ObsiGate/backend/tools/registry.py

"""Tool registry — declarative registration and uniform execution.

Tools are registered with the :func:`tool` decorator. Each tool declares its
input model (used both for JSON Schema exposure and argument validation), its
risk level, and the fronts (in-app / MCP) it is exposed to.

Execution goes through :func:`call_tool`, which centralizes argument
validation, vault permission checks, confirmation gating, and audit logging.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import logging
import time
from collections.abc import Callable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any

from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError

from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
from backend.tools.audit import log_tool_call
from backend.tools.context import (
    ToolConfirmationRequired,
    ToolContext,
    ToolError,
    ToolNotFoundError,
    ToolPermissionError,
    ToolRateLimitError,
    ToolRisk,
    ToolScope,
    ToolValidationError,
)
from backend.tools.ratelimit import check_and_record
from backend.tools.redaction import redact_payload
from backend.tools.schemas import ToolResult

logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.tools.registry")


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ToolSpec:
    """Static description of a registered tool."""

    name: str
    description: str
    input_model: type[BaseModel]
    handler: Callable[[ToolContext, Any], Any]
    risk: ToolRisk = ToolRisk.READ
    scopes: tuple[ToolScope, ...] = (ToolScope.IN_APP, ToolScope.MCP)
    requires_vault: bool = False

    @property
    def requires_confirmation(self) -> bool:
        """Mutating tools always require an explicit confirmation."""
        return self.risk != ToolRisk.READ

    def parameters_schema(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
        """JSON Schema of the tool arguments (for LLM function calling)."""
        schema = self.input_model.model_json_schema()
        schema.pop("title", None)
        return schema

    def openai_schema(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
        """OpenAI-compatible function-calling schema."""
        return {
            "type": "function",
            "function": {
                "name": self.name,
                "description": self.description,
                "parameters": self.parameters_schema(),
            },
        }


_REGISTRY: dict[str, ToolSpec] = {}


def tool(
    *,
    name: str,
    description: str,
    input_model: type[BaseModel],
    risk: ToolRisk = ToolRisk.READ,
    scopes: tuple[ToolScope, ...] = (ToolScope.IN_APP, ToolScope.MCP),
    requires_vault: bool = False,
) -> Callable[[Callable[[ToolContext, Any], Any]], Callable[[ToolContext, Any], Any]]:
    """Register a tool. Returns the original handler unchanged."""

    def decorator(func: Callable[[ToolContext, Any], Any]) -> Callable[[ToolContext, Any], Any]:
        if name in _REGISTRY:
            raise ValueError(f"Duplicate tool name: {name}")
        _REGISTRY[name] = ToolSpec(
            name=name,
            description=description,
            input_model=input_model,
            handler=func,
            risk=risk,
            scopes=scopes,
            requires_vault=requires_vault,
        )
        return func

    return decorator


def get_tool(name: str) -> ToolSpec | None:
    """Return the spec for *name*, or ``None``."""
    return _REGISTRY.get(name)


def list_tools(*, scope: ToolScope | None = None) -> list[ToolSpec]:
    """Return registered tools, optionally filtered by scope."""
    specs = list(_REGISTRY.values())
    if scope is not None:
        specs = [s for s in specs if scope in s.scopes]
    return specs


def get_tool_schemas(*, scope: ToolScope | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
    """Return OpenAI-compatible schemas for registered tools."""
    return [spec.openai_schema() for spec in list_tools(scope=scope)]


def _audit(ctx: ToolContext, spec: ToolSpec, arguments: dict[str, Any], *, ok: bool, error: str | None = None) -> None:
    if not ctx.audit_enabled:
        return
    try:
        log_tool_call(
            username=ctx.username,
            mode=ctx.mode.value,
            tool=spec.name,
            arguments=arguments,
            ok=ok,
            vault=arguments.get("vault"),
            ip=ctx.ip,
            error=error,
        )
    except Exception as e:
        logger.debug(f"Tool audit failed for '{spec.name}': {e}")


def _map_service_error(e: ServiceError) -> ToolError:
    """Map a shared-layer :class:`ServiceError` to a tool domain error."""
    if e.code == "not_found":
        return ToolNotFoundError(e.message, details=e.details)
    if e.code in ("permission_denied", "path_outside_vault", "vault_access_denied"):
        return ToolPermissionError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details)
    if e.code == "invalid_arguments":
        return ToolValidationError(e.message, details=e.details)
    return ToolError(e.message, code=e.code, details=e.details)


def call_tool(
    name: str,
    ctx: ToolContext,
    arguments: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
    *,
    confirm: bool = False,
) -> ToolResult:
    """Validate, authorize, execute and audit a tool call.

    Args:
        name: Registered tool name.
        ctx: Caller context (identity, mode, confirmation state).
        arguments: Raw arguments to validate against the tool input model.
        confirm: Explicit one-shot confirmation (two-step ``apply`` phase).

    Raises:
        ToolNotFoundError: Unknown tool.
        ToolValidationError: Arguments fail validation.
        ToolPermissionError: Vault access denied or path escapes the vault.
        ToolConfirmationRequired: Mutating tool invoked without confirmation.
        ToolError: Any other execution error.
    """
    spec = _REGISTRY.get(name)
    if spec is None:
        raise ToolNotFoundError(f"Unknown tool: {name}", details={"tool": name})

    arguments = arguments or {}

    try:
        params = spec.input_model.model_validate(arguments)
    except ValidationError as e:
        error = ToolValidationError(
            f"Invalid arguments for '{name}'",
            details={"errors": e.errors(include_url=False)},
        )
        _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=error.code)
        raise error from e

    allowed, retry_after = check_and_record(ctx.rate_limit_identity, spec.name)
    if not allowed:
        rate_error = ToolRateLimitError(spec.name, retry_after)
        _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=rate_error.code)
        raise rate_error

    vault = getattr(params, "vault", None)
    if spec.requires_vault and vault:
        try:
            ctx.require_vault_access(vault)
        except ToolPermissionError as e:
            _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=e.code)
            raise

    if spec.risk == ToolRisk.DANGEROUS and vault and vault != "all":
        try:
            ctx.require_destructive_allowed(vault)
        except ToolPermissionError as e:
            _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=e.code)
            raise

    if spec.requires_confirmation and not (confirm or ctx.confirmed):
        raise ToolConfirmationRequired(spec.name, arguments)

    started = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        data = spec.handler(ctx, params)
    except ToolError as e:
        _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=e.code)
        raise
    except ServiceError as e:
        mapped = _map_service_error(e)
        _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=mapped.code)
        raise mapped from e
    except Exception as e:
        logger.error(f"Tool '{name}' failed: {e}")
        exec_error = ToolError(f"Tool '{name}' failed: {e}", code="tool_execution_error")
        _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=False, error=exec_error.code)
        raise exec_error from e

    duration_ms = round((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000, 2)
    logger.debug(f"Tool '{name}' ok in {duration_ms}ms")
    _audit(ctx, spec, arguments, ok=True)
    # Never forward raw secrets to the model (defense in depth: some tools —
    # diffs, search snippets — return content that was not pre-redacted).
    return ToolResult(ok=True, data=redact_payload(data))