bruno
1706ad1ee9
- v6.8.0 Sites & Forms publics (migrations 24)
- v6.9.0 Recherche sémantique hybride + Ask AI (migration 25)
- v7.0.0 Automations v2 multi-étapes + Workers sandboxés (migration 26)
- v7.1.0 Calendar sync Google/CalDAV + Meeting Notes (migration 27)
- v7.2.0 Enterprise : SCIM 2.0, 2FA TOTP/passkeys, audit UI, agent approvals (migration 28)
- v7.3.0 Wiki/Teamspaces, verified pages, collab polish, charts, unfurl (migration 29)
- docs V68→V73, ROADMAP/CHANGELOG/WORKLOAD à jour, VERSION 7.3.0
- A9 : flowdeck.db, flowdeck_dev.db, test-commit.md, upload_test.txt et e2e/{node_modules,shots,test-results} désindexés + ignorés (.gitignore/.dockerignore)
2.2 KiB
V7.2.0 — Enterprise Admin : SCIM + 2FA + Audit UI
Statut : 📝 Planifié · Roadmap :
ROADMAP.md § v7.2.0Référence Notion : SCIM, audit log, domain verification, agent permissions/governance. Existant : SSO SAML/OIDC + provisioning +sso_only(v6.7.0),api_audit_log+permission_audit_log+sso_login_history(API seule),SessionManager,PermissionManager.
1. SCIM 2.0 (provisioning auto)
GET|POST /scim/v2/Users, GET|PUT|PATCH|DELETE /scim/v2/Users/{id} (Bearer scim_tokens, admin) :
mapping userName→login, emails[0]→email, name→full_name, active→users.is_active.
active=false → is_active=0, sessions révoquées, login refusé (401 « suspended ») sauf admin.
Groupes IdP → sync_sso_permissions() existant réutilisé.
2. 2FA + passkeys
- TOTP :
users.totp_secret_enc(Fernet), setup QR (otpauth://), vérif au login après password (fenêtre ±1), 10 backup codes (sha256, usage unique). - WebAuthn :
webauthn_credentials (id, user_id, credential_id, public_key, sign_count); loginpassword + keyoupasskey seulesipasswordless_allowed. - Combinable avec
sso_only(local password refusé, TOTP conservé sirequire_2fa=1).
3. Domain claim + audit UI
domain_claims (domain UNIQUE, txt_token, verified BOOL, auto_join_role, enforce_sso BOOL); vérif DNS TXT ;enforce_sso→ login local du domaine redirigé IdP.- Settings → Audit : table unifiée (
api_audit_log+permission_audit_log+sso_login_history+worker_runs), filtres acteur/ressource/date, export CSV (10k max), rétention 365j (purge scheduler).
4. Gouvernance agents
agent_policies (workspace_id, allowed_tools_json, max_steps, require_approval BOOL) + agent_approvals (action_id, status pending/approved/rejected, approver_id) :
si require_approval et outil write → agent.run.approval_requested (webhook + cloche) → exécution après approve, sinon 403. File Settings → Agents.
5. Migrations 28 + tests (~25)
scim_tokens, domain_claims, webauthn_credentials, agent_policies, agent_approvals, users.is_active/totp_secret_enc.
Tests : SCIM CRUD + suspend, TOTP ±fenêtre + backup, WebAuthn mock, domain TXT mock, audit filtres/export, policies approve/reject.