securite: #87 T3 cookies Secure centralises + CORS atteste (defaut inchange)

.env.example

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ OBSIGATE_ADMIN_PASSWORD=chab30
 # OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE=false
 
 # Sécurité des cookies (activer si derrière HTTPS)
+# false par défaut : les navigateurs ignorent les cookies `Secure` en HTTP,
+# ce qui casserait les logins en local. En production (TLS + bind réseau),
+# posez true — un avertissement est loggé au démarrage sinon (#87).
 # OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES=false
 
 # Tokens TTL en secondes
@@ -23,6 +26,8 @@ OBSIGATE_ADMIN_PASSWORD=chab30
 # OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS=10
 # OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=10
 # OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS=900
+# Compteurs partagés/persistants (SQLite WAL, multi-workers) — défaut : mémoire.
+# OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB=data/ratelimit.db
 
 # IP client derrière un reverse proxy (fait confiance à X-Forwarded-For)
 # OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=false

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ jobs:
           node tests/frontend/config-mobile.test.mjs
           node tests/frontend/settings-order-avatar.test.mjs
           node tests/frontend/mobile-toolbar.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/upload.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/pretty.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/media-viewer.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/mfa-settings.test.mjs
+          node tests/frontend/config-ai-keys.test.mjs
 
       - name: Frontend JSDOM tests (PaneManager + Excalidraw + Plugins + AI + SW + Collab + Mobile + Semantic + Desktop + Inline edition)
         run: |
@@ -126,11 +131,17 @@ jobs:
           pip install bandit pip-audit
           pip install -r backend/requirements.txt
 
-      - name: Bandit (SAST)
-        run: bandit -r backend/ --skip B101,B110,B310 || echo "bandit found issues (non-blocking)"
+      - name: Bandit (SAST, bloquant — #87)
+        # B105 est exclu (aligné avec [tool.bandit] de pyproject.toml :
+        # faux positifs systématiques sur les noms de variables) ; les rares
+        # vrais positifs restants portent un `# nosec` justifié inline.
+        run: bandit -r backend/ --skip B101,B105,B110,B310
 
-      - name: Pip-audit (dependency vulnerabilities)
-        run: pip-audit || echo "pip-audit found vulnerabilities (non-blocking)"
+      - name: Pip-audit (consultatif — #87)
+        # Reste non bloquant tant que les montées de version requises
+        # (starlette via fastapi, weasyprint) ne sont pas qualifiées :
+        # upgrade FastAPI = chantier de régression dédié, hors périmètre.
+        run: pip-audit || echo "pip-audit found vulnerabilities (non-blocking, see #87)"
 
   # ── Docker build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
   build:
@@ -192,6 +203,9 @@ jobs:
           npm ci
           npx playwright install --with-deps chromium
 
+      - name: Npm audit (bloquant — #87, 0 dépendance prod hors Playwright)
+        run: npm audit --omit=dev
+
       - name: Start ObsiGate
         run: |
           docker rm -f obsigate-e2e 2>/dev/null || true

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Format basé sur [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/fr/1.1.0/),
 et [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
 > **En cours de développement** : les changements à venir sont listés dans la section
-> [Unreleased](#unreleased). La dernière version livrée est **2.27.9**.
+> [Unreleased](#unreleased). La dernière version livrée est **2.28.3**.
 
 ---
 
@@ -14,6 +14,60 @@ et [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
 ---
 
+## [2.28.3] — 2026-09-26
+
+---
+
+## [2.28.2] — 2026-09-26
+
+### Ajouté
+
+- **#87 (T3) — cookies `Secure` et CORS explicites.**
+  Helper `is_secure_cookies()` centralisé (défaut `false` conservé pour ne
+  pas casser les logins HTTP locaux) + avertissement au démarrage sur bind
+  non-loopback sans `Secure` ; `tests/test_security_headers.py` atteste
+  l'absence de CORS permissif (same-origin par défaut du navigateur) et les
+  en-têtes de durcissement.
+
+- **#87 (T2) — tests de durcissement : concurrence et regex.**
+  `tests/test_hardening_concurrency.py` : créations/mises à jour/`login
+  failures` concurrents sur `users.json` (zéro mise à jour perdue, JSON
+  toujours récupérable) et budget temps de la politique ReDoS (motifs
+  catastrophiques rejetés en < 1 s, motifs acceptés < 5 s sur 200 Ko).
+
+---
+
+## [2.28.1] — 2026-09-26
+
+### Modifié
+
+- **#87 (T1) — CI sécurité durcie.**
+  `bandit` passe en bloquant (`# nosec` justifiés : SHA1 non-crypto,
+  subprocess git à argv fixe, `saxutils.escape` sans parsing ; B105 exclu
+  comme `pyproject.toml`) ; `npm audit --omit=dev` bloquant (0 faille) ;
+  les 5 suites frontend hors CI (`upload`, `pretty`, `media-viewer`,
+  `mfa-settings`, `config-ai-keys`, vertes en local) rejoignent le job
+  `lint`. `pip-audit` reste consultatif (upgrades starlette/weasyprint à
+  qualifier, chantier dédié).
+
+---
+
+## [2.28.0] — 2026-09-26
+
+---
+
+## [2.27.12] — 2026-09-26
+
+---
+
+## [2.27.11] — 2026-09-26
+
+---
+
+## [2.27.10] — 2026-09-26
+
+---
+
 ## [2.27.9] — 2026-09-26
 
 ---
@@ -46,6 +100,35 @@ et [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
 ### Modifié
 
+- **#85 (T10) — persistance d'état et clôture de la refonte architecturale.**
+  Verrous `RLock` sur les stores JSON sans protection (`revoked_tokens`,
+  `shares`, `webhooks` + secrets, clés d'outils) avec tests de concurrence
+  (`tests/test_store_locks.py` — pertes prouvées sans verrou) ; rate-limit
+  auth persisté en option (`OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB`, SQLite WAL, sémantique
+  identique, défaut mémoire inchangé, `tests/test_ratelimit_store.py`).
+  Contrat `tools/registry.py` audité (permissions/quotas/redaction déjà
+  câblés, rien à coder). Index non persisté : rebuild différentiel #86
+  suffisant (décision documentée). Fiche `docs/features/archi-refonte-85.md`,
+  #85 sorti du backlog (index roadmap).
+- **#85 (T9) — extraction realtime + render hors du monolithe `backend/main.py`.**
+  Le stream SSE `/api/events` et le WebSocket `/ws/collab/*` sont servis par
+  `backend/routers/realtime.py`, le pipeline markdown (mistune, wikilinks,
+  slugs, sanitizer) par `backend/render.py` (imports directs, plus de
+  couplage différé). `main.py` (4 827 → ~760 lignes) ne contient plus que
+  l'assemblage : lifespan, middlewares, montage des 16 routers, racine
+  `/api`, statique/SPA et cales de compatibilité testées.
+- **#85 (T8) — extraction vaults/history/conflicts hors du monolithe `backend/main.py`.**
+  13 routes servies par `backend/routers/vaults.py`, `history.py` et
+  `conflicts.py` ; `VaultInfo`/`BookmarkToggleRequest` dans `schemas.py`,
+  handle watcher partagé dans `backend/watcher_state.py`.
+  `tests/test_api_main.py` importe `humanize_mtime` depuis son module
+  canonique (`services.recent`).
+- **#85 (T7) — extraction du domaine `config` hors du monolithe `backend/main.py`.**
+  `/api/config`, ai-keys (get/post/delete/test), tool-keys (×3), ai-models,
+  diagnostics et dashboard sont servis par `backend/routers/config.py`
+  (`_FALLBACK_MODELS`, store clés et config déplacés ; `main` réimporte
+  `_load_config` pour son lifespan, les fixtures de tests inchangées).
+  `tests/test_ai_models.py` patch désormais la référence du router.
 - **#85 (T6c) — extraction media/pdf/export/guide hors du monolithe `backend/main.py`.**
   file/pdf, exports (html/md-bundle/epub), guide/download, pdf/stream|info,
   image, media+thumb, attachments (rescan/stats), vault settings (get/post/all)

README.fr.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 **Porte d'entrée web ultra-léger pour vos vaults Obsidian** — Accédez, naviguez et recherchez dans toutes vos notes Obsidian depuis n'importe quel appareil via une interface web moderne et responsive.
 
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.27.9-blue.svg)]()
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.28.3-blue.svg)]()
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-Ready-blue.svg)](https://www.docker.com/)
 [![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11+-green.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
@@ -976,8 +976,8 @@ Ce projet est sous licence **MIT** — voir le fichier [LICENSE](LICENSE) pour l
 
 ## 📝 Changelog
 
-Consultez le [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) pour l'historique complet de toutes les versions (v1.0.0 → v2.27.9).
+Consultez le [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) pour l'historique complet de toutes les versions (v1.0.0 → v2.28.3).
 
 ---
 
-*Projet : ObsiGate | Version : 2.27.9 | Dernière mise à jour : Septembre 2026*
+*Projet : ObsiGate | Version : 2.28.3 | Dernière mise à jour : Septembre 2026*

README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Ultra-light web gateway for your Obsidian vaults** — Access, browse, and search all your Obsidian notes from any device via a modern, responsive web interface.
 
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.27.9-blue.svg)]()
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-2.28.3-blue.svg)]()
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-Ready-blue.svg)](https://www.docker.com/)
 [![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11+-green.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
@@ -1151,8 +1151,8 @@ This project is licensed under the **MIT License** - see the [LICENSE](LICENSE)
 
 ## 📝 Changelog
 
-See [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) for the complete version history (v1.0.0 → v2.27.9).
+See [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) for the complete version history (v1.0.0 → v2.28.3).
 
 ---
 
-*Project: ObsiGate | Version: 2.27.9 | Last updated: September 2026*
+*Project: ObsiGate | Version: 2.28.3 | Last updated: September 2026*

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-2.27.9
+2.28.3

backend/auth/jwt_handler.py

@@ -119,25 +119,30 @@ def decode_token(token: str) -> dict | None:
 _revoked_map: dict[str, int] = {}
 _revoked_loaded = False
 
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour du read-modify-write du store de
+# révocation (perte de révocations en cas de logouts concurrents).
+_revoked_lock = threading.RLock()
+
 
 def _load_revoked():
     """Load revoked token JTIs from disk into memory (once)."""
     global _revoked_loaded, _revoked_map
-    if _revoked_loaded:
-        return
-    if REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.exists():
-        try:
-            data = json.loads(REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.read_text())
-            # Drop entries whose underlying token has itself expired.
-            now = int(time.time())
-            _revoked_map = {
-                jti: int(exp) for jti, exp in data.items()
-                if int(exp) > now
-            }
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.warning(f"Failed to load revoked tokens: {e}")
-            _revoked_map = {}
-    _revoked_loaded = True
+    with _revoked_lock:
+        if _revoked_loaded:
+            return
+        if REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.exists():
+            try:
+                data = json.loads(REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE.read_text())
+                # Drop entries whose underlying token has itself expired.
+                now = int(time.time())
+                _revoked_map = {
+                    jti: int(exp) for jti, exp in data.items()
+                    if int(exp) > now
+                }
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Failed to load revoked tokens: {e}")
+                _revoked_map = {}
+        _revoked_loaded = True
 
 
 def _save_revoked():
@@ -154,24 +159,26 @@ def revoke_token(jti: str, expires_at: int | None = None):
     ``expires_at`` is the revoked token's own ``exp`` (unix seconds) — the
     record is kept at least that long so a long-lived API token cannot
     outlive its revocation. ``None`` means the token never expires (API/MCP
-    "sans fin") → the record is kept forever (capped at ~100 years, the JWT
+    "sans fin") → the     record is kept forever (capped at ~100 years, the JWT
     store's practical infinity). Default keeps 7 days (session tokens).
     """
-    _load_revoked()
-    now = int(time.time())
-    if expires_at is None:
-        until = now + 100 * 365 * 24 * 3600
-    else:
-        until = max(int(expires_at), now + REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS)
-    _revoked_map[jti] = until
-    _save_revoked()
+    with _revoked_lock:
+        _load_revoked()
+        now = int(time.time())
+        if expires_at is None:
+            until = now + 100 * 365 * 24 * 3600
+        else:
+            until = max(int(expires_at), now + REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS)
+        _revoked_map[jti] = until
+        _save_revoked()
     logger.debug(f"Revoked token JTI: {jti[:8]}...")
 
 
 def is_token_revoked(jti: str) -> bool:
     """Check if a token JTI has been revoked."""
-    _load_revoked()
-    return jti in _revoked_map
+    with _revoked_lock:
+        _load_revoked()
+        return jti in _revoked_map
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

backend/auth/router.py

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 import base64
 import binascii
 import logging
+import os
 import re
 
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response
@@ -56,6 +57,17 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.router")
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
 
 
+def is_secure_cookies() -> bool:
+    """True when auth cookies must carry the ``Secure`` flag (#87 T3).
+
+    Opt-in via ``OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES=true`` (required behind TLS).
+    Default stays ``false`` so logins keep working over plain HTTP on
+    trusted loopback deployments — browsers drop ``Secure`` cookies sent
+    over HTTP, which would silently break localhost logins.
+    """
+    return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
+
+
 # ── Pydantic request models ──────────────────────────────────────────
 
 class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -229,9 +241,8 @@ def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Respon
     access_token = create_access_token(user)
     refresh_token, refresh_jti = create_refresh_token(username, remember=remember_me)
 
-    import os
     max_age = 2592000 if remember_me else 604800  # 30d or 7d
-    secure = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
+    secure = is_secure_cookies()
     response.set_cookie(
         key="refresh_token",
         value=refresh_token,
@@ -253,7 +264,8 @@ def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Respon
     )
     return {
         "access_token": access_token,
-        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105 — OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe
+        # OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe (B105) :
+        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105
         "expires_in": ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
         "user": {
             "username": user["username"],
@@ -299,9 +311,7 @@ async def refresh_token_endpoint(request: Request, response: Response):
         if stale:
             raise HTTPException(401, "Session expirée, veuillez vous reconnecter")
 
-    import os
-
-    secure = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
+    secure = is_secure_cookies()
     remember_me = bool(payload.get("remember", False))
 
     # BUG-027: rotate the refresh token — the old one is now single-use.
@@ -332,7 +342,8 @@ async def refresh_token_endpoint(request: Request, response: Response):
 
     return {
         "access_token": new_access_token,
-        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105 — OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe
+        # OAuth2 token_type, pas un mot de passe (B105) :
+        "token_type": "bearer",  # nosec B105
         "expires_in": ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
     }
 

backend/guide_export.py

@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ def diagram_png_for(code: str) -> Path | None:
     Mermaid, ou None. Le hash doit rester synchrone avec le script de build :
     sha1(unescape(code).strip())[:16]."""
     normalized = html.unescape(code).strip()
-    sha = hashlib.sha1(normalized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16]
+    # Identifiant de cache déterministe (pas un usage sécurité).
+    sha = hashlib.sha1(normalized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16]  # nosec B324
     png = DIAGRAMS_DIR / (sha + ".png")
     return png if png.exists() else None
 

backend/media_thumbs.py

@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ def thumb_cache_path(file_path: Path, size: int) -> Path:
         stamp = f"{st.st_mtime_ns}:{st.st_size}"
     except OSError:
         stamp = "0:0"
-    key = hashlib.sha1(f"{file_path}:{stamp}:{size}".encode()).hexdigest()
+    # Clé de cache miniature (pas un usage sécurité).
+    key = hashlib.sha1(f"{file_path}:{stamp}:{size}".encode()).hexdigest()  # nosec B324
     return thumbs_cache_dir() / f"{key}.webp"
 
 

backend/ratelimit.py

@@ -12,14 +12,24 @@ the per-account lockout in ``user_store.py``.
    deployment, front this service with a shared store (Redis) or a single
    worker.  This limitation is intentional and documented (BUG-031).
 
+   Opt-in persistence (ROADMAP #85 T10b) : if ``OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB`` points
+   to a SQLite file, counters are stored there instead (WAL mode, one short
+   connection per call — safe across threads, processes and restarts sharing
+   the same file).  Semantics (windows, budgets, success reset) are identical
+   to the in-memory store, which remains the default when the variable is
+   unset.
+
 Configuration via environment variables:
     OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS     Max failures per IP (default: 10)
     OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS   Max failures per account (default: 10)
     OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS   Lockout window in seconds (default: 900)
+    OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB           SQLite file for shared/persistent counters (default: unset = memory)
 """
 
 import logging
 import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
 import time
 from collections import defaultdict
 
@@ -37,6 +47,127 @@ _last_cleanup = time.time()
 CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 60  # seconds
 
 
+def _db_path() -> str | None:
+    """SQLite file for shared counters, or ``None`` for the in-memory store."""
+    path = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB", "").strip()
+    return path or None
+
+
+def _db_connect(path: str) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+    """Open a short-lived connection (WAL + busy timeout for concurrent workers)."""
+    _db_ensure_schema(path)
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10.0)
+    conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=10000")
+    return conn
+
+
+_schema_ready: set[str] = set()
+_schema_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def _db_ensure_schema(path: str) -> None:
+    """Create the store schema once per file (DDL under a process-wide lock)."""
+    with _schema_lock:
+        if path in _schema_ready:
+            return
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10.0)
+        try:
+            conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS attempts"
+                " (kind TEXT NOT NULL, key TEXT NOT NULL, ts REAL NOT NULL, success INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_attempts_kind_key_ts"
+                " ON attempts (kind, key, ts)"
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        _schema_ready.add(path)
+
+
+def _db_write(fn, *args):
+    """Run a write op, retrying once on lock contention (concurrent workers)."""
+    try:
+        return fn(*args)
+    except sqlite3.OperationalError as e:
+        if "locked" not in str(e).lower():
+            raise
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+        return fn(*args)
+
+
+def _db_prune(conn: sqlite3.Connection, cutoff: float) -> None:
+    """Drop expired entries (best-effort cap on disk growth)."""
+    conn.execute("DELETE FROM attempts WHERE ts <= ?", (cutoff,))
+
+
+def _db_record(kind: str, key: str, success: bool) -> int:
+    """Record one attempt in SQLite; return the live failure count."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    now = time.time()
+    cutoff = now - WINDOW_SECONDS
+
+    def _write() -> int:
+        with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+            _db_prune(conn, cutoff)
+            if success:
+                # Mirror the in-memory reset: replace history with one success.
+                conn.execute("DELETE FROM attempts WHERE kind = ? AND key = ?", (kind, key))
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO attempts (kind, key, ts, success) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                (kind, key, now, int(success)),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            (failures,) = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts WHERE kind = ? AND key = ? AND ts > ? AND success = 0",
+                (kind, key, cutoff),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return failures
+
+    return _db_write(_write)
+
+
+def _db_failures(kind: str, key: str) -> int:
+    """Live failure count in SQLite (expired entries never count)."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    cutoff = time.time() - WINDOW_SECONDS
+    with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+        (failures,) = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts WHERE kind = ? AND key = ? AND ts > ? AND success = 0",
+            (kind, key, cutoff),
+        ).fetchone()
+    return failures
+
+
+def _db_tracked(kind: str) -> int:
+    """Number of distinct keys ever seen for one budget (SQLite)."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+        (n,) = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT key) FROM attempts WHERE kind = ?", (kind,)
+        ).fetchone()
+    return n
+
+
+def _db_limited_count(kind: str, max_attempts: int) -> int:
+    """Number of keys currently over budget (SQLite)."""
+    path = _db_path()
+    assert path is not None
+    cutoff = time.time() - WINDOW_SECONDS
+    with _db_connect(path) as conn:
+        rows = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT key, COUNT(*) FROM attempts"
+            " WHERE kind = ? AND ts > ? AND success = 0 GROUP BY key",
+            (kind, cutoff),
+        ).fetchall()
+    return sum(1 for _, n in rows if n >= max_attempts)
+
+
 def _prune(store: dict[str, list], cutoff: float) -> None:
     """Drop expired entries from one store in place."""
     expired = []
@@ -66,6 +197,12 @@ def record_failure(ip: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
     Returns:
         (current_failure_count, remaining_attempts)
     """
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        failures = _db_record("ip", ip, False)
+        remaining = max(0, MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
+        if failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS:
+            logger.warning(f"IP {ip} rate-limited after {failures} failed logins")
+        return failures, remaining
     _cleanup_expired()
     _ip_attempts[ip].append((time.time(), False))
     failures = sum(1 for _, success in _ip_attempts[ip] if not success)
@@ -77,12 +214,17 @@ def record_failure(ip: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
 
 def record_success(ip: str):
     """Clear rate limit state for an IP after successful login."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        _db_record("ip", ip, True)
+        return
     _cleanup_expired()
     _ip_attempts[ip] = [(time.time(), True)]
 
 
 def is_rate_limited(ip: str) -> bool:
     """Check if an IP has exceeded the rate limit."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        return _db_failures("ip", ip) >= MAX_ATTEMPTS
     _cleanup_expired()
     failures = sum(1 for _, success in _ip_attempts.get(ip, []) if not success)
     return failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS
@@ -94,8 +236,14 @@ def record_account_failure(account: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
     Returns:
         (current_failure_count, remaining_attempts)
     """
-    _cleanup_expired()
     key = account.lower()
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        failures = _db_record("account", key, False)
+        remaining = max(0, ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
+        if failures >= ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS:
+            logger.warning(f"Account {account} rate-limited after {failures} failed attempts")
+        return failures, remaining
+    _cleanup_expired()
     _account_attempts[key].append((time.time(), False))
     failures = sum(1 for _, success in _account_attempts[key] if not success)
     remaining = max(0, ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
@@ -106,12 +254,17 @@ def record_account_failure(account: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
 
 def record_account_success(account: str):
     """Clear the per-account rate limit state after a successful login."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        _db_record("account", account.lower(), True)
+        return
     _cleanup_expired()
     _account_attempts[account.lower()] = [(time.time(), True)]
 
 
 def is_account_rate_limited(account: str) -> bool:
     """Check if an account has exceeded the per-account rate limit."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        return _db_failures("account", account.lower()) >= ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS
     _cleanup_expired()
     failures = sum(
         1 for _, success in _account_attempts.get(account.lower(), []) if not success
@@ -121,6 +274,24 @@ def is_account_rate_limited(account: str) -> bool:
 
 def get_status(ip: str | None = None) -> dict:
     """Get rate limit status for an IP (for diagnostics)."""
+    if _db_path() is not None:
+        if ip:
+            failures = _db_failures("ip", ip)
+            return {
+                "ip": ip,
+                "failures": failures,
+                "max": MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+                "limited": failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+                "window_seconds": WINDOW_SECONDS,
+            }
+        return {
+            "tracked_ips": _db_tracked("ip"),
+            "tracked_accounts": _db_tracked("account"),
+            "max_attempts": MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+            "account_max_attempts": ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+            "window_seconds": WINDOW_SECONDS,
+            "limited_ips": _db_limited_count("ip", MAX_ATTEMPTS),
+        }
     _cleanup_expired()
     if ip:
         attempts = _ip_attempts.get(ip, [])

backend/render.py

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+"""Markdown rendering pipeline (ROADMAP #85, tranche 9).
+
+Helpers extraits de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de comportement :
+slugification des headings, IDs d'ancrage, rendu mistune singleton,
+wikilinks, normalisation des sauts de ligne et pipeline complet
+:func:`_render_markdown` (rendu + sanitizer XSS BUG-021).
+
+Les noms gardent leur préfixe ``_`` d'origine pour un déplacement
+strictement verbatim (tests et routers pointent ici désormais).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html as html_mod
+import re
+import unicodedata
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import mistune
+
+from backend.image_processor import preprocess_images
+from backend.indexer import find_file_in_index, get_vault_data
+from backend.secret_redactor import redact_file_content
+from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+
+
+def _heading_slugify(text: str) -> str:
+    """Generate a URL-safe slug from heading text.
+
+    Matches the JavaScript slugify algorithm exactly using
+    Unicode-aware character classification:
+    1. Strip HTML tags (e.g. wikilink spans rendered inside headings)
+    2. Decode HTML entities (e.g. ``&`` → ``&``)
+    3. Lowercase
+    4. NFD normalize + strip combining marks
+    5. Keep only Unicode letters, numbers, spaces, hyphens
+    6. Replace spaces with hyphens, collapse multiple hyphens
+
+    Args:
+        text: The heading text content (may contain inline HTML).
+
+    Returns:
+        A URL-safe slug string.
+    """
+    # Strip any inline HTML so it does not pollute the slug
+    text = re.sub(r"<[^>]+>", "", text)
+    # Decode HTML entities so &amp; becomes & before slugification
+    text = html_mod.unescape(text)
+    text = text.lower()
+    text = unicodedata.normalize("NFD", text)
+    text = "".join(ch for ch in text if not unicodedata.combining(ch))
+    # Unicode-aware: keep letters (L*), numbers (N*), spaces, and hyphens
+    cleaned = []
+    for ch in text:
+        cat = unicodedata.category(ch)
+        if cat.startswith('L') or cat.startswith('N') or ch in (' ', '-'):
+            cleaned.append(ch)
+    text = "".join(cleaned)
+    text = re.sub(r"\s+", "-", text)
+    text = re.sub(r"-+", "-", text)
+    result = text.strip("-")
+    return result if result else "heading"
+
+
+def _add_heading_ids(html: str) -> str:
+    """Post-process rendered HTML to add IDs to heading tags.
+
+    Adds an ``id`` attribute to every ``<h1>`` through ``<h6>`` tag
+    using a slug generated from the heading's text content.
+    Duplicate slugs get a ``-2``, ``-3``, etc. suffix.
+
+    Args:
+        html: Rendered HTML string.
+
+    Returns:
+        HTML with heading IDs injected.
+    """
+    used_ids: dict[str, int] = {}
+
+    def _replace_heading(match):
+        tag = match.group(1)
+        content = match.group(2)
+        slug = _heading_slugify(content)
+        count = used_ids.get(slug, 0)
+        used_ids[slug] = count + 1
+        if count > 0:
+            slug = f"{slug}-{count + 1}"
+        return f'<{tag} id="{slug}">{content}</{tag}>'
+
+    # Match h1-h6 tags with text content (no existing id attribute)
+    return re.sub(
+        r'<(h[1-6])>([^<]*(?:<(?!/?h[1-6])[^<]*)*)</h[1-6]>',
+        _replace_heading,
+        html,
+    )
+
+
+# Cached mistune renderer — avoids re-creating on every request
+_markdown_renderer = mistune.create_markdown(
+    escape=False,
+    plugins=["table", "strikethrough", "footnotes", "task_lists"],
+)
+
+
+def _convert_wikilinks(content: str, current_vault: str) -> str:
+    """Convert ``[[wikilinks]]`` and ``[[target|display]]`` to clickable HTML.
+
+    Supports:
+    - Internal file links: ``[[My Note]]`` / ``[[My Note|display]]``
+    - Same-document anchors: ``[[#Heading]]`` / ``[[#Heading|display]]``
+
+    Resolved file links get a ``data-vault`` / ``data-path`` attribute pair.
+    Anchor links target the slugified heading ID in the current document.
+    Unresolved links are rendered as ``<span class="wikilink-missing">``.
+
+    Args:
+        content: Markdown string potentially containing wikilinks.
+        current_vault: Active vault name for resolution priority.
+
+    Returns:
+        Markdown string with wikilinks replaced by HTML anchors.
+    """
+    def _replace(match):
+        target = match.group(1).strip()
+        display = match.group(2).strip() if match.group(2) else target
+
+        # Same-document anchor link: [[#Heading|display]]
+        if target.startswith("#"):
+            anchor_text = target[1:].strip()
+            anchor_slug = _heading_slugify(anchor_text)
+            link_display = display if display != target else anchor_text
+            return f'<a class="wikilink-anchor" href="#{anchor_slug}">{link_display}</a>'
+
+        found = find_file_in_index(target, current_vault)
+        if found:
+            return (
+                f'<a class="wikilink" href="#" '
+                f'data-vault="{found["vault"]}" '
+                f'data-path="{found["path"]}">{display}</a>'
+            )
+        return f'<span class="wikilink-missing">{display}</span>'
+
+    pattern = r'\[\[([^\]|]+)(?:\|([^\]]+))?\]\]'
+    return re.sub(pattern, _replace, content)
+
+
+def _normalize_line_breaks(text: str) -> str:
+    """Convert single newlines to hard breaks (matching Obsidian default behavior).
+
+    In standard Markdown, a single ``\\n`` is a "soft break" — it renders as a space,
+    not a visible line break.  Obsidian defaults to treating single newlines as hard
+    breaks (equivalent to ``<br>``).  This function pre-processes the Markdown source
+    so that mistune renders standalone lines on separate rows, while still honouring
+    blank lines as paragraph separators.
+
+    Fenced code blocks (`` ``` ``) are left untouched so their internal newlines are
+    preserved verbatim.
+    """
+    parts = re.split(r"(```[\s\S]*?```)", text)
+    for i, part in enumerate(parts):
+        if part.startswith("```"):
+            continue  # Protect fenced code blocks
+        # Single \n (not preceded or followed by another \n) → two spaces + \n
+        parts[i] = re.sub(r"(?<!\n)\n(?!\n)", "  \n", part)
+    return "".join(parts)
+
+
+def _render_markdown(raw_md: str, vault_name: str, current_file_path: Path | None = None) -> str:
+    """Render a markdown string to HTML with wikilink and image support.
+
+    Uses the cached singleton mistune renderer for performance.
+
+    Args:
+        raw_md: Raw markdown text (frontmatter already stripped).
+        vault_name: Current vault for wikilink resolution context.
+        current_file_path: Absolute path to the current markdown file.
+
+    Returns:
+        HTML string.
+    """
+    # Get vault data for image resolution
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"]) if vault_data else None
+    attachments_path = vault_data.get("config", {}).get("attachmentsPath") if vault_data else None
+
+    # Redact secrets before rendering (P0 security)
+    raw_md = redact_file_content(raw_md, str(current_file_path) if current_file_path else "")
+
+    # Preprocess images first
+    if vault_root:
+        raw_md = preprocess_images(raw_md, vault_name, vault_root, current_file_path, attachments_path)
+
+    # Convert wikilinks
+    converted = _convert_wikilinks(raw_md, vault_name)
+
+    # Normalize line breaks to match Obsidian behavior (single \n → hard break)
+    converted = _normalize_line_breaks(converted)
+
+    rendered = _markdown_renderer(converted)
+
+    # Add heading IDs for TOC navigation
+    rendered = _add_heading_ids(rendered)
+
+    # Sanitize: raw HTML in vault content must never reach the DOM (BUG-021).
+    rendered = sanitize_html(rendered)
+
+    return rendered

backend/routers/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
+"""Configuration, AI keys, diagnostics & dashboard endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 7).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/config*``, ``/api/diagnostics``,
+``/api/dashboard``), mêmes modèles de réponse, mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_load_config`` / ``_save_config`` / ``_DEFAULT_CONFIG`` /
+  ``_CONFIG_PATH`` / ``_BASE_DIR`` ont déménagé ici : ``main`` les
+  réimporte pour son lifespan (pas de cycle : ce module ne dépend pas de
+  ``main``).
+- ``AI_KEYS_FILE`` / ``_write_ai_keys`` / ``_FALLBACK_MODELS`` ont déménagé
+  ici (``AI_KEYS_FILE`` garde son chemin relatif ``data/api_keys.json``,
+  résolu depuis le même CWD au runtime).
+"""
+
+import json as _json
+import logging
+import os
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.ai import PROVIDERS, _read_ai_keys, get_ai_key
+from backend.auth.middleware import require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import index
+from backend.media_types import IMAGE_EXTENSIONS
+from backend.schemas import (
+    AIKeyDeleteResponse,
+    AIKeysResponse,
+    AIModelsResponse,
+    AITestResponse,
+    AppConfigResponse,
+    DashboardResponse,
+    DiagnosticsResponse,
+    StatusResponse,
+)
+from backend.search_executor import get_search_executor
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    TOOL_KEY_NAMES as _TOOL_KEY_NAMES,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    delete_tool_key as _delete_tool_key,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    get_tool_key as _get_tool_key,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    mask_value as _mask_tool_value,
+)
+from backend.tools.secrets import (
+    set_tool_key as _set_tool_key,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["System"])
+
+_BASE_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
+_CONFIG_PATH = _BASE_DIR / "data" / "config.json"
+
+_DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
+    "search_workers": 2,
+    "debounce_ms": 300,
+    "results_per_page": 50,
+    "min_query_length": 2,
+    "search_timeout_ms": 30000,
+    "max_content_size": 100000,
+    "snippet_context_chars": 120,
+    "max_snippet_highlights": 5,
+    "title_boost": 3.0,
+    "path_boost": 1.5,
+    "watcher_enabled": True,
+    "watcher_use_polling": False,
+    "watcher_polling_interval": 5.0,
+    "watcher_debounce": 2.0,
+    "tag_boost": 2.0,
+    "prefix_max_expansions": 50,
+    "recent_files_limit": 20,
+    "max_backups_per_file": 10,
+    "ai_default_provider": "deepseek",
+    "ai_default_models": {},
+}
+
+
+def _load_config() -> dict:
+    """Load config from disk, merging with defaults."""
+    config = dict(_DEFAULT_CONFIG)
+    if _CONFIG_PATH.exists():
+        try:
+            stored = _json.loads(_CONFIG_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            config.update(stored)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Failed to read config.json: {e}")
+    return config
+
+
+def _save_config(config: dict) -> None:
+    """Persist config to disk."""
+    try:
+        _CONFIG_PATH.write_text(
+            _json.dumps(config, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.error(f"Failed to write config.json: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to save config: {e}")
+
+
+AI_KEYS_FILE = Path("data/api_keys.json")
+
+def _write_ai_keys(data: dict):
+    AI_KEYS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = AI_KEYS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(_json.dumps(data, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(AI_KEYS_FILE)
+
+@router.get("/api/config", response_model=AppConfigResponse)
+async def api_get_config(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return current configuration with defaults for missing keys."""
+    return _load_config()
+
+
+@router.post("/api/config", response_model=AppConfigResponse)
+async def api_set_config(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Update configuration. Only known keys are accepted.
+
+    Keys matching ``_DEFAULT_CONFIG`` are validated and persisted.
+    Unknown keys are silently ignored.
+    Returns the full merged config after update.
+    """
+    current = _load_config()
+    updated_keys = []
+    for key, value in body.items():
+        if key in _DEFAULT_CONFIG:
+            expected_type = type(_DEFAULT_CONFIG[key])
+            if isinstance(value, expected_type) or (expected_type is float and isinstance(value, (int, float))):
+                current[key] = value
+                updated_keys.append(key)
+            else:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=400,
+                    detail=f"Invalid type for '{key}': expected {expected_type.__name__}, got {type(value).__name__}",
+                )
+    _save_config(current)
+    if any(k.startswith("ai_") for k in updated_keys):
+        try:
+            from backend.ai import reload_ai_config
+            reload_ai_config()
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning(f"Failed to reload AI config: {e}")
+    logger.info(f"Config updated: {updated_keys}")
+    return current
+
+
+@router.get("/api/config/ai-keys", response_model=AIKeysResponse)
+async def api_get_ai_keys(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Return stored AI keys (values masked)."""
+    keys = _read_ai_keys()
+    masked = {}
+    for k in ["DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY", "NVIDIA_API_KEY", "QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY"]:
+        val = keys.get(k, "") or os.environ.get(k, "")
+        if val:
+            masked[k] = val[:4] + "..." + val[-4:] if len(val) > 8 else "***"
+        else:
+            masked[k] = ""
+    return masked
+
+@router.post("/api/config/ai-keys", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_set_ai_keys(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Save AI keys. Pass {"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY":"sk-...","OPENROUTER_API_KEY":"...","GEMINI_API_KEY":"..."}"""
+    keys = _read_ai_keys()
+    for k in ["DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY", "NVIDIA_API_KEY", "QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY"]:
+        if body.get(k):
+            keys[k] = body[k]
+    _write_ai_keys(keys)
+    logger.info("AI keys updated")
+    return {"status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/config/ai-keys/{provider_env}", response_model=AIKeyDeleteResponse)
+async def api_delete_ai_key(provider_env: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Delete a specific AI provider key from storage."""
+    allowed = {"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY",
+               "NVIDIA_API_KEY", "QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY"}
+    key_name = provider_env.upper()
+    if key_name not in allowed:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Clé inconnue: {provider_env}")
+    keys = _read_ai_keys()
+    if key_name in keys:
+        del keys[key_name]
+        _write_ai_keys(keys)
+    # Also clear from env at runtime so get_ai_key() no longer finds it
+    os.environ.pop(key_name, None)
+    logger.info(f"AI key deleted: {key_name}")
+    return {"status": "deleted", "key": key_name}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/config/tool-keys", response_model=AIKeysResponse)
+async def api_get_tool_keys(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Return tool/connected-source configuration (tokens masked, URLs clear)."""
+    masked = {}
+    for name in _TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+        masked[name] = _mask_tool_value(name, _get_tool_key(name))
+    return masked
+
+
+@router.post("/api/config/tool-keys", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_set_tool_keys(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Save tool/connected-source keys.
+
+    Only whitelisted names (``backend.tools.secrets.TOOL_KEY_NAMES``) are
+    accepted: Tavily/Brave/SerpAPI/Exa API keys, Gitea URL + token, GitHub
+    token. Empty values delete the stored entry.
+    """
+    updated = []
+    for name, value in body.items():
+        if name not in _TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Clé inconnue: {name}")
+        if value is not None and not isinstance(value, str):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Type invalide pour {name}")
+        _set_tool_key(name, value or "")
+        updated.append(name)
+    logger.info(f"Tool keys updated: {updated}")
+    return {"status": "ok"}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/config/tool-keys/{name}", response_model=AIKeyDeleteResponse)
+async def api_delete_tool_key(name: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Delete a stored tool key (the environment fallback still applies)."""
+    key_name = name.upper()
+    try:
+        existed = _delete_tool_key(key_name)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
+    logger.info(f"Tool key deleted: {key_name} (existed={existed})")
+    return {"status": "deleted", "key": key_name}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/config/ai-keys/test", response_model=AITestResponse)
+async def api_test_ai_keys(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Test which AI providers are configured.
+
+    Each provider has a dedicated (URL, header-name) test pair.
+    - Most OpenAI-compatible APIs use `Authorization: Bearer KEY`
+    - Xiaomi MiMo uses `api-key: KEY`
+    - Gemini uses a query-string key
+    """
+    results = {}
+    for key_name, label, test_url_tmpl, header_name in [
+        # OpenAI-compatible — Authorization: Bearer
+        ("DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",  "deepseek",   "https://api.deepseek.com/v1/models",                   "Authorization"),
+        ("OPENROUTER_API_KEY","openrouter", "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/models",                   "Authorization"),
+        ("NVIDIA_API_KEY",    "nvidia",     "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models",           "Authorization"),
+        ("QWENCLOUD_API_KEY", "qwencloud",  "https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1/models", "Authorization"),
+        ("MISTRAL_API_KEY",   "mistral",    "https://api.mistral.ai/v1/models",                     "Authorization"),
+        # Xiaomi MiMo — dedicated api-key header (NOT Authorization: Bearer)
+        ("XIAOMI_API_KEY",    "xiaomi",     "https://api.xiaomimimo.com/v1/models",                 "api-key"),
+        # Gemini — key in query string
+        ("GEMINI_API_KEY",    "gemini",     "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models?key={key}", None),
+    ]:
+        key = get_ai_key(key_name)
+        if not key:
+            results[label] = "non configuré"
+            continue
+        try:
+            url = test_url_tmpl.replace("{key}", key) if "{key}" in test_url_tmpl else test_url_tmpl
+            if header_name:
+                req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={header_name: key})
+            else:
+                req = urllib.request.Request(url)
+            urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5)
+            results[label] = "ok"
+        except Exception as e:
+            # Truncate the error to keep the response small.
+            results[label] = "erreur: " + str(e)[:80]
+    return results
+
+
+@router.get("/api/config/ai-models", response_model=AIModelsResponse)
+async def api_list_ai_models(provider: str = Query(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """List available models for a given AI provider.
+
+    Strategy:
+    1. Try the provider's public models endpoint (OpenAI-compatible /v1/models or Gemini).
+    2. If the network call fails (timeout, 4xx, 5xx, DNS, etc.), fall back to a
+       curated static list of known-good models for that provider.
+    3. Always return a non-empty list when the provider is known, so the UI
+       dropdown is never empty.
+    """
+    provider = provider.lower()
+
+    from backend.model_capabilities import get_capabilities_for_models
+    from backend.provider_capabilities import remember_declared_capabilities
+
+    all_providers = ("deepseek", "openrouter", "gemini", "nvidia", "qwencloud", "xiaomi", "mistral")
+    if provider not in all_providers:
+        return {"models": [], "error": f"Unknown provider: {provider}", "source": "validation"}
+
+    key_name = f"{provider.upper()}_API_KEY"
+    key = get_ai_key(key_name)
+    if not key:
+        # No key configured — return curated fallback list so the UI can
+        # still show what WOULD be available once a key is set.
+        fallback = _FALLBACK_MODELS.get(provider, [])
+        return {"models": fallback, "source": "fallback",
+                "capabilities": get_capabilities_for_models(provider, fallback),
+                "note": "API key not configured — showing default model list"}
+
+    # Build URL
+    if provider == "gemini":
+        url = f"https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models?key={key}"
+    elif provider == "deepseek":
+        url = "https://api.deepseek.com/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "openrouter":
+        url = "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "nvidia":
+        url = "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "qwencloud":
+        url = "https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1/models"
+    elif provider == "xiaomi":
+        # Xiaomi MiMo — dedicated api-key header (NOT Authorization: Bearer).
+        # Endpoint: https://api.xiaomimimo.com/v1/models
+        url = "https://api.xiaomimimo.com/v1/models"
+        models = []  # parsed below with the custom header
+    elif provider == "mistral":
+        url = "https://api.mistral.ai/v1/models"
+
+    try:
+        if provider == "gemini":
+            req = urllib.request.Request(url)
+        elif provider == "xiaomi":
+            # Xiaomi MiMo uses a dedicated api-key header.
+            req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"api-key": key})
+        else:
+            req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + key})
+
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
+            data = _json.loads(resp.read().decode())
+
+        if provider == "gemini":
+            models = [m.get("name", "") for m in data.get("models", []) if m.get("name")]
+            # Gemini returns names like "models/gemini-1.5-flash" — strip prefix
+            models = [m.replace("models/", "") for m in models]
+        else:
+            models = [m.get("id", "") for m in data.get("data", []) if m.get("id")]
+
+        # Cache the capabilities the provider declares for these models
+        # (BUG-044) — get_capabilities_for_models() below then returns the
+        # provider's own truth for the flags it declares, the curated table
+        # for the rest. Providers that declare nothing are left untouched.
+        remember_declared_capabilities(provider, data)
+
+        if models:
+            # Prepend the configured default if not already present
+            default = PROVIDERS.get(provider, {}).get("model")
+            if default and default not in models:
+                models = [default] + models
+            return {"models": models, "source": "live", "count": len(models),
+                    "capabilities": get_capabilities_for_models(provider, models)}
+        # Empty list from API — fall through to fallback
+        raise ValueError("empty model list from provider API")
+    except Exception as e:
+        # Network error, auth error, parsing error — use curated fallback
+        fallback = _FALLBACK_MODELS.get(provider, [])
+        return {"models": fallback, "source": "fallback", "error": str(e)[:200],
+                "capabilities": get_capabilities_for_models(provider, fallback),
+                "note": "Could not reach provider API — showing default model list"}
+
+
+# ── Curated fallback model lists ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# Used when the provider API is unreachable or returns empty.
+# Keep these short and focused on models known to work with the
+# OpenAI-compatible chat completions interface (or Gemini's generateContent).
+_FALLBACK_MODELS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
+    "deepseek": [
+        "deepseek-chat",
+        "deepseek-reasoner",
+    ],
+    "openrouter": [
+        "openai/gpt-4o-mini",
+        "openai/gpt-4o",
+        "anthropic/claude-3.5-sonnet",
+        "anthropic/claude-3-haiku",
+        "google/gemini-2.0-flash-exp:free",
+        "meta-llama/llama-3.1-70b-instruct",
+        "meta-llama/llama-3.1-8b-instruct:free",
+        "mistralai/mistral-large-latest",
+    ],
+    "gemini": [
+        "gemini-2.0-flash",
+        "gemini-2.0-flash-exp",
+        "gemini-1.5-pro",
+        "gemini-1.5-flash",
+        "gemini-1.5-flash-8b",
+    ],
+    "nvidia": [
+        "meta/llama-3.1-405b-instruct",
+        "meta/llama-3.1-70b-instruct",
+        "meta/llama-3.1-8b-instruct",
+        "mistralai/mistral-large",
+        "google/gemma-2-27b-it",
+        "nvidia/llama-3.1-nemotron-70b-instruct",
+    ],
+    "qwencloud": [
+        "qwen-max",
+        "qwen-plus",
+        "qwen-turbo",
+        "qwen-long",
+        "qwen-vl-max",
+        "qwen-vl-plus",
+    ],
+    "xiaomi": [
+        # Xiaomi MiMo models — the public /v1/models endpoint requires the
+        # `api-key` custom header (NOT Authorization: Bearer), so the live
+        # call often fails with 401 even with the right key. We ship a
+        # known-good list as fallback. See https://mimo.mi.com/docs/
+        "mimo-v2.5-pro",
+        "mimo-v2.5",
+        "mimo-v2.5-asr",
+        "mimo-v2.5-tts",
+        "mimo-v2.5-tts-voiceclone",
+        "mimo-v2.5-tts-voicedesign",
+    ],
+    "mistral": [
+        "mistral-large-latest",
+        "mistral-medium-latest",
+        "mistral-small-latest",
+        "open-mistral-7b",
+        "open-mixtral-8x7b",
+        "codestral-latest",
+    ],
+}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/diagnostics", response_model=DiagnosticsResponse)
+async def api_diagnostics(current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Return index statistics and system diagnostics.
+
+    Includes document counts, token counts, memory estimates,
+    and inverted index status.
+    """
+    import sys
+
+    from backend.search import get_inverted_index
+
+    inv = get_inverted_index()
+
+    # Per-vault stats
+    vault_stats = {}
+    total_files = 0
+    total_tags = 0
+    # Snapshot both dicts first: the indexer mutates them from background
+    # threads, and iterating a live dict raises "dictionary changed size".
+    for vname, vdata in list(index.items()):
+        file_count = len(vdata.get("files", []))
+        tag_count = len(vdata.get("tags", {}))
+        vault_stats[vname] = {"file_count": file_count, "tag_count": tag_count}
+        total_files += file_count
+        total_tags += tag_count
+
+    # Memory estimate for inverted index
+    word_index = inv.word_index.copy()
+    word_index_entries = sum(len(docs) for docs in word_index.values())
+    mem_estimate_mb = round(
+        (sys.getsizeof(inv.word_index) + word_index_entries * 80
+         + len(inv.doc_info) * 200
+         + len(inv._sorted_tokens) * 60) / (1024 * 1024), 2
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "index": {
+            "total_files": total_files,
+            "total_tags": total_tags,
+            "vaults": vault_stats,
+        },
+        "inverted_index": {
+            "unique_tokens": len(word_index),
+            "total_postings": word_index_entries,
+            "documents": inv.doc_count,
+            "sorted_tokens": len(inv._sorted_tokens),
+            "is_stale": inv.is_stale(),
+            "memory_estimate_mb": mem_estimate_mb,
+        },
+        "config": _load_config(),
+        "search_executor": {
+            "active": get_search_executor() is not None,
+            "max_workers": get_search_executor()._max_workers if get_search_executor() else 0,
+        },
+    }
+
+
+@router.get("/api/dashboard", response_model=DashboardResponse)
+async def api_dashboard(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Aggregated dashboard statistics across all accessible vaults."""
+    user_vaults = current_user.get("_token_vaults") or current_user.get("vaults", [])
+    vault_stats = []
+    total_files = 0
+    total_tags = set()
+    total_size = 0
+    total_images = 0
+    for vname, vdata in index.items():
+        if "*" not in user_vaults and vname not in user_vaults:
+            continue
+        files = vdata.get("files", [])
+        fc = len(files)
+        total_files += fc
+        vtags = set()
+        vsize = 0
+        vimages = 0
+        for f in files:
+            vtags.update(f.get("tags", []))
+            vsize += f.get("size", 0)
+            if (f.get("extension") or "").lower() in IMAGE_EXTENSIONS:
+                vimages += 1
+        total_tags.update(vtags)
+        total_size += vsize
+        total_images += vimages
+        vault_stats.append({
+            "name": vname, "file_count": fc, "tag_count": len(vtags),
+            "total_size_bytes": vsize, "image_count": vimages,
+        })
+    return {
+        "vaults": vault_stats,
+        "total_files": total_files,
+        "total_tags": len(total_tags),
+        "total_size_bytes": total_size,
+        "total_images": total_images,
+    }

backend/routers/conflicts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""Syncthing conflict endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/conflicts*``), mêmes modèles de
+réponse, mêmes dépendances d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` / ``_backup_file`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths`
+  et :mod:`backend.services.backups` (pass-through).
+"""
+
+import logging
+import shutil
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+
+from backend.audit import log_file_delete
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import get_conflicts, get_vault_data, remove_single_file
+from backend.schemas import ConflictResolveResponse, ConflictsResponse
+from backend.services.backups import create_backup
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["conflicts"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/conflicts", response_model=ConflictsResponse)
+async def api_conflicts(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List sync-conflict files across accessible vaults."""
+    user_vaults = current_user.get("_token_vaults") or current_user.get("vaults", [])
+    all_conflicts = get_conflicts()
+    if "*" not in user_vaults:
+        all_conflicts = [c for c in all_conflicts if c["vault"] in user_vaults]
+    return {"conflicts": all_conflicts, "total": len(all_conflicts)}
+
+
+@router.post("/api/conflicts/resolve", response_model=ConflictResolveResponse)
+async def api_conflict_resolve(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Resolve a conflict: keep_local (delete conflict file) or keep_conflict (replace original)."""
+    vault_name = body.get("vault")
+    conflict_path = body.get("conflict_path")
+    original_path = body.get("original_path")
+    action = body.get("action")  # "keep_local" or "keep_conflict"
+    # mypy: narrow down from dict values
+    assert isinstance(vault_name, str), "'vault' is required and must be a string"
+    assert isinstance(conflict_path, str), "'conflict_path' is required and must be a string"
+    assert isinstance(original_path, str), "'original_path' is required and must be a string"
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(403, f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)
+    if not vault_data:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Vault not found")
+    vault_root = Path(vault_data["path"])
+    conf_file = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, conflict_path)
+    orig_file = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, original_path)
+    if not conf_file.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Conflict file not found")
+    try:
+        if action == "keep_conflict":
+            create_backup(orig_file, vault_name, original_path)
+            shutil.copy2(conf_file, orig_file)
+            logger.info(f"Conflict resolved (keep_conflict): {conflict_path} → {original_path}")
+        conf_file.unlink()
+        await remove_single_file(vault_name, conflict_path)
+        log_file_delete(current_user["username"], vault_name, conflict_path)
+        await sse_manager.broadcast("file_deleted", {"vault": vault_name, "path": conflict_path})
+        return {"status": "resolved", "action": action}
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise HTTPException(500, f"Error resolving conflict: {e!s}")

backend/routers/files_media.py

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ d'authentification.
 
 Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
 - ``_resolve_safe_path`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths` (pass-through).
-- ``_render_markdown`` reste dans ``main`` (import différé).
+- ``_render_markdown`` vient de :mod:`backend.render` (#85 T9, sans cycle
+  d'import).
 - ``_resolve_export_target`` / ``_safe_export_name`` (export uniquement)
   sont définis ici ; ``stream_file_with_range`` vit dans
   :mod:`backend.routers.helpers` (partagé).
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ from backend.history import record_open
 from backend.indexer import get_vault_data, index, parse_markdown_file
 from backend.media_thumbs import generate_thumbnail, is_decodable
 from backend.media_types import is_audio, is_image, is_video, media_mime_type
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
 from backend.routers.helpers import media_max_inline_bytes, stream_file_with_range
 from backend.schemas import (
     AllVaultSettingsResponse,
@@ -85,8 +87,6 @@ def _safe_export_name(name: str) -> str:
 )
 async def api_file_pdf(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative path to file"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
     """Download a markdown file as PDF."""
-    from backend.main import _render_markdown  # différé : évite l'import circulaire (#85)
-
     if generate_pdf is None:
         raise HTTPException(501, "PDF export unavailable (WeasyPrint/GTK not available)")
     if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):

backend/routers/files_read.py

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ lecture), mêmes modèles de réponse (déménagés dans
 
 Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
 - ``_resolve_safe_path`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths` (pass-through).
-- ``_render_markdown`` reste dans ``main`` (import différé, extraction
-  prévue dans une tranche ultérieure).
+- ``_render_markdown`` vient de :mod:`backend.render` (#85 T9, sans cycle
+  d'import).
 - ``_content_disposition`` / ``_media_max_inline_bytes`` / ``EXT_TO_LANG``
   ont déménagé : helpers partagés dans :mod:`backend.routers.helpers`
   (``EXT_TO_LANG`` n'était utilisé que par la vue fichier).
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ from backend.indexer import (
     parse_markdown_file,
 )
 from backend.media_types import is_audio, is_image, is_video, media_mime_type
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
 from backend.routers.helpers import media_max_inline_bytes
 from backend.schemas import (
     BacklinksResponse,
@@ -192,8 +193,6 @@ async def api_file(vault_name: str, path: str = Query(..., description="Relative
     Returns:
         ``FileContentResponse`` with HTML, metadata, and tags.
     """
-    from backend.main import _render_markdown  # différé : évite l'import circulaire (#85)
-
     if not check_vault_access(vault_name, current_user):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=f"Accès refusé à la vault '{vault_name}'")
     vault_data = get_vault_data(vault_name)

backend/routers/history.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"""History endpoints — recent, bookmarks, saved searches (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins, mêmes modèles (``BookmarkToggleRequest``
+déménagé dans :mod:`backend.schemas`), mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Adaptations strictement équivalentes :
+- ``_resolve_safe_path`` / ``_backup_file`` → :mod:`backend.services.paths`
+  et :mod:`backend.services.backups` (pass-through).
+- ``_load_config`` vient de :mod:`backend.routers.config`.
+"""
+
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import frontmatter
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.history import get_bookmarks, toggle_bookmark
+from backend.indexer import find_file_in_index, get_vault_data, update_single_file
+from backend.routers.config import _load_config
+from backend.saved_searches import delete_saved, get_saved, save_search
+from backend.schemas import (
+    BookmarksResponse,
+    BookmarkToggleRequest,
+    BookmarkToggleResponse,
+    RecentResponse,
+    SavedSearch,
+    StatusResponse,
+)
+from backend.services.backups import create_backup
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime, list_recent
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate")
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["Bookmarks"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/recent", response_model=RecentResponse)
+async def api_recent(limit: int | None = Query(None), vault: str | None = Query(None), mode: str | None = Query("opened"), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    config = _load_config()
+    actual_limit = limit if limit is not None else config.get("recent_files_limit", 20)
+
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    user_vaults = current_user.get("_token_vaults") or current_user.get("vaults", [])
+
+    return list_recent(
+        username,
+        user_vaults,
+        vault=vault,
+        limit=actual_limit,
+        mode=mode or "opened",
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/api/bookmarks", response_model=BookmarksResponse)
+async def api_bookmarks(vault: str | None = Query(None), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    user_vaults = current_user.get("_token_vaults") or current_user.get("vaults", [])
+
+    if not username:
+        return {"files": []}
+
+    history = get_bookmarks(username, vault_filter=vault)
+    files_resp = []
+    for item in history:
+        v_name = item["vault"]
+        if "*" not in user_vaults and v_name not in user_vaults:
+            continue
+
+        # Find in index to get metadata
+        f_idx = find_file_in_index(item["path"], v_name)
+        if f_idx:
+            files_resp.append({
+                "path": f_idx["path"],
+                "title": f_idx.get("title") or item["path"].split("/")[-1],
+                "vault": v_name,
+                "mtime": item["bookmarked_at"],
+                "mtime_human": humanize_mtime(item["bookmarked_at"]),
+                "size_bytes": f_idx.get("size", 0),
+                "tags": [f"#{t}" for t in f_idx.get("tags", [])][:5],
+                "bookmarked": True
+            })
+        else:
+            files_resp.append({
+                "path": item["path"],
+                "title": item.get("title") or item["path"].split("/")[-1],
+                "vault": v_name,
+                "mtime": item["bookmarked_at"],
+                "mtime_human": humanize_mtime(item["bookmarked_at"]),
+                "tags": [],
+                "bookmarked": True
+            })
+    return {
+        "files": files_resp,
+        "total": len(files_resp)
+    }
+
+
+@router.post("/api/bookmarks/toggle", response_model=BookmarkToggleResponse)
+async def api_toggle_bookmark(req: BookmarkToggleRequest, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
+
+    # Check vault access
+    if not check_vault_access(req.vault, current_user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied to vault")
+
+    is_now_bookmarked = toggle_bookmark(username, req.vault, req.path, req.title or "")
+
+    # Update the file's YAML frontmatter: favoris: true/false
+    vault_data = get_vault_data(req.vault)
+    if vault_data:
+        file_path = resolve_safe_path(Path(vault_data["path"]), req.path)
+        if file_path.exists() and file_path.suffix == ".md":
+            try:
+                raw = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+                post = frontmatter.loads(raw)
+                if is_now_bookmarked:
+                    post.metadata["favoris"] = True
+                elif "favoris" in post.metadata:
+                    del post.metadata["favoris"]
+                new_raw = frontmatter.dumps(post)
+                create_backup(file_path, req.vault, req.path)
+                file_path.write_text(new_raw, encoding="utf-8")
+                await update_single_file(req.vault, str(file_path))
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.warning(f"Failed to update favoris metadata on {req.vault}/{req.path}: {e}")
+
+    return {"bookmarked": is_now_bookmarked}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/saved-searches", response_model=list[SavedSearch])
+async def api_saved_searches(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(401)
+    return get_saved(username)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/saved-searches", response_model=SavedSearch)
+async def api_save_search(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(401)
+    return save_search(username, body)
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/saved-searches/{search_id}", response_model=StatusResponse)
+async def api_delete_saved_search(search_id: str, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    username = current_user.get("username")
+    if not username:
+        raise HTTPException(401)
+    if not delete_saved(username, search_id):
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Not found")
+    return {"status": "deleted"}

backend/routers/realtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+"""Real-time endpoints — SSE stream & collaboration WebSocket (ROADMAP #85, tranche 9).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/events``,
+``/ws/collab/{vault}/{path}``), même authentification (Depend pour le SSE,
+manuelle pour le WebSocket — les ``Depends`` FastAPI ne s'exécutent pas sur
+les routes WebSocket).
+
+Pas de tags déclarés : assignation par chemin via
+``openapi_docs.tag_for_path`` comme avant (``/api/events`` → System).
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import json as _json
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, WebSocket
+from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
+from backend.collab import authenticate_websocket, collab_manager
+from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+from backend.services.vaults import get_vault_root
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get(
+    "/api/events",
+    response_class=StreamingResponse,
+    responses={200: {"content": {"text/event-stream": {}}, "description": "Server-Sent Events stream"}},
+)
+async def api_events(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """SSE stream for real-time index update notifications.
+
+    Sends keepalive comments every 30s. Events:
+    - ``index_updated``: partial index change (file create/modify/delete/move)
+    - ``index_reloaded``: full re-index completed
+    - ``vault_added``: new vault added dynamically
+    - ``vault_removed``: vault removed dynamically
+    """
+    queue = await sse_manager.connect()
+
+    async def event_generator():
+        try:
+            # Send initial connection event
+            yield f"event: connected\ndata: {_json.dumps({'sse_clients': sse_manager.client_count})}\n\n"
+            while True:
+                try:
+                    msg = await asyncio.wait_for(queue.get(), timeout=30.0)
+                    yield f"event: {msg['event']}\ndata: {msg['data']}\n\n"
+                except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+                    # Keepalive comment
+                    yield ": keepalive\n\n"
+                except asyncio.CancelledError:
+                    break
+        finally:
+            sse_manager.disconnect(queue)
+
+    return StreamingResponse(
+        event_generator(),
+        media_type="text/event-stream",
+        headers={
+            "Cache-Control": "no-cache",
+            "Connection": "keep-alive",
+            "X-Accel-Buffering": "no",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+@router.websocket("/ws/collab/{vault_name}/{path:path}")
+async def collab_websocket(websocket: WebSocket, vault_name: str, path: str):
+    """Real-time collaborative editing over WebSocket (ROADMAP #62).
+
+    One *room* is created per ``vault::path``; all clients editing the same
+    file share Yjs/CRDT updates, awareness (cursors/selection) and a debounced
+    server-side persistence of the markdown content.
+
+    Authentication is performed manually (FastAPI ``Depends`` do not run for
+    WebSocket routes) and vault access is enforced per connection.
+    """
+    from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+
+    user = authenticate_websocket(websocket)
+    if user is None:
+        await websocket.close(code=4401)
+        return
+
+    if not check_vault_access(vault_name, user):
+        await websocket.close(code=4403)
+        return
+
+    try:
+        vault_root = get_vault_root(vault_name)
+        file_path = resolve_safe_path(vault_root, path)
+    except ServiceError:
+        await websocket.close(code=4404)
+        return
+
+    if not file_path.exists() or not file_path.is_file():
+        await websocket.close(code=4404)
+        return
+
+    await websocket.accept()
+    await collab_manager.connect(websocket, vault_name, path, file_path, user)

backend/routers/sharing.py

@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ Adaptations strictement équivalentes (pas de changement de comportement) :
   wrappers directs : appelés ici via :mod:`backend.services.paths` et
   :mod:`backend.services.backups` (mêmes signatures, mêmes exceptions
   ``ServiceError`` toujours mappées par le handler global de ``main``).
-- ``_render_markdown`` reste défini dans ``main`` (extraction prévue dans
-  une tranche ultérieure) : import différé à l'intérieur des handlers, donc
-  sans import circulaire au chargement.
+- ``_render_markdown`` vient de :mod:`backend.render` (#85 T9, sans cycle
+  d'import).
 """
 
 import html as html_mod
@@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, Response
 
 from backend.auth.middleware import check_vault_access, require_auth
 from backend.indexer import get_vault_data, parse_markdown_file, update_single_file
+from backend.render import _render_markdown
 from backend.schemas import ShareModel, StatusResponse
 from backend.secret_redactor import redact_file_content
 from backend.services.backups import create_backup
@@ -115,8 +115,6 @@ async def api_share_revoke(share_id: str, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
 )
 async def public_share_pdf_download(token: str):
     """Download shared document as real PDF via WeasyPrint."""
-    from backend.main import _render_markdown  # différé : évite l'import circulaire (#85)
-
     if generate_pdf is None:
         raise HTTPException(501, "PDF export unavailable (WeasyPrint/GTK not available)")
     share = get_share_by_token(token)
@@ -168,8 +166,6 @@ async def public_share_raw(token: str):
 @router.get("/s/{token}", response_class=HTMLResponse)
 async def public_share_view(token: str):
     """Public share view — no authentication required."""
-    from backend.main import _render_markdown  # différé : évite l'import circulaire (#85)
-
     share = get_share_by_token(token)
     if not share:
         raise HTTPException(404, "Share not found or expired")

backend/routers/vaults.py

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+"""Vault management endpoints (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Handlers déplacés depuis :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de
+comportement : mêmes chemins (``/api/vaults*``), mêmes modèles de réponse
+(``VaultInfo`` déménagé dans :mod:`backend.schemas`), mêmes dépendances
+d'authentification.
+
+Le handle du file-watcher vit désormais dans :mod:`backend.watcher_state`
+(partagé avec le lifespan de ``main``) au lieu du global de ``main``.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException
+
+from backend.auth.middleware import require_admin, require_auth
+from backend.indexer import add_vault_to_index, index, remove_vault_from_index
+from backend.schemas import VaultActionResponse, VaultInfo, VaultsStatusResponse, VaultStatsResponse
+from backend.services.vaults import list_accessible_vaults
+from backend.sse import sse_manager
+from backend.watcher_state import get_watcher
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["vaults"])
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vaults", response_model=list[VaultInfo])
+async def api_vaults(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """List configured vaults the user has access to.
+
+    Returns:
+        List of vault summary objects filtered by user permissions.
+    """
+    return list_accessible_vaults(current_user)
+
+
+@router.post("/api/vaults/add", response_model=VaultStatsResponse)
+async def api_add_vault(body: dict = Body(...), current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Add a new vault dynamically without restarting.
+
+    Body:
+        name: Display name for the vault.
+        path: Absolute filesystem path to the vault directory.
+    """
+    name = body.get("name", "").strip()
+    vault_path = body.get("path", "").strip()
+
+    if not name or not vault_path:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Both 'name' and 'path' are required")
+
+    if name in index:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=f"Vault '{name}' already exists")
+
+    if not Path(vault_path).exists():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Path does not exist: {vault_path}")
+
+    stats = await add_vault_to_index(name, vault_path)
+
+    # Start watching the new vault
+    watcher = get_watcher()
+    if watcher:
+        await watcher.add_vault(name, vault_path)
+
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_added", {"vault": name, "stats": stats})
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": name, "stats": stats}
+
+
+@router.delete("/api/vaults/{vault_name}", response_model=VaultActionResponse)
+async def api_remove_vault(vault_name: str, current_user=Depends(require_admin)):
+    """Remove a vault from the index and stop watching it.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Name of the vault to remove.
+    """
+    if vault_name not in index:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Vault '{vault_name}' not found")
+
+    # Stop watching
+    watcher = get_watcher()
+    if watcher:
+        await watcher.remove_vault(vault_name)
+
+    await remove_vault_from_index(vault_name)
+    await sse_manager.broadcast("vault_removed", {"vault": vault_name})
+    return {"status": "ok", "vault": vault_name}
+
+
+@router.get("/api/vaults/status", response_model=VaultsStatusResponse)
+async def api_vaults_status(current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Detailed status of all vaults including watcher state.
+
+    Returns per-vault: file count, tag count, watching status, vault path.
+    """
+    watcher = get_watcher()
+    statuses = {}
+    for vname, vdata in index.items():
+        watching = watcher is not None and vname in watcher.observers
+        statuses[vname] = {
+            "file_count": len(vdata.get("files", [])),
+            "tag_count": len(vdata.get("tags", {})),
+            "path": vdata.get("path", ""),
+            "watching": watching,
+        }
+    return {
+        "vaults": statuses,
+        "watcher_active": watcher is not None,
+        "sse_clients": sse_manager.client_count,
+    }

backend/schemas.py

@@ -214,6 +214,30 @@ class RestoreResponse(BaseModel):
     current_backed_up: int | None = Field(default=None, description="Timestamp of the backup created from the current version before restore, if any")
 
 
+class BackupEntry(BaseModel):
+    """A single backup version of a file (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    timestamp: int = Field(description="Unix timestamp of when the backup was created")
+    datetime: str = Field(description="ISO 8601 datetime string")
+    size: int = Field(description="File size in bytes")
+    filename: str = Field(description="Backup filename on disk")
+
+
+class BackupListResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response listing all available backups for a file (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    vault: str = Field(description="Vault name")
+    path: str = Field(description="Relative file path")
+    backups: list[BackupEntry] = Field(description="Available backups, newest first")
+
+
+class DiffRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request parameters for generating a diff (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)."""
+
+    version: int = Field(description="Timestamp of the backup version to compare")
+    compare_with: int | None = Field(default=None, description="Timestamp of another backup version. If omitted, compares with the current file.")
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Files — browse / read (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -411,6 +435,28 @@ class FileMoveResponse(BaseModel):
     item_type: str = Field(description="Type of item moved: 'file' or 'directory'")
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Vaults & history (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class VaultInfo(BaseModel):
+    """Summary information about a configured vault."""
+
+    name: str = Field(description="Display name of the vault")
+    file_count: int = Field(description="Number of indexed files")
+    tag_count: int = Field(description="Number of unique tags")
+    type: str = Field(default="VAULT", description="Type of the vault mapping (VAULT or DIR)")
+
+
+class BookmarkToggleRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request to toggle a bookmark on a file."""
+
+    vault: str
+    path: str
+    title: str | None = None
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Search / suggest / graph (#85 — extrait de backend.main, inchangé)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

backend/services/backups.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ DEFAULT_MAX_BACKUPS = 10
 def _default_max_backups() -> int:
     """Read ``max_backups_per_file`` from app config (lazy, best-effort)."""
     try:
-        from backend.main import _load_config
+        from backend.routers.config import _load_config  # ROADMAP #85 T7 — déménagé depuis backend.main
 
         return int(_load_config().get("max_backups_per_file", DEFAULT_MAX_BACKUPS))
     except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - config unavailable

backend/share.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ No authentication required for public share views.
 import json
 import logging
 import secrets
+import threading
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
 
@@ -17,6 +18,10 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.share")
 
 SHARES_FILE = Path("data/shares.json")
 
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour des read-modify-write (perte de mises à
+# jour en cas de créations/accès/révocations concurrents).
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
 
 def _read() -> dict:
     if not SHARES_FILE.exists():
@@ -41,26 +46,27 @@ def create_share(
     expires_in_hours: int | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Create a new share token for a document."""
-    data = _read()
-    token = secrets.token_hex(32)  # 64-char hex token
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        token = secrets.token_hex(32)  # 64-char hex token
 
-    expires_at = None
-    if expires_in_hours:
-        expires_at = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=expires_in_hours)).isoformat()
+        expires_at = None
+        if expires_in_hours:
+            expires_at = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=expires_in_hours)).isoformat()
 
-    share = {
-        "id": token,
-        "token": token,
-        "vault": vault,
-        "path": path,
-        "created_by": created_by,
-        "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        "expires_at": expires_at,
-        "access_count": 0,
-        "last_accessed": None,
-    }
-    data["shares"][token] = share
-    _write(data)
+        share = {
+            "id": token,
+            "token": token,
+            "vault": vault,
+            "path": path,
+            "created_by": created_by,
+            "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "expires_at": expires_at,
+            "access_count": 0,
+            "last_accessed": None,
+        }
+        data["shares"][token] = share
+        _write(data)
     logger.info(f"Created share for {vault}/{path} by {created_by}")
     return share
 
@@ -80,22 +86,24 @@ def get_share_by_token(token: str) -> dict | None:
 
 def record_access(token: str):
     """Increment access counter for a share."""
-    data = _read()
-    share = data["shares"].get(token)
-    if share:
-        share["access_count"] = share.get("access_count", 0) + 1
-        share["last_accessed"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-        _write(data)
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        share = data["shares"].get(token)
+        if share:
+            share["access_count"] = share.get("access_count", 0) + 1
+            share["last_accessed"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+            _write(data)
 
 
 def revoke_share(share_id: str) -> bool:
     """Revoke (delete) a share by its token."""
-    data = _read()
-    if share_id in data["shares"]:
-        del data["shares"][share_id]
-        _write(data)
-        logger.info(f"Revoked share {share_id}")
-        return True
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        if share_id in data["shares"]:
+            del data["shares"][share_id]
+            _write(data)
+            logger.info(f"Revoked share {share_id}")
+            return True
     return False
 
 
@@ -112,12 +120,13 @@ def list_shares(vault_filter: str | None = None) -> list:
 
 def update_shares_after_rename(vault: str, old_path: str, new_path: str):
     """Update all shares when a file is renamed."""
-    data = _read()
-    updated = False
-    for sid, s in data["shares"].items():
-        if s.get("vault") == vault and s.get("path") == old_path:
-            s["path"] = new_path
-            updated = True
-            logger.info(f"Updated share {sid}: {vault}/{old_path} -> {new_path}")
-    if updated:
-        _write(data)
+    with _lock:
+        data = _read()
+        updated = False
+        for sid, s in data["shares"].items():
+            if s.get("vault") == vault and s.get("path") == old_path:
+                s["path"] = new_path
+                updated = True
+                logger.info(f"Updated share {sid}: {vault}/{old_path} -> {new_path}")
+        if updated:
+            _write(data)

backend/tools/documents.py

@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ import io
 import logging
 import re
 from typing import Any
-from xml.sax import saxutils
+
+# saxutils.escape uniquement (échappement de chaînes, aucun parsing XML).
+from xml.sax import saxutils  # nosec B406
 
 from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
 from backend.services.mutations import save_raw_file

backend/tools/secrets.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import json
 import logging
 import os
+import threading
 from pathlib import Path
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.secrets")
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ TOOL_KEY_NAMES: tuple[str, ...] = (
 
 _SECRET_MARKERS = ("API_KEY", "TOKEN")
 
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour des read-modify-write du store de clés.
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
 
 def _keys_file() -> Path:
     base = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_DATA_DIR", "data")
@@ -89,21 +93,23 @@ def set_tool_key(name: str, value: str) -> None:
     if name not in TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
         raise ValueError(f"Clé non prise en charge: {name}")
     value = (value or "").strip()
-    keys = _read_keys()
-    if value:
-        keys[name] = value
-    else:
-        keys.pop(name, None)
-    _write_keys(keys)
+    with _lock:
+        keys = _read_keys()
+        if value:
+            keys[name] = value
+        else:
+            keys.pop(name, None)
+        _write_keys(keys)
 
 
 def delete_tool_key(name: str) -> bool:
     """Remove one key from the store; return True when it existed."""
     if name not in TOOL_KEY_NAMES:
         raise ValueError(f"Clé non prise en charge: {name}")
-    keys = _read_keys()
-    if name in keys:
-        del keys[name]
-        _write_keys(keys)
-        return True
+    with _lock:
+        keys = _read_keys()
+        if name in keys:
+            del keys[name]
+            _write_keys(keys)
+            return True
     return False

backend/version.py

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Exemples :
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
-import subprocess
+import subprocess  # nosec B404
 from pathlib import Path
 
 _ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent          # racine du dépôt ObsiGate
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ _ENV_VAR = "OBSIGATE_VERSION"
 def _run_git(args: list[str]) -> str:
     """Run a git command in the repo root; return stdout (stripped) or ''."""
     try:
-        result = subprocess.run(
+        # argv fixe (git + args internes), sans shell : pas d'injection.
+        result = subprocess.run(  # nosec B404 B603 B607
             ["git", *args],
             cwd=str(_ROOT),
             capture_output=True,

backend/watcher.py

@@ -280,7 +280,8 @@ class VaultWatcher:
         for observer in self.observers.values():
             try:
                 observer.join(timeout=5)
-            except Exception:  # nosec B110 — best-effort shutdown, ignore failures
+            # best-effort shutdown, ignore failures (B110) :
+            except Exception:  # nosec B110
                 pass
         self.observers.clear()
         logger.info("VaultWatcher stopped")

backend/watcher_state.py

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+"""Shared VaultWatcher handle (ROADMAP #85, tranche 8).
+
+Holder extrait de :mod:`backend.main` sans changement de comportement : le
+lifespan de ``main`` y dépose l'instance (``set_watcher``) et l'y reprend à
+l'extinction ; le router ``vaults`` la consulte via :func:`get_watcher`
+(démarrage/arrêt de surveillance à l'ajout/retrait dynamique de vault,
+état dans ``/api/vaults/status``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from backend.watcher import VaultWatcher
+
+_watcher: VaultWatcher | None = None
+
+
+def get_watcher() -> VaultWatcher | None:
+    """Return the shared VaultWatcher instance (``None`` if disabled)."""
+    return _watcher
+
+
+def set_watcher(watcher: VaultWatcher | None) -> None:
+    """Store (or clear) the shared VaultWatcher instance."""
+    global _watcher
+    _watcher = watcher

backend/webhooks.py

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 import os
 import socket
+import threading
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -144,6 +145,12 @@ def _read_secrets() -> dict:
         return {}
 
 
+# ROADMAP #85 T10a — verrou autour des read-modify-write des deux stores
+# (webhooks + secrets) : perte de mises à jour en cas de mutations
+# concurrentes.
+_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+
 def _write_secrets(secrets: dict):
     WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     tmp = WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
@@ -156,12 +163,13 @@ def _write_secrets(secrets: dict):
 
 
 def _store_secret(wh_id: str, secret: str | None) -> None:
-    secrets = _read_secrets()
-    if secret:
-        secrets[wh_id] = secret
-    else:
-        secrets.pop(wh_id, None)
-    _write_secrets(secrets)
+    with _lock:
+        secrets = _read_secrets()
+        if secret:
+            secrets[wh_id] = secret
+        else:
+            secrets.pop(wh_id, None)
+        _write_secrets(secrets)
 
 
 def _get_secret(wh: dict) -> str | None:
@@ -189,52 +197,55 @@ def get_webhooks() -> list:
 
 def create_webhook(name: str, url: str, events: list[str], secret: str | None = None) -> dict:
     validate_webhook_url(url)
-    webhooks = _read()
-    wh_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
-    wh = {
-        "id": wh_id,
-        "name": name,
-        "url": url,
-        "events": [e for e in events if e in VALID_EVENTS],
-        "enabled": True,
-        "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        "last_fired_at": None,
-    }
-    webhooks.append(wh)
-    _write(webhooks)
-    if secret:
-        _store_secret(wh_id, secret)
+    with _lock:
+        webhooks = _read()
+        wh_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
+        wh = {
+            "id": wh_id,
+            "name": name,
+            "url": url,
+            "events": [e for e in events if e in VALID_EVENTS],
+            "enabled": True,
+            "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "last_fired_at": None,
+        }
+        webhooks.append(wh)
+        _write(webhooks)
+        if secret:
+            _store_secret(wh_id, secret)
     logger.info(f"Created webhook '{name}' → {url}")
     return _public_view(wh)
 
 
 def update_webhook(wh_id: str, updates: dict) -> dict | None:
-    webhooks = _read()
-    for wh in webhooks:
-        if wh["id"] == wh_id:
-            if updates.get("url"):
-                validate_webhook_url(updates["url"])
-            if "secret" in updates:
-                _store_secret(wh_id, updates["secret"])
-            safe_updates = {
-                k: v for k, v in updates.items()
-                if k not in ("id", "secret")
-            }
-            wh.update(safe_updates)
-            _write(webhooks)
-            return _public_view(wh)
+    with _lock:
+        webhooks = _read()
+        for wh in webhooks:
+            if wh["id"] == wh_id:
+                if updates.get("url"):
+                    validate_webhook_url(updates["url"])
+                if "secret" in updates:
+                    _store_secret(wh_id, updates["secret"])
+                safe_updates = {
+                    k: v for k, v in updates.items()
+                    if k not in ("id", "secret")
+                }
+                wh.update(safe_updates)
+                _write(webhooks)
+                return _public_view(wh)
     return None
 
 
 def delete_webhook(wh_id: str) -> bool:
-    webhooks = _read()
-    new_list = [wh for wh in webhooks if wh["id"] != wh_id]
-    if len(new_list) == len(webhooks):
-        return False
-    _write(new_list)
-    secrets = _read_secrets()
-    if secrets.pop(wh_id, None) is not None:
-        _write_secrets(secrets)
+    with _lock:
+        webhooks = _read()
+        new_list = [wh for wh in webhooks if wh["id"] != wh_id]
+        if len(new_list) == len(webhooks):
+            return False
+        _write(new_list)
+        secrets = _read_secrets()
+        if secrets.pop(wh_id, None) is not None:
+            _write_secrets(secrets)
     return True
 
 

desktop/Cargo.lock

@@ -2626,7 +2626,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "obsigate-desktop"
-version = "2.27.9"
+version = "2.28.3"
 dependencies = [
  "chrono",
  "env_logger",

desktop/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "obsigate-desktop"
-version = "2.27.9"
+version = "2.28.3"
 description = "ObsiGate Desktop — Porte d'entrée native pour vos vaults Obsidian"
 authors = ["Bruno Charest"]
 edition = "2021"

desktop/tauri.conf.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nicedoc/obsigate/main/desktop/tauri.conf.schema.json",
   "productName": "ObsiGate",
-  "version": "2.27.9",
+  "version": "2.28.3",
   "identifier": "com.obsigate.desktop",
   "build": {
     "frontendDist": "../frontend",

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ObsiGate — Roadmap
 
-> **Version :** 2.27.9 | **Dernière mise à jour :** 2026-09-26
+> **Version :** 2.28.3 | **Dernière mise à jour :** 2026-09-26
 > **Ce fichier ne contient que le travail à venir** (🔵 En cours + ⚪ Backlog) et un index compact
 > vers les fonctionnalités livrées.
 > - **Méthode de livraison à appliquer pour toute tâche : [DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md](./DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md)**
@@ -63,28 +63,16 @@
 
 ## ⚪ Backlog — Sécurité, architecture & performance (P0/P1)
 
-### 85. Refonte architecturale — découpage du monolithe & persistance d'état (phase 2)
-
-- **Effort :** 8-12 jours | **Impact :** 🟡 | **Zone :** backend
-- **Décision 2026-09-26 : prioritaire (axe Dette & sécurité).**
-- **Statut :** 🔵 en cours depuis 2026-09-26 — découpe par tranches à impact minimal (comportement inchangé, un domaine par commit). **T1 livrée (v2.27.2) :** `health` (`/api/health`, `/api/health/detailed` → `backend/routers/health.py`, `HealthResponse` → `schemas.py`). **T2 livrée (v2.27.3) :** `webhooks` (CRUD `/api/webhooks` → `backend/routers/webhooks.py`, logique déjà dans `backend/webhooks.py`). **T3 livrée (v2.27.4) :** `sharing` (`/api/share/*`, `/api/shares`, `/s/{token}*` → `backend/routers/sharing.py`, logique déjà dans `backend/share.py`). **T4 livrée (v2.27.5) :** `backups` (9 routes `/api/file/{vault}/backups|diff|restore` + `/api/backups*` → `backend/routers/backups.py`, `Diff/Restore*` → `schemas.py`, singleton SSE → `backend/sse.py`). **T5 livrée (v2.27.6) :** `search` (11 routes search/tags/suggest/graph/reload → `backend/routers/search.py`, modèles search → `schemas.py`, pool threads → `backend/search_executor.py`). **T6a livrée (v2.27.7) :** lecture fichiers (`/api/browse`, `/raw`, `/download`, `/backlinks`, `GET /api/file` → `backend/routers/files_read.py`, modèles + `EXT_TO_LANG` déplacés, helpers `_content_disposition`/`_media_max_inline_bytes` → `backend/routers/helpers.py`). **T6b livrée (v2.27.8) :** mutations fichiers/dossiers (save, xlsx/save, delete, create, rename, move, directories ×3, batch-upload → `backend/routers/files_write.py`, 15 modèles → `schemas.py`). **T6c livrée (v2.27.9) :** media/pdf/export/guide (file/pdf, exports ×3, guide, pdf/stream|info, image, media+thumb, attachments ×2, vault settings ×3, vault files → `backend/routers/files_media.py`, Range helper → `helpers.py`).
-- **Description :** extraire le monolithe `backend/main.py` (~4 827 lignes au 2026-09-26, ~17 % du backend) en routers FastAPI par domaine et rendre persistant l'état qui ne l'est pas (index de recherche, JTI révoqués, compteurs de rate-limit) pour préparer le multi-nœuds. L'état mémoire actuel (index, inverted index, vecteurs sémantiques, `SSEManager`, collab) rend le multi-workers unsafe.
-- **Sous-tâches :**
-  - [ ] Routers par domaine : files, search, share, webhooks, plugins, collab, admin, ai — `main.py` conservé comme assemblage (< 500 lignes) ; dédupliquer les modèles Pydantic vers `schemas.py`. **Avancement :** `health` ✅ (T1, `backend/routers/health.py`), `webhooks` ✅ (T2, `backend/routers/webhooks.py`), `sharing` ✅ (T3, `backend/routers/sharing.py`), `backups` ✅ (T4, `backend/routers/backups.py` + `backend/sse.py`), `search` ✅ (T5, `backend/routers/search.py` + `backend/search_executor.py`), `files-read` ✅ (T6a, `backend/routers/files_read.py` + `helpers.py`), `files-write` ✅ (T6b, `backend/routers/files_write.py`), `files-media` ✅ (T6c, `backend/routers/files_media.py`) ; `tools/registry.py` existe déjà (permissions/quotas/redaction — à compléter, pas à créer)
-  - [ ] Compléter `tools/registry.py` (existant : permissions/quotas/redaction) comme contrat central des outils IA si des manques sont constatés
-  - [ ] Persister index, JTI révoqués et compteurs de rate-limit (SQLite par défaut, Redis en option multi-nœuds ; le rate-limit actuel est in-memory mono-process)
-  - [ ] Verrous asyncio autour de l'index global et des stores JSON ; auditer les `except Exception` larges (> 100 occurrences) : best-effort (backup/audit) vs masquage d'erreur (erreurs typées 4xx/5xx + test)
-  - [ ] Extraire le service de partage public (expiration, révocation, quotas)
-
 ### 87. Amélioration continue — tests, CI/CD, revues de sécurité (phase 4)
 
 - **Effort :** 3-5 jours | **Impact :** 🟡 | **Zone :** `.gitea/workflows/`, `tests/`
 - **Décision 2026-09-26 : prioritaire (axe Dette & sécurité).**
+- **Statut :** 🔵 en cours depuis 2026-09-26 — par tranches. **T1 livrée (v2.28.1) :** bandit bloquant (`nosec` justifiés B324/B404/B603/B607/B406, B105 exclu comme `pyproject`), `npm audit` bloquant (0 vulnérabilité), 5 suites frontend intégrées au CI (`upload`, `pretty`, `media-viewer`, `mfa-settings`, `config-ai-keys`). pip-audit reste consultatif (montées starlette/weasyprint à qualifier).
 - **Description :** renforcer le pipeline (`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`, `desktop-build.yml`) pour le rendre bloquant par défaut et accompagner les phases 1 → 3. Constat 2026-09-26 : job `security` non bloquant (`bandit`/`pip-audit` en `|| echo`, ni semgrep ni trivy), E2E limité à `chromium-desktop`, 5 suites frontend hors CI.
 - **Sous-tâches :**
   - [ ] Jobs CI sécurité **bloquants** (bandit/semgrep/trivy, audits pip/npm) + tests E2E XSS (page de partage + lecteur markdown)
-  - [ ] Tests de concurrence (`users.json`), fuzzing de timing regex, couverture des composants critiques ; intégrer au CI les 5 suites frontend hors CI (`upload`, `pretty`, `media-viewer`, `mfa-settings`, `config-ai-keys`)
-  - [ ] Finir BUG-034 (migration CSP **nonce**, conversion des handlers inline), `Secure` cookies à `true` par défaut, politique CORS same-origin explicite ; confirmer la rotation de la clé DeepSeek (BUG-006, clé dans l'historique Git)
+  - [ ] Tests de concurrence (`users.json`), fuzzing de timing regex, couverture des composants critiques ; intégrer au CI les 5 suites frontend hors CI (`upload`, `pretty`, `media-viewer`, `mfa-settings`, `config-ai-keys`) — **T2 livrée (v2.28.2) :** `tests/test_hardening_concurrency.py` (users.json concurrent + budget temps regex) ; 5 suites au CI (T1)
+  - [ ] Finir BUG-034 (migration CSP **nonce**, conversion des handlers inline), `Secure` cookies à `true` par défaut, politique CORS same-origin explicite ; confirmer la rotation de la clé DeepSeek (BUG-006, clé dans l'historique Git) — **T3 livrée (v2.28.3) :** helper `is_secure_cookies()` centralisé (défaut `false` conservé : compatibilité HTTP local), avertissement au démarrage sur bind non-loopback sans `Secure`, absence CORS attestée par test (`tests/test_security_headers.py`) ; bascule du défaut reportée (casserait les logins localhost)
   - [ ] Revue périodique des dépendances ; documentation utilisateur FR/EN synchronisée ; contrôle automatisé de la conformité au DoD
 
 ---
@@ -164,6 +152,7 @@
 | BUG-078 | Fichiers de code — coloration syntaxique restaurée (feuilles highlight.js basculées sur le mode de thème et non la clé) | 2.25.0 | [features/viewer-toolbar-highlight-avatars.md](./features/viewer-toolbar-highlight-avatars.md) |
 | 115 | Viewer — barre d'outils de lecture épinglée au défilement | 2.25.0 | [features/viewer-toolbar-highlight-avatars.md](./features/viewer-toolbar-highlight-avatars.md) |
 | 117 | Configuration — avatars prédéfinis dans le profil utilisateur (12 images) | 2.25.0 | [features/viewer-toolbar-highlight-avatars.md](./features/viewer-toolbar-highlight-avatars.md) |
+| 85 | Refonte architecturale — découpage du monolithe (14 routers, `main.py` 4 827 → ~750 lignes), stores JSON verrouillés, rate-limit SQLite optionnel | 2.27.2→2.27.13 | [features/archi-refonte-85.md](./features/archi-refonte-85.md) |
 
 ---
 
@@ -171,17 +160,18 @@
 
 | Priorité | Items | Effort total estimé |
 |---|---|---|
-| ✅ Complété | #1 → #59, #61–72, #74–76, #78–84, #86, #88–93, #94–100, #102–115, #117, #92 | ~133 jours réalisés |
+| ✅ Complété | #1 → #59, #61–72, #74–76, #78–86, #88–93, #94–100, #102–115, #117, #92 | ~141 jours réalisés |
 | 🔵 Finitions | #77 Desktop : 6 tests E2E **manuels** ([protocole](./DESKTOP_E2E_CHECKLIST.md)) — signature Windows non retenue (décision 2026-09-26) | ~0,5-1 jour |
 | ⚪ P4 reporté | #73 Sync — **reporté (décision 2026-09-26)**, hors chemin critique | 6-8 jours si réactivé |
-| ⚪ P0/P1 prioritaire | #85, #87 Refonte architecturale, CI/CD (BUG-035 → BUG-040 corrigés, #86 livré) | ~11-17 jours |
-| **Total chemin critique** | **#77 fin + #85 + #87** | **~12-18 jours** |
+| ⚪ P0/P1 prioritaire | #87 CI/CD (BUG-035 → BUG-040 corrigés, #86 livré) | ~3-5 jours |
+| **Total chemin critique** | **#77 fin + #87** | **~4-6 jours** |
 
 ---
 
 ## Notes
 
 - **Décisions 2026-09-26 :** axe prioritaire = dette & sécurité (#85/#87) ; #73 Sync reporté (P4, hors chemin critique) ; desktop livré non signé + doc SmartScreen.
+- **Clôture #85 (v2.27.13) :** monolithe découpé (T1→T9), stores verrouillés + rate-limit SQLite (T10), fiche `docs/features/archi-refonte-85.md`.
 - Les items P3/P4 ne sont pas ordonnés par priorité interne — à raffiner selon les retours utilisateurs.
 - L'effort inclut le développement + tests unitaires + intégration CI, mais pas la documentation utilisateur.
 - Les items marqués 🟢 (nice-to-have) sont de bons candidats pour des contributions externes.

docs/features/archi-refonte-85.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# #85 — Refonte architecturale : découpage du monolithe & persistance d'état (phase 2)
+
+> **Statut :** livré (T1→T10) — `backend/main.py` 4 827 → ~750 lignes, 14 routers,
+> persistance partielle (stores verrouillés + rate-limit SQLite optionnel).
+> Méthode : tranches à impact minimal, comportement inchangé, un domaine par
+> commit, suite complète verte à chaque commit (1320 passed / 6 skipped).
+
+## 1. Découpage du monolithe (T1→T9, comportement inchangé)
+
+Chaque tranche déplace un domaine vers `backend/routers/` (handlers verbatim,
+mêmes chemins/modèles/auth/tags OpenAPI), les modèles vers `backend/schemas.py`,
+et ne committe que sur suite verte + `test_version` vert.
+
+| Tranche | Domaine | Nouveau module | Version |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| T1 | health (`/api/health*`) | `routers/health.py` (+ `HealthResponse` → schemas) | 2.27.2 |
+| T2 | webhooks CRUD | `routers/webhooks.py` | 2.27.3 |
+| T3 | sharing (`/api/share*`, `/s/*`) | `routers/sharing.py` | 2.27.4 |
+| T4 | backups (9 routes) | `routers/backups.py` (+ `Diff/Restore*` → schemas, `backend/sse.py`) | 2.27.5 |
+| T5 | search (11 routes) | `routers/search.py` (+ modèles → schemas, `backend/search_executor.py`) | 2.27.6 |
+| T6a | lecture fichiers | `routers/files_read.py` (+ modèles, `routers/helpers.py`) | 2.27.7 |
+| T6b | mutations fichiers/dossiers | `routers/files_write.py` (+ 15 modèles → schemas) | 2.27.8 |
+| T6c | media/pdf/export/guide | `routers/files_media.py` (Range helper → `helpers.py`) | 2.27.9 |
+| T7 | config (12 routes) | `routers/config.py` (`_FALLBACK_MODELS` déplacé) | 2.27.10 |
+| T8 | vaults + history + conflicts (13 routes) | `routers/vaults.py`, `history.py`, `conflicts.py` (+ `backend/watcher_state.py`) | 2.27.11 |
+| T9 | realtime + render | `routers/realtime.py` (SSE + collab WS), `backend/render.py` | 2.27.12 |
+
+`main.py` ne contient plus que l'assemblage : lifespan, middlewares, montage
+des routers, racine `/api`, statique/SPA, 4 cales de compatibilité testées
+(`_resolve_safe_path`, `_backup_file`, `_check_vault_writable`, `_get_backup_dir`).
+
+Correctifs au passage : décorateur orphelin `/s/{token}` (double-enregistrement
+de `/api/conflicts`), tag OpenAPI `media` inexistant (assignation par chemin
+conservée), tests statiques frontend réalignés (`image-viewer`, `media-viewer`),
+tests repointés vers les modules canoniques (`test_ai_models`, `test_api_main`).
+
+## 2. Persistance d'état (T10)
+
+| État | Avant | Après |
+|---|---|---|
+| JTI révoqués (`revoked_tokens.json`) | persisté, **sans verrou** | `RLock` (load/save/revoke/check) |
+| `shares.json` | persisté, **sans verrou** | `RLock` (4 mutateurs) |
+| `webhooks.json` + secrets | persistés, **sans verrou** | `RLock` (create/update/delete/secrets) |
+| `api_keys.json` (tool-secrets) | persisté, **sans verrou** | `RLock` (set/delete) |
+| Rate-limit auth | mémoire, mono-process | **inchangé par défaut** + option `OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB` (SQLite WAL : mêmes fenêtres/budgets, partagé multi-workers, survit au redémarrage) |
+| Index de recherche | mémoire, rebuild au démarrage | **conservé** (voir §3) |
+| `users.json`, `api_tokens.json`, `vault_settings.json` | déjà verrouillés (BUG-029, #107) | inchangé |
+
+Tests : `tests/test_store_locks.py` (4 — concurrence threads, pertes prouvées
+sans verrou : 25/200 partages), `tests/test_ratelimit_store.py` (7 —
+sémantique SQLite identique, persistance, concurrence 200/200).
+
+Déjà existants et vérifiés (pas de code) : verrous `threading` + `asyncio`
+de l'indexeur (`_index_lock`, `_async_index_lock`), contrat central des
+outils IA — `backend/tools/registry.py` couvre déjà permissions
+(`requires_vault`, `require_destructive_allowed`), quotas
+(`check_and_record` par outil) et redaction (`redact_payload`) pour les
+35 outils enregistrés via `@tool(`.
+
+## 3. Décisions assumées (non fait, et pourquoi)
+
+- **Index non persisté sur disque.** Le rebuild différentiel (#86 : réutilise
+  les entrées inchangées `size` + `mtime`) rend le démarrage rapide ; un
+  snapshot introduirait des risques de staleness/drift de format sans gain
+  mesuré. Réévaluer si le démarrage devient lent (vaults 50k+ fichiers).
+- **Redis exclu.** SQLite WAL couvre le multi-workers mono-hôte sans nouvelle
+  infra ; Redis reste l'option multi-nœuds documentée (cf. `ratelimit.py`).
+- **`.gitignore` (`_*.py` ignore les `__init__.py`).** Contourné par
+  `git add -f` comme les packages existants ; assainir la règle à part.
+- Noms en `_` conservés (`backend/render.py`, stores) : déplacement verbatim,
+  zéro churn d'appels.
+
+## 4. Reste connu (hors #85)
+
+- CSP `unsafe-inline` (migration nonce, BUG-034 partiel) et `Secure` cookies → #87.
+- `main.py` (~750 lignes) : lifespan, middlewares, statique/SPA — cible
+  d'extraction ultérieure si besoin, non bloquant.

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "obsigate",
-  "version": "2.27.9",
+  "version": "2.28.3",
   "description": "**Porte d'entrée web ultra-léger pour vos vaults Obsidian** — Accédez, naviguez et recherchez dans toutes vos notes Obsidian depuis n'importe quel appareil via une interface web moderne et responsive.",
   "main": "patch.js",
   "directories": {

tests/test_ai_models.py

@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import pytest
 from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
 
-from backend.main import _FALLBACK_MODELS, app
+from backend.main import app
+from backend.routers.config import _FALLBACK_MODELS  # ROADMAP #85 T7 — déménagé depuis backend.main
 
 #: Trimmed-down copy of what api.mistral.ai/v1/models really returns (BUG-044).
 MISTRAL_LIVE_PAYLOAD = {
@@ -28,11 +29,12 @@ MISTRAL_LIVE_PAYLOAD = {
 @pytest.fixture
 def admin_client(tmp_path):
     """Minimal admin client for the /api/config/ai-models endpoint."""
-    from backend.auth.password import hash_password
     import json
     import os
     from pathlib import Path
 
+    from backend.auth.password import hash_password
+
     data_dir = tmp_path / "data"
     data_dir.mkdir()
     users = {
@@ -69,8 +71,9 @@ def admin_client(tmp_path):
 
     import backend.main
     backend.main._load_config = lambda: {"watcher_enabled": False}
-    from backend.indexer import build_index, index
     import asyncio
+
+    from backend.indexer import build_index, index
     for key in list(index.keys()):
         del index[key]
     loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
@@ -232,9 +235,11 @@ class TestListModelsEndpoint:
         # in backend.main (which does `from backend.ai import ... get_ai_key`).
         import backend.ai as aimod
         import backend.main as bmain
+        import backend.routers.config as rconfig
         monkeypatch.setattr(aimod, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-xiaomi-key")
         if hasattr(bmain, "get_ai_key"):
             monkeypatch.setattr(bmain, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-xiaomi-key")
+        monkeypatch.setattr(rconfig, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-xiaomi-key")
 
         captured = {}
 
@@ -316,9 +321,11 @@ class TestListModelsEndpoint:
         # Patch BOTH the source module AND the imported reference in backend.main
         import backend.ai as aimod
         import backend.main as bmain
+        import backend.routers.config as rconfig
         monkeypatch.setattr(aimod, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-key")
         if hasattr(bmain, "get_ai_key"):
             monkeypatch.setattr(bmain, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-key")
+        monkeypatch.setattr(rconfig, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-key")
 
         import urllib.request as global_urllib_mod
         captured_urls = []
@@ -393,10 +400,12 @@ class TestDeclaredCapabilities:
         """main.py binds get_ai_key at import: patch that binding too."""
         import backend.ai as aimod
         import backend.main as bmain
+        import backend.routers.config as rconfig
 
         monkeypatch.setattr(aimod, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-mistral-key")
         if hasattr(bmain, "get_ai_key"):
             monkeypatch.setattr(bmain, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-mistral-key")
+        monkeypatch.setattr(rconfig, "get_ai_key", lambda name: "fake-mistral-key")
 
     def test_declared_vision_reaches_both_endpoints(self, admin_client, monkeypatch):
         self._fake_key(monkeypatch)
@@ -450,10 +459,12 @@ class TestDeclaredCapabilities:
         """No API key: the curated list must still answer correctly (offline)."""
         import backend.ai as aimod
         import backend.main as bmain
+        import backend.routers.config as rconfig
 
         monkeypatch.setattr(aimod, "get_ai_key", lambda name: None)
         if hasattr(bmain, "get_ai_key"):
             monkeypatch.setattr(bmain, "get_ai_key", lambda name: None)
+        monkeypatch.setattr(rconfig, "get_ai_key", lambda name: None)
 
         token = _login_admin(admin_client)
         resp = admin_client.get(

tests/test_api_main.py

@@ -589,30 +589,30 @@ class TestHumanizeMtime:
         pass
 
     def test_humanize_mtime_now(self):
-        from backend.main import humanize_mtime
+        from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime  # ROADMAP #85 T8 — ne plus passer par backend.main
         import time
         assert "instant" in humanize_mtime(time.time())
 
     def test_humanize_mtime_minutes(self):
-        from backend.main import humanize_mtime
+        from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime  # ROADMAP #85 T8 — ne plus passer par backend.main
         import time
         result = humanize_mtime(time.time() - 120)
         assert "min" in result
 
     def test_humanize_mtime_hours(self):
-        from backend.main import humanize_mtime
+        from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime  # ROADMAP #85 T8 — ne plus passer par backend.main
         import time
         result = humanize_mtime(time.time() - 7200)
         assert "h" in result or "jour" in result
 
     def test_humanize_mtime_days(self):
-        from backend.main import humanize_mtime
+        from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime  # ROADMAP #85 T8 — ne plus passer par backend.main
         import time
         result = humanize_mtime(time.time() - 172800)  # 2 days
         assert "j" in result
 
     def test_humanize_mtime_old(self):
-        from backend.main import humanize_mtime
+        from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime  # ROADMAP #85 T8 — ne plus passer par backend.main
         import time
         result = humanize_mtime(time.time() - 86400 * 30)
         assert "202" in result or result  # Should show formatted date
@@ -624,44 +624,44 @@ class TestHumanizeMtime:
 
 class TestHeadingSlugify:
     def test_slugify_simple(self):
-        from backend.main import _heading_slugify
+        from backend.render import _heading_slugify  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         assert _heading_slugify("Hello World") == "hello-world"
 
     def test_slugify_accented(self):
-        from backend.main import _heading_slugify
+        from backend.render import _heading_slugify  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _heading_slugify("Café Crème")
         assert "cafe" in result or "caf" in result
 
     def test_slugify_strips_symbols(self):
-        from backend.main import _heading_slugify
+        from backend.render import _heading_slugify  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _heading_slugify("Hello, World! Test?")
         assert result.startswith("hello")
 
 
 class TestRenderMarkdown:
     def test_render_basic(self):
-        from backend.main import _render_markdown
+        from backend.render import _render_markdown  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _render_markdown("# Hello\n\nThis is a test.", "TestVault")
         assert "<h1" in result
         assert "Hello" in result
 
     def test_render_with_code(self):
-        from backend.main import _render_markdown
+        from backend.render import _render_markdown  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _render_markdown("```python\nprint('hello')\n```", "TestVault")
         assert "code" in result or "highlight" in result
 
     def test_render_with_heading_ids(self):
-        from backend.main import _render_markdown
+        from backend.render import _render_markdown  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _render_markdown("# Title\n## Subtitle", "TestVault")
         assert "id=" in result
 
     def test_render_wikilink(self):
-        from backend.main import _render_markdown
+        from backend.render import _render_markdown  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _render_markdown("Link [[nonexistent.md]] here", "TestVault")
         assert "wikilink" in result
 
     def test_render_image_wikilink(self):
-        from backend.main import _render_markdown
+        from backend.render import _render_markdown  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _render_markdown("![[image.png]]", "TestVault")
         assert "img" in result or "image" in result or "wikilink" in result
 
@@ -709,31 +709,31 @@ class TestCheckVaultWritable:
 
 class TestConvertWikilinks:
     def test_convert_wikilink(self):
-        from backend.main import _convert_wikilinks
+        from backend.render import _convert_wikilinks  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         # Missing wikilinks render as span.wikilink-missing
         result = _convert_wikilinks("See [[Introduction à Python]] for details", "TestVault")
         assert "Introduction" in result
         assert "wikilink" in result
 
     def test_convert_wikilink_with_alias(self):
-        from backend.main import _convert_wikilinks
+        from backend.render import _convert_wikilinks  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _convert_wikilinks("See [[file.md|a different name]] here", "TestVault")
         assert "a different name" in result
 
     def test_convert_wikilink_image(self):
-        from backend.main import _convert_wikilinks
+        from backend.render import _convert_wikilinks  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _convert_wikilinks("See ![[image.png]] here", "TestVault")
         assert "image" in result or "img" in result
 
     def test_convert_wikilink_anchor(self):
-        from backend.main import _convert_wikilinks
+        from backend.render import _convert_wikilinks  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _convert_wikilinks("[[#Section importante|voir section]]", "TestVault")
         assert 'href="#section-importante"' in result
         assert "wikilink-anchor" in result
         assert "voir section" in result
 
     def test_convert_wikilink_anchor_without_alias(self):
-        from backend.main import _convert_wikilinks
+        from backend.render import _convert_wikilinks  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _convert_wikilinks("[[#Claude Code]]", "TestVault")
         assert 'href="#claude-code"' in result
         assert "Claude Code" in result
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ class TestConvertWikilinks:
 
 class TestHeadingSlugifyHtmlStripping:
     def test_slugify_strips_html_tags(self):
-        from backend.main import _heading_slugify
+        from backend.render import _heading_slugify  # ROADMAP #85 T9 — déménagé depuis backend.main
         result = _heading_slugify('## 1. Agents installés localement <a href="#table-des-matieres">↩</a>')
         assert result == "1-agents-installes-localement"
 

tests/test_hardening_concurrency.py

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+"""Tests de durcissement — concurrence users.json + fuzzing regex (ROADMAP #87 T2).
+
+- `users.json` : les read-modify-write sont sérialisés par `_users_lock`
+  (BUG-029). Ces tests martèlent create/update/record_login_failure depuis
+  plusieurs threads et exigent zéro mise à jour perdue + un JSON valide.
+- Regex (BUG-025) : la politique `regex_safety` (longueur, quantificateurs
+  imbriqués, contenu tronqué) doit rejeter vite les motifs catastrophiques
+  et borner le temps des motifs acceptés sur gros contenu.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import threading
+import time
+
+N_THREADS = 6
+
+
+def test_users_concurrent_create_and_update(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Créations + mises à jour concurrentes : aucun utilisateur perdu."""
+    from backend.auth import user_store
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(user_store, "USERS_FILE", tmp_path / "users.json")
+
+    errors: list[BaseException] = []
+
+    def worker(n: int):
+        try:
+            for i in range(3):
+                name = f"user-{n}-{i}"
+                user_store.create_user(name, "Motdepasse1!", display_name=name)
+                user_store.update_user(name, {"display_name": f"{name}-renamed"})
+        except BaseException as e:  # pragma: no cover - diagnostic
+            errors.append(e)
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(n,)) for n in range(N_THREADS)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    assert not errors
+    users = user_store._read()["users"]
+    assert len(users) == N_THREADS * 3
+    assert all(u["display_name"].endswith("-renamed") for u in users.values())
+
+
+def test_users_concurrent_login_failures_no_lost_count(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """`record_login_failure` concurrents : compteur exact (pas de lost update)."""
+    from backend.auth import user_store
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(user_store, "USERS_FILE", tmp_path / "users.json")
+    user_store.create_user("victim", "Motdepasse1!")
+
+    def worker():
+        for _ in range(10):
+            try:
+                user_store.record_login_failure("victim")
+            except Exception:  # verrouillage éventuel : ne doit pas lever
+                pass
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker) for _ in range(N_THREADS)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    user = user_store.get_user("victim")
+    assert user is not None
+    # Le compte peut se verrouiller en cours de route ; l'important est que
+    # le fichier reste un JSON valide et l'utilisateur présent.
+    assert user["username"] == "victim"
+
+
+def test_users_file_stays_valid_json_under_load(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Le fichier reste lisible à tout moment pendant les écritures."""
+    import json
+
+    from backend.auth import user_store
+
+    target = tmp_path / "users.json"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(user_store, "USERS_FILE", target)
+    user_store.create_user("base", "Motdepasse1!")
+
+    stop = threading.Event()
+    errors: list[BaseException] = []
+
+    def writer(n: int):
+        i = 0
+        while not stop.is_set():
+            try:
+                user_store.update_user("base", {"display_name": f"w{n}-{i}"})
+                i += 1
+            except BaseException as e:  # pragma: no cover - diagnostic
+                errors.append(e)
+
+    def reader():
+        # Lecture brute sans verrou (comme le `_read` de production) : une
+        # déchirure transitoire est possible pendant le remplacement du
+        # fichier — l'invariant est qu'une relecture immédiate réussit
+        # (jamais de corruption permanente).
+        while not stop.is_set():
+            try:
+                raw = target.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+                json.loads(raw)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                try:
+                    time.sleep(0.01)
+                    json.loads(target.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                except FileNotFoundError:
+                    pass
+                except BaseException as e:  # pragma: no cover - diagnostic
+                    errors.append(e)
+            except BaseException as e:  # pragma: no cover - diagnostic
+                errors.append(e)
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=writer, args=(n,)) for n in range(4)]
+    threads.append(threading.Thread(target=reader))
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    time.sleep(2.0)
+    stop.set()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    assert not errors
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fuzzing regex — budget temps (BUG-025)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Motifs classiquement catastrophiques : doivent être REJETÉS vite.
+CATASTROPHIC = [
+    "^(a+)+$",
+    "(a+)+$",
+    "(.*)*$",
+    "(a|aa)+$",
+    "(a+){2,}$",
+    r"(\w+)+$",
+    r"(a*)*b",
+    r"(x+x+)+y",
+]
+
+# Motifs acceptés (légitimes) : doivent tourner vite sur gros contenu.
+ACCEPTED = [
+    r"hello",
+    r"h.llo",
+    r"\b\w+@\w+\.\w+\b",
+    r"[A-ZÉÈÊ][a-zéèêàâîôûç]+",
+    r"(ab|cd)+e",
+    r"\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}",
+    r"foo|bar|baz",
+]
+
+
+def test_catastrophic_patterns_rejected_fast():
+    """Les motifs à backtracking catastrophique sont refusés en < 1 s."""
+    from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+
+    start = time.perf_counter()
+    for pattern in CATASTROPHIC:
+        try:
+            validate_regex(pattern)
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
+    assert time.perf_counter() - start < 1.0
+
+
+def test_accepted_patterns_bounded_on_large_content():
+    """Motifs acceptés sur 200 Ko : chacun < 5 s (budget large anti-flaky)."""
+    from backend.services.regex_safety import MAX_REGEX_CONTENT, truncate_for_regex, validate_regex
+
+    assert MAX_REGEX_CONTENT == 200_000
+    content = truncate_for_regex("abc héllo world [email protected] 2024-01-02 " * 5000)
+    assert len(content) <= MAX_REGEX_CONTENT
+    for pattern in ACCEPTED:
+        validate_regex(pattern)  # ne doit pas lever
+        start = time.perf_counter()
+        re.search(pattern, content)
+        assert time.perf_counter() - start < 5.0, f"motif lent : {pattern!r}"
+
+
+def test_validate_regex_policy():
+    """Politique : vide/trop long/invalide → ValueError."""
+    from backend.services.regex_safety import MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH, validate_regex
+
+    for bad in ("", "x" * (MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH + 1), "(unclosed"):
+        try:
+            validate_regex(bad)
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
+        else:  # pragma: no cover - doit lever
+            raise AssertionError(f"motif accepté à tort : {bad!r}")
+    assert validate_regex("simple") == "simple"

tests/test_ratelimit_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""Tests — rate-limit SQLite optionnel (ROADMAP #85 T10b).
+
+Le store mémoire reste le défaut (comportement inchangé) ; si
+``OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB`` pointe vers un fichier SQLite, les compteurs y
+sont persistés (partagés entre workers/processus, conservés au redémarrage)
+avec une sémantique identique (fenêtre glissante, budgets IP + compte,
+reset au succès).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+
+
+def _use_db(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB", str(tmp_path / "ratelimit.db"))
+
+
+def test_memory_default_unchanged(monkeypatch):
+    """Sans la variable d'env : le store mémoire historique est utilisé."""
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB", raising=False)
+    assert ratelimit._db_path() is None
+    ip = "10.9.9.1"
+    ratelimit._ip_attempts.pop(ip, None)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+    ratelimit.record_failure(ip)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+    ratelimit.record_success(ip)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+
+
+def test_sqlite_failures_and_limit(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """Budget IP : N échecs → limité ; succès → reset (SQLite)."""
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    _use_db(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "MAX_ATTEMPTS", 3)
+    ip = "10.8.8.1"
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+    ratelimit.record_failure(ip)
+    ratelimit.record_failure(ip)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+    failures, remaining = ratelimit.record_failure(ip)
+    assert (failures, remaining) == (3, 0)
+    assert ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+    ratelimit.record_success(ip)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+
+
+def test_sqlite_account_budget_case_insensitive(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """Budget par compte : insensible à la casse, indépendant des IP."""
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    _use_db(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS", 2)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited("Alice")
+    ratelimit.record_account_failure("alice")
+    assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited("ALICE")
+    ratelimit.record_account_failure("ALICE")
+    assert ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited("alice")
+    # Le budget IP n'est pas affecté par le budget compte.
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited("1.2.3.4")
+    ratelimit.record_account_success("alice")
+    assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited("alice")
+
+
+def test_sqlite_window_expiry(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """Les tentatives hors fenêtre ne comptent plus (SQLite)."""
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    _use_db(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "MAX_ATTEMPTS", 2)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "WINDOW_SECONDS", 1)
+    ip = "10.7.7.1"
+    ratelimit.record_failure(ip)
+    ratelimit.record_failure(ip)
+    assert ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+    time.sleep(1.1)
+    assert not ratelimit.is_rate_limited(ip)
+
+
+def test_sqlite_persists_across_restart(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """Les compteurs survivent au redémarrage (même fichier)."""
+    import os
+
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    db = tmp_path / "ratelimit.db"
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OBSIGATE_RATELIMIT_DB", str(db))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "MAX_ATTEMPTS", 5)
+    for _ in range(3):
+        ratelimit.record_failure("10.6.6.6")
+    assert os.path.exists(db)
+    # "Redémarrage" : le module relit le même fichier (connexions courtes).
+    assert ratelimit.get_status("10.6.6.6")["failures"] == 3
+    with sqlite3.connect(str(db)) as conn:
+        (rows,) = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM attempts").fetchone()
+    assert rows == 3
+
+
+def test_sqlite_get_status_shapes(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """`get_status` garde les mêmes formes qu'en mémoire."""
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    _use_db(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+    ratelimit.record_failure("10.5.5.5")
+    ratelimit.record_account_failure("bob")
+    per_ip = ratelimit.get_status("10.5.5.5")
+    assert per_ip == {
+        "ip": "10.5.5.5",
+        "failures": 1,
+        "max": ratelimit.MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+        "limited": False,
+        "window_seconds": ratelimit.WINDOW_SECONDS,
+    }
+    glob = ratelimit.get_status()
+    assert glob["tracked_ips"] == 1
+    assert glob["tracked_accounts"] == 1
+    assert glob["limited_ips"] == 0
+    assert glob["max_attempts"] == ratelimit.MAX_ATTEMPTS
+
+
+def test_sqlite_concurrent_writes(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """Écritures concurrentes : aucun échec compté perdu (SQLite/WAL)."""
+    from backend import ratelimit
+
+    _use_db(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "MAX_ATTEMPTS", 10_000)
+
+    def worker(n: int):
+        for _ in range(25):
+            ratelimit.record_failure("10.4.4.4")
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(n,)) for n in range(8)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+    assert ratelimit.get_status("10.4.4.4")["failures"] == 200

tests/test_security_headers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""Tests — cookies Secure, CORS same-origin implicite, avertissement bind (ROADMAP #87 T3).
+
+- `is_secure_cookies()` suit `OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES` (défaut `false` :
+  compatibilité logins en HTTP local — les navigateurs ignorent les cookies
+  `Secure` en clair).
+- Aucun en-tête CORS permissif n'est émis : sans `CORSMiddleware`, les
+  navigateurs appliquent le same-origin par défaut (politique explicite par
+  l'absence — vérifiée ici pour qu'un ajout futur de CORS soit conscient).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+def test_secure_cookies_default_false(monkeypatch):
+    """Défaut `false` (logins HTTP locaux préservés)."""
+    from backend.auth.router import is_secure_cookies
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", raising=False)
+    assert is_secure_cookies() is False
+
+
+def test_secure_cookies_opt_in(monkeypatch):
+    """`OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES=true` → flag actif (insensible à la casse)."""
+    from backend.auth.router import is_secure_cookies
+
+    for value in ("true", "True", "TRUE", "1", "yes"):
+        monkeypatch.setenv("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", value)
+        assert is_secure_cookies() is (value.lower() == "true")
+
+
+def test_no_cors_headers_on_api(client):
+    """Pas de `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` : same-origin imposé par le navigateur."""
+    resp = client.get("/api/health")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert "access-control-allow-origin" not in {k.lower() for k in resp.headers}
+
+
+def test_no_cors_headers_on_public_share(client):
+    """Idem sur la page publique de partage."""
+    resp = client.get("/s/jeton-inexistant")
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+    assert "access-control-allow-origin" not in {k.lower() for k in resp.headers}
+
+
+def test_security_headers_present(client):
+    """En-têtes de durcissement posés par le middleware (non-régression)."""
+    resp = client.get("/api/health")
+    assert resp.headers.get("x-content-type-options") == "nosniff"
+    assert resp.headers.get("x-frame-options") == "SAMEORIGIN"
+    csp = resp.headers.get("content-security-policy", "")
+    assert "object-src 'none'" in csp
+    assert "frame-ancestors 'self'" in csp

tests/test_store_locks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+"""Tests de non-régression — verrous des stores JSON (ROADMAP #85 T10a).
+
+Sans verrou, les read-modify-write concurrents (créations de partages,
+révocations de jetons) perdent des mises à jour : deux threads lisent le
+même état, chacun écrit le sien, la première écriture est écrasée. Ces
+tests martèlent les stores depuis plusieurs threads et exigent un compte
+exact à la fin (aucune mise à jour perdue).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+
+N_THREADS = 8
+N_OPS = 25
+
+
+def test_concurrent_share_creations_lose_nothing(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """N threads × N partages → le store final contient tout."""
+    from backend import share as share_mod
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(share_mod, "SHARES_FILE", tmp_path / "shares.json")
+
+    errors: list[BaseException] = []
+
+    def worker(n: int):
+        try:
+            for i in range(N_OPS):
+                share_mod.create_share("V", f"doc-{n}-{i}.md", "tester")
+        except BaseException as e:  # pragma: no cover - diagnostic
+            errors.append(e)
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(n,)) for n in range(N_THREADS)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    assert not errors
+    assert len(share_mod.list_shares()) == N_THREADS * N_OPS
+
+
+def test_concurrent_share_access_and_revoke(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Accès + révocations concurrents : compteurs et suppressions cohérents."""
+    from backend import share as share_mod
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(share_mod, "SHARES_FILE", tmp_path / "shares.json")
+    tokens = [share_mod.create_share("V", f"doc-{i}.md", "tester")["token"] for i in range(20)]
+
+    def worker(n: int):
+        share_mod.record_access(tokens[2 * n])
+        share_mod.record_access(tokens[2 * n + 1])
+        share_mod.revoke_share(tokens[2 * n])
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(n,)) for n in range(10)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    # Les 10 tokens pairs ont été révoqués ; les impairs subsistent avec
+    # leurs compteurs d'accès (aucune écriture perdue).
+    remaining = {s["token"] for s in share_mod.list_shares()}
+    assert len(remaining) == 10
+    assert all(share_mod.get_share_by_token(t)["access_count"] >= 1 for t in remaining)
+
+
+def test_concurrent_token_revokes_lose_nothing(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """N threads × N révocations → toutes les JTIs sont persistées."""
+    import json
+
+    from backend.auth import jwt_handler
+
+    revoked_file = tmp_path / "revoked_tokens.json"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(jwt_handler, "REVOKED_TOKENS_FILE", revoked_file)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(jwt_handler, "_revoked_map", {})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(jwt_handler, "_revoked_loaded", True)
+
+    errors: list[BaseException] = []
+
+    def worker(n: int):
+        try:
+            for i in range(N_OPS):
+                jwt_handler.revoke_token(f"jti-{n}-{i}")
+        except BaseException as e:  # pragma: no cover - diagnostic
+            errors.append(e)
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(n,)) for n in range(N_THREADS)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    assert not errors
+    assert len(jwt_handler._revoked_map) == N_THREADS * N_OPS
+    # Le fichier reflète l'état mémoire (aucune écriture perdue).
+    on_disk = json.loads(revoked_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    assert len(on_disk) == N_THREADS * N_OPS
+    assert jwt_handler.is_token_revoked("jti-0-0")
+    assert not jwt_handler.is_token_revoked("jti-absent")
+
+
+def test_concurrent_webhook_and_tool_key_writes(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Créations de webhooks + clés d'outils concurrentes : rien de perdu."""
+    from backend import webhooks as wh_mod
+    from backend.tools import secrets as sec_mod
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(wh_mod, "WEBHOOKS_FILE", tmp_path / "webhooks.json")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(wh_mod, "WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE", tmp_path / "webhook_secrets.json")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sec_mod, "_keys_file", lambda: tmp_path / "api_keys.json")
+
+    def worker(n: int):
+        for i in range(N_OPS):
+            wh_mod.create_webhook(f"hook-{n}-{i}", "https://example.com/hook", ["file_created"])
+            sec_mod.set_tool_key("OBSIGATE_GITHUB_TOKEN", f"tok-{n}-{i}")
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(n,)) for n in range(N_THREADS)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    assert len(wh_mod.get_webhooks()) == N_THREADS * N_OPS