fix: corrige 6 bugs mineurs (BUG-035 a BUG-040)
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ _PATTERNS = [
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(re.compile(r'(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|password|passwd|auth[_-]?token)\s*[:=]\s*[\'"]?([^\s\'"]{20,})[\'"]?', re.IGNORECASE),
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lambda m: f'{m.group(0).split("=")[0].split(":")[0]}=[MASQUÉ]' if "=" in m.group(0) or ":" in m.group(0) else '[MASQUÉ]'),
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# Generic long hex/base64 strings that look like secrets (40+ chars)
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# Prefixed API keys (sk-..., pk-..., rk-...)
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(re.compile(r'(?:sk|pk|rk)-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}'), '[CLÉ API MASQUÉE]'),
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# AWS access keys
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@@ -43,10 +43,50 @@ _PATTERNS = [
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# GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_)
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(re.compile(r'gh[pousr]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}'), '[GITHUB_TOKEN MASQUÉ]'),
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# Generic long random-looking strings (40+ hex chars)
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(re.compile(r'\b[a-fA-F0-9]{40,64}\b'), '[HEX_KEY MASQUÉ]'),
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]
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# BUG-035: bare 40–64 char hex strings used to be redacted unconditionally,
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# which mangled legitimate git commit SHAs, checksums and hashes in notes.
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# They are now only redacted when a secret-ish keyword sits in the immediate
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# context; hash/commit keywords explicitly exempt them.
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_HEX_RE = re.compile(r'\b[a-fA-F0-9]{40,64}\b')
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_SECRET_CONTEXT_RE = re.compile(
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r'(?i)\b(?:secret|token|key|apikey|api[_-]?key|password|passwd|auth|bearer|'
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r'credential|x-api-key|x-auth-token)\b'
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)
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_HASH_CONTEXT_RE = re.compile(
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r'(?i)\b(?:commit|sha\d*|hash|md5|blob|git|checksum|digest|integrity|'
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r'revision|rev|etag|fingerprint)\b'
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)
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#: How far before the hex string a keyword may appear to count as context.
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_HEX_CONTEXT_WINDOW = 60
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def _redact_bare_hex_secrets(text: str) -> tuple:
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"""Redact 40–64 char hex strings only when a secret keyword is nearby.
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Git/SHA/checksum contexts are left untouched (BUG-035).
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Args:
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text: Text to scan.
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Returns:
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(redacted_text, redaction_count) tuple.
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"""
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count = 0
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def _replace(match: re.Match) -> str:
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nonlocal count
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window = text[max(0, match.start() - _HEX_CONTEXT_WINDOW):match.start()]
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if _HASH_CONTEXT_RE.search(window):
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return match.group(0)
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if _SECRET_CONTEXT_RE.search(window):
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count += 1
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return '[HEX_KEY MASQUÉ]'
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return match.group(0)
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return _HEX_RE.sub(_replace, text), count
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def redact(text: str) -> tuple:
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"""Redact sensitive patterns from text.
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@@ -66,6 +106,8 @@ def redact(text: str) -> tuple:
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new_result, n = pattern.subn(str(replacement), result)
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count += n
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result = new_result
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result, hex_count = _redact_bare_hex_secrets(result)
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count += hex_count
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if count > 0:
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logger.info(f"Redacted {count} secret(s) from content")
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return result, count
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