feat(ai): durcissement phase F (#79) - rate limit, redaction, OpenAPI/MCP, E2E
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"""Secret redaction for tool results (Phase F).
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Tool results are fed back to the LLM (in-app agent loop) or returned to an
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external MCP client, so they must never leak credentials. ``read_file`` and
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``read_file_raw`` already redact through the shared file service, but other
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tools (``diff_backup``, ``search_*``) return content that has not been through
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the redactor. This module applies :func:`backend.secret_redactor.redact` to
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every string in a tool payload, recursively.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Any
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from backend.secret_redactor import redact
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_MAX_DEPTH = 12
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def redact_payload(payload: Any, _depth: int = 0) -> Any:
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"""Return a copy of *payload* with every string secret-redacted.
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Walks dicts, lists and tuples; scalars are returned unchanged. Strings are
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run through :func:`backend.secret_redactor.redact`. A recursion cap avoids
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pathological/cyclic structures (tool results are JSON-serialisable, so
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cycles should not occur, but the guard keeps this safe).
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"""
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if _depth > _MAX_DEPTH:
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return payload
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if isinstance(payload, str):
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redacted, count = redact(payload)
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return redacted if count else payload
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if isinstance(payload, dict):
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return {key: redact_payload(value, _depth + 1) for key, value in payload.items()}
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if isinstance(payload, list):
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return [redact_payload(item, _depth + 1) for item in payload]
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if isinstance(payload, tuple):
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return tuple(redact_payload(item, _depth + 1) for item in payload)
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return payload
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