fix: A3–A8 — bloc « fallback admin » de l'audit sécurité (401 sans session, ACL, CSRF)
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- A3 : helper `_require_user_id()` (401 sans session) sur profile/password/token/forge ; `PUT /api/user/password` exige `current_password` vérifié ; `/api/user` sorti de la liste CSRF exemptée
- A4 : `POST /api/v1/token` → 401 sans session, chemin legacy `user_id=0` supprimé
- A5 : CRUD membres d'espace (POST/PUT/DELETE) : session + rôle admin de l'espace (ou admin global), placeholder user créé en `is_admin=0`, GET membres sans session → 401
- A6 : `_require_view` → 404 et `_require_edit` → 401 quand il n'y a pas de session (fin du legacy single-user sur les collections)
- A7 : création ET lecture de page → 401 sans session (PermissionManager conservé) ; `/board/api/pages` sorti de `EXCLUDED_PATHS` ; header CSRF manquant ajouté sur setItemIcon (local_workspace)
- A8 : seed admin sans mot de passe codé en dur — aléatoire au premier boot loggé une fois, ou `FLOWDECK_ADMIN_PASSWORD` ; re-seed seulement si absent
- tests : client connecté par défaut via `_TestSessionAuth` (session + CSRF injectés à la volée, jamais dans le cookie jar → plus de CookieConflict), helper `anon()` sur les 40 tests d'anonymat ; 1016/1016 verts, `ruff check app tests` OK
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-30 22:04:13 -04:00
parent e6c1f7dbb3
commit d125eb399e
36 changed files with 260 additions and 67 deletions
+20 -6
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from fastapi import APIRouter, Query, Request
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
from app.auth.session import SessionManager
@@ -689,11 +689,20 @@ def _get_user_id(request: Request) -> int:
return user["id"] if user and user.get("id") else 1
def _require_user_id(request: Request) -> int:
"""A3/A4 — 401 sans session (les routes qui mutent un compte ne tolèrent
plus le fallback « legacy single-user » → id 1 = l'admin seedé)."""
user = SessionManager.decode_session(request.cookies.get("flowdeck_session", ""))
if not user or not user.get("id"):
raise HTTPException(401, "Authentication required")
return user["id"]
@router.put("/api/user/profile")
async def update_profile(request: Request):
body = await request.json()
full_name = body.get("full_name", "").strip()
uid = _get_user_id(request)
uid = _require_user_id(request)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute("UPDATE users SET full_name=? WHERE id=?", (full_name, uid))
conn.commit()
@@ -702,13 +711,18 @@ async def update_profile(request: Request):
@router.put("/api/user/password")
async def update_password(request: Request):
from app.password_utils import hash_password
from app.password_utils import hash_password, verify_password
body = await request.json()
password = body.get("password", "").strip()
if len(password) < 6:
return {"error": "Password must be at least 6 characters"}
uid = _get_user_id(request)
uid = _require_user_id(request)
# A3 : le mot de passe actuel est exigé (session volée ≠ droit de changer le mdp).
current = body.get("current_password", "")
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute("SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE id=?", (uid,)).fetchone()
if not row or not verify_password(current, row["password_hash"]):
raise HTTPException(403, "Current password is incorrect")
conn.execute("UPDATE users SET password_hash=? WHERE id=?", (hash_password(password), uid))
conn.commit()
return {"status": "ok"}
@@ -717,7 +731,7 @@ async def update_password(request: Request):
@router.post("/api/user/token")
async def generate_token(request: Request):
import secrets
uid = _get_user_id(request)
uid = _require_user_id(request)
token = secrets.token_hex(32)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
@@ -730,7 +744,7 @@ async def generate_token(request: Request):
@router.delete("/api/user/forge/{provider}")
async def disconnect_forge(request: Request, provider: str):
uid = _get_user_id(request)
uid = _require_user_id(request)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM user_oauth_tokens WHERE user_id=? AND provider=?", (uid, provider)