fix: desktop — commandes Tauri bloquées par l'ACL et crash heap à l'ouverture (BUG-104, BUG-105)
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This commit is contained in:
2026-10-02 20:17:20 -04:00
parent 34428ea7b3
commit bab272bb5c
19 changed files with 172 additions and 58 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -2626,7 +2626,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "obsigate-desktop"
version = "2.49.2"
version = "2.49.4"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"env_logger",
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "obsigate-desktop"
version = "2.49.2"
version = "2.49.4"
description = "ObsiGate Desktop — Porte d'entrée native pour vos vaults Obsidian"
authors = ["Bruno Charest"]
edition = "2021"
+2
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@@ -38,5 +38,7 @@ fn main() {
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/refs/heads/main");
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/refs/tags");
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=permissions");
tauri_build::build()
}
+1
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
},
"permissions": [
"core:default",
"allow-app-commands",
"shell:allow-open",
"shell:allow-execute",
"dialog:default",
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"Default capabilities for ObsiGate Desktop","remote":{"urls":["http://127.0.0.1:*","http://localhost:*"]},"local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:default","shell:allow-open","shell:allow-execute","dialog:default","notification:default","fs:default","process:default","store:default"]}}
{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"Default capabilities for ObsiGate Desktop","remote":{"urls":["http://127.0.0.1:*","http://localhost:*"]},"local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:default","allow-app-commands","shell:allow-open","shell:allow-execute","dialog:default","notification:default","fs:default","process:default","store:default"]}}
+6
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@@ -2210,6 +2210,12 @@
"Identifier": {
"description": "Permission identifier",
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1).",
"type": "string",
"const": "allow-app-commands",
"markdownDescription": "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1)."
},
{
"description": "Default core plugins set.\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `core:path:default`\n- `core:event:default`\n- `core:window:default`\n- `core:webview:default`\n- `core:app:default`\n- `core:image:default`\n- `core:resources:default`\n- `core:menu:default`\n- `core:tray:default`",
"type": "string",
+6
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@@ -2210,6 +2210,12 @@
"Identifier": {
"description": "Permission identifier",
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1).",
"type": "string",
"const": "allow-app-commands",
"markdownDescription": "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1)."
},
{
"description": "Default core plugins set.\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `core:path:default`\n- `core:event:default`\n- `core:window:default`\n- `core:webview:default`\n- `core:app:default`\n- `core:image:default`\n- `core:resources:default`\n- `core:menu:default`\n- `core:tray:default`",
"type": "string",
+35
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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# Commandes applicatives ObsiGate — autorisées depuis l'origine distante.
#
# La fenêtre Tauri redirige vers http://127.0.0.1:<port> (page servie par le
# backend Python). Pour Tauri v2 c'est une origine *remote* : sans entrée ACL
# explicite, TOUTE commande de l'app (invoke_handler) est rejetée avec
# "Command ... not allowed by ACL" — le bouton « Choisir mon dossier » et le
# wizard ne faisaient alors rien (erreurs avalées par desktop.js:invoke()).
#
# Auto-généré en… non : édité à la main. Liste = tauri::generate_handler![…]
# dans src/main.rs — ajouter toute nouvelle commande ici.
[[permission]]
identifier = "allow-app-commands"
description = "Commandes de l'application ObsiGate appelées depuis la page backend (http://127.0.0.1)."
commands.allow = [
"get_backend_url",
"get_version",
"get_config",
"save_vault_path",
"get_vault_path",
"get_wizard_state",
"complete_wizard",
"pick_vault_folder",
"get_system_theme",
"restart_backend",
"check_backend_health",
"save_window_state",
"get_window_state",
"add_vault",
"remove_vault",
"list_vaults",
"add_dir",
"remove_dir",
"list_dirs",
]
+19 -43
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@@ -10,48 +10,23 @@ use log::{info, warn};
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
mod imp {
use super::*;
use std::os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt;
use windows::core::{Interface, HSTRING, PCWSTR};
use windows::Win32::Foundation::PROPERTYKEY;
use windows::Win32::System::Com::{
CoCreateInstance, CoInitializeEx, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED,
};
use windows::Win32::System::Com::StructuredStorage::PROPVARIANT;
use windows::Win32::System::Variant::VT_LPWSTR;
use windows::Win32::UI::Shell::{
ICustomDestinationList, IShellLinkW, SetCurrentProcessExplicitAppUserModelID,
DestinationList, EnumerableObjectCollection, ShellLink,
};
use windows::Win32::UI::Shell::Common::IObjectCollection;
use windows::Win32::UI::Shell::PropertiesSystem::IPropertyStore;
use super::*;
use std::os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt;
use windows::core::{Interface, HSTRING, PCWSTR};
use windows::Win32::System::Com::{
CoCreateInstance, CoInitializeEx, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED,
};
use windows::Win32::UI::Shell::{
ICustomDestinationList, IShellLinkW, SetCurrentProcessExplicitAppUserModelID,
DestinationList, EnumerableObjectCollection, ShellLink,
};
use windows::Win32::UI::Shell::Common::IObjectCollection;
const APP_ID: &str = "com.obsigate.desktop";
const APP_ID: &str = "com.obsigate.desktop";
// PKEY_Title (System.Title): {F29F85E0-4FF9-1068-AB91-08002B27B3D9}, pid 2
const PKEY_TITLE: PROPERTYKEY = PROPERTYKEY {
fmtid: windows::core::GUID::from_u128(0xF29F85E0_4FF9_1068_AB91_08002B27B3D9),
pid: 2,
};
fn wide_null_terminated(s: &str) -> Vec<u16> {
std::ffi::OsStr::new(s).encode_wide().chain(std::iter::once(0)).collect()
}
/// Set the jump-list display title via the shell link's property store.
fn set_link_title(link: &IShellLinkW, title: &str) -> windows::core::Result<()> {
let store: IPropertyStore = link.cast()?;
let mut wide = wide_null_terminated(title);
let mut pv: PROPVARIANT = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
unsafe {
let inner = &mut *pv.Anonymous.Anonymous;
inner.vt = VT_LPWSTR;
inner.Anonymous.pwszVal = windows::core::PWSTR(wide.as_mut_ptr());
store.SetValue(&PKEY_TITLE, &pv)?;
store.Commit()?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn wide_null_terminated(s: &str) -> Vec<u16> {
std::ffi::OsStr::new(s).encode_wide().chain(std::iter::once(0)).collect()
}
/// Build one shell link for a vault. `arg` is the command-line argument the
/// app expects to open that vault (see file associations / single-instance).
@@ -70,9 +45,10 @@ mod imp {
}
link.SetDescription(&HSTRING::from(name))?;
}
// Title (display name) is best-effort — a missing title only means the
// jump-list entry falls back to the executable name.
let _ = set_link_title(&link, name);
// Title (display name): the raw PROPVARIANT setter that used to live
// here corrupted the process heap (STATUS_HEAP_CORRUPTION c0000374 —
// the shell property store freed our Rust-allocated VT_LPWSTR buffer).
// SetDescription below already gives jump-list entries their label.
Ok(link)
}
+61
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@@ -1122,4 +1122,65 @@ mod tests {
let dbg = format!("{:?}", d);
assert!(dbg.contains("x"));
}
/// Guardrail ACL : toute commande Tauri invoquée par le frontend doit
/// figurer dans desktop/permissions/commands.toml. La page servie par le
/// backend (http://127.0.0.1) est une origine *remote* pour Tauri v2 :
/// sans cette entrée, la commande est rejetée « not allowed by ACL » et
/// desktop.js:invoke() avale l'erreur → bouton silencieusement mort
/// (bouton « Choisir mon dossier » du wizard, BUG-104).
#[test]
fn test_frontend_invokes_are_acl_allowed() {
let dir = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
let perms = fs::read_to_string(dir.join("permissions/commands.toml"))
.expect("desktop/permissions/commands.toml manquant");
let main_src = fs::read_to_string(dir.join("src/main.rs")).unwrap();
// Commandes déclarées dans le manifeste de permissions.
let allow_list = perms
.split("commands.allow")
.nth(1)
.and_then(|s| s.split(']').next())
.unwrap_or("");
let allowed: Vec<String> = allow_list
.split('"')
.skip(1)
.step_by(2)
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.collect();
assert!(!allowed.is_empty(), "commands.allow vide dans commands.toml");
// Chaque permission doit correspondre à une commande réellement
// enregistrée (faute de frappe → permission morte).
for cmd in &allowed {
assert!(
main_src.contains(&format!("fn {cmd}(")),
"permission allow pour la commande inconnue {cmd}"
);
}
// Toute commande invoke('…') du frontend doit être autorisée.
let js_dir = dir.join("../frontend/js");
let mut seen = 0usize;
for entry in fs::read_dir(&js_dir).unwrap() {
let path = entry.unwrap().path();
if path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) != Some("js") { continue; }
let src = fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
let mut rest = src.as_str();
while let Some(pos) = rest.find("invoke('") {
rest = &rest[pos + "invoke('".len()..];
let name: String = rest.chars().take_while(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || *c == '_').collect();
if !name.is_empty() {
seen += 1;
assert!(
allowed.contains(&name),
"commande {name} invoquée par {} absente de permissions/commands.toml",
path.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy()
);
}
rest = &rest[rest.find('\'').map(|i| i + 1).unwrap_or(rest.len())..];
}
}
assert!(seen > 0, "aucun invoke('…') trouvé dans frontend/js");
}
}
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nicedoc/obsigate/main/desktop/tauri.conf.schema.json",
"productName": "ObsiGate",
"version": "2.49.2",
"version": "2.49.4",
"identifier": "com.obsigate.desktop",
"build": {
"frontendDist": "../frontend",