# tests/test_security_hardening.py — Regression tests for ROADMAP #84
# (BUG-021 → BUG-034): sanitizer, path isolation, password policy, regex
# safety, webhook SSRF, rate limiting, audit IP and share-page escaping.

import time
from pathlib import Path

import pytest

from backend.services.errors import ServiceError


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-021/022 — HTML sanitizer
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestSanitizer:
    def test_strips_event_handlers(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html('<img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">')
        assert "onerror" not in out
        assert "alert" not in out

    def test_drops_script_content(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html("<p>ok</p><script>alert(1)</script>tail")
        assert "<script" not in out
        assert "alert" not in out
        assert "ok" in out
        assert "tail" in out

    def test_blocks_javascript_urls(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html('<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>')
        assert "javascript:" not in out
        assert ">x</a>" in out

    def test_blocks_obfuscated_javascript_url(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html('<a href="java&#115;cript:alert(1)">x</a>')
        assert "javascript" not in out.lower()

    def test_keeps_safe_markup(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html('<p class="a">hi</p><a href="/x" data-vault="v" data-path="p.md">y</a>')
        assert '<p class="a">hi</p>' in out
        assert 'data-vault="v"' in out
        assert 'href="/x"' in out

    def test_allows_image_data_uri_but_not_html(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        good = sanitize_html('<img src="">')
        assert "data:image/png" in good
        bad = sanitize_html('<img src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">')
        assert "data:text/html" not in bad

    def test_heading_ids_preserved(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html('<h2 id="intro">Intro</h2>')
        assert 'id="intro"' in out

    def test_drops_style_attribute(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
        out = sanitize_html('<p style="position:fixed">x</p>')
        assert "style" not in out

    def test_is_safe_url(self):
        from backend.services.sanitizer import is_safe_url
        assert is_safe_url("/relative")
        assert is_safe_url("https://example.com")
        assert is_safe_url("#anchor")
        assert not is_safe_url("javascript:alert(1)")
        assert not is_safe_url("vbscript:msgbox")
        assert not is_safe_url("data:text/html,<script>")


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-024 — Vault path isolation
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestPathIsolation:
    def test_inside_vault_ok(self, tmp_path):
        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
        root = tmp_path / "vault"
        root.mkdir()
        resolved = resolve_safe_path(root, "note.md")
        assert resolved == (root / "note.md").resolve()

    def test_sibling_prefix_is_rejected(self, tmp_path):
        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
        (tmp_path / "vault").mkdir()
        (tmp_path / "vault-evil").mkdir()
        with pytest.raises(ServiceError) as exc:
            resolve_safe_path(tmp_path / "vault", "../vault-evil/secret.md")
        assert exc.value.code == "path_outside_vault"

    def test_parent_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path):
        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
        root = tmp_path / "vault"
        root.mkdir()
        with pytest.raises(ServiceError) as exc:
            resolve_safe_path(root, "../../etc/passwd")
        assert exc.value.code == "path_outside_vault"


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-028 — Password policy
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestPasswordPolicy:
    def test_short_rejected(self):
        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_password_strength("short")

    def test_too_long_rejected(self):
        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_password_strength("a" * 200)

    def test_valid_accepted(self):
        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
        assert validate_password_strength("ValidPass123") == "ValidPass123"


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-025 — Regex safety (ReDoS)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestRegexSafety:
    def test_nested_quantifier_rejected(self):
        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_regex("(a+)+$")

    def test_long_pattern_rejected(self):
        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_regex("a" * 600)

    def test_simple_pattern_accepted(self):
        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
        assert validate_regex(r"\bpython\b") == r"\bpython\b"

    def test_truncate_for_regex(self):
        from backend.services.regex_safety import truncate_for_regex
        assert len(truncate_for_regex("x" * 1000, limit=10)) == 10


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-026 — Webhook SSRF
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestWebhookUrlValidation:
    def test_https_public_ok(self):
        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
        assert validate_webhook_url("https://example.com/hook") == "https://example.com/hook"

    def test_http_rejected_by_default(self, monkeypatch):
        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP", raising=False)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_webhook_url("http://example.com/hook")

    def test_private_ip_rejected(self, monkeypatch):
        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE", raising=False)
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_webhook_url("https://127.0.0.1/hook")
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_webhook_url("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")

    def test_bad_scheme_rejected(self):
        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
            validate_webhook_url("ftp://example.com")


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-031 — Per-account rate limiting
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestAccountRateLimit:
    def test_account_limited_after_threshold(self, monkeypatch):
        from backend import ratelimit
        monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS", 3)
        account = "ratelimit-account@test"
        assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
        for _ in range(3):
            ratelimit.record_account_failure(account)
        assert ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
        ratelimit.record_account_success(account)
        assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-030 — Client IP resolution
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestClientIp:
    def _request(self, headers=None, client=("1.2.3.4", 1234)):
        from starlette.requests import Request
        raw_headers = [(k.lower().encode(), v.encode()) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()]
        scope = {
            "type": "http",
            "method": "GET",
            "path": "/",
            "query_string": b"",
            "headers": raw_headers,
            "client": client,
            "scheme": "http",
            "server": ("test", 80),
        }
        return Request(scope)

    def test_socket_peer_used_by_default(self, monkeypatch):
        from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", raising=False)
        assert get_client_ip(self._request()) == "1.2.3.4"

    def test_forwarded_header_used_when_trusted(self, monkeypatch):
        from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
        monkeypatch.setenv("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", "true")
        req = self._request({"X-Forwarded-For": "9.8.7.6, 10.0.0.1"})
        assert get_client_ip(req) == "9.8.7.6"


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-032 — Indexing must not follow symlinks outside the vault
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestSymlinkIndexing:
    def test_external_symlink_is_skipped(self, tmp_path):
        import os

        from backend.indexer import _scan_vault

        vault = tmp_path / "vault"
        vault.mkdir()
        (vault / "inside.md").write_text("# Inside\n", encoding="utf-8")

        outside = tmp_path / "outside"
        outside.mkdir()
        (outside / "secret.md").write_text("# Secret\n", encoding="utf-8")

        link = vault / "link.md"
        try:
            os.symlink(outside / "secret.md", link)
        except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
            pytest.skip("Symlinks are not supported in this environment")

        result = _scan_vault("vault", str(vault))
        paths = {f["path"] for f in result["files"]}
        assert "inside.md" in paths
        assert "link.md" not in paths


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-021/022 — End-to-end rendering & share page escaping
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestRenderingAndShare:
    def test_markdown_rendering_is_sanitized(self, client, test_vault_dir):
        payload = (
            "---\ntitle: Safe\n---\n"
            "# Hello\n\n"
            "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\n\n"
            "<script>alert(2)</script>\n\n"
            "Normal **text**.\n"
        )
        (Path(test_vault_dir) / "xss.md").write_text(payload, encoding="utf-8")
        resp = client.get("/api/file/TestVault", params={"path": "xss.md"})
        assert resp.status_code == 200
        html = resp.json()["html"]
        assert "onerror" not in html
        assert "<script" not in html
        assert "<strong>text</strong>" in html

    def test_share_page_escapes_title_and_frontmatter(self, client, test_vault_dir):
        payload = (
            '---\ntitle: "<script>alert(1)</script>"\n'
            'author: "<img src=x onerror=alert(9)>"\n---\n'
            "# Body\ncontent\n"
        )
        (Path(test_vault_dir) / "share_xss.md").write_text(payload, encoding="utf-8")
        create = client.post("/api/share/TestVault", json={"path": "share_xss.md"})
        assert create.status_code == 200
        token = create.json()["token"]

        page = client.get(f"/s/{token}")
        assert page.status_code == 200
        body = page.text
        assert "<script>alert(1)</script>" not in body
        assert "&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;" in body
        # The img tag must be escaped, so no live attribute is emitted.
        assert "<img src=x onerror" not in body
        assert "&lt;img" in body


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-027/028 — Token invalidation on password change
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestTokenInvalidation:
    def test_access_token_rejected_after_password_change(self, admin_client):
        login = admin_client.post(
            "/api/auth/login", json={"username": "admin", "password": "chab30"}
        )
        assert login.status_code == 200
        token = login.json()["access_token"]

        # Simulate a password change happening in the future relative to the token.
        from backend.auth.user_store import update_user
        update_user("admin", {"password_changed_at": time.time() + 10})

        me = admin_client.get(
            "/api/auth/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
        )
        assert me.status_code == 401


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BUG-064 — Excalidraw editor stylesheet (esm.sh) must pass CSP
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class TestCspExcalidrawStylesheet:
    def test_style_src_allows_esm_sh(self, client):
        """The Excalidraw editor loads its stylesheet from esm.sh.

        Without this directive the CSS is blocked, the editor is unstyled and
        its container enters a resize feedback loop up to the 2^25 canvas cap,
        leaving the scene blank (BUG-064).
        """
        resp = client.get("/api/health")
        csp = resp.headers.get("content-security-policy", "")
        style_src = next(
            (d.strip() for d in csp.split(";") if d.strip().startswith("style-src")),
            "",
        )
        assert style_src, "CSP style-src directive not found"
        assert "https://esm.sh" in style_src