Spark
fae335f808
Le middleware CSRF rejetait tout POST /mcp en 403 avant la route ; les tests passaient car leur client porte session + CSRF. Test de régression : client anonyme Bearer seul (200 avec jeton, 401 sans).
77 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
77 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
"""FlowDeck — CSRF protection middleware."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
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from starlette.requests import Request
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from app.templating import CSRF_TOKEN
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class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Lightweight CSRF protection for state-changing requests.
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All POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests must include X-CSRF-Token
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header matching the csrf_token cookie.
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"""
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SAFE_METHODS = {"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"}
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# NOTE: ``/scim/v2`` is Bearer-token only (no cookie auth), so CSRF does not
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# apply — IdP SCIM clients (Okta, Entra) cannot send an X-CSRF-Token.
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# Même logique pour ``/mcp`` (Fusion, 7.76.1) : le serveur MCP est
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# machine-à-machine, authentifié par les jetons d'API personnels
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# (Bearer) — le service d'agents ne peut pas envoyer de X-CSRF-Token.
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# Sans cette exemption, tout POST /mcp mourait en 403 avant la route
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# (les tests passaient : leur client porte session + CSRF).
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# A19 — LISTE FINALE : plus aucun préfixe cookie-auth n'est exempté.
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# Tous les appels non-GET du front envoient désormais `X-CSRF-Token`
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# (46 sites équipés en v7.3.6 : agent_panel, settings, local_workspace,
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# library, gitea_workspace, workspace, workspaces, welcome).
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# Ne restent que du machine-to-machine / hors session :
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# - Bearer : /api/webhook, /api/v1, /api/v2, /scim/v2
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# - callbacks : /auth/* (login, register, SSO, 2FA, WebAuthn)
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# - publics : /s/ (sites), /f/ (forms)
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# - infra/diag : /api/csrf-token (le jeton lui-même), /api/frontend-error
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EXCLUDED_PATHS = {
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"/api/webhook", "/api/v1", "/api/v2", "/scim/v2", "/mcp",
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"/auth/callback", "/auth/register", "/auth/local-login", "/auth/local-verify",
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"/auth/2fa", "/auth/saml", "/auth/oidc", "/auth/webauthn",
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"/s/", "/f/", "/api/csrf-token", "/api/frontend-error",
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}
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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# A43 : jeton expose aux templates (base.html hx-headers) — posé AVANT
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# call_next, comme le nonce CSP (meme mecanisme ContextVar).
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CSRF_TOKEN.set(request.cookies.get("csrf_token", ""))
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# Webhook receiver, OAuth callback, and internal API are exempt
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if any(request.url.path.startswith(p) for p in self.EXCLUDED_PATHS):
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return await call_next(request)
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if request.method in self.SAFE_METHODS:
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response = await call_next(request)
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# Set CSRF cookie if not present
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if "csrf_token" not in request.cookies:
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response.set_cookie(
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"csrf_token",
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secrets.token_hex(32),
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httponly=False, # Must be readable by JS
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samesite="lax",
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max_age=86400,
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path="/",
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)
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return response
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# Validate CSRF for state-changing methods
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csrf_cookie = request.cookies.get("csrf_token", "")
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csrf_header = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token", "")
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if not csrf_cookie or not csrf_header or not secrets.compare_digest(csrf_cookie, csrf_header):
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return JSONResponse(
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{"detail": "CSRF validation failed"},
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status_code=403,
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)
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return await call_next(request)
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