placeholders back into plain labels (public shares, PDF exports, AI
+context) or into clickable ``<span class="secret-mask" data-secret="…">``
+badges (authenticated app preview) so a click copies the real value to
+the clipboard.
 """
 
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html as _html
 import logging
 import re
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.redactor")
 
 # --- Patterns ---
-# Order matters: more specific patterns first
-_PATTERNS = [
+# Each entry is ``(pattern, replacement, secret_group)``:
+#   * ``replacement``: a literal label, a ``\\1``-style template, or a
+#     callable receiving the match and returning the visible label;
+#   * ``secret_group``: index of the group holding the value that a click
+#     copies to the clipboard (feature #188).
+_PATTERNS: list[tuple[re.Pattern[str], object, int]] = [
     # Private key blocks
-    (re.compile(r'-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----', re.DOTALL), '[CLÉ PRIVÉE MASQUÉE]'),
-    
+    (re.compile(r'-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----', re.DOTALL), '[CLÉ PRIVÉE MASQUÉE]', 0),
+
     # JWT tokens (base64url encoded, starts with eyJ)
-    (re.compile(r'eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}'), '[JWT MASQUÉ]'),
-    
+    (re.compile(r'eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}'), '[JWT MASQUÉ]', 0),
+
     # Connection strings with passwords
-    (re.compile(r'(?:mongodb|mysql|postgres(?:ql)?|redis|sqlite)://[^:]+:[^@\s]+@'), '[CONNECTION_STRING MASQUÉE]'),
-    
-    # Generic API key patterns: key=... or token=... or secret=...
-    (re.compile(r'(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|password|passwd|auth[_-]?token)\s*[:=]\s*[\'"]?([^\s\'"]{20,})[\'"]?', re.IGNORECASE),
-     lambda m: f'{m.group(0).split("=")[0].split(":")[0]}=[MASQUÉ]' if "=" in m.group(0) or ":" in m.group(0) else '[MASQUÉ]'),
-    
-    # Generic long hex/base64 strings that look like secrets (40+ chars)
-    (re.compile(r'(?:sk|pk|rk)-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}'), '[CLÉ API MASQUÉE]'),
-    
-    # AWS access keys
-    (re.compile(r'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'), '[AWS_KEY MASQUÉ]'),
-    
+    (re.compile(r'(?:mongodb|mysql|postgres(?:ql)?|redis|sqlite)://[^:]+:[^@\s]+@'), '[CONNECTION_STRING MASQUÉE]', 0),
+
+    # Passwords — any length, bare or quoted (``password=…``,
+    # ``"passwd": "…"``). The left side may carry a qualifier
+    # (``db_password``, ``DATABASE.PASSWORD``, ``user_pwd``); a *bare*
+    # ``PWD=`` (shell working directory) must NOT match, hence ``pwd``
+    # only in its qualified branch.
+    (re.compile(
+        r'(?i)((?:[A-Za-z0-9_.-]*(?:password|passwd|passphrase|mot\s+de\s+passe)'
+        r'|[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+pwd)["\']?\s*[:=]\s*["\']?)([^\s"\',;]{4,})'),
+     r'\1[MOT DE PASSE MASQUÉ]', 2),
+
+    # Generic API key assignments: api_key=…, token=…, secret=… — values
+    # of 8+ characters (short enough to catch real keys, long enough to
+    # skip plain words).
+    (re.compile(r'(?i)([A-Za-z0-9_.-]*(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|auth[_-]?token)["\']?\s*[:=]\s*["\']?)([^\s\'"]{8,})'),
+     lambda m: f'{m.group(1)}[MASQUÉ]' if ("=" in m.group(0) or ":" in m.group(0)) else '[MASQUÉ]', 2),
+
     # GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_)
-    (re.compile(r'gh[pousr]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}'), '[GITHUB_TOKEN MASQUÉ]'),
-    
-    # Generic long random-looking strings (40+ hex chars)
-    (re.compile(r'\b[a-fA-F0-9]{40,64}\b'), '[HEX_KEY MASQUÉ]'),
+    (re.compile(r'gh[pousr]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}'), '[GITHUB_TOKEN MASQUÉ]', 0),
+
+    # AWS access keys
+    (re.compile(r'(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}'), '[AWS_KEY MASQUÉ]', 0),
+
+    # Provider key formats (feature #188) — one alternation covering the
+    # large majority of token shapes in the wild.
+    (re.compile(
+        r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:'
+        r'sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}'                  # OpenAI / Anthropic / OpenRouter
+        r'|sk_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}'      # Stripe secret key
+        r'|pk_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}'      # Stripe publishable key
+        r'|whsec_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}'                 # Stripe / Svix webhook secret
+        r'|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}'              # GitLab personal access token
+        r'|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}'           # GitHub fine-grained PAT
+        r'|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}'                    # npm automation token
+        r'|dckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}'           # Docker Hub token
+        r'|hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}'                    # Hugging Face token
+        r'|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{35}'                 # Google API key
+        r'|ya29\.[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{20,}'              # Google OAuth access token
+        r'|xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z\-]{10,}'          # Slack token
+        r'|SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}'                # SendGrid API key
+        r'|re_[A-Za-z0-9]{40}'                     # Resend API key
+        r'|sq0[a-z]{3}-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}'        # Square access token
+        r'|ATATT[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}'               # Atlassian access token
+        r'|[NOP][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{23,28}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{27,}'  # Discord bot token
+        r'|\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{35}'            # Telegram bot token
+        r'|Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=\-]{20,}'      # Authorization: Bearer …
+        r')'),
+     '[CLÉ API MASQUÉE]', 0),
+
 ]
 
+# BUG-035: bare 40–64 char hex strings used to be redacted unconditionally,
+# which mangled legitimate git commit SHAs, checksums and hashes in notes.
+# They are now only redacted when a secret-ish keyword sits in the immediate
+# context; hash/commit keywords explicitly exempt them.
+_HEX_RE = re.compile(r'\b[a-fA-F0-9]{40,64}\b')
+_SECRET_CONTEXT_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b(?:secret|token|key|apikey|api[_-]?key|password|passwd|auth|bearer|'
+    r'credential|x-api-key|x-auth-token)\b'
+)
+_HASH_CONTEXT_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b(?:commit|sha\d*|hash|md5|blob|git|checksum|digest|integrity|'
+    r'revision|rev|etag|fingerprint)\b'
+)
+#: How far before the hex string a keyword may appear to count as context.
+_HEX_CONTEXT_WINDOW = 60
+
+# --- Interactive masking (feature #188) ---
+# Private-use-area sentinels: they survive markdown rendering (mistune
+# treats them as plain text, fenced code blocks included) and are
+# stripped by ``backend.render._heading_slugify``.
+_PLACEHOLDER_OPEN = "\uE000"
+_PLACEHOLDER_CLOSE = "\uE001"
+_PLACEHOLDER_RE = re.compile("\uE000(\\d+)\uE001")
+
+
+def _redact_bare_hex_secrets(text: str, mask) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    """Redact 40–64 char hex strings only when a secret keyword is nearby.
+
+    Git/SHA/checksum contexts are left untouched (BUG-035).
+
+    Args:
+        text: Text to scan.
+        mask: ``mask(original, label) -> str`` replacement builder.
+
+    Returns:
+        (redacted_text, redaction_count) tuple.
+    """
+    count = 0
+
+    def _replace(match: re.Match) -> str:
+        nonlocal count
+        window = text[max(0, match.start() - _HEX_CONTEXT_WINDOW):match.start()]
+        if _HASH_CONTEXT_RE.search(window):
+            return match.group(0)
+        if _SECRET_CONTEXT_RE.search(window):
+            count += 1
+            return mask(match.group(0), '[HEX_KEY MASQUÉ]')
+        return match.group(0)
+
+    return _HEX_RE.sub(_replace, text), count
+
+
+def _redact(text: str, mask) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    """Apply every pattern; ``mask(original, label) -> str`` builds the
+    replacement (plain label, or placeholder for the interactive mode)."""
+    count = 0
+    result = text
+    for pattern, replacement, secret_group in _PATTERNS:
+
+        def _sub(match: re.Match, replacement=replacement, secret_group=secret_group) -> str:
+            if callable(replacement):
+                label = replacement(match)
+            else:
+                label = match.expand(str(replacement))
+            return mask(match.group(secret_group), label)
+
+        new_result, n = pattern.subn(_sub, result)
+        count += n
+        result = new_result
+    result, hex_count = _redact_bare_hex_secrets(result, mask)
+    return result, count + hex_count
+
+
+def _plain_mask(original: str, label: str) -> str:
+    """Plain masking: only the visible label survives."""
+    return label
+
 
 def redact(text: str) -> tuple:
     """Redact sensitive patterns from text.
@@ -57,20 +188,84 @@ def redact(text: str) -> tuple:
     Returns:
         (redacted_text, redaction_count) tuple.
     """
-    count = 0
-    result = text
-    for pattern, replacement in _PATTERNS:
-        if callable(replacement):
-            new_result, n = pattern.subn(replacement, result)
-        else:
-            new_result, n = pattern.subn(str(replacement), result)
-        count += n
-        result = new_result
+    result, count = _redact(text, _plain_mask)
     if count > 0:
         logger.info(f"Redacted {count} secret(s) from content")
     return result, count
 
 
+def redact_with_placeholders(text: str, file_path: str = "") -> tuple[str, list[tuple[str, str]]]:
+    """Redact *text*, replacing every mask with an opaque placeholder.
+
+    Used by the markdown rendering pipeline: placeholders survive the
+    markdown → HTML conversion (fenced code blocks included, where a
+    literal ``<span>`` would be shown as text), then
+    :func:`restore_masks` turns them back into labels or clickable badges.
+
+    Args:
+        text: The raw text content to scan.
+        file_path: Optional file path for logging context.
+
+    Returns:
+        (text_with_placeholders, entries) where *entries* is the list of
+        ``(label, secret)`` tuples referenced by the placeholders, in
+        order of appearance.
+    """
+    entries: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+
+    def mask(original: str, label: str) -> str:
+        entries.append((label, original))
+        return f"{_PLACEHOLDER_OPEN}{len(entries) - 1}{_PLACEHOLDER_CLOSE}"
+
+    result, count = _redact(text, mask)
+    if count > 0:
+        logger.warning(f"Redacted {count} potential secret(s) from {file_path or '<unknown>'}")
+    return result, entries
+
+
+def restore_masks(
+    text: str,
+    entries: list[tuple[str, str]],
+    *,
+    click_to_copy: bool = False,
+) -> str:
+    """Turn placeholders produced by :func:`redact_with_placeholders` back
+    into visible masks.
+
+    Args:
+        text: Rendered HTML still containing placeholders.
+        entries: The ``(label, secret)`` list returned alongside.
+        click_to_copy: When True (authenticated app preview), each mask
+            becomes ``<span class="secret-mask" data-secret="…">label</span>``
+            so a click copies the real value. When False (public shares,
+            PDF exports), only the plain label is restored — the secret
+            never reaches the page.
+
+    Returns:
+        The text with every placeholder replaced.
+    """
+    if not entries:
+        return text
+
+    def _sub(match: re.Match) -> str:
+        idx = int(match.group(1))
+        if idx >= len(entries):
+            return ""
+        label, original = entries[idx]
+        label_esc = _html.escape(str(label), quote=False)
+        if not click_to_copy:
+            return label_esc
+        return (
+            '<span class="secret-mask" data-secret="'
+            + _html.escape(str(original), quote=True)
+            + '">'
+            + label_esc
+            + "</span>"
+        )
+
+    return _PLACEHOLDER_RE.sub(_sub, text)
+
+
 def redact_file_content(content: str, file_path: str = "") -> str:
     """Redact a file's content for preview rendering.
 

backend/semantic_search.py

@@ -457,10 +457,6 @@ class SemanticIndex:
         """Return True once a full rebuild has completed."""
         return self._ready
 
-    def is_stale(self) -> bool:
-        """Alias used by callers that check index freshness."""
-        return not self._ready
-
     def _ensure_provider(self) -> EmbeddingProvider:
         if self.provider is None:
             self.provider = get_embedding_provider()

backend/services/backups.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ DEFAULT_MAX_BACKUPS = 10
 def _default_max_backups() -> int:
     """Read ``max_backups_per_file`` from app config (lazy, best-effort)."""
     try:
-        from backend.main import _load_config
+        from backend.routers.config import _load_config  # ROADMAP #85 T7 — déménagé depuis backend.main
 
         return int(_load_config().get("max_backups_per_file", DEFAULT_MAX_BACKUPS))
     except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - config unavailable

backend/services/duplicates.py

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+"""Duplicate detection & merge services (#166).
+
+Single source of truth consumed by the REST routes
+(``/api/duplicates``) and the AI tool layer (``find_duplicates``,
+``merge_duplicate_notes``).
+
+Method is deterministic stdlib-only: frontmatter stripped, token-set
+Jaccard blended with a title similarity. No embedding dependency —
+the semantic index (#70) stays an optional refinement, not a requirement.
+
+Fusion never runs without an explicit confirmation: the tool layer
+registers the merge as ``DANGEROUS`` (two-step propose/apply) and this
+service takes an automatic backup before any destructive write.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import re
+from difflib import SequenceMatcher
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from backend.services.backups import create_backup
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.vaults import get_vault_root
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.services.duplicates")
+
+MAX_FILES_SCANNED = 500
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 200_000
+MAX_CONTENT_CHARS = 50_000
+
+_WORD_RE = re.compile(r"[\w]+", re.UNICODE)
+_FRONTMATTER_RE = re.compile(r"\A---\s*\n.*?\n---\s*\n", re.DOTALL)
+
+
+def _strip_frontmatter(text: str) -> str:
+    """Remove a leading YAML frontmatter block, if present."""
+    return _FRONTMATTER_RE.sub("", text, count=1)
+
+
+def _tokens(text: str) -> set[str]:
+    """Lowercase word tokens (keeps accents), stop-words free but tiny tokens dropped."""
+    return {t for t in _WORD_RE.findall(text.lower()) if len(t) > 2}
+
+
+def similarity_score(a: str, b: str) -> float:
+    """Blend Jaccard (0.7) + title/first-line similarity (0.3) in [0, 1].
+
+    Pure function — unit-tested directly.
+    """
+    ta, tb = _tokens(_strip_frontmatter(a)), _tokens(_strip_frontmatter(b))
+    if not ta or not tb:
+        return 0.0
+    jaccard = len(ta & tb) / len(ta | tb)
+    head_a = (a.strip().splitlines() or [""])[:1][0][:200].lower()
+    head_b = (b.strip().splitlines() or [""])[:1][0][:200].lower()
+    title_sim = SequenceMatcher(None, head_a, head_b).ratio() if head_a and head_b else 0.0
+    return round(0.7 * jaccard + 0.3 * title_sim, 4)
+
+
+def _iter_markdown_files(root: Path, subdir: str = "") -> list[Path]:
+    base = resolve_safe_path(root, subdir) if subdir else root.resolve()
+    if not base.exists() or not base.is_dir():
+        raise ServiceError(
+            f"Directory not found: {subdir or '.'}",
+            code="not_found",
+            status=404,
+            details={"path": subdir},
+        )
+    files = sorted(
+        (p for p in base.rglob("*.md") if p.is_file() and not p.is_symlink()),
+        key=lambda p: str(p),
+    )
+    return files[:MAX_FILES_SCANNED]
+
+
+def _read_capped(path: Path) -> str:
+    try:
+        if path.stat().st_size > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+            return ""
+        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except OSError:
+        return ""
+    return text[:MAX_CONTENT_CHARS]
+
+
+def find_duplicate_pairs(
+    vault: str,
+    threshold: float = 0.75,
+    limit: int = 50,
+    subdir: str = "",
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return candidate duplicate pairs ordered by descending score.
+
+    Args:
+        vault: Vault name.
+        threshold: Minimum blended score in [0.3, 1.0].
+        limit: Max pairs returned (1-200).
+        subdir: Optional vault-relative directory scope.
+    """
+    if not 0.3 <= threshold <= 1.0:
+        raise ServiceError(
+            "threshold must be between 0.3 and 1.0",
+            code="invalid_arguments",
+            status=400,
+        )
+    limit = max(1, min(limit, 200))
+    root = get_vault_root(vault)
+    files = _iter_markdown_files(root, subdir)
+    contents: dict[str, str] = {}
+    token_sets: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+    for path in files:
+        rel = str(path.relative_to(root)).replace("\\", "/")
+        text = _read_capped(path)
+        if not text.strip():
+            continue
+        contents[rel] = text
+        token_sets[rel] = _tokens(_strip_frontmatter(text))
+
+    rels = sorted(contents)
+    pairs: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for i in range(len(rels)):
+        for j in range(i + 1, len(rels)):
+            a, b = rels[i], rels[j]
+            ta, tb = token_sets[a], token_sets[b]
+            if not ta or not tb:
+                continue
+            # Cheap pre-filter: Jaccard lower bound before the full score.
+            inter = len(ta & tb)
+            union = len(ta | tb)
+            if union == 0 or inter / union < threshold * 0.6:
+                continue
+            score = similarity_score(contents[a], contents[b])
+            if score >= threshold:
+                pairs.append({"file_a": a, "file_b": b, "score": score})
+    pairs.sort(key=lambda p: p["score"], reverse=True)
+    return {
+        "vault": vault,
+        "threshold": threshold,
+        "files_scanned": len(contents),
+        "truncated": len(files) >= MAX_FILES_SCANNED,
+        "pairs": pairs[:limit],
+    }
+
+
+def merge_duplicates(
+    vault: str,
+    source_path: str,
+    target_path: str,
+    strategy: str = "append",
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Merge *source_path* into *target_path*, then delete the source.
+
+    Strategies:
+        ``append`` — source content appended after target (separator + origin
+        marker), source deleted.
+        ``prefer_target`` — source deleted, target untouched (dedupe only).
+        ``prefer_source`` — target overwritten with source content, source deleted.
+
+    A backup of both files is taken first; the source deletion also goes
+    through the backup-aware mutation service.
+    """
+    from backend.services import mutations as _mutations
+
+    if strategy not in ("append", "prefer_target", "prefer_source"):
+        raise ServiceError(
+            f"Unknown strategy: {strategy}",
+            code="invalid_arguments",
+            status=400,
+        )
+    if source_path == target_path:
+        raise ServiceError(
+            "source_path and target_path must differ",
+            code="invalid_arguments",
+            status=400,
+        )
+    root = get_vault_root(vault)
+    src = resolve_safe_path(root, source_path)
+    dst = resolve_safe_path(root, target_path)
+    if not src.is_file() or src.suffix.lower() != ".md":
+        raise ServiceError(
+            f"Source not found: {source_path}",
+            code="not_found",
+            status=404,
+            details={"path": source_path},
+        )
+    if not dst.is_file() or dst.suffix.lower() != ".md":
+        raise ServiceError(
+            f"Target not found: {target_path}",
+            code="not_found",
+            status=404,
+            details={"path": target_path},
+        )
+    # Backup préalable (jamais de fusion sans filet — critère #166).
+    create_backup(src, vault, source_path)
+    create_backup(dst, vault, target_path)
+
+    if strategy == "prefer_target":
+        result = _mutations.delete_file(vault, source_path)
+        return {"strategy": strategy, "target": target_path, "deleted": source_path, "delete": result}
+    if strategy == "prefer_source":
+        content = src.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+        result = _mutations.edit_file(vault, target_path, content)
+        deleted = _mutations.delete_file(vault, source_path)
+        return {"strategy": strategy, "target": target_path, "edit": result, "deleted": source_path, "delete": deleted}
+    # append
+    target_text = dst.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    source_text = src.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+    merged = target_text.rstrip() + f"\n\n---\n\n_Fusionné depuis `{source_path}` (#166)_\n\n" + source_text.lstrip()
+    result = _mutations.edit_file(vault, target_path, merged)
+    deleted = _mutations.delete_file(vault, source_path)
+    return {"strategy": strategy, "target": target_path, "edit": result, "deleted": source_path, "delete": deleted}

backend/services/recent.py

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import time
 from datetime import datetime
 from typing import Any
 
+from backend.auth.middleware import is_home_vault
 from backend.history import get_recent_opened, is_bookmarked
 from backend.indexer import find_file_in_index, index
 
@@ -31,6 +32,10 @@ def humanize_mtime(mtime: float) -> str:
 
 
 def _can_access(vault: str, user_vaults: list[str]) -> bool:
+    # #194 : un dossier perso ne bénéficie jamais de "*" (même règle que
+    # backend.auth.middleware.check_vault_access).
+    if is_home_vault(vault):
+        return vault in user_vaults
     return "*" in user_vaults or vault in user_vaults
 
 

backend/services/search.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+from collections.abc import Callable
 from typing import Any
 
 
@@ -11,15 +12,29 @@ def search_vaults(
     tag: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 50,
     offset: int = 0,
+    is_allowed: Callable[[str], bool] | None = None,
+    username: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Full-text search with pagination, returned as the API response payload.
 
-    No permission filtering is applied here: callers that need it (the tool
-    layer) filter the ``results`` list themselves.
+    ``is_allowed`` (#194) filters the raw hits **before** pagination, so a
+    restricted vault set neither distorts ``total`` nor the returned page.
+    The tool layer filters on its own and leaves it as ``None``.
+
+    ``username`` (#196) : les documents **reçus** par cet utilisateur via un
+    partage dirigé sont ajoutés aux résultats (lecture seule, sans indexer
+    les fichiers d'autrui — le contenu est lu à la volée et mis en cache
+    TF-IDF côté index, pas sur disque).
     """
     from backend.search import search
 
     all_results = search(q, vault_filter=vault, tag_filter=tag)
+    if is_allowed is not None:
+        all_results = [r for r in all_results if is_allowed(r.get("vault", ""))]
+
+    if username is not None:
+        all_results = all_results + _shared_results(username, q, vault)
+
     total = len(all_results)
     page = all_results[offset: offset + limit]
     return {
@@ -34,6 +49,67 @@ def search_vaults(
     }
 
 
+def _shared_results(username: str, q: str, vault: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Search results for documents shared TO *username* (#196).
+
+    Reads the shared file content on the fly (read-only, source vault on
+    disk) and returns hits shaped exactly like ordinary search results so
+    the frontend can open them via the normal share page.
+    """
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+    from backend.indexer import get_vault_data
+    from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+    from backend.share import list_shares
+
+    out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    if not q:
+        return out
+    q_lower = q.lower()
+
+    for s in list_shares(user=username):
+        if s.get("created_by") == username:
+            continue  # own share — already indexed in its own vault
+        if vault not in ("all", f"home-{username}"):
+            continue
+        data = get_vault_data(s["vault"])
+        if not data:
+            continue
+        try:
+            fp = resolve_safe_path(Path(data["path"]), s["path"])
+            if not fp.exists() or fp.suffix.lower() != ".md":
+                continue
+            raw = fp.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        title = fp.stem
+        occurrences = raw.lower().count(q_lower)
+        if q_lower in title.lower():
+            occurrences += 1
+        if occurrences == 0:
+            continue
+        out.append({
+            "vault": f"home-{username}",
+            "path": f"Partage/{fp.name}",
+            "title": title,
+            "tags": [],
+            "score": min(occurrences, 10),
+            "snippet": _snippet(raw, q_lower),
+            "modified": None,
+            "share_token": s["token"],
+        })
+    return out
+
+
+def _snippet(text: str, q_lower: str, width: int = 160) -> str:
+    """Small excerpt around the first match (#196, shared-file search)."""
+    idx = text.lower().find(q_lower)
+    if idx < 0:
+        return text[:width]
+    start = max(0, idx - width // 2)
+    return "…" + text[start:start + width].replace("\n", " ") + "…"
+
+
 def list_tags(vault: str | None = None) -> dict[str, int]:
     """Return tag → count, optionally restricted to a single vault."""
     from backend.search import get_all_tags

backend/services/vaults.py

@@ -102,6 +102,29 @@ def browse_directory(vault_name: str, path: str = "") -> dict[str, Any]:
     return {"vault": vault_name, "path": path, "items": items}
 
 
+def _indexed_tags(vault_name: str, rel_path: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Tags of a file as stored in the search index (#158).
+
+    Empty list when the file is not indexed yet (binary formats, index still
+    building) — the listing itself comes from the filesystem, tags are a
+    decoration used by the navigation page facets/filters.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Vault name.
+        rel_path: Path of the file relative to the vault root (``/`` separated).
+
+    Returns:
+        The file's tags, or an empty list when unknown.
+    """
+    try:
+        from backend.search import get_inverted_index
+
+        info = get_inverted_index().doc_info.get(f"{vault_name}::{rel_path}")
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+    return list((info or {}).get("tags") or [])
+
+
 def list_all_files(
     vault_name: str,
     dir: str = "",
@@ -189,6 +212,7 @@ def list_all_files(
                 "modified": stat.st_mtime,
                 "modified_iso": datetime.fromtimestamp(stat.st_mtime, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
                 "extension": ext.lstrip(".") if ext else "",
+                "tags": _indexed_tags(vault_name, rel_path),
             }
             if rel_to_dir and rel_to_dir != ".":
                 file_entry["rel_dir"] = rel_to_dir

backend/share.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ No authentication required for public share views.
 import json
 import logging
 import secrets
+import threading
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
 
@@ -17,6 +18,10 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.share")
 
 SHARES_FILE = Path("data/shares.json")
 
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour des read-modify-write (perte de mises à
+# jour en cas de créations/accès/révocations concurrents).
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
 
 def _read() -> dict:
     if not SHARES_FILE.exists():
@@ -39,28 +44,36 @@ def create_share(
     path: str,
     created_by: str,
     expires_in_hours: int | None = None,
+    shared_with: list[str] | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Create a new share token for a document."""
-    data = _read()
-    token = secrets.token_hex(32)  # 64-char hex token
+    """Create a new share token for a document.
 
-    expires_at = None
-    if expires_in_hours:
-        expires_at = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=expires_in_hours)).isoformat()
+    ``shared_with`` non vide (#196) : partage **dirigé** — la page ``/s/…``
+    exige alors une session et n'accepte que les destinataires listés (plus
+    le créateur et les admins). Vide/absent : comportement public inchangé.
+    """
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        token = secrets.token_hex(32)  # 64-char hex token
 
-    share = {
-        "id": token,
-        "token": token,
-        "vault": vault,
-        "path": path,
-        "created_by": created_by,
-        "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        "expires_at": expires_at,
-        "access_count": 0,
-        "last_accessed": None,
-    }
-    data["shares"][token] = share
-    _write(data)
+        expires_at = None
+        if expires_in_hours:
+            expires_at = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=expires_in_hours)).isoformat()
+
+        share = {
+            "id": token,
+            "token": token,
+            "vault": vault,
+            "path": path,
+            "created_by": created_by,
+            "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "expires_at": expires_at,
+            "access_count": 0,
+            "last_accessed": None,
+            "shared_with": list(shared_with) if shared_with else [],
+        }
+        data["shares"][token] = share
+        _write(data)
     logger.info(f"Created share for {vault}/{path} by {created_by}")
     return share
 
@@ -80,29 +93,38 @@ def get_share_by_token(token: str) -> dict | None:
 
 def record_access(token: str):
     """Increment access counter for a share."""
-    data = _read()
-    share = data["shares"].get(token)
-    if share:
-        share["access_count"] = share.get("access_count", 0) + 1
-        share["last_accessed"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-        _write(data)
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        share = data["shares"].get(token)
+        if share:
+            share["access_count"] = share.get("access_count", 0) + 1
+            share["last_accessed"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+            _write(data)
 
 
 def revoke_share(share_id: str) -> bool:
     """Revoke (delete) a share by its token."""
-    data = _read()
-    if share_id in data["shares"]:
-        del data["shares"][share_id]
-        _write(data)
-        logger.info(f"Revoked share {share_id}")
-        return True
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        if share_id in data["shares"]:
+            del data["shares"][share_id]
+            _write(data)
+            logger.info(f"Revoked share {share_id}")
+            return True
     return False
 
 
-def list_shares(vault_filter: str | None = None) -> list:
-    """List all shares, optionally filtered by vault."""
+def list_shares(vault_filter: str | None = None, user: str | None = None) -> list:
+    """List shares, optionally filtered by vault and/or requesting user.
+
+    #196 : un non-admin ne voit que les partages qu'il a créés **ou** qui lui
+    sont dirigés. Un admin voit tout. ``user=None`` (anciens appels, tests
+    unitaires) conserve l'ancien comportement : tout lister.
+    """
     data = _read()
     shares = list(data["shares"].values())
+    if user is not None:
+        shares = [s for s in shares if user in (s.get("created_by"), *(s.get("shared_with") or []))]
     if vault_filter:
         shares = [s for s in shares if s["vault"] == vault_filter]
     # Most recent first
@@ -112,12 +134,13 @@ def list_shares(vault_filter: str | None = None) -> list:
 
 def update_shares_after_rename(vault: str, old_path: str, new_path: str):
     """Update all shares when a file is renamed."""
-    data = _read()
-    updated = False
-    for sid, s in data["shares"].items():
-        if s.get("vault") == vault and s.get("path") == old_path:
-            s["path"] = new_path
-            updated = True
-            logger.info(f"Updated share {sid}: {vault}/{old_path} -> {new_path}")
-    if updated:
-        _write(data)
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        updated = False
+        for sid, s in data["shares"].items():
+            if s.get("vault") == vault and s.get("path") == old_path:
+                s["path"] = new_path
+                updated = True
+                logger.info(f"Updated share {sid}: {vault}/{old_path} -> {new_path}")
+        if updated:
+            _write(data)

backend/sse.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Server-Sent Events manager (ROADMAP #85, tranche 4).
+
+Singleton extrait de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de comportement :
+les routers montés par ``main`` partagent la même instance (les clients SSE
+connectés sur ``/api/events`` reçoivent les broadcasts émis depuis
+n'importe quel router).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json as _json
+import logging
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+
+class SSEManager:
+    """Manages SSE client connections and broadcasts events."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self._clients: list[asyncio.Queue] = []
+
+    async def connect(self) -> asyncio.Queue:
+        """Register a new SSE client and return its message queue."""
+        queue: asyncio.Queue = asyncio.Queue()
+        self._clients.append(queue)
+        logger.debug(f"SSE client connected (total: {len(self._clients)})")
+        return queue
+
+    def disconnect(self, queue: asyncio.Queue):
+        """Remove a disconnected SSE client."""
+        if queue in self._clients:
+            self._clients.remove(queue)
+        logger.debug(f"SSE client disconnected (total: {len(self._clients)})")
+
+    async def broadcast(self, event_type: str, data: dict):
+        """Send an event to all connected SSE clients."""
+        message = _json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False)
+        dead: list[asyncio.Queue] = []
+        for q in self._clients:
+            try:
+                q.put_nowait({"event": event_type, "data": message})
+            except asyncio.QueueFull:
+                dead.append(q)
+        for q in dead:
+            self.disconnect(q)
+
+    @property
+    def client_count(self) -> int:
+        return len(self._clients)
+
+
+sse_manager = SSEManager()

backend/tools/api.py

@@ -9,7 +9,14 @@ Note: ObsiGate uses implicit namespace packages (no tracked ``__init__.py``,
 which ``.gitignore`` excludes via ``_*.py``), hence this explicit facade.
 """
 
+from backend.tools import connected as _connected  # noqa: F401  (registers connected-source tools)
+from backend.tools import crawler as _crawler  # noqa: F401  (registers the site crawler)
+from backend.tools import documents as _documents  # noqa: F401  (registers document tools)
+from backend.tools import duplicates as _duplicates  # noqa: F401  (registers duplicate tools #166)
+from backend.tools import notify as _notify_tools  # noqa: F401  (registers notify tool #168)
+from backend.tools import scheduled as _scheduled  # noqa: F401  (registers scheduler tools #170)
 from backend.tools import service as _service  # noqa: F401  (registers tools)
+from backend.tools import spreadsheets as _spreadsheets  # noqa: F401  (registers existing-workbook tools #153 A6)
 from backend.tools import web as _web  # noqa: F401  (registers web tools)
 from backend.tools.context import (
     ToolConfirmationRequired,

backend/tools/connected.py

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+"""Connected sources — Gitea & GitHub repositories (phase 2 #92).
+
+The assistant can query the source-hosting platforms the project actually
+uses (ObsiGate is hosted on Gitea): repositories, issues/pull requests and
+repository files. Everything is READ-risk, rate-limited through the shared
+registry and audited.
+
+Configuration (environment — injected by Infisical in production, never
+hard-coded):
+
+* ``OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL``    — base URL of the self-hosted instance (e.g.
+  ``https://git.example.net``); the ``gitea`` provider is only available when
+  this variable is set. Admin-controlled, so the SSRF guard does not apply
+  (unlike user-supplied URLs). Both the URL and the tokens can also be set
+  from the configuration page (stored in ``data/api_keys.json``, #103) —
+  the stored value takes precedence over the environment.
+* ``OBSIGATE_GITEA_TOKEN``  — optional personal access token (private repos).
+* ``OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN`` — optional token (raises the API rate limits and
+  unlocks private repositories).
+
+Cloud drives (Google Drive / OneDrive) deliberately stay out of the core:
+per the documented roadmap they are best served by an *external MCP server*
+(#79) so the OAuth surface remains outside ObsiGate.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import binascii
+import logging
+from typing import Any
+
+import httpx
+
+from backend.tools.context import ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import GitGetFileInput, GitProviderInput, GitSearchIssuesInput
+from backend.tools.secrets import get_tool_key
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.connected")
+
+TIMEOUT = 10.0
+USER_AGENT = "ObsiGateAssistant/1.0 (+self-hosted vault AI)"
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 300_000
+GITHUB_API = "https://api.github.com"
+
+
+def _provider_base(provider: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Return (base_url, auth_header_value) for the requested provider."""
+    if provider == "gitea":
+        base = get_tool_key("OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL").rstrip("/")
+        if not base:
+            raise ToolError(
+                "Source Gitea non configurée (OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL absente).",
+                code="provider_not_configured",
+            )
+        token = get_tool_key("OBSIGATE_GITEA_TOKEN")
+        return base, f"token {token}" if token else ""
+    if provider == "github":
+        token = get_tool_key("OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN")
+        return GITHUB_API, f"Bearer {token}" if token else ""
+    raise ToolError(
+        f"Fournisseur inconnu : {provider} ('gitea' ou 'github')",
+        code="invalid_arguments",
+    )
+
+
+def _headers(auth: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    headers = {"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, "Accept": "application/json"}
+    if auth:
+        headers["Authorization"] = auth
+    return headers
+
+
+def _request(method: str, url: str, auth: str, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Response:
+    try:
+        resp = httpx.request(
+            method, url, headers=_headers(auth), timeout=TIMEOUT, follow_redirects=False,
+            **kwargs,
+        )
+    except httpx.HTTPError as e:
+        logger.warning("connected source request failed %s: %s", url, e)
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Source connectée momentanément indisponible.",
+            code="connected_source_unavailable",
+        ) from e
+    if resp.status_code in (401, 403):
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Accès refusé par la source connectée (jeton manquant ou expiré).",
+            code="permission_denied",
+        )
+    if resp.status_code == 404:
+        raise ToolError("Ressource introuvable sur la source connectée.", code="not_found")
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    return resp
+
+
+def _normalize_repo(item: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "name": item.get("name") or "",
+        "full_name": item.get("full_name") or "",
+        "url": item.get("html_url") or item.get("clone_url") or "",
+        "description": item.get("description") or "",
+        "updated": item.get("updated_at") or "",
+        "private": bool(item.get("private", False)),
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="git_list_repos",
+    description=(
+        "List repositories on the connected Gitea instance or GitHub account "
+        "(name, url, description, last update). Use when the user asks about "
+        "their code projects."
+    ),
+    input_model=GitProviderInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+)
+def git_list_repos(ctx, params: GitProviderInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Query the configured source and return normalized repositories."""
+    base, auth = _provider_base(params.provider)
+    if params.provider == "gitea":
+        url = base + "/api/v1/repos/search"
+        query: dict[str, Any] = {"limit": params.limit}
+        if params.repo:
+            query["q"] = params.repo
+        resp = _request("GET", url, auth, params=query)
+        items = resp.json().get("data") or []
+    else:
+        if params.repo:
+            url = GITHUB_API + f"/repos/{params.repo.strip('/')}"
+            items = [_request("GET", url, auth).json()]
+        else:
+            resp = _request(
+                "GET", GITHUB_API + "/user/repos",
+                auth, params={"per_page": params.limit, "sort": "updated"},
+            )
+            items = resp.json()
+    repos = [_normalize_repo(item) for item in items if isinstance(item, dict)]
+    return {"provider": params.provider, "count": len(repos), "repos": repos}
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="git_search_issues",
+    description=(
+        "Search issues and pull requests on the connected Gitea instance or "
+        "GitHub (title/body keywords, optional repository scope, open/closed)."
+    ),
+    input_model=GitSearchIssuesInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+)
+def git_search_issues(ctx, params: GitSearchIssuesInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Query issues (and PRs) from the configured source."""
+    base, auth = _provider_base(params.provider)
+    state = params.state if params.state in ("open", "closed") else "open"
+    if params.provider == "gitea":
+        if params.repo:
+            url = base + f"/api/v1/repos/{params.repo.strip('/')}/issues"
+            query: dict[str, Any] = {"state": state, "limit": params.limit, "q": params.query}
+            resp = _request("GET", url, auth, params=query)
+            items = resp.json()
+        else:
+            url = base + "/api/v1/repos/issues/search"
+            resp = _request("GET", url, auth, params={
+                "q": params.query, "state": state, "limit": params.limit,
+            })
+            items = resp.json()
+    else:
+        clause = f"{params.query} is:issue is:{state}"
+        if params.repo:
+            clause += f" repo:{params.repo.strip('/')}"
+        resp = _request(
+            "GET", GITHUB_API + "/search/issues", auth,
+            params={"q": clause, "per_page": params.limit},
+        )
+        items = (resp.json().get("items") or [])
+    issues = [
+        {
+            "id": item.get("number") or item.get("id") or "",
+            "title": (item.get("title") or "")[:300],
+            "url": item.get("html_url") or "",
+            "state": item.get("state") or "",
+            "pull_request": bool(item.get("pull_request")),
+        }
+        for item in (items if isinstance(items, list) else [])
+        if isinstance(item, dict)
+    ]
+    return {
+        "provider": params.provider,
+        "query": params.query,
+        "count": len(issues),
+        "issues": issues,
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="git_get_file",
+    description=(
+        "Read a file's content from a connected Gitea or GitHub repository "
+        "(source code, docs, config). Text/JSON only, size-capped."
+    ),
+    input_model=GitGetFileInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+)
+def git_get_file(ctx, params: GitGetFileInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fetch one repository file and return its decoded text content."""
+    base, auth = _provider_base(params.provider)
+    repo = params.repo.strip("/")
+    path = params.path.strip("/")
+    if not repo or not path:
+        raise ToolError(
+            "'repo' (owner/nom) et 'path' sont obligatoires", code="invalid_arguments"
+        )
+    if params.provider == "gitea":
+        url = base + f"/api/v1/repos/{repo}/contents/{path}"
+    else:
+        url = GITHUB_API + f"/repos/{repo}/contents/{path}"
+    if params.ref:
+        url += f"?ref={params.ref}"
+    resp = _request("GET", url, auth)
+    data = resp.json()
+    encoded = data.get("content") or ""
+    if (data.get("encoding") or "") == "base64" and encoded:
+        try:
+            content = base64.b64decode(encoded).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, binascii.Error) as e:
+            raise ToolError(
+                "Contenu du fichier illisible (encodage inattendu).",
+                code="file_decode_error",
+            ) from e
+    else:
+        content = encoded
+    truncated = len(content) > MAX_FILE_BYTES
+    return {
+        "provider": params.provider,
+        "repo": repo,
+        "path": data.get("path") or path,
+        "size": data.get("size") or len(content),
+        "content": content[:MAX_FILE_BYTES],
+        "truncated": truncated,
+    }

backend/tools/crawler.py

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+"""Multi-page site crawl — ``crawl_site`` (phase 2 #92, WRITE + confirmation).
+
+The assistant can digest a small public site (documentation, docs portal) and
+store a Markdown summary inside a vault: one section per page, title, URL and
+readable text. The crawl is bounded and same-host only:
+
+* max 20 pages (``max_pages``), same hostname, breadth-first from the entry URL;
+* SSRF guard on every URL (scheme + private-address rejection), size caps;
+* no third-party crawler dependency (scrapy deliberately avoided — a bounded
+  httpx BFS keeps the surface small and the runtime predictable; the task is
+  executed as a single background-style tool run instead of a web request
+  pipeline).
+
+Risk is WRITE: the digest is written into a vault, so the two-step
+confirmation applies (Apply card in the UI, propose/apply over MCP).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import re
+import time
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
+
+import httpx
+
+from backend.tools.context import ToolContext, ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import CrawlSiteInput
+from backend.tools.web import (
+    USER_AGENT,
+    _assert_public_http_url,
+    _html_to_text,
+    _response_text,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.crawler")
+
+MAX_PAGE_BYTES = 800_000
+MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 6_000_000
+MAX_TEXT_PER_PAGE = 12_000
+PAGE_TIMEOUT = 10.0
+_LINK_RE = re.compile(r'<a[^>]*href="([^"#]+)"', re.IGNORECASE)
+_TITLE_RE = re.compile(r"<title[^>]*>(.*?)</title>", re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
+
+
+def _same_host(url: str, host: str) -> bool:
+    return (urlparse(url).hostname or "") == host
+
+
+def _extract_links(raw: str, base_url: str) -> list[str]:
+    import html as html_lib
+
+    links: list[str] = []
+    for match in _LINK_RE.finditer(raw):
+        href = html_lib.unescape(match.group(1)).strip()
+        if not href or href.lower().startswith(("javascript:", "mailto:", "tel:")):
+            continue
+        absolute = urljoin(base_url, href)
+        if absolute.lower().endswith((".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".svg", ".webp", ".pdf", ".zip")):
+            continue
+        links.append(absolute.split("#", 1)[0])
+    return links
+
+
+def _fetch_page(url: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Fetch one page (SSRF-guarded, manual redirects) → (title, text)."""
+    current = _assert_public_http_url(url)
+    resp = None
+    for _hop in range(5):
+        resp = httpx.get(
+            current,
+            headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT, "Accept": "text/html,*/*"},
+            timeout=PAGE_TIMEOUT,
+            follow_redirects=False,
+        )
+        if resp.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
+            location = resp.headers.get("location") or ""
+            if not location:
+                break
+            current = _assert_public_http_url(str(httpx.URL(current).join(location)))
+            continue
+        break
+    assert resp is not None
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    ctype = (resp.headers.get("content-type") or "").lower()
+    if "html" not in ctype and "text" not in ctype:
+        raise ToolError(
+            f"Type de contenu non pris en charge: {ctype.split(';')[0] or 'inconnu'}",
+            code="unsupported_content_type",
+        )
+    raw = (resp.content[:MAX_PAGE_BYTES]).decode(resp.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace")
+    title_match = _TITLE_RE.search(raw)
+    import html as html_lib
+
+    title = html_lib.unescape(title_match.group(1)).strip()[:300] if title_match else ""
+    return title, _html_to_text(raw)[:MAX_TEXT_PER_PAGE]
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="crawl_site",
+    description=(
+        "Crawl a small public site (same-host only, max 20 pages) starting at "
+        "a URL and save a Markdown digest (title, url, readable text per page) "
+        "into a vault. Use to capture an online documentation for offline use."
+    ),
+    input_model=CrawlSiteInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def crawl_site(ctx: ToolContext, params: CrawlSiteInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Bounded BFS crawl; writes the digest file and returns a summary."""
+    from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+    from backend.services.mutations import save_raw_file
+
+    start = _assert_public_http_url(params.url.strip())
+    host = urlparse(start).hostname or ""
+    if not host:
+        raise ToolError("URL sans hôte", code="invalid_url")
+
+    queue: list[str] = [start]
+    seen: set[str] = {start}
+    pages: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    total_bytes = 0
+    failures: list[str] = []
+
+    while queue and len(pages) < params.max_pages and total_bytes < MAX_TOTAL_BYTES:
+        url = queue.pop(0)
+        try:
+            title, text = _fetch_page(url)
+        except ToolError as e:
+            failures.append(url)
+            logger.warning("crawl_site page failed %s: %s", url, e.code)
+            continue
+        except httpx.HTTPError as e:
+            failures.append(url)
+            logger.warning("crawl_site page failed %s: %s", url, e)
+            continue
+        pages.append({"url": url, "title": title, "text": text})
+        total_bytes += len(text)
+        if len(pages) >= params.max_pages:
+            break
+        try:
+            raw_resp = httpx.get(
+                url, headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT}, timeout=PAGE_TIMEOUT,
+                follow_redirects=False,
+            )
+            raw = _response_text(raw_resp)
+        except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError):
+            continue
+        for link in _extract_links(raw, url):
+            if len(pages) + len(queue) >= params.max_pages:
+                break
+            if link in seen or not _same_host(link, host):
+                continue
+            try:
+                _assert_public_http_url(link)
+            except ToolError:
+                continue
+            seen.add(link)
+            queue.append(link)
+
+    if not pages:
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Aucune page n'a pu être récupérée pour ce site.",
+            code="crawl_failed",
+        )
+
+    lines = [
+        f"# Crawl de {host}",
+        "",
+        f"> {len(pages)} page(s) capturée(s) depuis {start} — {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M')}",
+        "",
+    ]
+    for page in pages:
+        lines.append(f"## {page['title'] or page['url']}")
+        lines.append("")
+        lines.append(f"Source : {page['url']}")
+        lines.append("")
+        lines.append(page["text"])
+        lines.append("")
+    digest = "\n".join(lines).encode("utf-8")
+    try:
+        saved = save_raw_file(
+            params.vault, params.path, digest, overwrite=True, allow_docs=False
+        )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details) from e
+    return {
+        "url": start,
+        "vault": params.vault,
+        "path": saved.get("path", params.path),
+        "pages": len(pages),
+        "failed": failures[:10],
+        "size": saved.get("size", len(digest)),
+    }

backend/tools/documents.py

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+"""Document-production tools (phase 2 #92) — WRITE, confirmation required.
+
+The assistant can generate real files inside a vault:
+
+* ``create_xlsx`` — spreadsheet (openpyxl);
+* ``create_docx`` — Word document (python-docx);
+* ``create_csv``  — CSV (stdlib);
+* ``create_pdf``  — PDF (reportlab, from markdown-ish content).
+
+Every tool is ``WRITE`` (two-step confirm in the UI / propose-apply over MCP),
+vault-scoped through ``requires_vault`` and saved via the shared mutation
+service (path safety, read-only check, backup on overwrite).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import csv as csv_lib
+import io
+import logging
+import re
+from typing import Any, cast
+
+# saxutils.escape uniquement (échappement de chaînes, aucun parsing XML).
+from xml.sax import saxutils  # nosec B406
+
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+from backend.services.mutations import save_raw_file
+from backend.tools.context import ToolContext, ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import CsvInput, DocxInput, PdfInput, SpreadsheetInput
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.documents")
+
+MAX_PDF_CHARS = 200_000
+MAX_ROWS = 5_000
+
+
+def _save(vault: str, path: str, content: bytes, overwrite: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Shared save helper (maps ServiceError to ToolError)."""
+    try:
+        return save_raw_file(vault, path, content, overwrite=overwrite, allow_docs=True)
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details) from e
+
+
+def _check_rows(rows: list[list[Any]]) -> None:
+    if not rows:
+        raise ToolError("Aucune ligne fournie", code="invalid_arguments")
+    if len(rows) > MAX_ROWS:
+        raise ToolError(
+            f"Trop de lignes ({len(rows)} > {MAX_ROWS})", code="invalid_arguments"
+        )
+
+
+def _check_extension(path: str, expected: str) -> str:
+    """Enforce the document extension; return the normalized path."""
+    path = (path or "").strip()
+    if not path.lower().endswith(expected):
+        raise ToolError(
+            f"Extension attendue : {expected}", code="invalid_arguments"
+        )
+    return path
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="create_xlsx",
+    description=(
+        "Create an .xlsx spreadsheet in a vault from rows of cell values "
+        "(first row = header). Use for tables, budgets, checklists the user "
+        "asked to turn into an Excel file."
+    ),
+    input_model=SpreadsheetInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def create_xlsx(ctx: ToolContext, params: SpreadsheetInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build the workbook with openpyxl and save it into the vault."""
+    from openpyxl import Workbook
+
+    _check_rows(params.rows)
+    path = _check_extension(params.path, ".xlsx")
+    wb = Workbook()
+    ws = wb.active
+    ws.title = params.sheet_name[:31] or "Feuille1"
+    for row in params.rows:
+        ws.append(list(row))
+    buffer = io.BytesIO()
+    wb.save(buffer)
+    return _save(params.vault, path, buffer.getvalue(), params.overwrite)
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="create_docx",
+    description=(
+        "Create a .docx Word document in a vault from an optional title and "
+        "ordered paragraphs. Use for letters, reports, structured drafts."
+    ),
+    input_model=DocxInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def create_docx(ctx: ToolContext, params: DocxInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build the document with python-docx and save it into the vault."""
+    from docx import Document
+
+    if not params.paragraphs:
+        raise ToolError("Aucun paragraphe fourni", code="invalid_arguments")
+    path = _check_extension(params.path, ".docx")
+    doc = Document()
+    if params.title.strip():
+        doc.add_heading(params.title.strip(), level=1)
+    for paragraph in params.paragraphs:
+        doc.add_paragraph(paragraph)
+    buffer = io.BytesIO()
+    doc.save(buffer)
+    return _save(params.vault, path, buffer.getvalue(), params.overwrite)
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="create_csv",
+    description=(
+        "Create a .csv file in a vault from rows of cell values (first row = "
+        "header). Use for flat data exports, simple tables."
+    ),
+    input_model=CsvInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def create_csv(ctx: ToolContext, params: CsvInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the rows and save the CSV into the vault."""
+    _check_rows(params.rows)
+    path = _check_extension(params.path, ".csv")
+    delimiter = params.delimiter if params.delimiter in (",", ";", "\t") else ","
+    buffer = io.StringIO()
+    writer = csv_lib.writer(buffer, delimiter=delimiter, lineterminator="\n")
+    writer.writerows(params.rows)
+    return _save(params.vault, path, buffer.getvalue().encode("utf-8"), params.overwrite)
+
+
+_HEADING_RE = re.compile(r"^(#{1,6})\s+(.*)$")
+
+
+def _markdown_to_flowables(content: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """Split markdown-ish content into (style, text) blocks for reportlab."""
+    blocks: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for raw_line in content.splitlines():
+        line = raw_line.rstrip()
+        if not line.strip():
+            continue
+        heading = _HEADING_RE.match(line)
+        if heading:
+            blocks.append((f"H{min(3, len(heading.group(1)))}", heading.group(2).strip()))
+        else:
+            blocks.append(("P", line.strip()))
+    return blocks
+
+
+def _render_markdown_pdf(content: str, title: str) -> bytes | None:
+    """Render markdown → HTML → PDF through the document-page pipeline.
+
+    Uses the same stack as the « Download PDF » button of the document viewer
+    (mistune with the table plugin + WeasyPrint print CSS), so tables, code
+    blocks and lists are laid out correctly. Returns ``None`` when WeasyPrint
+    is not importable (missing GTK on some hosts) so the caller can fall back
+    to the simplified reportlab renderer.
+    """
+    try:
+        import mistune
+
+        from backend.pdf_export import build_pdf_html, generate_pdf
+
+        renderer = mistune.create_markdown(
+            escape=False,
+            plugins=["table", "strikethrough", "footnotes", "task_lists"],
+        )
+        # mistune 3.3 types `Markdown.__call__` as `str | list[...]` (le
+        # renderer HTML renvoie toujours `str` à l'exécution).
+        html = cast(str, renderer(content))
+        return generate_pdf(build_pdf_html(html, title), title)
+    except Exception as e:
+        # WeasyPrint loads GTK lazily: a missing native library can surface at
+        # import OR render time. Fall back to the simple renderer either way.
+        logger.warning("WeasyPrint pipeline unavailable for create_pdf: %s", e)
+        return None
+
+
+def _render_reportlab_pdf(content: str, title: str) -> bytes:
+    """Fallback renderer (no WeasyPrint): headings + paragraphs, no tables."""
+    from reportlab.lib.pagesizes import A4
+    from reportlab.lib.styles import getSampleStyleSheet
+    from reportlab.platypus import Paragraph, SimpleDocTemplate, Spacer
+
+    styles = getSampleStyleSheet()
+    style_map = {
+        "P": styles["BodyText"],
+        "H1": styles["Heading1"],
+        "H2": styles["Heading2"],
+        "H3": styles["Heading3"],
+    }
+    buffer = io.BytesIO()
+    doc = SimpleDocTemplate(buffer, pagesize=A4, title=title[:200])
+    story: list[Any] = [Paragraph(saxutils.escape(title[:300]), styles["Title"])]
+    for style, line in _markdown_to_flowables(content):
+        story.append(Spacer(1, 4))
+        story.append(Paragraph(saxutils.escape(line), style_map[style]))
+    doc.build(story)
+    return buffer.getvalue()
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="create_pdf",
+    description=(
+        "Create a .pdf document in a vault from markdown content (headings, "
+        "paragraphs, tables, code blocks, lists). Use for printable "
+        "deliverables; tables are laid out like the document-page PDF export."
+    ),
+    input_model=PdfInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def create_pdf(ctx: ToolContext, params: PdfInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Render the content and save the PDF into the vault.
+
+    Primary path: mistune (tables) + WeasyPrint — identical to the viewer's
+    « Download PDF » export. Fallback (WeasyPrint unavailable): simplified
+    reportlab layout without tables.
+    """
+    path = _check_extension(params.path, ".pdf")
+    content = params.content[:MAX_PDF_CHARS]
+    pdf_bytes = _render_markdown_pdf(content, params.title[:300])
+    if pdf_bytes is None:
+        pdf_bytes = _render_reportlab_pdf(content, params.title[:300])
+    return _save(params.vault, path, pdf_bytes, params.overwrite)

backend/tools/duplicates.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"""Duplicate detection & merge tools (#166).
+
+* ``find_duplicates`` — READ, vault-scoped: candidate pairs with scores.
+* ``merge_duplicate_notes`` — DANGEROUS: confirmed fusion with automatic
+  backup (service layer), never without an explicit approval.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from backend.services import duplicates as _duplicates
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+from backend.tools.context import ToolContext, ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import FindDuplicatesInput, MergeDuplicatesInput
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="find_duplicates",
+    description="Find candidate duplicate markdown notes in a vault (similarity scores).",
+    input_model=FindDuplicatesInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def find_duplicates(ctx: ToolContext, params: FindDuplicatesInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """List duplicate candidates ordered by descending score."""
+    try:
+        return _duplicates.find_duplicate_pairs(
+            params.vault,
+            threshold=params.threshold,
+            limit=params.limit,
+            subdir=params.subdir,
+        )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details) from e
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="merge_duplicate_notes",
+    description=(
+        "Merge one note into another and delete the source (backup first). "
+        "Destructive: requires confirmation."
+    ),
+    input_model=MergeDuplicatesInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.DANGEROUS,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def merge_duplicate_notes(ctx: ToolContext, params: MergeDuplicatesInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fuse *source_path* into *target_path* using the chosen strategy."""
+    try:
+        return _duplicates.merge_duplicates(
+            params.vault,
+            params.source_path,
+            params.target_path,
+            strategy=params.strategy,
+        )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details) from e

backend/tools/labels.py

@@ -47,6 +47,28 @@ _STEP_LABELS: dict[str, tuple[str, str | None]] = {
     "restore_backup": ("backup_restore", "path"),
     "web_search": ("web_search", "query"),
     "fetch_url": ("fetch_url", "url"),
+    "crawl_site": ("crawl", "url"),
+    "git_list_repos": ("git_repos", "provider"),
+    "git_search_issues": ("git_issues", "query"),
+    "git_get_file": ("git_file", "path"),
+    "create_xlsx": ("xlsx_create", "path"),
+    "list_xlsx_sheets": ("xlsx_sheets", "path"),
+    "xlsx_to_markdown": ("xlsx_read", "path"),
+    "update_xlsx_cells": ("xlsx_update", "path"),
+    "append_xlsx_rows": ("xlsx_append", "path"),
+    "search_workbook": ("xlsx_search", "query"),
+    "analyze_range": ("xlsx_analyze", "path"),
+    "edit_xlsx_structure": ("xlsx_structure", "path"),
+    "create_docx": ("docx_create", "path"),
+    "create_csv": ("csv_create", "path"),
+    "create_pdf": ("pdf_create", "path"),
+    "find_duplicates": ("duplicates", "vault"),
+    "merge_duplicate_notes": ("duplicates_merge", "source_path"),
+    "notify_external": ("notify", "title"),
+    "create_scheduled_task": ("schedule_create", "name"),
+    "list_scheduled_tasks": ("schedule_list", None),
+    "delete_scheduled_task": ("schedule_delete", "task_id"),
+    "run_scheduled_task_now": ("schedule_run", "task_id"),
 }
 
 GENERIC_KEY = "generic"

backend/tools/notify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"""External notification tool (#168) — Discord, Telegram, SMTP, webhook.
+
+``notify_external`` is WRITE (external side effect → confirmation card in the
+UI, propose/apply over MCP). Delivery itself lives in :mod:`backend.notify`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from backend import notify as _notify
+from backend.tools.context import ToolContext, ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import NotifyExternalInput
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="notify_external",
+    description="Send a notification through external channels (Discord, Telegram, SMTP, webhook).",
+    input_model=NotifyExternalInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+)
+def notify_external(ctx: ToolContext, params: NotifyExternalInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Broadcast to the trigger scope, or target a single channel id."""
+    try:
+        if params.channel_id:
+            channel = next(
+                (c for c in _notify._read_channels() if c.get("id") == params.channel_id),
+                None,
+            )
+            if channel is None:
+                raise ToolError(f"Unknown channel: {params.channel_id}", code="not_found")
+            if not channel.get("enabled", True):
+                raise ToolError(f"Channel disabled: {params.channel_id}", code="invalid_arguments")
+            _notify.send_via_channel(channel, params.title, params.message, params.trigger)
+            return {"ok": True, "channel_id": params.channel_id}
+        results = _notify.broadcast(params.trigger, params.title, params.message)
+        return {"ok": True, "deliveries": results}
+    except ToolError:
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise ToolError(f"Notification failed: {e}", code="notify_failed") from e

backend/tools/registry.py

@@ -117,9 +117,22 @@ def list_tools(*, scope: ToolScope | None = None) -> list[ToolSpec]:
     return specs
 
 
+# ponytail: tool schemas are static after import (registration is decorator
+# only); keying the cache on len(_REGISTRY) invalidates it if a tool is ever
+# registered at runtime. Rebuilding 50 pydantic JSON schemas cost ~27 ms per
+# agent/MCP request.
+_SCHEMAS_CACHE: dict[Any, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+
+
 def get_tool_schemas(*, scope: ToolScope | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    """Return OpenAI-compatible schemas for registered tools."""
-    return [spec.openai_schema() for spec in list_tools(scope=scope)]
+    """Return OpenAI-compatible schemas for registered tools (cached)."""
+    key = (scope, len(_REGISTRY))
+    cached = _SCHEMAS_CACHE.get(key)
+    if cached is None:
+        cached = [spec.openai_schema() for spec in list_tools(scope=scope)]
+        _SCHEMAS_CACHE.clear()
+        _SCHEMAS_CACHE[key] = cached
+    return [dict(s) for s in cached]
 
 
 def _audit(ctx: ToolContext, spec: ToolSpec, arguments: dict[str, Any], *, ok: bool, error: str | None = None) -> None:

backend/tools/scheduled.py

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""Scheduled-task tools (#170) — the agent programs its own cron.
+
+* ``create_scheduled_task`` — WRITE (a future write, confirmed once now).
+* ``list_scheduled_tasks`` — READ.
+* ``delete_scheduled_task`` — WRITE (removes a future side effect).
+* ``run_scheduled_task_now`` — WRITE (immediate side effect).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+from backend import scheduler as _scheduler
+from backend.tools.context import ToolContext, ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import (
+    CreateScheduledTaskInput,
+    DeleteScheduledTaskInput,
+    ListVaultsInput,
+    RunScheduledTaskInput,
+)
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="create_scheduled_task",
+    description="Program an automatic task (create_file, append_to_file, notify) on a cron-like schedule.",
+    input_model=CreateScheduledTaskInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+)
+def create_scheduled_task(ctx: ToolContext, params: CreateScheduledTaskInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Create a task owned by the requesting user."""
+    try:
+        return _scheduler.create_task(
+            params.name,
+            params.action,
+            params.schedule,
+            created_by=ctx.username,
+        )
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise ToolError(str(e), code="invalid_arguments") from e
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="list_scheduled_tasks",
+    description="List automatic tasks programmed in ObsiGate.",
+    input_model=ListVaultsInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+)
+def list_scheduled_tasks(ctx: ToolContext, _params: ListVaultsInput) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return tasks newest first."""
+    return _scheduler.list_tasks()
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="delete_scheduled_task",
+    description="Delete a programmed automatic task.",
+    input_model=DeleteScheduledTaskInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+)
+def delete_scheduled_task(ctx: ToolContext, params: DeleteScheduledTaskInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Delete by id; unknown id is a not_found tool error."""
+    if not _scheduler.delete_task(params.task_id):
+        raise ToolError(f"Unknown task: {params.task_id}", code="not_found")
+    return {"ok": True, "task_id": params.task_id}
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="run_scheduled_task_now",
+    description="Execute a programmed task immediately (manual run).",
+    input_model=RunScheduledTaskInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+)
+def run_scheduled_task_now(ctx: ToolContext, params: RunScheduledTaskInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Run now and return the outcome (failures are recorded + notified)."""
+    try:
+        return _scheduler.run_task(params.task_id, manual=True)
+    except KeyError as e:
+        raise ToolError(f"Unknown task: {params.task_id}", code="not_found") from e

backend/tools/schemas.py

@@ -251,6 +251,241 @@ class FetchUrlInput(BaseModel):
     """Fetch one public web page and return its readable text."""
 
     url: str = Field(..., description="Absolute http(s) URL of a public page")
+    render: bool = Field(
+        False,
+        description="Render JavaScript with the optional Playwright worker (dynamic SPA pages)",
+    )
+
+
+class CrawlSiteInput(BaseModel):
+    """Crawl a small public site (same-host only) and save a digest into a vault."""
+
+    url: str = Field(..., description="Absolute http(s) URL where the crawl starts")
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the digest file to write (.md)")
+    max_pages: int = Field(5, ge=1, le=20, description="Maximum number of pages to crawl")
+
+
+class GitProviderInput(BaseModel):
+    """Base fields for connected-source tools (Gitea / GitHub)."""
+
+    provider: str = Field(..., description="'gitea' (OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL) or 'github'")
+    repo: str = Field("", description="Optional 'owner/name' repository filter")
+    limit: int = Field(20, ge=1, le=50, description="Maximum number of entries")
+
+
+class GitSearchIssuesInput(BaseModel):
+    """Search issues/pull requests on a connected Gitea or GitHub instance."""
+
+    provider: str = Field(..., description="'gitea' or 'github'")
+    query: str = Field(..., min_length=1, description="Search keywords")
+    repo: str = Field("", description="Optional 'owner/name' scope (empty = instance-wide)")
+    state: str = Field("open", description="'open' or 'closed'")
+    limit: int = Field(10, ge=1, le=20, description="Maximum number of issues")
+
+
+class GitGetFileInput(BaseModel):
+    """Read a file from a connected Gitea or GitHub repository."""
+
+    provider: str = Field(..., description="'gitea' or 'github'")
+    repo: str = Field(..., description="'owner/name' repository")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Repository-relative file path")
+    ref: str = Field("", description="Optional branch/tag/commit (empty = default branch)")
+
+
+class SpreadsheetInput(BaseModel):
+    """Create an .xlsx spreadsheet in a vault from rows of cells."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the file to write (.xlsx)")
+    rows: list[list[str | int | float | bool | None]] = Field(
+        ..., description="Rows of cell values (first row = header)"
+    )
+    sheet_name: str = Field("Feuille1", description="Worksheet name")
+    overwrite: bool = Field(True, description="Replace an existing file (with backup)")
+
+
+class DocxInput(BaseModel):
+    """Create a .docx Word document in a vault from paragraphs."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the file to write (.docx)")
+    title: str = Field("", description="Optional document title (heading 1)")
+    paragraphs: list[str] = Field(..., description="Paragraph texts, in order")
+    overwrite: bool = Field(True, description="Replace an existing file (with backup)")
+
+
+class ListXlsxSheetsInput(BaseModel):
+    """List the sheets of an existing .xlsx workbook (#153 A6)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the .xlsx file")
+
+
+class XlsxToMarkdownInput(BaseModel):
+    """Read one sheet of an existing .xlsx workbook as markdown (#153 A6)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the .xlsx file")
+    sheet: str = Field(
+        "", description="Sheet name (empty = the first/active sheet)"
+    )
+
+
+class SearchWorkbookInput(BaseModel):
+    """Find a text across the sheets of a spreadsheet (#156 A14)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(
+        ..., description="Vault-relative path of the file (.xlsx, .xlsm or .csv)"
+    )
+    query: str = Field(..., description="Text to look for")
+    sheet: str = Field("", description="Restrict to one sheet (empty = all sheets)")
+    case_sensitive: bool = Field(False, description="Match case")
+
+
+class AnalyzeRangeInput(BaseModel):
+    """Aggregate the values of an A1 range (#156 A14)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(
+        ..., description="Vault-relative path of the file (.xlsx, .xlsm or .csv)"
+    )
+    sheet: str = Field(
+        "", description="Sheet name (empty = the first/active sheet)"
+    )
+    range: str = Field(
+        "",
+        description="A1 range to analyse (e.g. 'B2:B50'); empty = the whole sheet",
+    )
+
+
+class UpdateXlsxCellsInput(BaseModel):
+    """Batch-edit cells of an existing .xlsx workbook (#153 A6)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the .xlsx file")
+    sheet: str = Field(
+        "", description="Worksheet title to edit (ignored for a .csv)"
+    )
+    cells: dict[str, str | int | float | bool | None] = Field(
+        ..., description="A1 reference -> new value (max 500 per call)"
+    )
+    allow_formula: bool = Field(
+        False,
+        description="Store '='/'@' values as real formulas (off by default, DDE guard)",
+    )
+    force: bool = Field(
+        False,
+        description="Write even when features openpyxl cannot rewrite would be dropped",
+    )
+
+
+class AppendXlsxRowsInput(BaseModel):
+    """Append rows at the end of a sheet of an existing .xlsx (#153 A6)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the .xlsx file")
+    sheet: str = Field(..., description="Worksheet title to extend")
+    rows: list[list[str | int | float | bool | None]] = Field(
+        ..., description="Rows of cell values, appended below the last used row (max 500)"
+    )
+    allow_formula: bool = Field(
+        False,
+        description="Store '='/'@' values as real formulas (off by default, DDE guard)",
+    )
+    force: bool = Field(
+        False,
+        description="Write even when features openpyxl cannot rewrite would be dropped",
+    )
+
+
+class EditXlsxStructureInput(BaseModel):
+    """Structural CRUD on an existing workbook (#156 A14)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the .xlsx/.xlsm file")
+    actions: list[dict[str, Any]] = Field(
+        ...,
+        description=(
+            "Ordered structural actions (1-50): sheet_add/sheet_rename/"
+            "sheet_duplicate/sheet_delete, row_insert/row_delete/"
+            "col_insert/col_delete"
+        ),
+    )
+    force: bool = Field(
+        False,
+        description="Write even when features openpyxl cannot rewrite would be dropped",
+    )
+
+
+class CsvInput(BaseModel):
+    """Create a .csv file in a vault from rows of cells."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the file to write (.csv)")
+    rows: list[list[str | int | float | bool | None]] = Field(
+        ..., description="Rows of cell values (first row = header)"
+    )
+    delimiter: str = Field(",", description="Field separator (',' ';' '\\t')")
+    overwrite: bool = Field(True, description="Replace an existing file (with backup)")
+
+
+class PdfInput(BaseModel):
+    """Create a .pdf document in a vault from markdown-ish content."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the file to write (.pdf)")
+    title: str = Field("Document", description="Document title")
+    content: str = Field(..., description="Content (headings with #/##, then paragraphs)")
+    overwrite: bool = Field(True, description="Replace an existing file (with backup)")
+
+
+class FindDuplicatesInput(BaseModel):
+    """Find candidate duplicate notes in a vault (#166)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    threshold: float = Field(0.75, ge=0.3, le=1.0, description="Minimum similarity score")
+    limit: int = Field(20, ge=1, le=200, description="Maximum number of pairs")
+    subdir: str = Field("", description="Vault-relative directory scope (empty = whole vault)")
+
+
+class MergeDuplicatesInput(BaseModel):
+    """Merge one note into another, then delete the source (#166, destructive)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(..., description="Vault name")
+    source_path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the note to absorb")
+    target_path: str = Field(..., description="Vault-relative path of the surviving note")
+    strategy: str = Field("append", description="'append', 'prefer_target' or 'prefer_source'")
+
+
+class NotifyExternalInput(BaseModel):
+    """Send a notification through external channels (#168)."""
+
+    title: str = Field(..., min_length=1, description="Notification title")
+    message: str = Field(..., min_length=1, description="Notification body")
+    trigger: str = Field("manual", description="Trigger scope: manual, schedule_failure, schedule_success")
+    channel_id: str = Field("", description="Single channel id (empty = broadcast to trigger)")
+
+
+class CreateScheduledTaskInput(BaseModel):
+    """Create an automatic task executed by the scheduler (#170)."""
+
+    name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, description="Task display name")
+    action: dict[str, Any] = Field(..., description="{kind, params} (create_file, append_to_file, notify)")
+    schedule: dict[str, Any] = Field(..., description="{kind, ...} (interval_hours, daily_time, once_at)")
+
+
+class DeleteScheduledTaskInput(BaseModel):
+    """Delete a scheduled task by id (#170)."""
+
+    task_id: str = Field(..., min_length=1, description="Task id")
+
+
+class RunScheduledTaskInput(BaseModel):
+    """Execute a scheduled task immediately (#170)."""
+
+    task_id: str = Field(..., min_length=1, description="Task id")
 
 
 class ToolResult(BaseModel):

backend/tools/secrets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+"""Tool-layer secrets — user-configured tokens & API keys (#103).
+
+The connected-source (Gitea / GitHub) and keyed web-search (Tavily, Brave,
+SerpAPI, Exa) tools read their credentials through this module instead of
+``os.environ`` directly. The value comes from the store the user edits in the
+configuration page (``data/api_keys.json`` — the same file the AI provider
+keys use) first, then falls back to the environment (Infisical-injected in
+production). Nothing is ever hard-coded and no tool result carries a secret
+(the registry redacts payloads).
+
+Allowed names are whitelisted: only the variables below can be stored or
+deleted from the configuration page.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.secrets")
+
+# Whitelisted configuration names (config page « Sources connectées & recherche »).
+TOOL_KEY_NAMES: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY",
+    "OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY",
+    "OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY",
+    "OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY",
+    "OBSIGATE_GITEA_URL",
+    "OBSIGATE_GITEA_TOKEN",
+    "OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN",
+)
+
+_SECRET_MARKERS = ("API_KEY", "TOKEN")
+
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour des read-modify-write du store de clés.
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+
+def _keys_file() -> Path:
+    base = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR", "data")
+    return Path(base) / "api_keys.json"
+
+
+def _read_keys() -> dict:
+    path = _keys_file()
+    if not path.exists():
+        return {}
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
+        logger.warning("tool key store unreadable (%s): %s", path, e)
+        return {}
+    return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+
+
+def _write_keys(data: dict) -> None:
+    path = _keys_file()
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(path)
+
+
+def is_secret_name(name: str) -> bool:
+    """True for API keys / tokens (masked in API responses); URLs are clear."""
+    return any(marker in name for marker in _SECRET_MARKERS)
+
+
+def mask_value(name: str, value: str) -> str:
+    """Mask a secret for display; non-secret values (URLs) are returned as-is."""
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    if not is_secret_name(name):
+        return value
+    return value[:4] + "..." + value[-4:] if len(value) > 8 else "***"
+
+
+def get_tool_key(name: str) -> str:
+    """Stored (configuration page) value first, then environment fallback."""
+    if name not in TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+        return os.environ.get(name, "").strip()
+    stored = _read_keys().get(name)
+    if isinstance(stored, str) and stored.strip():
+        return stored.strip()
+    return os.environ.get(name, "").strip()
+
+
+def set_tool_key(name: str, value: str) -> None:
+    """Persist one whitelisted key into the store (admin configuration page)."""
+    if name not in TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+        raise ValueError(f"Clé non prise en charge: {name}")
+    value = (value or "").strip()
+    with _lock:
+        keys = _read_keys()
+        if value:
+            keys[name] = value
+        else:
+            keys.pop(name, None)
+        _write_keys(keys)
+
+
+def delete_tool_key(name: str) -> bool:
+    """Remove one key from the store; return True when it existed."""
+    if name not in TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+        raise ValueError(f"Clé non prise en charge: {name}")
+    with _lock:
+        keys = _read_keys()
+        if name in keys:
+            del keys[name]
+            _write_keys(keys)
+            return True
+    return False

backend/tools/spreadsheets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+"""Spreadsheet tools (#153 A6, #156 A14) — read and mutate existing workbooks.
+
+Complements :mod:`backend.tools.documents` (``create_xlsx`` creates a *new*
+file; here the assistant can read and edit one that already exists). The same
+three formats the viewer edits are supported — ``.xlsx``, ``.xlsm`` and
+``.csv`` (#156-A14 used to be ``.xlsx`` only, which made a workbook the UI
+edits invisible to the assistant):
+
+* ``list_xlsx_sheets``    — READ, sheet names + dimensions;
+* ``xlsx_to_markdown``    — READ, bounded markdown table for the LLM context;
+* ``search_workbook``     — READ, find text across every sheet (#156-A14);
+* ``analyze_range``       — READ, aggregate stats over an A1 range (#156-A14);
+* ``update_xlsx_cells``   — WRITE, batch cell edits (guarded service);
+* ``append_xlsx_rows``    — WRITE, append whole rows at the end of a sheet;
+* ``edit_xlsx_structure`` — WRITE, structural CRUD (sheets/rows/columns).
+
+Mutation tools go through :func:`backend.services.mutations.edit_xlsx_cells`
+(or ``save_csv_cells`` / ``mutate_xlsx_structure``), which already carry the
+#153 P0 guards: per-file lock, atomic replace, formula neutralisation
+(``allow_formula`` opt-in) and the lossy-write 409. Every write is a WRITE-risk
+tool, so the registry keeps asking for an explicit confirmation.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.vaults import get_vault_root
+from backend.tools.context import ToolContext, ToolError, ToolRisk
+from backend.tools.registry import tool
+from backend.tools.schemas import (
+    AnalyzeRangeInput,
+    AppendXlsxRowsInput,
+    EditXlsxStructureInput,
+    ListXlsxSheetsInput,
+    SearchWorkbookInput,
+    UpdateXlsxCellsInput,
+    XlsxToMarkdownInput,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.spreadsheets")
+
+# xlsx_to_markdown ceiling: a workbook is a data dump, not prose. The table is
+# for the LLM context, so both axes are bounded (same spirit as A5's index cap).
+MAX_MD_ROWS = 100
+MAX_MD_COLS = 20
+MAX_MD_CHARS = 20_000
+
+# #156-A14 — the newer read tools scan more than the markdown table (a search
+# or an aggregate must not stop at row 100) but stay bounded all the same:
+# a runaway scan would load a whole ledger into the model's context.
+MAX_SCAN_ROWS = 5_000
+MAX_SCAN_COLS = 100
+MAX_SEARCH_RESULTS = 100
+MAX_RANGE_CELLS = 10_000
+MAX_RANGE_VALUES = 200
+
+# The formats the spreadsheet editor (and now the assistant) can handle.
+SPREADSHEET_EXTENSIONS = (".xlsx", ".xlsm", ".csv")
+
+_NUMBER_RE = re.compile(r"^-?\d+(?:[.,]\d+)?$")
+
+
+def _spreadsheet_path(vault: str, path: str) -> Path:
+    """Resolve and validate a vault-relative ``.xlsx``/``.xlsm``/``.csv`` path."""
+    path = (path or "").strip()
+    if not path.lower().endswith(SPREADSHEET_EXTENSIONS):
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Extension attendue : .xlsx, .xlsm ou .csv", code="invalid_arguments"
+        )
+    try:
+        root = get_vault_root(vault)
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details) from e
+    return resolve_safe_path(root, path)
+
+
+def _is_csv(file_path: Path) -> bool:
+    return file_path.suffix.lower() == ".csv"
+
+
+def _map_service_error(e: ServiceError) -> ToolError:
+    return ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details)
+
+
+def _sheet_titles(file_path: Path) -> list[str]:
+    """Sheet names of a workbook; a CSV has a single, unnamed “sheet”."""
+    if _is_csv(file_path):
+        return [""]
+    from openpyxl import load_workbook
+
+    wb = load_workbook(str(file_path), read_only=True, data_only=True)
+    try:
+        return list(wb.sheetnames)
+    finally:
+        wb.close()
+
+
+def _read_grid(
+    file_path: Path, sheet: str, max_rows: int, max_cols: int
+) -> tuple[str, list[list[str]], bool]:
+    """Read one sheet (or a CSV) as bounded, formatted, trimmed rows.
+
+    Returns ``(title, rows, truncated)``; ``truncated`` is True when real data
+    sits just beyond the row cap (probed one row further) so the caller can say
+    so instead of silently dropping it.
+    """
+    from openpyxl import load_workbook
+
+    from backend.xlsx_reader import _fmt
+
+    if _is_csv(file_path):
+        import csv as csv_mod
+        import io as io_mod
+
+        from backend.xlsx_reader import sniff_csv_delimiter
+
+        stem = file_path.stem
+        if sheet and sheet != stem:
+            raise ToolError(f"Feuille introuvable: {sheet}", code="not_found")
+        raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig", errors="replace")
+        reader = csv_mod.reader(io_mod.StringIO(raw), delimiter=sniff_csv_delimiter(raw))
+        grid: list[list[str]] = []
+        truncated = False
+        for i, row in enumerate(reader):
+            if i >= max_rows:
+                truncated = any(str(c).strip() for c in row)
+                break
+            grid.append([str(c) for c in row][:max_cols])
+        while grid and not any(c.strip() for c in grid[-1]):
+            grid.pop()
+        return stem, grid, truncated
+
+    try:
+        wb = load_workbook(str(file_path), read_only=True, data_only=True)
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise _map_service_error(e) from e
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise ToolError(f"Classeur illisible: {e}", code="invalid") from e
+    try:
+        if sheet:
+            if sheet not in wb.sheetnames:
+                raise ToolError(f"Feuille introuvable: {sheet}", code="not_found")
+            ws = wb[sheet]
+        else:
+            ws = wb.active
+        title = ws.title
+        grid = []
+        for row in ws.iter_rows(
+            min_row=1, max_row=max_rows, max_col=max_cols, values_only=True
+        ):
+            grid.append([_fmt(v) for v in row])
+        probe = list(
+            ws.iter_rows(
+                min_row=max_rows + 1,
+                max_row=max_rows + 1,
+                max_col=max_cols,
+                values_only=True,
+            )
+        )
+        truncated = any(any(str(v or "").strip() for v in r) for r in probe)
+    finally:
+        wb.close()
+    while grid and not any(c.strip() for c in grid[-1]):
+        grid.pop()
+    return title, grid, truncated
+
+
+def _to_number(text: str) -> float | None:
+    """Coerce a displayed cell to a float, or ``None`` when it is not one."""
+    t = text.strip().replace("\u00a0", "").replace(" ", "")
+    if not _NUMBER_RE.match(t):
+        return None
+    try:
+        return float(t.replace(",", "."))
+    except ValueError:  # pragma: no cover - regex already guarantees the shape
+        return None
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="list_xlsx_sheets",
+    description=(
+        "List the sheets of a spreadsheet (.xlsx, .xlsm or .csv) with their "
+        "dimensions (rows x columns) and whether the display caps truncate "
+        "them. Use before editing to pick the right sheet name."
+    ),
+    input_model=ListXlsxSheetsInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def list_xlsx_sheets(ctx: ToolContext, params: ListXlsxSheetsInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return sheet names and extents of the workbook (or of the CSV)."""
+    from backend.xlsx_reader import MAX_COLS, MAX_ROWS
+
+    file_path = _spreadsheet_path(params.vault, params.path)
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        raise ToolError(f"Fichier introuvable: {params.path}", code="not_found")
+
+    extents: list[tuple[str, int, int]] = []
+    if _is_csv(file_path):
+        _, rows, _ = _read_grid(file_path, "", MAX_SCAN_ROWS, MAX_SCAN_COLS)
+        extents.append(
+            (
+                file_path.stem,
+                len(rows),
+                max((len(r) for r in rows), default=0),
+            )
+        )
+    else:
+        # Declared dimensions are enough here (and far cheaper than scanning
+        # every row): the caller just needs a size to decide what to read.
+        from openpyxl import load_workbook
+
+        from backend.xlsx_reader import _sheet_extent
+
+        try:
+            wb = load_workbook(str(file_path), read_only=True, data_only=True)
+        except ServiceError as e:
+            raise _map_service_error(e) from e
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise ToolError(f"Classeur illisible: {e}", code="invalid") from e
+        try:
+            extents = [
+                (ws.title, *_sheet_extent(ws)) for ws in wb.worksheets
+            ]
+        finally:
+            wb.close()
+
+    sheets = [
+        {
+            "name": name,
+            "total_rows": total_rows,
+            "total_cols": total_cols,
+            "truncated": total_rows > MAX_ROWS or total_cols > MAX_COLS,
+        }
+        for name, total_rows, total_cols in extents
+    ]
+    return {"vault": params.vault, "path": params.path, "sheets": sheets}
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="xlsx_to_markdown",
+    description=(
+        "Read a sheet of a spreadsheet (.xlsx, .xlsm or .csv) as a bounded "
+        "markdown table (up to 100 rows x 20 columns). Use to inspect "
+        "spreadsheet data before answering or editing."
+    ),
+    input_model=XlsxToMarkdownInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def xlsx_to_markdown(ctx: ToolContext, params: XlsxToMarkdownInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Render one sheet as a markdown table for the LLM context."""
+    file_path = _spreadsheet_path(params.vault, params.path)
+    title, rows, truncated = _read_grid(file_path, params.sheet, MAX_MD_ROWS, MAX_MD_COLS)
+
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    if rows:
+        header = rows[0]
+        lines.append("| " + " | ".join(header) + " |")
+        lines.append("|" + "|".join("---" for _ in header) + "|")
+        for row in rows[1:]:
+            lines.append("| " + " | ".join(row) + " |")
+    table = "\n".join(lines)[:MAX_MD_CHARS]
+
+    return {
+        "vault": params.vault,
+        "path": params.path,
+        "sheet": title,
+        "rows": len(rows),
+        "cols": max((len(r) for r in rows), default=0),
+        "truncated": truncated,
+        "markdown": table,
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="search_workbook",
+    description=(
+        "Search a text across every sheet of a spreadsheet (.xlsx, .xlsm or "
+        ".csv) and return the matching cells with their sheet and A1 "
+        "reference (max 100 matches). Use it to find where a value lives "
+        "without dumping whole sheets into the context."
+    ),
+    input_model=SearchWorkbookInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def search_workbook(ctx: ToolContext, params: SearchWorkbookInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Find a needle across all sheets, bounded and counted per sheet."""
+    from openpyxl.utils import get_column_letter
+
+    file_path = _spreadsheet_path(params.vault, params.path)
+    needle = (params.query or "").strip()
+    if not needle:
+        raise ToolError("Requête vide", code="invalid_arguments")
+
+    titles = _sheet_titles(file_path)
+    if params.sheet:
+        if params.sheet not in titles:
+            raise ToolError(f"Feuille introuvable: {params.sheet}", code="not_found")
+        titles = [params.sheet]
+
+    hay = needle if params.case_sensitive else needle.lower()
+    matches: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    by_sheet: dict[str, int] = {}
+    total = 0
+    for title in titles:
+        sheet_title, rows, _ = _read_grid(
+            file_path, title, MAX_SCAN_ROWS, MAX_SCAN_COLS
+        )
+        label = sheet_title or file_path.stem
+        for r_i, row in enumerate(rows, start=1):
+            for c_i, value in enumerate(row, start=1):
+                if not value:
+                    continue
+                haystack = value if params.case_sensitive else value.lower()
+                if hay not in haystack:
+                    continue
+                total += 1
+                by_sheet[label] = by_sheet.get(label, 0) + 1
+                if len(matches) < MAX_SEARCH_RESULTS:
+                    matches.append(
+                        {
+                            "sheet": label,
+                            "cell": f"{get_column_letter(c_i)}{r_i}",
+                            "value": value,
+                        }
+                    )
+    return {
+        "vault": params.vault,
+        "path": params.path,
+        "query": needle,
+        "total": total,
+        "truncated": total > MAX_SEARCH_RESULTS,
+        "by_sheet": by_sheet,
+        "matches": matches,
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="analyze_range",
+    description=(
+        "Aggregate an A1 range of a sheet (.xlsx, .xlsm or .csv): count, sum, "
+        "mean, min and max of the numeric cells, plus a bounded sample of the "
+        "values. Use it to answer a question about a column without reading "
+        "the whole sheet."
+    ),
+    input_model=AnalyzeRangeInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.READ,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def analyze_range(ctx: ToolContext, params: AnalyzeRangeInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Numeric aggregates + value sample over an A1 range of the sheet."""
+    from openpyxl.utils.cell import range_boundaries
+
+    file_path = _spreadsheet_path(params.vault, params.path)
+    title, rows, _ = _read_grid(file_path, params.sheet, MAX_SCAN_ROWS, MAX_SCAN_COLS)
+
+    label = (params.range or "").strip()
+    if label:
+        try:
+            min_col, min_row, max_col, max_row = range_boundaries(label.upper())
+        except Exception as e:
+            raise ToolError(f"Plage invalide: {label}", code="invalid_arguments") from e
+        if (max_row - min_row + 1) * (max_col - min_col + 1) > MAX_RANGE_CELLS:
+            raise ToolError(
+                f"Plage trop grande (max {MAX_RANGE_CELLS} cellules)",
+                code="invalid_arguments",
+            )
+        selected = [row[min_col - 1 : max_col] for row in rows[min_row - 1 : max_row]]
+    else:
+        selected = rows
+
+    values = [v for row in selected for v in row if isinstance(v, str) and v.strip()]
+    numbers = [n for n in (_to_number(v) for v in values) if n is not None]
+
+    stats: dict[str, Any] = {"count": len(numbers)}
+    if numbers:
+        stats.update(
+            {
+                "sum": round(sum(numbers), 6),
+                "mean": round(sum(numbers) / len(numbers), 6),
+                "min": min(numbers),
+                "max": max(numbers),
+            }
+        )
+    return {
+        "vault": params.vault,
+        "path": params.path,
+        "sheet": title,
+        "range": params.range or "",
+        "rows": len(selected),
+        "cols": max((len(r) for r in selected), default=0),
+        "cells": len(values),
+        "numeric": stats,
+        "values": values[:MAX_RANGE_VALUES],
+        "truncated": len(values) > MAX_RANGE_VALUES,
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="update_xlsx_cells",
+    description=(
+        "Edit cells of an existing spreadsheet (.xlsx, .xlsm or .csv). "
+        "``cells`` maps A1 references to new values (max 500). A value "
+        "starting with '=' or '@' is stored as TEXT unless allow_formula is "
+        "set (DDE guard). Editing a workbook carrying features openpyxl "
+        "cannot rewrite requires force=true (cached formula results, "
+        "slicers…). A .csv has no sheet: any ``sheet`` value is ignored."
+    ),
+    input_model=UpdateXlsxCellsInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def update_xlsx_cells(ctx: ToolContext, params: UpdateXlsxCellsInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Wrap the guarded cell-edit service (``.xlsx``/``.xlsm`` or ``.csv``)."""
+    from backend.services.mutations import edit_xlsx_cells, save_csv_cells
+
+    file_path = _spreadsheet_path(params.vault, params.path)
+    if not params.cells:
+        raise ToolError("Aucune cellule fournie", code="invalid_arguments")
+    if not _is_csv(file_path) and not params.sheet:
+        raise ToolError("Feuille requise pour un classeur", code="invalid_arguments")
+    try:
+        if _is_csv(file_path):
+            result = save_csv_cells(params.vault, params.path, dict(params.cells))
+        else:
+            result = edit_xlsx_cells(
+                params.vault,
+                params.path,
+                params.sheet,
+                dict(params.cells),
+                allow_formula=params.allow_formula,
+                force=params.force,
+            )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise _map_service_error(e) from e
+    return {
+        "status": "ok",
+        "vault": result["vault"],
+        "path": result["path"],
+        "sheet": params.sheet,
+        "cells": len(params.cells),
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="append_xlsx_rows",
+    description=(
+        "Append rows at the end of a sheet of an existing spreadsheet "
+        "(.xlsx or .xlsm). Values are typed like in the viewer (numbers, "
+        "TRUE/FALSE, FR dates JJ/MM/AAAA). The workbook is rewritten "
+        "atomically with a backup. Not available for .csv."
+    ),
+    input_model=AppendXlsxRowsInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def append_xlsx_rows(ctx: ToolContext, params: AppendXlsxRowsInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Append whole rows below the last used row of the sheet."""
+    from openpyxl import load_workbook
+    from openpyxl.utils import get_column_letter
+
+    from backend.services.mutations import _coerce_xlsx_value, edit_xlsx_cells
+
+    if not params.rows:
+        raise ToolError("Aucune ligne fournie", code="invalid_arguments")
+    if len(params.rows) > 500:
+        raise ToolError("Trop de lignes (max 500)", code="invalid_arguments")
+
+    file_path = _spreadsheet_path(params.vault, params.path)
+    if _is_csv(file_path):
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Un .csv n'a pas de notion de fin de feuille : utilisez "
+            "update_xlsx_cells avec des références A1",
+            code="invalid_arguments",
+        )
+    try:
+        wb = load_workbook(str(file_path), read_only=True, data_only=True)
+        try:
+            if params.sheet not in wb.sheetnames:
+                raise ToolError(
+                    f"Feuille introuvable: {params.sheet}", code="not_found"
+                )
+            ws = wb[params.sheet]
+            first_free = (ws.max_row or 0) + 1
+        finally:
+            wb.close()
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise _map_service_error(e) from e
+    except ToolError:
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise ToolError(f"Classeur illisible: {e}", code="invalid") from e
+
+    cells: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for i, row in enumerate(params.rows):
+        for j, value in enumerate(row):
+            if value is None or (isinstance(value, str) and not value.strip()):
+                continue
+            ref = f"{get_column_letter(j + 1)}{first_free + i}"
+            cells[ref] = _coerce_xlsx_value(value)
+    if not cells:
+        raise ToolError("Aucune valeur fournie", code="invalid_arguments")
+
+    try:
+        result = edit_xlsx_cells(
+            params.vault,
+            params.path,
+            params.sheet,
+            cells,
+            allow_formula=params.allow_formula,
+            force=params.force,
+        )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise _map_service_error(e) from e
+    return {
+        "status": "ok",
+        "vault": result["vault"],
+        "path": result["path"],
+        "sheet": params.sheet,
+        "rows": len(params.rows),
+        "first_row": first_free,
+    }
+
+
+@tool(
+    name="edit_xlsx_structure",
+    description=(
+        "Change the structure of an existing .xlsx/.xlsm workbook: add, "
+        "rename, duplicate or delete a sheet, or insert/delete rows and "
+        "columns. ``actions`` is an ordered list of "
+        '{"op": "sheet_add"|"sheet_rename"|"sheet_duplicate"|"sheet_delete"|'
+        '"row_insert"|"row_delete"|"col_insert"|"col_delete", …} '
+        "(1 to 50). Deletions drop data and cannot be undone from the "
+        "assistant — confirm with the user first."
+    ),
+    input_model=EditXlsxStructureInput,
+    risk=ToolRisk.WRITE,
+    requires_vault=True,
+)
+def edit_xlsx_structure(
+    ctx: ToolContext, params: EditXlsxStructureInput
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Apply a batch of structural changes through the guarded service."""
+    from backend.services.mutations import mutate_xlsx_structure
+
+    if not params.actions:
+        raise ToolError("Aucune action fournie", code="invalid_arguments")
+    if len(params.actions) > 50:
+        raise ToolError("Trop d'actions (max 50)", code="invalid_arguments")
+    if str(params.path or "").lower().endswith(".csv"):
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Un .csv n'a pas de structure modifiable", code="invalid_arguments"
+        )
+    try:
+        result = mutate_xlsx_structure(
+            params.vault, params.path, [dict(a) for a in params.actions], force=params.force
+        )
+    except ServiceError as e:
+        raise _map_service_error(e) from e
+    return {
+        "status": "ok",
+        "vault": result["vault"],
+        "path": result["path"],
+        "actions": len(params.actions),
+    }

backend/tools/web.py

@@ -8,6 +8,16 @@ Phase 1 of the documented web-toolset roadmap:
   answering « je n'ai pas accès à internet ».
 * ``fetch_url``   — retrieve a public web page and return readable text.
 
+Phase 2 (#92) additions:
+
+* keyed providers — Tavily, Brave Search, SerpAPI and Exa are used first when
+  their API key is configured (env, injected by Infisical in production);
+* SQLite cache — search/fetch results are cached with a TTL
+  (:mod:`backend.tools.webcache`);
+* retry with backoff — transient network errors get one extra attempt;
+* dynamic rendering — ``fetch_url(render=True)`` uses an isolated Playwright
+  worker (optional dependency, graceful degradation).
+
 All are READ-risk tools (no confirmation), rate-limited through the shared
 registry, SSRF-guarded (scheme + private-address rejection), and size-capped.
 
@@ -16,6 +26,14 @@ Configuration (environment):
 * ``OBSIGATE_WEB_TIMEOUT``   — seconds, default 10
 * ``OBSIGATE_WEB_FALLBACK``  — ``0``/``false`` disables the keyless HTML
   fallbacks (SearXNG only), default enabled
+* ``OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY`` / ``OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY`` /
+  ``OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY`` / ``OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY`` — optional keyed
+  providers, tried before SearXNG when set
+* ``OBSIGATE_WEB_PROVIDERS`` — optional comma-separated provider order
+  (e.g. ``brave,searxng``); keyed providers without a key are skipped
+* ``OBSIGATE_WEB_RETRY``     — extra attempts for transient network errors
+  (default 1)
+* ``OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_TTL`` — cache TTL seconds, ``0`` disables (default 900)
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -28,15 +46,18 @@ import logging
 import os
 import re
 import socket
+import time
 from collections.abc import Callable
 from typing import Any
 from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
 
 import httpx
 
+from backend.tools import webcache
 from backend.tools.context import ToolError, ToolRisk, ToolScope
 from backend.tools.registry import tool
 from backend.tools.schemas import FetchUrlInput, WebSearchInput
+from backend.tools.secrets import get_tool_key
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.web")
 
@@ -48,6 +69,7 @@ WEB_FALLBACK_ENABLED = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEB_FALLBACK", "1").strip().lowe
     "no",
     "off",
 }
+WEB_RETRY_ATTEMPTS = int(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEB_RETRY", "1"))
 USER_AGENT = "ObsiGateAssistant/1.0 (+self-hosted vault AI)"
 # Search engines reject non-browser agents on their public HTML endpoints.
 BROWSER_UA = (
@@ -163,6 +185,115 @@ def _result(
     }
 
 
+def _with_retry(call: Callable[[], Any]) -> Any:
+    """Run *call* with one extra attempt on transient network errors.
+
+    House-made backoff (the roadmap's « tenacity ou boucle maison »): DNS
+    blips and rate-limit hiccups are the common failure mode, and a single
+    retry keeps the fallback chain from being consumed too early.
+    """
+    for attempt in range(1 + max(0, WEB_RETRY_ATTEMPTS)):
+        try:
+            return call()
+        except httpx.TransportError:
+            if attempt >= max(0, WEB_RETRY_ATTEMPTS):
+                raise
+            time.sleep(0.2 * (attempt + 1))
+    raise RuntimeError("unreachable")  # pragma: no cover
+
+
+def _env_key(name: str) -> str:
+    """Read an API key: configuration-page store first, then environment."""
+    return get_tool_key(name)
+
+
+def _search_tavily(query: str, params: WebSearchInput) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]:
+    """Tavily Search API (agent-oriented results, key required)."""
+    resp = httpx.post(
+        "https://api.tavily.com/search",
+        json={
+            "api_key": _env_key("OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY"),
+            "query": query,
+            "max_results": params.max_results,
+            "search_depth": "basic",
+            "include_answer": False,
+        },
+        headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
+        timeout=WEB_TIMEOUT,
+    )
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    data = resp.json()
+    return [
+        _result(item.get("title") or "", item.get("url") or "", item.get("content") or "")
+        for item in (data.get("results") or [])
+    ], []
+
+
+def _search_brave(query: str, params: WebSearchInput) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]:
+    """Brave Search API (key required)."""
+    resp = httpx.get(
+        "https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search",
+        params={"q": query, "count": params.max_results, "safesearch": "moderate"},
+        headers={
+            "X-Subscription-Id": _env_key("OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY"),
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
+        },
+        timeout=WEB_TIMEOUT,
+    )
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    data = resp.json()
+    return [
+        _result(item.get("title") or "", item.get("url") or "", item.get("description") or "")
+        for item in ((data.get("web") or {}).get("results") or [])
+    ], []
+
+
+def _search_serpapi(query: str, params: WebSearchInput) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]:
+    """SerpAPI (Google SERP, key required)."""
+    resp = httpx.get(
+        "https://serpapi.com/search",
+        params={"q": query, "api_key": _env_key("OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY"),
+                "num": params.max_results},
+        headers={"User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
+        timeout=WEB_TIMEOUT,
+    )
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    data = resp.json()
+    return [
+        _result(item.get("title") or "", item.get("link") or "", item.get("snippet") or "")
+        for item in (data.get("organic_results") or [])
+    ], []
+
+
+def _search_exa(query: str, params: WebSearchInput) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]:
+    """Exa neural search (key required)."""
+    resp = httpx.post(
+        "https://api.exa.ai/search",
+        json={"query": query, "numResults": params.max_results},
+        headers={
+            "x-api-key": _env_key("OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY"),
+            "User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
+        },
+        timeout=WEB_TIMEOUT,
+    )
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    data = resp.json()
+    return [
+        _result(item.get("title") or "", item.get("url") or "", (item.get("text") or "")[:600])
+        for item in (data.get("results") or [])
+    ], []
+
+
+# Keyed providers: name -> (implementation, API key env var)
+_KEYED_PROVIDERS: dict[str, tuple[_Provider, str]] = {
+    "tavily": (_search_tavily, "OBSIGATE_TAVILY_API_KEY"),
+    "brave": (_search_brave, "OBSIGATE_BRAVE_API_KEY"),
+    "serpapi": (_search_serpapi, "OBSIGATE_SERPAPI_API_KEY"),
+    "exa": (_search_exa, "OBSIGATE_EXA_API_KEY"),
+}
+
+
 def _search_searxng(
     query: str, params: WebSearchInput
 ) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]:
@@ -288,8 +419,22 @@ _Provider = Callable[[str, WebSearchInput], "tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[st
 
 
 def _provider_chain() -> list[tuple[str, _Provider]]:
-    """Ordered providers: self-hosted meta-search first, then keyless fallbacks."""
-    chain: list[tuple[str, _Provider]] = [("searxng", _search_searxng)]
+    """Ordered providers: keyed APIs first, then self-hosted, then keyless.
+
+    ``OBSIGATE_WEB_PROVIDERS`` (comma-separated) overrides the default order;
+    unknown names are ignored and keyed providers without their key are skipped.
+    """
+    chain: list[tuple[str, _Provider]] = []
+    configured = [
+        name.strip().lower()
+        for name in os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEB_PROVIDERS", "").split(",")
+        if name.strip()
+    ]
+    for name in configured or list(_KEYED_PROVIDERS):
+        entry = _KEYED_PROVIDERS.get(name)
+        if entry and _env_key(entry[1]):
+            chain.append((name, entry[0]))
+    chain.append(("searxng", _search_searxng))
     if WEB_FALLBACK_ENABLED:
         chain.append(("duckduckgo", _search_duckduckgo))
         chain.append(("bing", _search_bing))
@@ -313,6 +458,17 @@ def web_search(ctx, params: WebSearchInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
     if not query:
         raise ToolError("Requête vide", code="invalid_arguments")
 
+    key = webcache.cache_key("search", {
+        "q": query,
+        "max_results": params.max_results,
+        "category": params.category,
+        "language": params.language,
+        "page": params.page,
+    })
+    cached = webcache.cache_get(key)
+    if cached is not None:
+        return {**cached, "cached": True}
+
     attempts: list[str] = []
     unresponsive: list[str] = []
     reachable = False
@@ -320,8 +476,12 @@ def web_search(ctx, params: WebSearchInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
 
     for name, provider in _provider_chain():
         attempts.append(name)
+
+        def _attempt(p: _Provider = provider) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[str]]:
+            return p(query, params)
+
         try:
-            results, engines = provider(query, params)
+            results, engines = _with_retry(_attempt)
         except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError, AttributeError) as e:
             logger.warning("web_search provider %s failed: %s", name, e)
             last_error = e
@@ -338,6 +498,7 @@ def web_search(ctx, params: WebSearchInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
             }
             if unresponsive:
                 payload["unresponsive_engines"] = unresponsive[:8]
+            webcache.cache_set(key, payload)
             return payload
 
     if not reachable:
@@ -378,6 +539,20 @@ def web_search(ctx, params: WebSearchInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
 def fetch_url(ctx, params: FetchUrlInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Retrieve one page, guard against SSRF, and extract its text."""
     url = _assert_public_http_url(params.url.strip())
+    key = webcache.cache_key("fetch", {"url": url, "render": params.render})
+    cached = webcache.cache_get(key)
+    if cached is not None:
+        return {**cached, "cached": True}
+
+    if params.render:
+        # Dynamic pages (SPA/React): delegated to the isolated Playwright
+        # worker; the browser dependency stays optional (graceful error).
+        from backend.tools.webrender import render_page
+
+        payload = render_page(url)
+        webcache.cache_set(key, payload)
+        return payload
+
     try:
         # Follow redirects manually so every hop is re-checked against the
         # private-address SSRF guard (a public page can redirect to 127.0.0.1).
@@ -414,10 +589,12 @@ def fetch_url(ctx, params: FetchUrlInput) -> dict[str, Any]:
     title_match = re.search(r"<title[^>]*>(.*?)</title>", raw, re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
     title = html_lib.unescape(title_match.group(1)).strip()[:300] if title_match else ""
     text = _html_to_text(raw)[:MAX_TEXT_CHARS]
-    return {
+    payload = {
         "url": str(resp.url),
         "status": resp.status_code,
         "title": title,
         "text": text,
         "truncated": len(raw) > MAX_TEXT_CHARS,
     }
+    webcache.cache_set(key, payload)
+    return payload

backend/tools/webcache.py

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+"""SQLite cache for web tool results (search results, fetched pages).
+
+Phase 2 of the web-toolset roadmap (« Transverse »): repeated web searches and
+page fetches (common in agent loops, where the model re-reads a source) must
+not hammer the providers. Results are cached in a dedicated SQLite table with
+a TTL; the cache is best-effort — any error silently disables it so a broken
+database file never takes the assistant down.
+
+Configuration (environment):
+* ``OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR``        — base data directory (default ``data``)
+* ``OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_PATH``  — explicit cache file override
+* ``OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_TTL``   — seconds, ``0`` disables the cache (default 900)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.webcache")
+
+DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 900
+_schema_ready = False
+_write_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def ttl_seconds() -> float:
+    """Configured TTL in seconds (``0`` = cache disabled)."""
+    return float(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_TTL", str(DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS)))
+
+
+def _cache_path() -> Path:
+    override = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEB_CACHE_PATH", "").strip()
+    if override:
+        return Path(override)
+    return Path(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR", "data")) / "web_cache.sqlite3"
+
+
+def _connect() -> sqlite3.Connection:
+    """Open (and lazily create) the cache database."""
+    global _schema_ready
+    path = _cache_path()
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=5, check_same_thread=False)
+    if not _schema_ready:
+        conn.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS web_cache ("
+            "key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL, created REAL NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+        _schema_ready = True
+    return conn
+
+
+def cache_key(prefix: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Deterministic cache key from a prefix and the normalized arguments."""
+    raw = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str)
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(raw.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:32]
+    return f"{prefix}:{digest}"
+
+
+def cache_get(key: str) -> Any | None:
+    """Return the cached payload for *key*, or ``None`` (miss/expiry/disabled)."""
+    if ttl_seconds() <= 0:
+        return None
+    try:
+        conn = _connect()
+        row = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT value, created FROM web_cache WHERE key = ?", (key,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        conn.close()
+    except sqlite3.Error as e:
+        logger.warning("web cache read failed (%s): %s", key, e)
+        return None
+    if row is None:
+        return None
+    value, created = row
+    if time.time() - float(created) > ttl_seconds():
+        return None
+    try:
+        return json.loads(value)
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return None
+
+
+def cache_set(key: str, value: Any) -> None:
+    """Store *value* under *key* (best effort, never raises)."""
+    if ttl_seconds() <= 0:
+        return
+    try:
+        with _write_lock:
+            conn = _connect()
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO web_cache (key, value, created) VALUES (?, ?, ?) "
+                "ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value, created = excluded.created",
+                (key, json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, default=str), time.time()),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            conn.close()
+    except sqlite3.Error as e:
+        logger.warning("web cache write failed (%s): %s", key, e)
+
+
+def purge_expired() -> int:
+    """Delete expired rows; return the number of removed entries (maintenance)."""
+    try:
+        conn = _connect()
+        cursor = conn.execute(
+            "DELETE FROM web_cache WHERE created < ?", (time.time() - ttl_seconds(),)
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+        deleted = cursor.rowcount
+        conn.close()
+        return int(deleted)
+    except sqlite3.Error as e:
+        logger.warning("web cache purge failed: %s", e)
+        return 0
+
+
+def clear_cache() -> int:
+    """Drop every cached entry (tests / admin); returns the number of rows."""
+    try:
+        conn = _connect()
+        cursor = conn.execute("DELETE FROM web_cache")
+        conn.commit()
+        deleted = cursor.rowcount
+        conn.close()
+        return int(deleted)
+    except sqlite3.Error as e:
+        logger.warning("web cache clear failed: %s", e)
+        return 0

backend/tools/webrender.py

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Dynamic page rendering (Playwright) — ``fetch_url(render=True)``.
+
+Static pages are fetched with httpx inside :mod:`backend.tools.web`. Dynamic
+pages (SPA/React, JS-loaded content) need a real browser engine; this module
+runs one Playwright call inside a dedicated worker thread so browser
+crashes/timeouts never take over the tool layer, and the heavyweight
+dependency stays optional:
+
+* not installed → ``ToolError(code="playwright_unavailable")`` with a clear
+  message (the assistant explains the limitation instead of hanging);
+* installed → ``pip install playwright && playwright install chromium``.
+
+The SSRF guard (scheme + private-address rejection) is applied before the
+browser navigates. Note: unlike the httpx path, internal redirects performed
+by the browser engine are not re-checked hop by hop.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html as html_lib
+import logging
+import re
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+from typing import Any
+
+from backend.tools.context import ToolError
+from backend.tools.web import (
+    MAX_TEXT_CHARS,
+    USER_AGENT,
+    _assert_public_http_url,
+    _html_to_text,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.webrender")
+
+# One worker: browser automation is serialized on purpose (one Chromium at a
+# time keeps memory predictable on small hosts).
+_executor = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1, thread_name_prefix="obsigate-playwright")
+GOTO_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000
+
+
+def _playwright_available() -> bool:
+    try:
+        import playwright  # noqa: F401
+    except ImportError:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _render_in_worker(url: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Synchronous Playwright render — runs in the dedicated worker thread."""
+    from playwright.sync_api import sync_playwright
+
+    status = 0
+    with sync_playwright() as p:
+        browser = p.chromium.launch(headless=True)
+        try:
+            page = browser.new_page(user_agent=USER_AGENT)
+            response = page.goto(url, wait_until="networkidle", timeout=GOTO_TIMEOUT_MS)
+            if response is not None:
+                status = response.status
+            raw = page.content()
+            title = html_lib.unescape(page.title() or "").strip()
+            text = _html_to_text(raw)[:MAX_TEXT_CHARS]
+        finally:
+            browser.close()
+    title = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", title)[:300]
+    return {
+        "url": url,
+        "status": status,
+        "title": title,
+        "text": text,
+        "rendered": True,
+        "truncated": len(raw) > MAX_TEXT_CHARS,
+    }
+
+
+def render_page(url: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Render *url* (JavaScript included) and return readable text.
+
+    Raises:
+        ToolError: ``playwright_unavailable`` when the optional dependency is
+            missing, ``render_unavailable`` when the render itself failed.
+    """
+    _assert_public_http_url(url)
+    if not _playwright_available():
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Rendu dynamique indisponible : Playwright n'est pas installé "
+            "(pip install playwright && playwright install chromium).",
+            code="playwright_unavailable",
+        )
+    try:
+        return _executor.submit(_render_in_worker, url).result(timeout=GOTO_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000 + 40)
+    except ToolError:
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.warning("render_page failed for %s: %s", url, e)
+        raise ToolError(
+            "Le rendu dynamique de la page a échoué.", code="render_unavailable"
+        ) from e

backend/user_home.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+"""Dossier personnel par utilisateur (#194).
+
+Chaque utilisateur reçoit ``<OBSIGATE_HOME_ROOT>/<username>`` monté comme un
+vault propre ``home-<username>`` : l'isolation profite de l'ACL par vault
+déjà en place (``check_vault_access``), aucune ACL par chemin à inventer.
+
+Tout est idempotent (``ensure_user_home``) pour être rappelé à la création
+d'un compte ET au démarrage : un dossier supprimé, un registre perdu ou un
+user créé hors API se réparent au boot.
+
+La fonctionnalité est inactive tant que ``OBSIGATE_HOME_ROOT`` n'est pas
+défini (dev, tests, desktop) — comportement inchangé.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import os
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.user_home")
+
+# Même grammaire que CreateUserRequest.username_valid (backend/auth/router.py) :
+# segment de chemin sûr, déjà passé par la validation de l'API. Re-vérifié ici
+# car le nom sert à construire un chemin (défense en profondeur).
+_USERNAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{2,32}$")
+
+
+def home_root() -> Path | None:
+    """Racine des dossiers persos, ou ``None`` si la fonctionnalité est inactive."""
+    root = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_HOME_ROOT", "").strip()
+    return Path(root) if root else None
+
+
+def home_vault_name(username: str) -> str:
+    """Nom de vault du dossier perso — pas de ``/`` ni ``::`` (segment d'URL, clé d'index)."""
+    return f"home-{username}"
+
+
+async def ensure_user_home(username: str) -> str | None:
+    """Crée (si besoin) le dossier perso de *username*, son vault et son octroi.
+
+    Retourne le nom de vault, ou ``None`` si désactivé / nom invalide /
+    erreur disque (journalisée, réparée au prochain démarrage).
+    """
+    root = home_root()
+    if root is None:
+        return None
+    if not _USERNAME_RE.match(username):
+        logger.warning(f"Home folder skipped: invalid username {username!r}")
+        return None
+
+    home = root / username
+    try:
+        home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    except OSError:
+        logger.exception(f"Cannot create home folder {home} for user '{username}'")
+        return None
+
+    name = home_vault_name(username)
+    try:
+        from backend.indexer import add_vault_to_index, index, persist_vault, vault_config
+        from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+        vault_path = str(home)
+        if name not in index:
+            await add_vault_to_index(name, vault_path)
+            persist_vault(name)
+            from backend.watcher_state import get_watcher
+
+            watcher = get_watcher()
+            if watcher:
+                await watcher.add_vault(name, vault_path)
+            await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_added", {"vault": name})
+            logger.info(f"Home vault '{name}' registered at {vault_path}")
+        elif name not in vault_config:
+            vault_config[name] = {"path": vault_path, "attachmentsPath": None,
+                                  "scanAttachmentsOnStartup": True}
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception(f"Cannot register home vault '{name}' for user '{username}'")
+        return None
+
+    _grant(username, name)
+    return name
+
+
+async def release_user_home(username: str) -> None:
+    """Retire le vault du dossier perso à la suppression du compte (#194).
+
+    Le dossier sur disque est **conservé** (décision produit : pas de perte
+    de données) ; seul l'index, le watcher et le registre le referment.
+    """
+    name = home_vault_name(username)
+    try:
+        from backend.indexer import index, remove_vault_from_index, unpersist_vault
+
+        unpersist_vault(name)
+        if name not in index:
+            return
+        await remove_vault_from_index(name)
+        from backend.sse import sse_manager
+        from backend.watcher_state import get_watcher
+
+        watcher = get_watcher()
+        if watcher:
+            await watcher.remove_vault(name)
+        await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_removed", {"vault": name})
+        logger.info(f"Home vault '{name}' released (folder kept)")
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception(f"Cannot release home vault '{name}'")
+
+
+def _grant(username: str, vault_name: str) -> None:
+    """Ajoute le vault à ``user.vaults`` s'il n'y est pas déjà (#194).
+
+    L'octroi est explicite même pour un admin (``vaults: ["*"]``) : ``*`` ne
+    couvre jamais un dossier perso (voir ``check_vault_access``).
+    """
+    from backend.auth.user_store import get_user, update_user
+
+    user = get_user(username)
+    if not user:
+        return  # créé hors API (bootstrap avant users.json) → réparé au boot suivant
+    vaults = user.get("vaults") or []
+    if vault_name in vaults:
+        return
+    update_user(username, {"vaults": [*vaults, vault_name]})
+
+
+async def ensure_all_user_homes() -> int:
+    """Passe de réparation/migration au démarrage : un home par user existant.
+
+    Balaye aussi les vaults orphelins (compte supprimé hors route, ex.
+    ``create_admin.py delete``) : ils sont refermés, dossier conservé.
+    """
+    from backend.auth.user_store import get_all_users
+    from backend.indexer import index, vault_config
+
+    root = home_root()
+    if root is None:
+        return 0
+    users = get_all_users()
+    usernames = {u.get("username") for u in users}
+    created = 0
+    for user in users:
+        username = user.get("username")
+        if not username:
+            continue
+        if await ensure_user_home(username):
+            created += 1
+    if created:
+        logger.info(f"User home folders ensured for {created} user(s)")
+
+    # Orphelins : vault home-<x> toujours indexé mais <x> n'existe plus.
+    # Path.parent == root → on ne touche qu'aux dossiers sous la racine Home,
+    # jamais à un vault admin nommé « home-… » par ailleurs.
+    for name in list(index):
+        if not name.startswith("home-"):
+            continue
+        owner = name[len("home-"):]
+        if owner in usernames:
+            continue
+        cfg_path = Path((vault_config.get(name) or {}).get("path", ""))
+        if cfg_path.parent != root:
+            continue
+        logger.warning(f"Orphan home vault '{name}' released (user deleted?)")
+        await release_user_home(owner)
+    return created

backend/version.py

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Exemples :
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
-import subprocess
+import subprocess  # nosec B404
 from pathlib import Path
 
 _ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent          # racine du dépôt ObsiGate
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ _ENV_VAR = "OBSIGATE_VERSION"
 def _run_git(args: list[str]) -> str:
     """Run a git command in the repo root; return stdout (stripped) or ''."""
     try:
-        result = subprocess.run(
+        # argv fixe (git + args internes), sans shell : pas d'injection.
+        result = subprocess.run(  # nosec B404 B603 B607
             ["git", *args],
             cwd=str(_ROOT),
             capture_output=True,

backend/watcher.py

@@ -280,7 +280,8 @@ class VaultWatcher:
         for observer in self.observers.values():
             try:
                 observer.join(timeout=5)
-            except Exception:  # nosec B110 — best-effort shutdown, ignore failures
+            # best-effort shutdown, ignore failures (B110) :
+            except Exception:  # nosec B110
                 pass
         self.observers.clear()
         logger.info("VaultWatcher stopped")

backend/watcher_state.py

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+"""Shared VaultWatcher handle (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Holder extrait de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de comportement : le
+lifespan de ``main`` y dépose l'instance (``set_watcher``) et l'y reprend à
+l'extinction ; le router ``vaults`` la consulte via :func:`get_watcher`
+(démarrage/arrêt de surveillance à l'ajout/retrait dynamique de vault,
+état dans ``/api/vaults/status``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from backend.watcher import VaultWatcher
+
+_watcher: VaultWatcher | None = None
+
+
+def get_watcher() -> VaultWatcher | None:
+    """Return the shared VaultWatcher instance (``None`` if disabled)."""
+    return _watcher
+
+
+def set_watcher(watcher: VaultWatcher | None) -> None:
+    """Store (or clear) the shared VaultWatcher instance."""
+    global _watcher
+    _watcher = watcher

backend/webhooks.py

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 import os
 import socket
+import threading
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -144,6 +145,12 @@ def _read_secrets() -> dict:
         return {}
 
 
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour des read-modify-write des deux stores
+# (webhooks + secrets) : perte de mises à jour en cas de mutations
+# concurrentes.
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+
 def _write_secrets(secrets: dict):
     WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     tmp = WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
@@ -156,12 +163,13 @@ def _write_secrets(secrets: dict):
 
 
 def _store_secret(wh_id: str, secret: str | None) -> None:
-    secrets = _read_secrets()
-    if secret:
-        secrets[wh_id] = secret
-    else:
-        secrets.pop(wh_id, None)
-    _write_secrets(secrets)
+    with _lock:
+        secrets = _read_secrets()
+        if secret:
+            secrets[wh_id] = secret
+        else:
+            secrets.pop(wh_id, None)
+        _write_secrets(secrets)
 
 
 def _get_secret(wh: dict) -> str | None:
@@ -189,52 +197,55 @@ def get_webhooks() -> list:
 
 def create_webhook(name: str, url: str, events: list[str], secret: str | None = None) -> dict:
     validate_webhook_url(url)
-    webhooks = _read()
-    wh_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
-    wh = {
-        "id": wh_id,
-        "name": name,
-        "url": url,
-        "events": [e for e in events if e in VALID_EVENTS],
-        "enabled": True,
-        "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        "last_fired_at": None,
-    }
-    webhooks.append(wh)
-    _write(webhooks)
-    if secret:
-        _store_secret(wh_id, secret)
+    with _lock:
+        webhooks = _read()
+        wh_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        wh = {
+            "id": wh_id,
+            "name": name,
+            "url": url,
+            "events": [e for e in events if e in VALID_EVENTS],
+            "enabled": True,
+            "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "last_fired_at": None,
+        }
+        webhooks.append(wh)
+        _write(webhooks)
+        if secret:
+            _store_secret(wh_id, secret)
     logger.info(f"Created webhook '{name}' → {url}")
     return _public_view(wh)
 
 
 def update_webhook(wh_id: str, updates: dict) -> dict | None:
-    webhooks = _read()
-    for wh in webhooks:
-        if wh["id"] == wh_id:
-            if updates.get("url"):
-                validate_webhook_url(updates["url"])
-            if "secret" in updates:
-                _store_secret(wh_id, updates["secret"])
-            safe_updates = {
-                k: v for k, v in updates.items()
-                if k not in ("id", "secret")
-            }
-            wh.update(safe_updates)
-            _write(webhooks)
-            return _public_view(wh)
+    with _lock:
+        webhooks = _read()
+        for wh in webhooks:
+            if wh["id"] == wh_id:
+                if updates.get("url"):
+                    validate_webhook_url(updates["url"])
+                if "secret" in updates:
+                    _store_secret(wh_id, updates["secret"])
+                safe_updates = {
+                    k: v for k, v in updates.items()
+                    if k not in ("id", "secret")
+                }
+                wh.update(safe_updates)
+                _write(webhooks)
+                return _public_view(wh)
     return None
 
 
 def delete_webhook(wh_id: str) -> bool:
-    webhooks = _read()
-    new_list = [wh for wh in webhooks if wh["id"] != wh_id]
-    if len(new_list) == len(webhooks):
-        return False
-    _write(new_list)
-    secrets = _read_secrets()
-    if secrets.pop(wh_id, None) is not None:
-        _write_secrets(secrets)
+    with _lock:
+        webhooks = _read()
+        new_list = [wh for wh in webhooks if wh["id"] != wh_id]
+        if len(new_list) == len(webhooks):
+            return False
+        _write(new_list)
+        secrets = _read_secrets()
+        if secrets.pop(wh_id, None) is not None:
+            _write_secrets(secrets)
     return True
 
 

build.ps1

@@ -115,7 +115,9 @@ $env:VERSION = $Version
 Write-Info "Version : $Version"
 
 # ----- Build the image -----
-$BuildArgs = @("-f", $ComposeFile)
+# NOTE : `--no-cache` est un flag de `docker compose build` (après `build`),
+# pas un flag global (avant) — sinon `unknown flag: --no-cache`.
+$BuildArgs = @("-f", $ComposeFile, "build")
 if (-not $UseCache) {
     $BuildArgs += "--no-cache"
     Write-Info "Construction de l'image Docker (sans cache)..."
@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ if (-not $UseCache) {
     Write-Info "Construction de l'image Docker (avec cache)..."
 }
 
-docker compose @BuildArgs build
+docker compose @BuildArgs
 if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
     Write-Error "Échec de la construction de l'image Docker."
     exit $LASTEXITCODE

build.sh

@@ -223,4 +223,4 @@ $COMPOSE_CMD -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" ps
 
 echo ""
 info "Logs récents (Ctrl+C pour quitter) :"
-$COMPOSE_CMD -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" logs --tail=20 -f
+$COMPOSE_CMD -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" logs --tail=20

desktop/Cargo.lock

@@ -2626,7 +2626,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "obsigate-desktop"
-version = "2.7.3"
+version = "2.67.2"
 dependencies = [
  "chrono",
  "env_logger",

desktop/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "obsigate-desktop"
-version = "2.7.3"
+version = "2.67.2"
 description = "ObsiGate Desktop — Porte d'entrée native pour vos vaults Obsidian"
 authors = ["Bruno Charest"]
 edition = "2021"

desktop/build.rs

@@ -38,5 +38,7 @@ fn main() {
     println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/refs/heads/main");
     println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/refs/tags");
 
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=permissions");
+
     tauri_build::build()
 }

desktop/capabilities/default.json

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
   },
   "permissions": [
     "core:default",
+    "allow-app-commands",
     "shell:allow-open",
     "shell:allow-execute",
     "dialog:default",

desktop/gen/schemas/capabilities.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"Default capabilities for ObsiGate Desktop","remote":{"urls":["http://127.0.0.1:*","http://localhost:*"]},"local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:default","shell:allow-open","shell:allow-execute","dialog:default","notification:default","fs:default","process:default","store:default"]}}
+{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"Default capabilities for ObsiGate Desktop","remote":{"urls":["http://127.0.0.1:*","http://localhost:*"]},"local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:default","allow-app-commands","shell:allow-open","shell:allow-execute","dialog:default","notification:default","fs:default","process:default","store:default"]}}

desktop/gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json

@@ -2210,6 +2210,12 @@
     "Identifier": {
       "description": "Permission identifier",
       "oneOf": [
+        {
+          "description": "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1).",
+          "type": "string",
+          "const": "allow-app-commands",
+          "markdownDescription": "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1)."
+        },
         {
           "description": "Default core plugins set.\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `core:path:default`\n- `core:event:default`\n- `core:window:default`\n- `core:webview:default`\n- `core:app:default`\n- `core:image:default`\n- `core:resources:default`\n- `core:menu:default`\n- `core:tray:default`",
           "type": "string",