fix: corrige 6 bugs mineurs (BUG-035 a BUG-040)

backend/auth/middleware.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 import logging
 import os
+import sys
 
 from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.middleware")
 
 security = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
 
+#: Hosts considered safe to bind without authentication (loopback only).
+_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1"}
+
 
 def is_auth_enabled() -> bool:
     """Check if authentication is enabled via environment variable.
@@ -26,6 +30,34 @@ def is_auth_enabled() -> bool:
     return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() != "false"
 
 
+def is_insecure_mode_allowed() -> bool:
+    """True when the operator explicitly accepts running without auth (BUG-037)."""
+    return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE", "false").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
+
+
+def bind_host_from_argv(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> str | None:
+    """Extract the ``--host`` value from the process arguments (uvicorn), if any.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when no explicit host is passed (uvicorn then defaults to
+    loopback ``127.0.0.1``).
+    """
+    args = sys.argv if argv is None else argv
+    for i, arg in enumerate(args):
+        if arg == "--host" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            return args[i + 1]
+        if arg.startswith("--host="):
+            return arg.split("=", 1)[1]
+    return None
+
+
+def is_loopback_host(host: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *host* is a loopback address (or unset → uvicorn default)."""
+    if not host:
+        return True
+    normalized = host.strip().strip("[]").lower()
+    return normalized in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS
+
+
 def get_current_user(
     request: Request,
     credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None = Depends(security),

backend/auth/password.py

@@ -1,14 +1,21 @@
 # backend/auth/password.py
 # Argon2id password hashing — OWASP 2024 recommended algorithm.
-# Parameters: time_cost=2, memory_cost=64MB, parallelism=2
+# Parameters (BUG-038): time_cost=2, memory_cost=19 MiB, parallelism=1
+# (OWASP current recommendation for Argon2id). The previous 64 MiB setting
+# allowed memory exhaustion under concurrent login attempts.
 
 from argon2 import PasswordHasher
 from argon2.exceptions import VerificationError, VerifyMismatchError
 
+#: Argon2id cost parameters (OWASP 2024: m=19456 KiB, t=2, p=1).
+ARGON2_TIME_COST = 2
+ARGON2_MEMORY_COST_KIB = 19456  # 19 MiB
+ARGON2_PARALLELISM = 1
+
 ph = PasswordHasher(
-    time_cost=2,
-    memory_cost=65536,  # 64 MB
-    parallelism=2,
+    time_cost=ARGON2_TIME_COST,
+    memory_cost=ARGON2_MEMORY_COST_KIB,
+    parallelism=ARGON2_PARALLELISM,
     hash_len=32,
     salt_len=16,
 )

backend/auth/router.py

@@ -124,31 +124,32 @@ async def auth_status():
 async def login(body: LoginRequest, response: Response, request: Request):
     """Authenticate a user. Returns access token and sets refresh cookie.
 
-    Implements timing-safe responses to prevent user enumeration:
-    a failed login with an unknown user takes the same time as one
-    with a known user (dummy hash is computed).
+    Implements timing-safe responses to prevent user enumeration: a failed
+    login with an unknown user takes the same time as one with a known user
+    (dummy hash is computed). BUG-039: unknown, inactive, locked and
+    per-account rate-limited accounts all answer the same ``401`` so the HTTP
+    status can never reveal whether an account exists.
     """
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
+
+    # IP-based rate limiting (10 failures / 15 min per IP). It is not
+    # account-specific, so a 429 here cannot be used to enumerate accounts.
+    if is_rate_limited(client_ip):
+        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives depuis cette adresse IP (15min)")
+
     user = get_user(body.username)
 
-    if not user:
+    # BUG-039: uniform 401 + equivalent timing for every account-state outcome.
+    if not user or not user.get("active"):
         # Timing-safe: simulate hash computation to prevent user enumeration
         hash_password("dummy_timing_protection")
         raise HTTPException(401, "Identifiants invalides")
 
-    if not user.get("active"):
-        raise HTTPException(403, "Compte désactivé")
-
-    # IP-based rate limiting (10 failures / 15 min per IP)
-    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
-    if is_rate_limited(client_ip):
-        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives depuis cette adresse IP (15min)")
-
     # BUG-031: per-account budget still applies when the attacker rotates IPs.
-    if is_account_rate_limited(body.username):
-        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives sur ce compte (15min)")
-
-    if is_locked(body.username):
-        raise HTTPException(429, "Compte temporairement verrouillé (15min)")
+    # Kept indistinguishable from a wrong password (BUG-039).
+    if is_account_rate_limited(body.username) or is_locked(body.username):
+        hash_password("dummy_timing_protection")
+        raise HTTPException(401, "Identifiants invalides")
 
     if not verify_password(body.password, user["password_hash"]):
         attempts = record_login_failure(body.username)

backend/collab.py

@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ MAX_UPDATE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
 #: Taille maximale d'un snapshot texte (protection anti-abus).
 MAX_TEXT_CHARS = 8 * 1024 * 1024
 
+#: Taille maximale d'un message brut reçu (protection anti-abus, BUG-036).
+MAX_MESSAGE_CHARS = 16 * 1024 * 1024
+
 #: Palette de couleurs attribuées aux utilisateurs (curseurs + avatars).
 PEER_COLORS = [
     "#e6194b", "#3cb44b", "#4363d8", "#f58231", "#911eb4",
@@ -68,9 +71,13 @@ def authenticate_websocket(websocket: WebSocket) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """Authenticate a WebSocket connection.
 
     Mirrors :func:`backend.auth.middleware.get_current_user` but works on the
-    WebSocket scope: the JWT is read from the ``access_token`` cookie (sent
-    automatically by same-origin browsers during the handshake) or, as a
-    fallback, from the ``token`` query parameter.
+    WebSocket scope: the JWT is read from the ``access_token`` cookie, which
+    same-origin browsers send automatically during the handshake.
+
+    BUG-036: the token is **never** accepted from the query string anymore —
+    URLs end up in access logs, proxies and browser history. Browsers cannot
+    set custom headers on a WebSocket handshake, so the HttpOnly cookie set at
+    login is the only supported transport.
 
     Returns the user dict, or ``None`` if authentication fails.
     """
@@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ def authenticate_websocket(websocket: WebSocket) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
             "_token_vaults": ["*"],
         }
 
-    token = websocket.query_params.get("token") or websocket.cookies.get("access_token")
+    token = websocket.cookies.get("access_token")
     if not token:
         return None
 
@@ -274,6 +281,9 @@ class CollabManager:
 
     # -- message handling ---------------------------------------------------
     async def _on_message(self, room: CollabRoom, client: CollabClient, raw: str) -> None:
+        # BUG-036: drop oversized frames before parsing them.
+        if not isinstance(raw, str) or len(raw) > MAX_MESSAGE_CHARS:
+            return
         try:
             message = json.loads(raw)
         except (ValueError, TypeError):

backend/indexer.py

@@ -481,12 +481,18 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
 
                 # PDF handling — special path (binary, uses pdf_reader)
                 tags: list[str] = []
+                pdf_text_pending = False
                 if ext == ".pdf":
-                    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata, extract_pdf_text
-                    raw = extract_pdf_text(fpath, max_chars=100000)
+                    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata
+                    # BUG-040: only the (cheap) metadata is read during the
+                    # scan. Full-text extraction is deferred to a background
+                    # pass (``enrich_pdf_texts``) so a vault with many/large
+                    # PDFs no longer blocks startup and index rebuilds.
                     pdf_meta = extract_pdf_metadata(fpath)
                     title = pdf_meta.get("title") or fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
-                    content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
+                    raw = ""
+                    content_preview = ""
+                    pdf_text_pending = True
                 elif ext == ".excalidraw" or fpath.name.lower().endswith(".excalidraw.md"):
                     raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
                     raw = extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw)
@@ -510,7 +516,7 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
                             title, post.content
                         )
 
-                files.append({
+                file_info = {
                     "path": str(relative).replace("\\", "/"),
                     "title": title,
                     "tags": tags,
@@ -519,7 +525,10 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
                     "size": stat.st_size,
                     "modified": modified,
                     "extension": ext,
-                })
+                }
+                if pdf_text_pending:
+                    file_info["pdf_text_pending"] = True
+                files.append(file_info)
 
                 for tag in tags:
                     tag_counts[tag] = tag_counts.get(tag, 0) + 1
@@ -535,6 +544,60 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
     return {"files": files, "tags": tag_counts, "path": vault_path, "paths": paths, "config": {}}
 
 
+async def enrich_pdf_texts(vault_name: str | None = None) -> int:
+    """Extract text from PDFs whose extraction was deferred during the scan (BUG-040).
+
+    ``_scan_vault`` only reads PDF metadata so a vault with many or large PDFs
+    starts serving immediately. This coroutine runs *after* the index (and the
+    inverted index) is ready, extracts the missing text off the event loop and
+    updates the in-memory entry plus the incremental index hooks.
+
+    Args:
+        vault_name: Restrict the pass to a single vault; ``None`` covers every
+            indexed vault.
+
+    Returns:
+        Number of deferred PDFs whose text extraction was attempted.
+    """
+    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_text
+
+    pending: list[tuple[str, dict[str, Any], Path]] = []
+    with _index_lock:
+        for name, vault_data in index.items():
+            if vault_name is not None and name != vault_name:
+                continue
+            vault_root = Path(vault_data.get("path", ""))
+            for file_info in vault_data.get("files", []):
+                if file_info.get("pdf_text_pending"):
+                    pending.append((name, file_info, vault_root / file_info["path"]))
+
+    if not pending:
+        return 0
+
+    loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    enriched = 0
+    for name, file_info, file_path in pending:
+        try:
+            raw = await loop.run_in_executor(None, extract_pdf_text, file_path, 100000)
+        except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+            logger.warning("PDF enrichment failed for %s: %s", file_path, exc)
+            raw = ""
+        file_info["content"] = raw[:SEARCH_CONTENT_LIMIT]
+        file_info["content_preview"] = raw[:200].strip()
+        file_info.pop("pdf_text_pending", None)
+        enriched += 1
+        if _on_index_change:
+            try:
+                _on_index_change("add", name, file_info["path"], file_info)
+            except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Index hook failed after PDF enrichment for %s: %s", file_path, exc
+                )
+
+    logger.info("PDF enrichment: extracted text for %d deferred PDF(s)", enriched)
+    return enriched
+
+
 async def build_index(progress_callback=None) -> None:
     """Build the full in-memory index for all configured vaults.
 
@@ -632,6 +695,8 @@ async def reload_index() -> dict[str, Any]:
         Dict mapping vault names to their file/tag counts.
     """
     await build_index()
+    # BUG-040: complete the deferred PDF extraction for the rebuilt index.
+    await enrich_pdf_texts()
     stats = {}
     for name, data in index.items():
         stats[name] = {"file_count": len(data["files"]), "tag_count": len(data["tags"])}
@@ -695,7 +760,10 @@ async def reload_single_vault(vault_name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     # Rebuild attachment index for this vault only
     from backend.attachment_indexer import build_attachment_index
     await build_attachment_index({vault_name: config})
-    
+
+    # BUG-040: complete the deferred PDF extraction for this vault.
+    await enrich_pdf_texts(vault_name)
+
     stats = {"file_count": len(vault_data["files"]), "tag_count": len(vault_data["tags"])}
     logger.info(f"Vault '{vault_name}' reindexed: {stats['file_count']} files, {stats['tag_count']} tags")
     return stats

backend/main.py

@@ -722,12 +722,56 @@ class SecurityHeadersMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
         return response
 
 
+def _guard_insecure_auth() -> None:
+    """Warn or refuse to start when authentication is disabled (BUG-037).
+
+    With ``OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=false`` every request is served as an
+    anonymous admin. That is convenient for local use but dangerous when the
+    process is reachable from a network. Binding to a non-loopback host
+    without the explicit ``OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE=true`` opt-in is refused.
+    """
+    from backend.auth.middleware import (
+        bind_host_from_argv,
+        is_auth_enabled,
+        is_insecure_mode_allowed,
+        is_loopback_host,
+    )
+
+    if is_auth_enabled():
+        return
+
+    if is_insecure_mode_allowed():
+        logger.warning(
+            "Authentication is DISABLED and OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE=true: every request "
+            "is treated as an anonymous administrator. Do not expose this instance."
+        )
+        return
+
+    host = bind_host_from_argv()
+    if not is_loopback_host(host):
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "Refusing to start: authentication is disabled (OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=false) "
+            f"while binding to a non-loopback address ('{host}'). This would expose an "
+            "unauthenticated instance with admin access. Enable authentication, or set "
+            "OBSIGATE_ALLOW_INSECURE=true if you really know what you are doing."
+        )
+
+    logger.warning(
+        "Authentication is DISABLED (OBSIGATE_AUTH_ENABLED=false): every request is "
+        "treated as an anonymous administrator. This is only safe on a trusted, "
+        "loopback-only deployment."
+    )
+
+
 @asynccontextmanager
 async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     """Application lifespan: build index on startup, cleanup on shutdown."""
     global _search_executor, _vault_watcher
     _search_executor = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2, thread_name_prefix="search")
-    
+
+    # BUG-037: refuse to expose an unauthenticated instance on a public bind.
+    _guard_insecure_auth()
+
     # Bootstrap admin account if needed
     bootstrap_admin()
 
@@ -748,6 +792,11 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
         # Build the semantic (embedding) index in the same background thread pool.
         await loop.run_in_executor(_search_executor, init_semantic_index)
 
+        # BUG-040: extract the PDF text deferred during the scan now that the
+        # index and inverted index are queryable (keeps startup non-blocking).
+        from backend.indexer import enrich_pdf_texts
+        await enrich_pdf_texts()
+
         # Scan for plugins in all vaults
         logger.info("Scanning for plugins...")
         from backend.indexer import vault_config

backend/secret_redactor.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ _PATTERNS = [
     (re.compile(r'(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|password|passwd|auth[_-]?token)\s*[:=]\s*[\'"]?([^\s\'"]{20,})[\'"]?', re.IGNORECASE),
      lambda m: f'{m.group(0).split("=")[0].split(":")[0]}=[MASQUÉ]' if "=" in m.group(0) or ":" in m.group(0) else '[MASQUÉ]'),
     
-    # Generic long hex/base64 strings that look like secrets (40+ chars)
+    # Prefixed API keys (sk-..., pk-..., rk-...)
     (re.compile(r'(?:sk|pk|rk)-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}'), '[CLÉ API MASQUÉE]'),
     
     # AWS access keys
@@ -43,10 +43,50 @@ _PATTERNS = [
     # GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_)
     (re.compile(r'gh[pousr]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}'), '[GITHUB_TOKEN MASQUÉ]'),
     
-    # Generic long random-looking strings (40+ hex chars)
-    (re.compile(r'\b[a-fA-F0-9]{40,64}\b'), '[HEX_KEY MASQUÉ]'),
 ]
 
+# BUG-035: bare 40–64 char hex strings used to be redacted unconditionally,
+# which mangled legitimate git commit SHAs, checksums and hashes in notes.
+# They are now only redacted when a secret-ish keyword sits in the immediate
+# context; hash/commit keywords explicitly exempt them.
+_HEX_RE = re.compile(r'\b[a-fA-F0-9]{40,64}\b')
+_SECRET_CONTEXT_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b(?:secret|token|key|apikey|api[_-]?key|password|passwd|auth|bearer|'
+    r'credential|x-api-key|x-auth-token)\b'
+)
+_HASH_CONTEXT_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b(?:commit|sha\d*|hash|md5|blob|git|checksum|digest|integrity|'
+    r'revision|rev|etag|fingerprint)\b'
+)
+#: How far before the hex string a keyword may appear to count as context.
+_HEX_CONTEXT_WINDOW = 60
+
+
+def _redact_bare_hex_secrets(text: str) -> tuple:
+    """Redact 40–64 char hex strings only when a secret keyword is nearby.
+
+    Git/SHA/checksum contexts are left untouched (BUG-035).
+
+    Args:
+        text: Text to scan.
+
+    Returns:
+        (redacted_text, redaction_count) tuple.
+    """
+    count = 0
+
+    def _replace(match: re.Match) -> str:
+        nonlocal count
+        window = text[max(0, match.start() - _HEX_CONTEXT_WINDOW):match.start()]
+        if _HASH_CONTEXT_RE.search(window):
+            return match.group(0)
+        if _SECRET_CONTEXT_RE.search(window):
+            count += 1
+            return '[HEX_KEY MASQUÉ]'
+        return match.group(0)
+
+    return _HEX_RE.sub(_replace, text), count
+
 
 def redact(text: str) -> tuple:
     """Redact sensitive patterns from text.
@@ -66,6 +106,8 @@ def redact(text: str) -> tuple:
             new_result, n = pattern.subn(str(replacement), result)
         count += n
         result = new_result
+    result, hex_count = _redact_bare_hex_secrets(result)
+    count += hex_count
     if count > 0:
         logger.info(f"Redacted {count} secret(s) from content")
     return result, count