feat: v7.3.0 — cycle v6.8.0→v7.3.0 (Sites, Search, Automations, Calendar, SCIM, Wiki) + audit A9
- v6.8.0 Sites & Forms publics (migrations 24)
- v6.9.0 Recherche sémantique hybride + Ask AI (migration 25)
- v7.0.0 Automations v2 multi-étapes + Workers sandboxés (migration 26)
- v7.1.0 Calendar sync Google/CalDAV + Meeting Notes (migration 27)
- v7.2.0 Enterprise : SCIM 2.0, 2FA TOTP/passkeys, audit UI, agent approvals (migration 28)
- v7.3.0 Wiki/Teamspaces, verified pages, collab polish, charts, unfurl (migration 29)
- docs V68→V73, ROADMAP/CHANGELOG/WORKLOAD à jour, VERSION 7.3.0
- A9 : flowdeck.db, flowdeck_dev.db, test-commit.md, upload_test.txt et e2e/{node_modules,shots,test-results} désindexés + ignorés (.gitignore/.dockerignore)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -18,9 +18,10 @@ import re
|
||||
|
||||
from app.config import settings
|
||||
from app.db import get_conn
|
||||
from app.services.agent_policies import check_tool, get_policy
|
||||
from app.services.context_builder import ContextBuilder
|
||||
from app.services.llm_client import LLMClient
|
||||
from app.services.permission_manager import PermissionManager
|
||||
from app.services.permission_manager import WRITE_TOOLS, PermissionManager
|
||||
from app.services.tool_registry import ToolRegistry
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
@@ -185,7 +186,10 @@ class AgentEngine:
|
||||
used_model = model or "" # peut être ajusté par un repli de modèle (404/410)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for _step in range(settings.agent_max_iterations or MAX_ITERATIONS):
|
||||
# v7.2.0 — the workspace policy may cap iterations below the global max.
|
||||
policy_max = get_policy(self.workspace_id).get("max_steps") or MAX_ITERATIONS
|
||||
iterations = min(settings.agent_max_iterations or MAX_ITERATIONS, policy_max)
|
||||
for _step in range(iterations):
|
||||
if self._tokens >= settings.agent_max_tokens_budget:
|
||||
yield self._event("error", {"message": "Budget de tokens dépassé"})
|
||||
break
|
||||
@@ -235,8 +239,30 @@ class AgentEngine:
|
||||
tool, args = call["name"], call.get("arguments") or {}
|
||||
call_id = tool_specs[idx]["id"]
|
||||
denied = False
|
||||
# v7.2.0 — workspace tool scope + human approval gate, checked
|
||||
# *before* permissions so a scoped-out tool never reaches ACLs.
|
||||
gov = check_tool(self.user_id, self.workspace_id, tool,
|
||||
is_write=tool in WRITE_TOOLS,
|
||||
conversation_id=conversation_id)
|
||||
if not gov.get("allowed"):
|
||||
detail = gov.get("reason") or "Refusé par la politique agent"
|
||||
if gov.get("approval_id"):
|
||||
detail = (f"Approbation requise (demande #{gov['approval_id']}) "
|
||||
f"— action suspendue")
|
||||
yield self._event("action", {
|
||||
"tool": tool, "status": "approval_required" if gov.get("approval_id")
|
||||
else "error", "detail": detail,
|
||||
"approval_id": gov.get("approval_id")})
|
||||
self._log_action(conversation_id, tool, args, {}, "error", detail=detail)
|
||||
messages.append({
|
||||
"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": call_id,
|
||||
"content": json.dumps({"status": "error", "message": detail},
|
||||
ensure_ascii=False),
|
||||
})
|
||||
denied = True
|
||||
try:
|
||||
self.perms.assert_can(tool, args, self.workspace_id, approval_mode)
|
||||
if not denied:
|
||||
self.perms.assert_can(tool, args, self.workspace_id, approval_mode)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # permission / approval guard
|
||||
detail = self._exc_detail(exc)
|
||||
yield self._event("action", {"tool": tool, "status": "error", "detail": detail})
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user