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flowdeck/tests/test_audit_p0_fixes.py
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bruno 937ecfc2e0
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fix: A30 + A37 + A39 + A40 + A41 — fin du P2/P3 XS/S (v7.4.0)
- A30 — `require_scope()` câblé : 69 sites stricts de api_v2.py passent par la
  factory (Bearer + scope en 1 appel, contrôle manuel supprimé) ; sémantique
  alignée sur celle des handlers (pas de default "read" → 0 changement de
  comportement) ; 12 top-level morts supprimés (0 ref app ET tests) :
  unsync_block, find_referring, _b64url, strip_markdown, format_number,
  get_auto_property_value, get_next_unique_id, local_date_in_tz,
  verify_device_token, _get_dynamic_groups, _require_user_gitea,
  validate_upload_request
- A37 — CORS sans `*` : origines = app_base_url + allow_origin_regex
  (localhost/dev, origines d'extension pour le Web Clipper), méthodes et
  entêtes minutées, allow_credentials explicite + test test_cors_no_star
- A39 — htmx : décision « rien » documentée (32 attributs hx-* réels sur 6
  templates, conversion = refonte du view-switching sans test E2E)
- A40 — version d'assets à source unique : ENV.globals["asset_version"] lu au
  boot depuis le fichier VERSION ; littéraux `?v=` de base.html éliminés ;
  test test_asset_version_single_source
- A41 — app.css : 91 règles mortes purgées (-10 274 octets, 121 618 → 111 344),
  scan templates/JS/CSS/Python à 0 référence

suite **1031/1031** · `ruff check app tests` OK · OpenAPI 511 chemins / 7.4.0
docs (ROADMAP/CHANGELOG/WORKLOAD/VERSION) à jour
2026-10-01 09:30:37 -04:00

209 lines
8.6 KiB
Python

"""Non-régression de l'audit sécurité 2026-09-30 — A11 (traversal) et A18 (XSS public)."""
from conftest import anon, anon_csrf
def test_avatar_path_traversal_denied(client):
"""A11 : `:path` accepte les `/` — la lecture doit rester dans /data/avatars."""
r = client.get("/api/settings/avatar/..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd")
assert r.status_code in (403, 404), r.status_code
def test_public_view_escapes_output(client):
"""A18 : titre de base et titre de ligne interpolés dans un f-string HTML."""
cid = client.post("/db/api", json={"name": "<script>alert(1)</script>"}).json()["id"]
client.post(f"/db/{cid}/pages/api", json={"title": "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"})
anon(client)
r = client.get(f"/workspace/public/{cid}")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert "<script>alert(1)" not in r.text
assert "&lt;script&gt;" in r.text
assert "<img src=x" not in r.text
def test_public_view_hides_restricted_collection(client):
"""A18 : `permission_type` restricted/private → 404 (pas de fuite)."""
cid = client.post("/db/api", json={"name": "Internal"}).json()["id"]
from app.db import get_conn
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute("UPDATE collections SET permission_type='restricted' WHERE id=?", (cid,))
conn.commit()
anon(client)
r = client.get(f"/workspace/public/{cid}")
assert r.status_code == 404
assert "Internal" not in r.text
def test_rate_limit_key_and_prune():
"""A33 : XFF ignoré depuis une IP publique (anti-bypass), épurage du store."""
from types import SimpleNamespace
from app.middleware.security import RateLimitMiddleware
mw = RateLimitMiddleware(None)
def req(host, fwd=None):
headers = {"x-forwarded-for": fwd} if fwd else {}
return SimpleNamespace(headers=headers, client=SimpleNamespace(host=host))
# IP publique (globale) : le client peut spoofer XFF autant qu'il veut → clé d'origine
assert mw._client_key(req("8.8.8.8", "1.2.3.4")) == "8.8.8.8"
# Derrière un proxy local : on prend le premier hop XFF
assert mw._client_key(req("10.0.0.1", "198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.2")) == "198.51.100.7"
# Sans XFF / hôte non IP (testserver)
assert mw._client_key(req("testserver")) == "testserver"
# Épurage : les fenêtres expirées sortent du store
import time
now = time.time()
mw._store["old"] = (now - 3600, 5)
mw._store["fresh"] = (now, 1)
mw._prune(now)
assert "old" not in mw._store and "fresh" in mw._store
def test_cors_no_star(client):
"""A37 : plus de `*` — origine refusée n'a pas d'ACAO, origine autorisée oui."""
r = client.get("/api/health", headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"})
assert "access-control-allow-origin" not in r.headers
r2 = client.get("/api/health", headers={"Origin": "http://localhost:8080"})
assert r2.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == "http://localhost:8080"
def test_asset_version_single_source():
"""A40 : une seule source de version d'assets = le fichier VERSION."""
import re as _re
from pathlib import Path
root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
version = (root / "VERSION").read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
from app.templating import ASSET_VERSION, ENV
assert ASSET_VERSION == version
assert ENV.globals["asset_version"] == version
src = (root / "app/templates/base.html").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "app.css?v={{ asset_version }}" in src
assert "app.js?v={{ asset_version }}" in src
# plus aucun littéral de version première main dans les templates
literals = _re.findall(
r"(?:app|design-tokens|components|offline|flowdeck)\.(?:css|js)\?v=\d", src
)
assert literals == [], literals
def test_no_duplicate_routes():
"""A24 : deux routes même méthode+chemin → l'une écrase silencieusement l'autre."""
from app.main import app
seen = set()
for route in app.routes:
for method in getattr(route, "methods", None) or set():
if method in ("HEAD", "OPTIONS"):
continue
key = (method, route.path)
assert key not in seen, f"doublon de route: {key}"
seen.add(key)
def test_og_metadata_rejects_private_host(client):
"""A12 : SSRF — aucun fetch vers loopback/link-local (re-vérif à chaque hop)."""
for url in ("http://127.0.0.1/latest/meta-data/", "http://169.254.169.254/x", "http://localhost/x"):
r = client.post("/board/api/og/metadata", json={"url": url})
assert r.status_code == 400, (url, r.status_code, r.text[:200])
def test_automations_require_session(client):
"""A13 : CRUD, run et press-button refusent un anonymous."""
anon(client)
anon_csrf(client)
assert client.post("/workspace/automations", json={"name": "x"}).status_code == 401
assert client.post("/workspace/automations/1/run", json={}).status_code == 401
assert client.post("/api/automations/press-button", json={}).status_code == 401
assert client.get("/workspace/automations").status_code == 401
def test_outbound_webhook_requires_admin_and_public_url(client):
"""A15 : webhooks sortants = admin + URL publique (le scheduler POSTe le contenu)."""
# admin de la fixture : URL privée refusée (SSRF)
r = client.post("/workspace/webhooks", json={"url": "http://127.0.0.1/hook"})
assert r.status_code == 400
anon(client)
anon_csrf(client)
assert client.post("/workspace/webhooks", json={"url": "https://example.com/h"}).status_code == 401
def test_legacy_api_requires_auth(client):
"""A17 : le router /api legacy refuse un anonymous (health et front-error restent publics)."""
anon(client)
assert client.get("/api/users/me").status_code == 401
# CSRF valide mais aucune session → la garde du router doit répondre 401.
client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "csrf-anon")
assert client.post("/api/move", json={}, headers={"X-CSRF-Token": "csrf-anon"}).status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/health").status_code == 200
def test_upload_requires_session_and_validates_files(client):
"""A22 : validate_upload branché (taille + extension) et pas d'upload anonyme."""
from app.middleware.security import validate_upload
assert validate_upload("note.txt", 10) is None
assert validate_upload("virus.exe", 10) is not None
assert validate_upload("big.txt", 11 * 1024 * 1024) is not None
anon_csrf(client)
r = client.post("/api/local-workspace/upload", files={"files": ("a.txt", b"x", "text/plain")})
assert r.status_code == 401
def test_agent_providers_require_admin_and_valid_api_base(client):
"""A14 : plus de fallback `admin` — un anonymous ne dirige plus le ping."""
# admin de la fixture : scheme non-http refusé, identifiants refusés
r = client.patch("/api/agent/providers", json={"provider": "mistral", "api_base": "ftp://x.test/v1"})
assert r.status_code == 400, r.text
r2 = client.post("/api/agent/providers/test", json={"provider": "mistral", "api_base": "https://user:[email protected]/v1"})
assert r2.status_code == 400, r2.text
anon_csrf(client)
assert client.patch("/api/agent/providers", json={"provider": "ollama"}).status_code == 401
assert client.post("/api/agent/providers/test", json={"provider": "ollama"}).status_code == 401
def test_collection_rollback_when_materialize_fails(client, monkeypatch):
"""A25 : un échec de `materialize_properties` ne doit pas commiter la collection."""
import pytest
from app.services import db_templates
def boom(*_a, **_k):
raise RuntimeError("materialize boom")
monkeypatch.setattr(db_templates, "materialize_properties", boom)
tok = client.post("/api/v1/token").json()["token"]
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
client.post(
"/api/v2/collections",
json={"name": "Broken", "schema": [{"name": "Title", "type": "title"}]},
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {tok}"},
)
from app.db import get_conn
with get_conn() as conn:
n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM collections WHERE name='Broken'").fetchone()[0]
assert n == 0, "la collection ne doit pas survivre à un schéma non matérialisé"
def test_exports_and_attachments_require_auth(client):
"""A16 : export + pièces jointes = session et `can_view_page` (jamais le contenu)."""
pid = client.post("/board/api/pages?title=Secret&section=Private").json()["id"]
anon(client)
assert client.get(f"/api/export/markdown/{pid}").status_code == 401
assert client.get(f"/api/export/html/{pid}").status_code == 401
assert client.get(f"/api/pages/{pid}/download").status_code == 401
assert client.get(f"/api/pages/{pid}/file-content").status_code == 401