- ContentSecurityPolicyMiddleware : nonce aléatoire par requête dans la
ContextVar `CSP_NONCE` (posée avant `call_next` → visible des templates),
`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'nonce-…'` — plus aucun script inline
sans nonce ne tourne (fin des XSS injectés en JS)
- 38 tags `<script>` des templates : `nonce="{{ csp_nonce() }}"` (passage
scripté, vérifié : 0 restant) ; `LOCAL_LOGIN_HTML` (constante de module) :
helper `_with_nonce()` au rendu ; collections.py : 3 scripts Python
(chart/form/map) noncés
- `<meta name="htmx-config" content='{"inlineScriptNonce": …}'>` dans base.html
: htmx ré-injecte les <script> des réponses boostées avec le bon nonce
- `script-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'` : les 74 handlers `onclick=` inline
restent couverts (le nonce les aurait désactivés aussi)
- chart.js (cdn.jsdelivr.net) et leaflet (unpkg) ajoutés à script-src/style-src
: vues chart/map déjà BLOQUÉES par la CSP depuis toujours
(commentaire ponytail: upgrade = vendoriser puis retirer les hôtes)
- reste d'A20 : unsafe-eval (Alpine x-data → @alpinejs/csp), externalisation
JS (A27), resserrer img-src/connect-src
test : test_csp_nonce_per_request (page base.html + page hors template,
nonce unique par requête)
suite **1037/1037** · `ruff check app tests` OK · docs à jour
216 lines
8.7 KiB
Python
216 lines
8.7 KiB
Python
"""FlowDeck — Security middleware: CSP headers + rate limiting."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import ipaddress
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import secrets
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import time
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from collections import defaultdict
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from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
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from starlette.requests import Request
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from app.templating import CSP_NONCE
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# ── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Allowed extensions for file uploads
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ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
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# Images
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".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".webp", ".svg", ".bmp", ".ico",
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# Documents
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".pdf", ".md", ".markdown", ".txt", ".log", ".csv",
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# Code
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".py", ".js", ".jsx", ".ts", ".tsx", ".html", ".htm", ".xml", ".css",
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".json", ".yaml", ".yml", ".toml", ".sql", ".sh", ".bash", ".zsh",
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".ps1", ".rs", ".go", ".java", ".rb", ".php", ".c", ".cpp", ".h",
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".swift", ".kt", ".scala", ".r",
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# Archives
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".zip", ".tar", ".gz", ".rar", ".7z",
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# Misc
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".env", ".cfg", ".conf", ".ini", ".dockerfile", ".makefile",
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})
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MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # 10 MB
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def validate_upload(filename: str, size: int) -> str | None:
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"""Validate upload filename and size. Returns error message or None."""
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if size > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
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return f"File '{filename}' exceeds maximum size of 10 MB"
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ext = _ext(filename)
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if ext and ext not in ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS:
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return f"File extension '{ext}' is not allowed"
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return None
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def _ext(filename: str) -> str:
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"""Extract lowercase extension from filename."""
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if "." in filename:
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return "." + filename.rsplit(".", 1)[-1].lower()
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return ""
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# ── Content-Security-Policy Middleware ────────────────────────
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class ContentSecurityPolicyMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Sets Content-Security-Policy headers on all HTML responses.
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A permissive-yet-safe policy for a Notion-style app that needs:
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- inline scripts (Alpine.js, HTMX)
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- inline styles
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- font loading
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- images from various sources
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- media (audio/video)
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- websocket connections for HMR/SSE
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"""
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CSP_HEADER = "Content-Security-Policy"
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# A20 : `unsafe-inline` sort de script-src (remplacé par un nonce par
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# requête — un XSS injecté dans une page ne tourne plus). Les 74 handlers
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# inline `onclick=` restent couverts par `script-src-attr`, explicitement
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# détaché de script-src (sinon le nonce les désactiverait aussi).
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# `unsafe-eval` reste : Alpine (x-data en string) et htmx (hx-vars) en ont
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# besoin → à retirer avec le build CSP d'Alpine (voir reste d'A20).
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CSP_VALUE = (
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"default-src 'self'; "
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# ponytail: chart.js et leaflet sont chargés depuis CDN par les vues
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# chart/map de collections — l'upgrade est de les vendoriser dans
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# /static/js puis de retirer ces deux hôtes.
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"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'nonce-{nonce}' "
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"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://unpkg.com; "
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"script-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'; "
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://unpkg.com; "
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"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
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"font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; "
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"connect-src 'self' https: wss: ws:; "
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"media-src 'self' blob:; "
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"frame-src 'self'; "
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"object-src 'none'; "
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"base-uri 'self'; "
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"form-action 'self'; "
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)
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
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# Posé AVANT call_next : BaseHTTPMiddleware exécute le aval dans une
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# tâche créée maintenant → le contexte (donc le nonce) y est copié,
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# exactement ce que les templates liront via `csp_nonce()`.
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CSP_NONCE.set(nonce)
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response = await call_next(request)
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# Only set CSP on HTML responses
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content_type = response.headers.get("content-type", "")
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if "text/html" in content_type:
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response.headers[self.CSP_HEADER] = self.CSP_VALUE.format(nonce=nonce)
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return response
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# ── Rate Limiting Middleware ──────────────────────────────────
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class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""Simple in-memory sliding-window rate limiter per IP.
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Default: 100 requests per minute per IP for API routes.
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Non-API routes (HTML pages, static files) are not rate-limited.
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"""
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# Paths that should be rate-limited
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RATE_LIMITED_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
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"/api/", "/board/api/", "/auth/",
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# A33 : préfixes qui manquaient — SCIM (brute force de jetons/IdP),
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# API workspace + collections (les endpoints mutants du legacy).
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"/scim/v2/", "/workspace/", "/db/",
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)
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# Pages publiques : seul le non-GET est plafonné (brute force de
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# /s/<slug>/auth et spam de /f/<token>) — la lecture reste libre pour les
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# visiteurs d'un site publié qui partagent une IP.
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RATE_LIMITED_NON_GET_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = ("/s/", "/f/")
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# Paths exempt from rate limiting even under an API prefix
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EXEMPT_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
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"/api/health",
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"/api/frontend-error",
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"/api/frontend-errors",
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})
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def __init__(self, app, max_requests: int | None = None, window_seconds: int = 60):
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super().__init__(app)
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# A33 : None = lire `settings.rate_limit_requests` à chaque requête (la
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# valeur de config n'était jamais lue — 100 codé en dur contre 60 annoncé).
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self.max_requests = max_requests
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self.window_seconds = window_seconds
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self._store: dict[str, tuple[float, int]] = defaultdict(lambda: (0.0, 0))
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self._last_prune = 0.0
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self._max_keys = 5000
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async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
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path = request.url.path
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# Respect the global rate-limit toggle (disabled in tests/local).
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from app.config import settings
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if not settings.rate_limit_enabled:
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return await call_next(request)
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# Only rate-limit API routes (+ non-GET sur les pages publiques)
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method = request.method.upper()
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limited = any(path.startswith(p) for p in self.RATE_LIMITED_PREFIXES) or (
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method not in ("GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS")
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and any(path.startswith(p) for p in self.RATE_LIMITED_NON_GET_PREFIXES)
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)
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if not limited:
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return await call_next(request)
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# Exempt health check and error capture
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if path in self.EXEMPT_PATHS:
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return await call_next(request)
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limit = self.max_requests or settings.rate_limit_requests
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ip = self._client_key(request)
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now = time.time()
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# A33 : le store n'était jamais épuré → croissance mémoire par IP.
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if len(self._store) > self._max_keys and now - self._last_prune > self.window_seconds:
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self._prune(now)
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window_start, count = self._store[ip]
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if now - window_start > self.window_seconds:
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self._store[ip] = (now, 1)
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return await call_next(request)
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if count >= limit:
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return JSONResponse(
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{"error": "Rate limit exceeded", "detail": f"Max {limit} req/min per IP"},
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status_code=429,
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)
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self._store[ip] = (window_start, count + 1)
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return await call_next(request)
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def _client_key(self, request: Request) -> str:
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"""A33 : X-Forwarded-For uniquement derrière un proxy local.
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Le test porte sur `is_private` (Python ≥ 3.13 : toutes les plages non
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globales, pas seulement RFC1918) — un pair non-global n'est pas un
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internaute, donc le XFF du proxy fait foi.
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ponytail: si un jour plusieurs proxies se chaînent (ou si l'app est
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exposée directement), prendre la dernière adresse non privée de la
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chaîne plutôt que la première.
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"""
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host = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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fwd = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
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if fwd:
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try:
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direct = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
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if direct.is_private or direct.is_loopback:
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return fwd.split(",")[0].strip() or host
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except ValueError:
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pass # hôte non-IP (testserver…) → on garde la clé d'origine
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return host
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def _prune(self, now: float) -> None:
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expired = [k for k, (start, _) in self._store.items() if now - start > self.window_seconds]
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for k in expired:
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del self._store[k]
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self._last_prune = now
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