fix(security): consolidation & securite phase 1 (#84, BUG-021 a BUG-034)

- sanitizer XSS serveur (markdown + page de partage) [BUG-021/022]
- rate-limit/lockout MFA [BUG-023]
- isolation vaults par segments [BUG-024]
- caps regex ReDoS [BUG-025]
- SSRF webhooks + secrets externalises [BUG-026]
- rotation/revocation des jetons [BUG-027]
- politique de mot de passe + invalidation sessions [BUG-028]
- verrous users.json [BUG-029]
- IP reelle dans les audits [BUG-030]
- rate-limit par compte [BUG-031]
- symlinks hors vault ignores [BUG-032]
- recherche simple via inverted index [BUG-033]
- token en memoire + cookie HttpOnly, CSP durcie [BUG-034]

Tests: pytest 961 passed / 6 skipped, ruff 0, mypy 0, frontend vert.

.env.example

@@ -16,8 +16,17 @@ OBSIGATE_ADMIN_PASSWORD=chab30
 
 # Rate limiting
 # OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS=10
+# OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=10
 # OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS=900
 
+# IP client derrière un reverse proxy (fait confiance à X-Forwarded-For)
+# OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=false
+
+# Webhooks : sécurité SSRF
+# OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP=false      # autoriser http:// (défaut : HTTPS requis)
+# OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE=false   # autoriser les IP privées/boucle
+# Secret d'un webhook : OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_SECRET_<ID_WEBHOOK_EN_MAJUSCULES>
+
 # Watcher
 # OBSIGATE_WATCHER_ENABLED=true
 # OBSIGATE_WATCHER_USE_POLLING=false

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -12,6 +12,46 @@ et [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Sécurité
+
+- **#84 Consolidation & sécurité — phase 1 (BUG-021 → BUG-034)** — traitement des
+  vulnérabilités de la revue statique du 2026-09-13 :
+  - **BUG-021/022 — XSS stocké** : nouveau sanitizer serveur en liste blanche
+    (`backend/services/sanitizer.py`, stdlib) appliqué au rendu markdown ; échappement
+    systématique du `title`, du frontmatter et du JSON de la page publique `/s/{token}`
+    (`</script>` neutralisé). Tests : `tests/test_security_hardening.py` (9).
+  - **BUG-023 — brute-force MFA** : rate-limit IP + compte et verrouillage de compte sur
+    `mfa/totp/verify`, `mfa/recovery` et `mfa/webauthn/verify` (`_enforce_mfa_rate_limit`).
+  - **BUG-024 — traversal inter-vaults** : `resolve_safe_path` compare désormais les chemins
+    par **segment** (`Path.relative_to` + repli casse-insensible), plus par préfixe de chaîne :
+    `vault` ne peut plus lire `vault-evil`.
+  - **BUG-025 — ReDoS** : validation des regex utilisateur (longueur max, rejet des
+    quantificateurs imbriqués/backrefs), contenu tronqué et nombre de matchs plafonné
+    (`backend/services/regex_safety.py`), appliqué à la recherche avancée et au find/replace.
+  - **BUG-026 — SSRF webhooks** : validation d'URL (HTTPS par défaut, IP privées/boucle
+    interdites, résolution DNS vérifiée au dispatch, redirections non suivies) et
+    **externalisation du secret** dans `data/webhook_secrets.json` (0600) ou variable
+    `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_SECRET_<ID>` (plus de secret en clair dans `webhooks.json`).
+  - **BUG-027 — sessions** : rotation du refresh token à chaque usage, révocation du JTI de
+    l'access token au logout, et vérification de la révocation dans le middleware.
+  - **BUG-028 — politique de mot de passe** : validation centralisée (8–128 caractères) à la
+    création, à la modification admin et au changement ; `password_changed_at` invalide tous
+    les jetons émis avant un changement de mot de passe.
+  - **BUG-029 — race `users.json`** : verrou `threading.RLock` autour des cycles
+    lecture-modification-écriture.
+  - **BUG-030 — audits** : l'adresse IP réelle du client (`X-Forwarded-For` si
+    `OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true`) est injectée dans `current_user` et consignée dans les audits.
+  - **BUG-031 — rate-limiter** : budget **par compte** en plus du budget par IP (rotation d'IP
+    neutralisée) ; limite mono-process documentée.
+  - **BUG-032 — indexation** : `_scan_vault` utilise `os.walk(followlinks=False)` et refuse
+    tout symlink sortant de la racine du vault.
+  - **BUG-033 — recherche O(N)** : la recherche simple et l'outil IA `search_fulltext`
+    utilisent l'inverted index (repli sur le scan pendant la construction).
+  - **BUG-034 — CSP & jetons** : le token d'accès n'est plus persisté dans `sessionStorage`
+    (mémoire + cookie `HttpOnly`) ; directives CSP durcies (`object-src`, `base-uri`,
+    `form-action`, `frame-ancestors`). *Reste : migration CSP par nonce (exige la conversion
+    des gestionnaires d'événements inline).*
+
 ### Ajouté
 
 - **#82 Assistant IA — menu `@` instantané** — nouvel endpoint `GET /api/vault/{vault}/paths`

README.fr.md

@@ -275,7 +275,11 @@ Un compte **admin** connecté voit une icône 🛡️ dans le header : liste, cr
 | `OBSIGATE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL` | Durée de vie token JWT (secondes) | `3600` |
 | `OBSIGATE_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL` | Durée de vie refresh token (secondes) | `2592000` |
 | `OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS` | Tentatives de login max par IP | `10` |
+| `OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS` | Tentatives de login max par compte | `10` |
 | `OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS` | Fenêtre de rate limiting (secondes) | `900` |
+| `OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY` | Faire confiance à `X-Forwarded-For` pour l'IP client (reverse proxy) | `false` |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP` | Autoriser les webhooks non HTTPS | `false` |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE` | Autoriser les webhooks vers des adresses privées/boucle | `false` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_MAX_SIZE_MB` | Taille max des PDF extraits (text indexation) | `50` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_EXTRACT_TIMEOUT` | Timeout extraction PDF (secondes) | `30` |
 

README.md

@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ When an **admin** account is logged in, a 🛡️ icon appears in the header. Cl
 | `OBSIGATE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL` | JWT token lifetime (seconds) | `3600` |
 | `OBSIGATE_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL` | Refresh token lifetime (seconds) | `2592000` |
 | `OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS` | Max login attempts per IP | `10` |
+| `OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS` | Max login attempts per account | `10` |
 | `OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS` | Rate limiting window (seconds) | `900` |
+| `OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY` | Trust `X-Forwarded-For` for the client IP (reverse proxy) | `false` |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP` | Allow non-HTTPS webhook targets | `false` |
+| `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE` | Allow webhooks to private/loopback addresses | `false` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_MAX_SIZE_MB` | Max PDF size for text extraction | `50` |
 | `OBSIGATE_PDF_EXTRACT_TIMEOUT` | PDF extraction timeout (seconds) | `30` |
 

backend/auth/jwt_handler.py

@@ -62,16 +62,21 @@ def create_access_token(user: dict) -> str:
     return jwt.encode(payload, get_secret_key(), algorithm=ALGORITHM)
 
 
-def create_refresh_token(username: str) -> tuple:
+def create_refresh_token(username: str, remember: bool = False) -> tuple:
-    """Create a JWT refresh token. Returns (token_string, jti)."""
+    """Create a JWT refresh token. Returns (token_string, jti).
+
+    ``remember`` is carried as a claim so token rotation can preserve the
+    30-day vs 7-day lifetime chosen at login.
+    """
     now = int(time.time())
     jti = str(uuid.uuid4())
     payload = {
         "sub": username,
         "jti": jti,
         "iat": now,
-        "exp": now + REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
+        "exp": now + (2592000 if remember else REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS),
         "type": "refresh",
+        "remember": remember,
     }
     return jwt.encode(payload, get_secret_key(), algorithm=ALGORITHM), jti
 

backend/auth/middleware.py

@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ import os
 from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
 
-from .jwt_handler import decode_token
+from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
+
+from .jwt_handler import decode_token, is_token_revoked
 from .user_store import get_user
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.middleware")
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ def get_current_user(
             "vaults": ["*"],
             "active": True,
             "_token_vaults": ["*"],
+            "_request_ip": get_client_ip(request),
         }
 
     token = None
@@ -57,14 +60,31 @@ def get_current_user(
     if not payload or payload.get("type") != "access":
         return None
 
+    # BUG-027: access tokens revoked at logout must be rejected immediately.
+    jti = payload.get("jti")
+    if jti and is_token_revoked(jti):
+        return None
+
     user = get_user(payload["sub"])
     if not user or not user.get("active"):
         return None
 
+    # BUG-028: a password change invalidates every token issued before it.
+    pca = user.get("password_changed_at")
+    iat = payload.get("iat")
+    if pca is not None and iat is not None:
+        try:
+            if int(iat) < int(float(pca)):
+                return None
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            return None
+
     # Attach vault permissions from the token (snapshot at login time)
     user["_token_vaults"] = payload.get("vaults", [])
     # Attach the token id for per-token rate limiting (AI tool layer).
     user["_token_jti"] = payload.get("jti")
+    # BUG-030: expose the real client IP to the audit log.
+    user["_request_ip"] = get_client_ip(request)
     return user
 
 

backend/auth/password.py

@@ -13,6 +13,32 @@ ph = PasswordHasher(
     salt_len=16,
 )
 
+# Password policy (BUG-028). Applied by the API validators at account creation
+# and password change so the rules stay consistent across both paths.
+MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8
+MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 128
+
+
+def validate_password_strength(password: str) -> str:
+    """Validate a plaintext password against the project policy.
+
+    Args:
+        password: Candidate password.
+
+    Returns:
+        The password unchanged when valid.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: When the password is too short, too long or blank.
+    """
+    if password is None or len(password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
+        raise ValueError(f"Minimum {MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} caractères")
+    if len(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
+        raise ValueError(f"Maximum {MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH} caractères")
+    if not password.strip():
+        raise ValueError("Le mot de passe ne peut pas être vide")
+    return password
+
 
 def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
     """Hash a password with Argon2id."""

backend/auth/router.py

@@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ import re
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Body, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response
 from pydantic import BaseModel, validator
 
-from backend.ratelimit import is_rate_limited
+from backend.ratelimit import is_account_rate_limited, is_rate_limited
+from backend.ratelimit import record_account_failure as rl_record_account_failure
+from backend.ratelimit import record_account_success as rl_record_account_success
 from backend.ratelimit import record_failure as rl_record_failure
 from backend.ratelimit import record_success as rl_record_success
+from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
 
 from .jwt_handler import (
     ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_SECONDS,
@@ -29,7 +32,7 @@ from .mfa import (
     verify_totp,
 )
 from .middleware import is_auth_enabled, require_admin, require_auth
-from .password import hash_password, verify_password
+from .password import hash_password, validate_password_strength, verify_password
 from .user_store import (
     create_user,
     delete_user,
@@ -61,9 +64,7 @@ class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
 
     @validator("new_password")
     def password_strength(cls, v):
-        if len(v) < 8:
+        return validate_password_strength(v)
-            raise ValueError("Minimum 8 caractères")
-        return v
 
 
 class CreateUserRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -73,6 +74,10 @@ class CreateUserRequest(BaseModel):
     role: str = "user"
     vaults: list[str] = []
 
+    @validator("password")
+    def password_valid(cls, v):
+        return validate_password_strength(v)
+
     @validator("username")
     def username_valid(cls, v):
         if not re.match(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{2,32}$", v):
@@ -93,6 +98,12 @@ class UpdateUserRequest(BaseModel):
     password: str | None = None
     role: str | None = None
 
+    @validator("password")
+    def password_valid(cls, v):
+        if v is None:
+            return v
+        return validate_password_strength(v)
+
 
 # ── Public endpoints ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -128,16 +139,21 @@ async def login(body: LoginRequest, response: Response, request: Request):
         raise HTTPException(403, "Compte désactivé")
 
     # IP-based rate limiting (10 failures / 15 min per IP)
-    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
     if is_rate_limited(client_ip):
         raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives depuis cette adresse IP (15min)")
 
+    # BUG-031: per-account budget still applies when the attacker rotates IPs.
+    if is_account_rate_limited(body.username):
+        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives sur ce compte (15min)")
+
     if is_locked(body.username):
         raise HTTPException(429, "Compte temporairement verrouillé (15min)")
 
     if not verify_password(body.password, user["password_hash"]):
         attempts = record_login_failure(body.username)
         rl_attempts, rl_remaining = rl_record_failure(client_ip)
+        rl_record_account_failure(body.username)
         remaining = max(0, 5 - attempts)
         detail = "Identifiants invalides"
         if 0 < remaining <= 2:
@@ -164,9 +180,10 @@ async def login(body: LoginRequest, response: Response, request: Request):
 def _issue_tokens(user: dict, username: str, remember_me: bool, response: Response) -> dict:
     """Issue JWT tokens after successful authentication (password or MFA verified)."""
     record_login_success(username)
+    rl_record_account_success(username)
 
     access_token = create_access_token(user)
-    refresh_token, refresh_jti = create_refresh_token(username)
+    refresh_token, refresh_jti = create_refresh_token(username, remember=remember_me)
 
     import os
     max_age = 2592000 if remember_me else 604800  # 30d or 7d
@@ -208,6 +225,8 @@ async def refresh_token_endpoint(request: Request, response: Response):
     """Renew access token via refresh token cookie.
 
     Called automatically by the frontend when the access token expires.
+    The refresh token is rotated on every use (BUG-027) and rejected if it
+    predates the user's last password change (BUG-028).
     """
     refresh_tok = request.cookies.get("refresh_token")
     if not refresh_tok:
@@ -224,11 +243,38 @@ async def refresh_token_endpoint(request: Request, response: Response):
     if not user or not user.get("active"):
         raise HTTPException(401, "Utilisateur introuvable ou inactif")
 
+    # BUG-028: reject refresh tokens issued before the last password change.
+    pca = user.get("password_changed_at")
+    iat = payload.get("iat")
+    if pca is not None and iat is not None:
+        try:
+            stale = int(iat) < int(float(pca))
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            stale = True
+        if stale:
+            raise HTTPException(401, "Session expirée, veuillez vous reconnecter")
+
+    import os
+
+    secure = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
+    remember_me = bool(payload.get("remember", False))
+
+    # BUG-027: rotate the refresh token — the old one is now single-use.
+    revoke_token(payload["jti"])
+    new_refresh_token, _new_jti = create_refresh_token(user["username"], remember=remember_me)
+    max_age = 2592000 if remember_me else 604800
+    response.set_cookie(
+        key="refresh_token",
+        value=new_refresh_token,
+        max_age=max_age,
+        httponly=True,
+        samesite="strict",
+        secure=secure,
+        path="/api/auth/refresh",
+    )
+
     new_access_token = create_access_token(user)
 
-    # Update cookies
-    import os
-    secure = os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true"
     response.set_cookie(
         key="access_token",
         value=new_access_token,
@@ -251,7 +297,7 @@ async def logout(
     request: Request,
     response: Response,
 ):
-    """Logout: revoke refresh token and delete cookies."""
+    """Logout: revoke refresh and access tokens, then delete cookies."""
     refresh_tok = request.cookies.get("refresh_token")
     if refresh_tok:
         payload = decode_token(refresh_tok)
@@ -261,6 +307,21 @@ async def logout(
             except Exception:
                 pass  # token already revoked
 
+    # BUG-027: revoke the access token too, otherwise it stays valid until expiry.
+    access_tok = None
+    auth_header = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
+    if auth_header.lower().startswith("bearer "):
+        access_tok = auth_header[7:].strip()
+    if not access_tok:
+        access_tok = request.cookies.get("access_token")
+    if access_tok:
+        access_payload = decode_token(access_tok)
+        if access_payload and access_payload.get("type") == "access":
+            try:
+                revoke_token(access_payload["jti"])
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
     response.delete_cookie("refresh_token", path="/api/auth/refresh")
     response.delete_cookie("access_token", path="/")
     response.delete_cookie("access_token", path="/api")  # just in case
@@ -313,19 +374,51 @@ async def patch_me(req: UpdateMeRequest, current_user=Depends(require_auth)):
 @router.post("/change-password")
 async def change_password(
     req: ChangePasswordRequest,
+    response: Response,
     current_user=Depends(require_auth),
 ):
-    """Change own password."""
+    """Change own password.
+
+    BUG-028: changing the password invalidates all previously issued tokens;
+    a fresh pair is issued to keep the current session alive.
+    """
     user = get_user(current_user["username"])
     assert user is not None, f"User {current_user['username']} not found"
     if not verify_password(req.current_password, user["password_hash"]):
         raise HTTPException(400, "Mot de passe actuel incorrect")
     update_user(current_user["username"], {"password": req.new_password})
-    return {"message": "Mot de passe mis à jour"}
+    updated = get_user(current_user["username"])
+    result: dict = {"message": "Mot de passe mis à jour"}
+    if updated is not None:
+        result.update(_issue_tokens(updated, updated["username"], False, response))
+    return result
 
 
 # ── MFA endpoints ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+def _enforce_mfa_rate_limit(request: Request, username: str) -> str:
+    """Reject MFA attempts from a rate-limited IP or on a locked account.
+
+    BUG-023: the second-factor endpoints were previously unprotected, making
+    the 6-digit TOTP brute-forceable.  Returns the resolved client IP.
+    """
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
+    if is_rate_limited(client_ip):
+        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives depuis cette adresse IP (15min)")
+    if is_account_rate_limited(username):
+        raise HTTPException(429, "Trop de tentatives sur ce compte (15min)")
+    if is_locked(username):
+        raise HTTPException(429, "Compte temporairement verrouillé (15min)")
+    return client_ip
+
+
+def _record_mfa_failure(client_ip: str, username: str) -> None:
+    """Record a failed MFA attempt for the IP, the account and the lockout."""
+    record_login_failure(username)
+    rl_record_failure(client_ip)
+    rl_record_account_failure(username)
+
+
 class MfaVerifyRequest(BaseModel):
     username: str
     code: str
@@ -601,6 +694,8 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_verify(
     from .user_store import get_user, update_user
     from .webauthn_mfa import complete_authentication
 
+    client_ip = _enforce_mfa_rate_limit(request, body.username)
+
     user = get_user(body.username)
     if not user:
         hash_password("dummy_timing_protection")
@@ -616,8 +711,10 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_verify(
             raise ValueError("Credential non enregistré")
         new_count = complete_authentication(body.username, body.credential, stored)
     except ValueError as e:
+        _record_mfa_failure(client_ip, body.username)
         raise HTTPException(401, str(e))
     except Exception as e:
+        _record_mfa_failure(client_ip, body.username)
         logger.warning(f"WebAuthn verification failed for {body.username}: {e}")
         raise HTTPException(401, "Vérification WebAuthn échouée")
 
@@ -627,7 +724,6 @@ async def mfa_webauthn_verify(
             c["sign_count"] = new_count
     update_user(body.username, {"webauthn_credentials": updated})
 
-    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
     rl_record_success(client_ip)
     logger.info(f"User '{body.username}' logged in via WebAuthn")
     return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response)
@@ -655,6 +751,8 @@ async def mfa_totp_verify(body: MfaVerifyRequest, response: Response, request: R
     """
     from .user_store import get_user
 
+    client_ip = _enforce_mfa_rate_limit(request, body.username)
+
     user = get_user(body.username)
     if not user:
         # Timing-safe: simulate work
@@ -665,10 +763,10 @@ async def mfa_totp_verify(body: MfaVerifyRequest, response: Response, request: R
         raise HTTPException(400, "MFA non activé pour cet utilisateur")
 
     if not verify_totp(user["mfa_secret"], body.code):
+        _record_mfa_failure(client_ip, body.username)
         raise HTTPException(401, "Code TOTP invalide")
 
     # Clear IP rate limit on success
-    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
     rl_record_success(client_ip)
 
     return _issue_tokens(user, body.username, body.remember_me, response)
@@ -682,6 +780,8 @@ async def mfa_recovery_login(body: MfaRecoveryRequest, response: Response, reque
     """
     from .user_store import get_user, update_user
 
+    client_ip = _enforce_mfa_rate_limit(request, body.username)
+
     user = get_user(body.username)
     if not user:
         hash_password("dummy_timing_protection")
@@ -696,6 +796,7 @@ async def mfa_recovery_login(body: MfaRecoveryRequest, response: Response, reque
 
     idx = verify_recovery_code(body.recovery_code, hashed_codes)
     if idx is None:
+        _record_mfa_failure(client_ip, body.username)
         raise HTTPException(401, "Code de récupération invalide")
 
     # Remove used recovery code (single-use)
@@ -703,7 +804,6 @@ async def mfa_recovery_login(body: MfaRecoveryRequest, response: Response, reque
     update_user(body.username, {"mfa_recovery_codes": hashed_codes})
 
     # Clear IP rate limit
-    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
     rl_record_success(client_ip)
 
     logger.info(f"User '{body.username}' logged in via recovery code")

backend/auth/user_store.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 import json
 import logging
 import shutil
+import threading
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -16,6 +17,12 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.users")
 
 USERS_FILE = Path("data/users.json")
 
+# Serialises read-modify-write cycles on users.json.  ``RLock`` because a few
+# helpers (e.g. ``record_login_failure``) call other mutators while holding it.
+# BUG-029: without this, concurrent MFA enable + password change could lose one
+# of the two updates (last writer wins).
+_users_lock = threading.RLock()
+
 
 def _read() -> dict:
     """Read users.json. Returns empty structure if file doesn't exist."""
@@ -75,26 +82,28 @@ def create_user(
     display_name: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Create a new user. Raises ValueError if username already taken."""
-    data = _read()
+    with _users_lock:
-    if username in data["users"]:
+        data = _read()
-        raise ValueError(f"User '{username}' already exists")
+        if username in data["users"]:
+            raise ValueError(f"User '{username}' already exists")
 
-    user = {
+        user = {
-        "id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
+            "id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
-        "username": username,
+            "username": username,
-        "display_name": display_name or username,
+            "display_name": display_name or username,
-        "password_hash": hash_password(password),
+            "password_hash": hash_password(password),
-        "role": role,
+            "role": role,
-        "vaults": vaults or [],
+            "vaults": vaults or [],
-        "active": True,
+            "active": True,
-        "language": "fr",  # default UI language
+            "language": "fr",  # default UI language
-        "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        "last_login": None,
+            "password_changed_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp(),
-        "failed_attempts": 0,
+            "last_login": None,
-        "locked_until": None,
+            "failed_attempts": 0,
-    }
+            "locked_until": None,
-    data["users"][username] = user
+        }
-    _write(data)
+        data["users"][username] = user
+        _write(data)
     logger.info(f"Created user '{username}' (role={role})")
     return {k: v for k, v in user.items() if k != "password_hash"}
 
@@ -105,28 +114,33 @@ def update_user(username: str, updates: dict) -> dict:
     Forbidden fields (id, username, created_at) are silently ignored.
     If 'password' is in updates, it's hashed and stored as password_hash.
     """
-    data = _read()
+    with _users_lock:
-    if username not in data["users"]:
+        data = _read()
-        raise ValueError(f"User '{username}' not found")
+        if username not in data["users"]:
+            raise ValueError(f"User '{username}' not found")
 
-    forbidden = {"id", "username", "created_at"}
+        forbidden = {"id", "username", "created_at"}
-    safe_updates = {k: v for k, v in updates.items() if k not in forbidden}
+        safe_updates = {k: v for k, v in updates.items() if k not in forbidden}
 
-    if "password" in safe_updates:
+        if "password" in safe_updates:
-        safe_updates["password_hash"] = hash_password(safe_updates.pop("password"))
+            safe_updates["password_hash"] = hash_password(safe_updates.pop("password"))
+            # BUG-028: invalidate every token issued before this change.
+            safe_updates["password_changed_at"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp()
 
-    data["users"][username].update(safe_updates)
+        data["users"][username].update(safe_updates)
-    _write(data)
+        _write(data)
-    return {k: v for k, v in data["users"][username].items() if k != "password_hash"}
+        result = {k: v for k, v in data["users"][username].items() if k != "password_hash"}
+    return result
 
 
 def delete_user(username: str):
     """Delete a user. Raises ValueError if not found."""
-    data = _read()
+    with _users_lock:
-    if username not in data["users"]:
+        data = _read()
-        raise ValueError(f"User '{username}' not found")
+        if username not in data["users"]:
-    del data["users"][username]
+            raise ValueError(f"User '{username}' not found")
-    _write(data)
+        del data["users"][username]
+        _write(data)
     logger.info(f"Deleted user '{username}'")
 
 
@@ -144,24 +158,25 @@ def record_login_failure(username: str) -> int:
 
     After 5 failures, locks the account for 15 minutes.
     """
-    data = _read()
+    with _users_lock:
-    user = data["users"].get(username)
+        data = _read()
-    if not user:
+        user = data["users"].get(username)
-        return 0
+        if not user:
+            return 0
 
-    attempts = user.get("failed_attempts", 0) + 1
+        attempts = user.get("failed_attempts", 0) + 1
-    updates = {"failed_attempts": attempts}
+        updates = {"failed_attempts": attempts}
 
-    # Lock after 5 failed attempts (15 minutes)
+        # Lock after 5 failed attempts (15 minutes)
-    if attempts >= 5:
+        if attempts >= 5:
-        locked_until = (
+            locked_until = (
-            datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=15)
+                datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=15)
-        ).isoformat()
+            ).isoformat()
-        updates["locked_until"] = locked_until
+            updates["locked_until"] = locked_until
-        logger.warning(f"Account '{username}' locked after {attempts} failed attempts")
+            logger.warning(f"Account '{username}' locked after {attempts} failed attempts")
 
-    update_user(username, updates)
+        update_user(username, updates)
-    return attempts
+        return attempts
 
 
 def is_locked(username: str) -> bool:

backend/indexer.py

@@ -423,94 +423,113 @@ def _scan_vault(vault_name: str, vault_path: str, vault_cfg: dict[str, Any] | No
         logger.warning(f"Vault path does not exist: {vault_path}")
         return {"files": [], "tags": {}, "path": vault_path, "paths": []}
 
-    for fpath in vault_root.rglob("*"):
+    root_resolved = vault_root.resolve(strict=False)
-        # Skip ignored directories
-        if any(part in IGNORED_DIRS for part in fpath.relative_to(vault_root).parts):
-            continue
 
-        rel_path_str = str(fpath.relative_to(vault_root)).replace("\\", "/")
+    # BUG-032: walk without following symlinks and refuse any symlink that
-        
+    # escapes the vault root, so external data can never be indexed/exposed.
-        # Add all paths (files and directories) to path index
+    for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(vault_root, followlinks=False):
-        if fpath.is_dir():
+        current_dir = Path(dirpath)
+
+        # Prune ignored and symlinked directories in place (no recursion).
+        dirnames[:] = [
+            d for d in dirnames
+            if d not in IGNORED_DIRS and not (current_dir / d).is_symlink()
+        ]
+
+        for d in dirnames:
+            dpath = current_dir / d
+            rel_path_str = str(dpath.relative_to(vault_root)).replace("\\", "/")
             paths.append({
                 "path": rel_path_str,
-                "name": fpath.name,
+                "name": d,
                 "type": "directory"
             })
-            continue
-        
-        # Files only from here
-        if not fpath.is_file():
-            continue
-        ext = fpath.suffix.lower()
-        # Also match extensionless files named like Dockerfile, Makefile
-        basename_lower = fpath.name.lower()
-        if ext not in SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS and basename_lower not in ("dockerfile", "makefile", "cmakelists.txt"):
-            continue
-        
-        # Add file to path index
-        paths.append({
-            "path": rel_path_str,
-            "name": fpath.name,
-            "type": "file"
-        })
-        
-        try:
-            relative = fpath.relative_to(vault_root)
-            stat = fpath.stat()
-            modified = datetime.fromtimestamp(stat.st_mtime, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
 
-            # PDF handling — special path (binary, uses pdf_reader)
+        for fname in filenames:
-            tags: list[str] = []
+            fpath = current_dir / fname
-            if ext == ".pdf":
-                from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata, extract_pdf_text
-                raw = extract_pdf_text(fpath, max_chars=100000)
-                pdf_meta = extract_pdf_metadata(fpath)
-                title = pdf_meta.get("title") or fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
-                content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
-            elif ext == ".excalidraw" or fpath.name.lower().endswith(".excalidraw.md"):
-                raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
-                raw = extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw)
-                title = fpath.stem.replace(".excalidraw", "").replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
-                content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
-            else:
-                raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
-                title = fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
-                content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
 
-                if ext == ".md":
+            if fpath.is_symlink():
-                    post = parse_markdown_file(raw)
+                try:
-                    tags = _extract_tags(post)
+                    target = fpath.resolve(strict=True)
-                    inline_tags = _extract_inline_tags(post.content)
+                except OSError:
-                    tags = list(set(tags) | set(inline_tags))
+                    continue
-                    title = _extract_title(post, fpath)
+                try:
-                    content_preview = post.content[:200].strip()
+                    target.relative_to(root_resolved)
+                except ValueError:
+                    logger.warning(f"Skipping symlink outside vault: {fpath}")
+                    continue
 
-                    _extract_wikilinks_for_backlinks(
+            rel_path_str = str(fpath.relative_to(vault_root)).replace("\\", "/")
-                        vault_name, str(relative).replace("\\", "/"),
-                        title, post.content
-                    )
 
-            files.append({
+            ext = fpath.suffix.lower()
-                "path": str(relative).replace("\\", "/"),
+            # Also match extensionless files named like Dockerfile, Makefile
-                "title": title,
+            basename_lower = fpath.name.lower()
-                "tags": tags,
+            if ext not in SUPPORTED_EXTENSIONS and basename_lower not in ("dockerfile", "makefile", "cmakelists.txt"):
-                "content_preview": content_preview,
+                continue
-                "content": raw[:SEARCH_CONTENT_LIMIT],
+
-                "size": stat.st_size,
+            # Add file to path index
-                "modified": modified,
+            paths.append({
-                "extension": ext,
+                "path": rel_path_str,
+                "name": fname,
+                "type": "file"
             })
 
-            for tag in tags:
+            try:
-                tag_counts[tag] = tag_counts.get(tag, 0) + 1
+                relative = fpath.relative_to(vault_root)
+                stat = fpath.stat()
+                modified = datetime.fromtimestamp(stat.st_mtime, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
 
-        except PermissionError:
+                # PDF handling — special path (binary, uses pdf_reader)
-            logger.debug(f"Permission denied, skipping {fpath}")
+                tags: list[str] = []
-            continue
+                if ext == ".pdf":
-        except Exception as e:
+                    from backend.pdf_reader import extract_pdf_metadata, extract_pdf_text
-            logger.error(f"Error indexing {fpath}: {e}")
+                    raw = extract_pdf_text(fpath, max_chars=100000)
-            continue
+                    pdf_meta = extract_pdf_metadata(fpath)
+                    title = pdf_meta.get("title") or fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
+                    content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
+                elif ext == ".excalidraw" or fpath.name.lower().endswith(".excalidraw.md"):
+                    raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+                    raw = extract_excalidraw_indexable(raw)
+                    title = fpath.stem.replace(".excalidraw", "").replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
+                    content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
+                else:
+                    raw = fpath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+                    title = fpath.stem.replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ")
+                    content_preview = raw[:200].strip()
+
+                    if ext == ".md":
+                        post = parse_markdown_file(raw)
+                        tags = _extract_tags(post)
+                        inline_tags = _extract_inline_tags(post.content)
+                        tags = list(set(tags) | set(inline_tags))
+                        title = _extract_title(post, fpath)
+                        content_preview = post.content[:200].strip()
+
+                        _extract_wikilinks_for_backlinks(
+                            vault_name, str(relative).replace("\\", "/"),
+                            title, post.content
+                        )
+
+                files.append({
+                    "path": str(relative).replace("\\", "/"),
+                    "title": title,
+                    "tags": tags,
+                    "content_preview": content_preview,
+                    "content": raw[:SEARCH_CONTENT_LIMIT],
+                    "size": stat.st_size,
+                    "modified": modified,
+                    "extension": ext,
+                })
+
+                for tag in tags:
+                    tag_counts[tag] = tag_counts.get(tag, 0) + 1
+
+            except PermissionError:
+                logger.debug(f"Permission denied, skipping {fpath}")
+                continue
+            except Exception as e:
+                logger.error(f"Error indexing {fpath}: {e}")
+                continue
 
     logger.info(f"Vault '{vault_name}': indexed {len(files)} files, {len(paths)} paths, {len(tag_counts)} unique tags")
     return {"files": files, "tags": tag_counts, "path": vault_path, "paths": paths, "config": {}}

backend/main.py

@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ from backend.services.mutations import (
     restore_backup as service_restore_backup,
 )
 from backend.services.recent import humanize_mtime, list_recent
+from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
 from backend.services.search import advanced_search_vaults, list_paths, search_paths, search_vaults
 from backend.services.search import list_tags as service_list_tags
 from backend.services.vaults import (
@@ -678,7 +679,11 @@ class SecurityHeadersMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
             "connect-src 'self' blob: https://esm.sh https://unpkg.com https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com https://fonts.googleapis.com https://fonts.gstatic.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
             "font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com https://esm.sh; "
             "worker-src 'self' blob:; "
-            "frame-src 'self' blob:;"
+            "frame-src 'self' blob:; "
+            "object-src 'none'; "
+            "base-uri 'self'; "
+            "form-action 'self'; "
+            "frame-ancestors 'self';"
         )
         # Static assets are NOT content-hashed, so they must revalidate:
         # ``immutable``/long max-age made Cloudflare and mobile browsers serve
@@ -1178,7 +1183,10 @@ def _render_markdown(raw_md: str, vault_name: str, current_file_path: Path | Non
     
     # Add heading IDs for TOC navigation
     rendered = _add_heading_ids(rendered)
-    
+
+    # Sanitize: raw HTML in vault content must never reach the DOM (BUG-021).
+    rendered = sanitize_html(rendered)
+
     return rendered
 
 
@@ -2657,14 +2665,15 @@ async def api_advanced_search(
     Results include ``<mark>``-highlighted snippets and faceted tag/vault counts.
     """
     loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
-    return await loop.run_in_executor(
+    search_fn = partial(advanced_search_vaults, q, vault=vault, tag=tag,
-        _search_executor,
-        partial(advanced_search_vaults, q, vault=vault, tag=tag,
                 limit=limit, offset=offset, sort=sort,
                 case_sensitive=case_sensitive, whole_word=whole_word, regex=regex,
                 include_paths=include_paths, exclude_paths=exclude_paths,
-                created=created, modified=modified, size=size, semantic=semantic),
+                created=created, modified=modified, size=size, semantic=semantic)
-    )
+    try:
+        return await loop.run_in_executor(_search_executor, search_fn)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(400, str(e)) from e
 
 
 @app.post("/api/search/replace", response_model=ReplaceResponse)
@@ -4012,9 +4021,23 @@ async def public_share_view(token: str):
 
     title = post.metadata.get("title", file_path.stem)
 
-    # JSON-escape raw content for embedding in HTML
+    # Escape everything user-controlled before embedding in HTML/JS (BUG-022).
-    import json as _json
+    title_esc = html_mod.escape(str(title))
-    raw_json = _json.dumps(raw)
+    # Neutralise ``</script>`` in the JS string literal too.
+    title_download_js = (
+        _json.dumps(f"{title}.md")
+        .replace("<", "\\u003c")
+        .replace(">", "\\u003e")
+        .replace("&", "\\u0026")
+    )
+
+    # JSON-escape raw content for embedding in HTML, and neutralise ``</script>``.
+    raw_json = (
+        _json.dumps(raw)
+        .replace("<", "\\u003c")
+        .replace(">", "\\u003e")
+        .replace("&", "\\u0026")
+    )
     fm_html = ""
     if post.metadata:
         fm_items = []
@@ -4028,12 +4051,15 @@ async def public_share_view(token: str):
                 v = "✓" if v else "✗"
             elif v is None:
                 v = "—"
-            fm_items.append(f'<div class="fm-row"><span class="fm-key">{k}</span><span class="fm-val">{v}</span></div>')
+            fm_items.append(
+                f'<div class="fm-row"><span class="fm-key">{html_mod.escape(str(k))}</span>'
+                f'<span class="fm-val">{html_mod.escape(str(v))}</span></div>'
+            )
         if fm_items:
             fm_html = f'<div class="fm-section"><div class="fm-header">Frontmatter</div><div class="fm-body">{"".join(fm_items)}</div></div>'
 
     return HTMLResponse(f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="fr" data-theme="dark"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
-<title>{title} — ObsiGate Share</title>
+<title>{title_esc} — ObsiGate Share</title>
 <style>
 :root {{ --bg:#1a1a2e; --bg-card:#16213e; --text:#e0e0e0; --text-muted:#888; --accent:#6366f1; --border:#2a2a4a; --banner-bg:var(--accent); --banner-text:#fff; }}
 [data-theme="light"] {{ --bg:#f8f9fa; --bg-card:#fff; --text:#1a1a2e; --text-muted:#666; --accent:#4f46e5; --border:#ddd; --banner-bg:#eef2ff; --banner-text:#4338ca; }}
@@ -4075,7 +4101,7 @@ body{{font-family:system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif;background:var(--bg);color:
   Document partagé via ObsiGate
 </div>
 <div class="toolbar">
-  <span class="toolbar-title">{title}</span>
+  <span class="toolbar-title">{title_esc}</span>
   <button class="toolbar-btn" onclick="toggleTheme()" title="Thème clair/sombre">
     <svg id="theme-icon-dark" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M21 12.79A9 9 0 1 1 11.21 3 7 7 0 0 0 21 12.79z"/></svg>
     <svg id="theme-icon-light" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" style="display:none"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="5"/><line x1="12" y1="1" x2="12" y2="3"/><line x1="12" y1="21" x2="12" y2="23"/><line x1="4.22" y1="4.22" x2="5.64" y2="5.64"/><line x1="18.36" y1="18.36" x2="19.78" y2="19.78"/><line x1="1" y1="12" x2="3" y2="12"/><line x1="21" y1="12" x2="23" y2="12"/><line x1="4.22" y1="19.78" x2="5.64" y2="18.36"/><line x1="18.36" y1="5.64" x2="19.78" y2="4.22"/></svg>
@@ -4094,7 +4120,7 @@ body{{font-family:system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif;background:var(--bg);color:
 <script>
 function toggleTheme(){{var t=document.documentElement;var isDark=t.dataset.theme==="dark";t.dataset.theme=isDark?"light":"dark";document.getElementById("theme-icon-dark").style.display=isDark?"none":"";document.getElementById("theme-icon-light").style.display=isDark?"":"none";localStorage.setItem("obsigate-share-theme",t.dataset.theme)}}
 (function(){{var s=localStorage.getItem("obsigate-share-theme");if(!s)s="dark";document.documentElement.dataset.theme=s;var isDark=s==="dark";document.getElementById("theme-icon-dark").style.display=isDark?"":"none";document.getElementById("theme-icon-light").style.display=isDark?"none":""}})();
-function exportMD(){{var raw=JSON.parse(document.getElementById("raw-content").textContent);var b=new Blob([raw],{{type:"text/markdown"}});var a=document.createElement("a");a.href=URL.createObjectURL(b);a.download="{title}.md";a.click()}}
+function exportMD(){{var raw=JSON.parse(document.getElementById("raw-content").textContent);var b=new Blob([raw],{{type:"text/markdown"}});var a=document.createElement("a");a.href=URL.createObjectURL(b);a.download={title_download_js};a.click()}}
 </script></body></html>""")
 
 

backend/ratelimit.py

@@ -1,13 +1,21 @@
 """
-IP-based rate limiter for authentication endpoints.
+In-memory rate limiter for authentication endpoints.
 
-Tracks failed login attempts per IP address with automatic
+Tracks failed attempts per IP **and** per account with automatic cleanup of
-cleanup of expired entries. Complements the per-account lockout
+expired entries.  The per-IP budget stops a single source; the per-account
-in user_store.py.
+budget (BUG-031) still throttles an attacker who rotates IPs.  It complements
+the per-account lockout in ``user_store.py``.
+
+.. note::
+   The counters live in process memory only.  They are **not** shared between
+   multiple workers/containers and are lost on restart.  For a multi-node
+   deployment, front this service with a shared store (Redis) or a single
+   worker.  This limitation is intentional and documented (BUG-031).
 
 Configuration via environment variables:
-    OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS   Max failures per IP (default: 10)
+    OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS     Max failures per IP (default: 10)
-    OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS Lockout window in seconds (default: 900 = 15min)
+    OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS   Max failures per account (default: 10)
+    OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS   Lockout window in seconds (default: 900)
 """
 
 import logging
@@ -19,29 +27,37 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.ratelimit")
 
 # --- Configuration ---
 MAX_ATTEMPTS = int(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS", "10"))
+ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = int(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS", "10"))
 WINDOW_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS", "900"))  # 15 min
 
-# --- In-memory store: {ip: [(timestamp, success_bool), ...]} ---
+# --- In-memory stores: {key: [(timestamp, success_bool), ...]} ---
 _ip_attempts: dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list)
+_account_attempts: dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list)
 _last_cleanup = time.time()
 CLEANUP_INTERVAL = 60  # seconds
 
 
+def _prune(store: dict[str, list], cutoff: float) -> None:
+    """Drop expired entries from one store in place."""
+    expired = []
+    for key, attempts in store.items():
+        store[key] = [a for a in attempts if a[0] > cutoff]
+        if not store[key]:
+            expired.append(key)
+    for key in expired:
+        del store[key]
+
+
 def _cleanup_expired():
-    """Remove entries older than the window."""
+    """Remove entries older than the window from both stores."""
     global _last_cleanup
     now = time.time()
     if now - _last_cleanup < CLEANUP_INTERVAL:
         return
     _last_cleanup = now
     cutoff = now - WINDOW_SECONDS
-    expired_ips = []
+    _prune(_ip_attempts, cutoff)
-    for ip, attempts in _ip_attempts.items():
+    _prune(_account_attempts, cutoff)
-        _ip_attempts[ip] = [a for a in attempts if a[0] > cutoff]
-        if not _ip_attempts[ip]:
-            expired_ips.append(ip)
-    for ip in expired_ips:
-        del _ip_attempts[ip]
 
 
 def record_failure(ip: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
@@ -72,6 +88,37 @@ def is_rate_limited(ip: str) -> bool:
     return failures >= MAX_ATTEMPTS
 
 
+def record_account_failure(account: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    """Record a failed attempt for an account, regardless of source IP.
+
+    Returns:
+        (current_failure_count, remaining_attempts)
+    """
+    _cleanup_expired()
+    key = account.lower()
+    _account_attempts[key].append((time.time(), False))
+    failures = sum(1 for _, success in _account_attempts[key] if not success)
+    remaining = max(0, ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS - failures)
+    if failures >= ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS:
+        logger.warning(f"Account {account} rate-limited after {failures} failed attempts")
+    return failures, remaining
+
+
+def record_account_success(account: str):
+    """Clear the per-account rate limit state after a successful login."""
+    _cleanup_expired()
+    _account_attempts[account.lower()] = [(time.time(), True)]
+
+
+def is_account_rate_limited(account: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if an account has exceeded the per-account rate limit."""
+    _cleanup_expired()
+    failures = sum(
+        1 for _, success in _account_attempts.get(account.lower(), []) if not success
+    )
+    return failures >= ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS
+
+
 def get_status(ip: str | None = None) -> dict:
     """Get rate limit status for an IP (for diagnostics)."""
     _cleanup_expired()
@@ -87,7 +134,9 @@ def get_status(ip: str | None = None) -> dict:
         }
     return {
         "tracked_ips": len(_ip_attempts),
+        "tracked_accounts": len(_account_attempts),
         "max_attempts": MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+        "account_max_attempts": ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
         "window_seconds": WINDOW_SECONDS,
         "limited_ips": sum(
             1 for ip_addr in _ip_attempts

backend/search.py

@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ from sortedcontainers import SortedList
 from backend import indexer as _indexer
 from backend import semantic_search as _semantic
 from backend.indexer import index
+from backend.services.regex_safety import (
+    MAX_REGEX_MATCHES,
+    truncate_for_regex,
+    validate_regex,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.search")
 
@@ -226,12 +231,16 @@ def _extract_regex_snippet(
     if not content or not pattern_text:
         return content[:200].strip() if content else ""
 
+    # BUG-025: bound the text scanned and the number of matches collected.
+    content = truncate_for_regex(content)
+
     try:
+        validate_regex(pattern_text)
         pattern = re.compile(pattern_text, re.IGNORECASE)
-    except re.error:
+    except (re.error, ValueError):
         return _escape_html(content[:200].strip())
 
-    matches = list(pattern.finditer(content))
+    matches = list(pattern.finditer(content))[:MAX_REGEX_MATCHES]
     if not matches:
         return _escape_html(content[:200].strip())
 
@@ -729,60 +738,97 @@ def search(
     query_lower = query.lower()
     results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
 
-    for vault_name, vault_data in index.items():
+    inv = get_inverted_index()
-        if vault_filter != "all" and vault_name != vault_filter:
+    use_index = (not inv.is_stale()) and inv.doc_count > 0
+
+    if use_index:
+        # BUG-033: retrieve candidates from the inverted index instead of
+        # scanning every document.  Multi-term queries require all terms
+        # (a superset of exact-phrase matches), single terms use prefix
+        # expansion.  Falls back to a full scan while the index is building.
+        if has_query:
+            terms = [t for t in tokenize(query) if t]
+            if not terms:
+                return []
+            doc_sets: list[set] = []
+            for term in terms:
+                term_docs: set = set(inv.word_index.get(term, {}).keys())
+                if len(term) >= MIN_PREFIX_LENGTH:
+                    for expanded in inv.get_prefix_tokens(term):
+                        term_docs.update(inv.word_index.get(expanded, {}).keys())
+                doc_sets.append(term_docs)
+            doc_keys = set.intersection(*doc_sets) if doc_sets else set()
+        else:
+            doc_keys = set(inv.doc_info.keys())
+
+        if vault_filter != "all":
+            doc_keys &= inv.vault_docs.get(vault_filter, set())
+        for tag in selected_tags:
+            doc_keys &= inv.tag_docs.get(tag.lower(), set())
+
+        candidates = [
+            (inv.doc_vault[dk], inv.doc_info[dk])
+            for dk in doc_keys
+            if dk in inv.doc_info
+        ]
+    else:
+        candidates = [
+            (vault_name, file_info)
+            for vault_name, vault_data in index.items()
+            if vault_filter == "all" or vault_name == vault_filter
+            for file_info in vault_data["files"]
+        ]
+
+    for vault_name, file_info in candidates:
+        # Tag filter: all selected tags must be present
+        if selected_tags and not all(tag in file_info["tags"] for tag in selected_tags):
             continue
 
-        for file_info in vault_data["files"]:
+        score = 0
-            # Tag filter: all selected tags must be present
+        snippet = file_info.get("content_preview", "")
-            if selected_tags and not all(tag in file_info["tags"] for tag in selected_tags):
-                continue
 
-            score = 0
+        if has_query:
-            snippet = file_info.get("content_preview", "")
+            title_lower = file_info["title"].lower()
 
-            if has_query:
+            # Exact title match (highest weight)
-                title_lower = file_info["title"].lower()
+            if query_lower == title_lower:
+                score += 20
+            # Partial title match
+            elif query_lower in title_lower:
+                score += 10
 
-                # Exact title match (highest weight)
+            # Path match (folder/filename relevance)
-                if query_lower == title_lower:
+            if query_lower in file_info["path"].lower():
-                    score += 20
+                score += 5
-                # Partial title match
-                elif query_lower in title_lower:
-                    score += 10
 
-                # Path match (folder/filename relevance)
+            # Tag name match
-                if query_lower in file_info["path"].lower():
+            for tag in file_info.get("tags", []):
-                    score += 5
+                if query_lower in tag.lower():
+                    score += 3
+                    break  # count once per file
 
-                # Tag name match
+            # Content match — use cached content (no disk I/O)
-                for tag in file_info.get("tags", []):
+            content = file_info.get("content", "")
-                    if query_lower in tag.lower():
+            content_lower = content.lower()
-                        score += 3
+            if query_lower in content_lower:
-                        break  # count once per file
+                # Frequency-based scoring, capped to avoid over-weighting
+                occurrences = content_lower.count(query_lower)
+                score += min(occurrences, 10)
+                snippet = _extract_snippet(content, query)
+        else:
+            # Tag-only filter: all matching files get score 1
+            score = 1
 
-                # Content match — use cached content (no disk I/O)
+        if score > 0:
-                content = file_info.get("content", "")
+            results.append({
-                content_lower = content.lower()
+                "vault": vault_name,
-                if query_lower in content_lower:
+                "path": file_info["path"],
-                    # Frequency-based scoring, capped to avoid over-weighting
+                "title": file_info["title"],
-                    occurrences = content_lower.count(query_lower)
+                "tags": file_info["tags"],
-                    score += min(occurrences, 10)
+                "score": score,
-                    snippet = _extract_snippet(content, query)
+                "snippet": snippet,
-            else:
+                "modified": file_info["modified"],
-                # Tag-only filter: all matching files get score 1
+            })
-                score = 1
-
-            if score > 0:
-                results.append({
-                    "vault": vault_name,
-                    "path": file_info["path"],
-                    "title": file_info["title"],
-                    "tags": file_info["tags"],
-                    "score": score,
-                    "snippet": snippet,
-                    "modified": file_info["modified"],
-                })
 
     results.sort(key=lambda x: -x["score"])
     return results[:limit]
@@ -908,12 +954,14 @@ def _passes_search_filters(
     title = file_info.get("title", "")
     content = file_info.get("content", "")
     path = file_info.get("path", "")
-    search_text = f"{title} {content}"
+    # BUG-025: cap the text scanned by a user-supplied regex.
+    search_text = truncate_for_regex(f"{title} {content}")
     search_text_norm = normalize_text(search_text)
 
     # --- Regex mode ---
     if regex and raw_query:
         try:
+            validate_regex(raw_query)
             flags = 0 if case_sensitive else re.IGNORECASE
             if whole_word:
                 pattern = re.compile(rf"\b{raw_query}\b", flags)
@@ -921,7 +969,7 @@ def _passes_search_filters(
                 pattern = re.compile(raw_query, flags)
             if not pattern.search(search_text):
                 return False
-        except re.error:
+        except (re.error, ValueError):
             return False
         return _passes_path_filters(path, include_paths, exclude_paths)
 
@@ -1138,6 +1186,11 @@ def advanced_search(
     """
     t0 = time.monotonic()
     query = query.strip() if query else ""
+
+    # BUG-025: reject oversized / catastrophic regex patterns up front.
+    if regex and query:
+        validate_regex(query)
+
     parsed = _parse_advanced_query(query)
 
     # Merge explicit tag_filter with parsed tag: operators

backend/services/mutations.py

@@ -433,22 +433,33 @@ def replace_in_files(
     """
     import re as re_mod
 
+    from backend.services.regex_safety import MAX_REGEX_MATCHES, validate_regex
     from backend.services.search import advanced_search_vaults
 
     if not find:
         raise ServiceError("Query is required", code="invalid_arguments", status=400)
 
-    search_results = advanced_search_vaults(
+    # BUG-025: validate the pattern before it is compiled / applied in bulk.
-        find,
+    if regex:
-        vault=vault,
+        try:
-        case_sensitive=case_sensitive,
+            validate_regex(find)
-        whole_word=whole_word,
+        except ValueError as e:
-        regex=regex,
+            raise ServiceError(str(e), code="invalid_arguments", status=400) from e
-        include_paths=include_paths,
+
-        exclude_paths=exclude_paths,
+    try:
-        limit=500,
+        search_results = advanced_search_vaults(
-        sort="relevance",
+            find,
-    )
+            vault=vault,
+            case_sensitive=case_sensitive,
+            whole_word=whole_word,
+            regex=regex,
+            include_paths=include_paths,
+            exclude_paths=exclude_paths,
+            limit=500,
+            sort="relevance",
+        )
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise ServiceError(str(e), code="invalid_arguments", status=400) from e
 
     if not search_results["results"]:
         return {"matches": [], "total_matches": 0, "dry_run": dry_run}
@@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ def replace_in_files(
         except OSError:
             continue
 
-        occurrences = list(pattern.finditer(original))
+        occurrences = list(pattern.finditer(original))[:MAX_REGEX_MATCHES]
         if not occurrences:
             continue
 

backend/services/net.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+"""Network helpers shared by the auth middleware and rate limiter."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+
+from fastapi import Request
+
+__all__ = ["get_client_ip", "is_trusted_proxy"]
+
+
+def is_trusted_proxy() -> bool:
+    """Whether ``X-Forwarded-For`` should be trusted (reverse proxy in front)."""
+    return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", "false").lower() == "true"
+
+
+def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
+    """Return the best-known client IP for *request*.
+
+    When ``OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true`` the left-most ``X-Forwarded-For`` entry
+    is used (the original client behind the proxy).  Otherwise the socket peer
+    address is returned.  BUG-030: this value feeds the audit log so attacks
+    remain traceable.
+    """
+    if is_trusted_proxy():
+        forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
+        if forwarded:
+            first = forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
+            if first:
+                return first
+        real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip")
+        if real_ip:
+            return real_ip.strip()
+    return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"

backend/services/paths.py

@@ -15,6 +15,27 @@ from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.services.paths")
 
 
+def _is_within(resolved: Path, root: Path) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *resolved* is *root* or lives below it.
+
+    The comparison is segment-aware so that a sibling directory whose name
+    merely shares a prefix (``vault`` vs ``vault-evil``) is rejected.  A
+    case-insensitive fallback preserves the Windows / Docker behaviour where
+    the resolved casing can differ from the configured root.
+    """
+    try:
+        resolved.relative_to(root)
+        return True
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    try:
+        resolved_parts = tuple(part.lower() for part in resolved.parts)
+        root_parts = tuple(part.lower() for part in root.parts)
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return resolved_parts[: len(root_parts)] == root_parts
+
+
 def resolve_safe_path(vault_root: Path, relative_path: str | None) -> Path:
     """Resolve a vault-relative path, rejecting traversal outside the vault.
 
@@ -30,16 +51,12 @@ def resolve_safe_path(vault_root: Path, relative_path: str | None) -> Path:
         logger.error(f"Path resolution error - vault_root: {vault_root}, relative_path: {relative_path}, error: {e}")
         raise ServiceError(f"Path resolution error: {e!s}", code="path_error", status=500) from e
 
-    try:
+    if not _is_within(resolved, root):
-        resolved.relative_to(root)
+        logger.warning(f"Path outside vault - vault: {root}, requested: {relative_path}, resolved: {resolved}")
-    except ValueError:
+        raise ServiceError(
-        # Case-insensitive fallback for Windows / Docker path casing.
+            "Access denied: path outside vault",
-        if not str(resolved).lower().startswith(str(root).lower()):
+            code="path_outside_vault",
-            logger.warning(f"Path outside vault - vault: {root}, requested: {relative_path}, resolved: {resolved}")
+            status=403,
-            raise ServiceError(
+            details={"path": relative_path},
-                "Access denied: path outside vault",
+        )
-                code="path_outside_vault",
-                status=403,
-                details={"path": relative_path},
-            ) from None
     return resolved

backend/services/regex_safety.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Regex safety helpers (BUG-025).
+
+User-supplied regular expressions are applied to large amounts of indexed
+content.  Python's :mod:`re` has no timeout, so a malicious pattern such as
+``(a+)+$`` can pin a CPU for a long time (ReDoS).  Without adding a native
+dependency we mitigate by:
+
+* bounding the pattern length,
+* rejecting nested-quantifier constructs (the classic catastrophic form),
+* capping the amount of text a single regex pass may scan,
+* capping the number of matches collected.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+
+__all__ = [
+    "MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH",
+    "MAX_REGEX_CONTENT",
+    "MAX_REGEX_MATCHES",
+    "truncate_for_regex",
+    "validate_regex",
+]
+
+MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH = 500
+MAX_REGEX_CONTENT = 200_000
+MAX_REGEX_MATCHES = 1000
+
+# A quantified group whose body already contains a quantifier, immediately
+# followed by another quantifier: ``(a+)+``, ``(.*)*``, ``(a+){2,}``, ...
+_NESTED_QUANTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"\([^()]*[+*][^()]*\)\s*(?:[+*?]|\{)")
+# Backreferences combined with quantifiers are a common ReDoS vector too.
+_BACKREF_QUANTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"\\[1-9][0-9]*\s*(?:[+*]|\{)")
+
+
+def validate_regex(pattern: str) -> str:
+    """Validate a user-supplied regex against the safety policy.
+
+    Args:
+        pattern: Raw regex pattern.
+
+    Returns:
+        The pattern unchanged when acceptable.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: When the pattern is empty, too long, or uses a construct
+            known to cause catastrophic backtracking.
+    """
+    if not pattern:
+        raise ValueError("Expression régulière vide")
+    if len(pattern) > MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH:
+        raise ValueError(f"Expression régulière trop longue (max {MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH})")
+    if _NESTED_QUANTIFIER_RE.search(pattern) or _BACKREF_QUANTIFIER_RE.search(pattern):
+        raise ValueError("Expression régulière refusée (quantificateurs imbriqués)")
+    try:
+        re.compile(pattern)
+    except re.error as e:
+        raise ValueError(f"Expression régulière invalide : {e}") from e
+    return pattern
+
+
+def truncate_for_regex(content: str, limit: int = MAX_REGEX_CONTENT) -> str:
+    """Return at most *limit* characters to bound a single regex pass."""
+    if content and len(content) > limit:
+        return content[:limit]
+    return content

backend/services/sanitizer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+"""Whitelist HTML sanitizer used for untrusted markdown / AI output.
+
+The markdown renderer runs with ``escape=False`` so raw HTML authored inside a
+vault (or returned by a model) reaches the browser.  This module scrubs the
+rendered HTML against a strict whitelist of tags and attributes, drops
+dangerous URL schemes and strips every event handler / ``style`` attribute.
+
+Implemented with the standard library only (no third-party dependency) so the
+runtime footprint stays unchanged.  It is *not* a full HTML5 parser: it is a
+conservative, allow-list based filter intended for already well-formed output
+produced by mistune and the image/wikilink pre-processors.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html as _html
+from html.parser import HTMLParser
+
+__all__ = ["is_safe_url", "sanitize_html"]
+
+# Tags whose *content* is discarded entirely (never rendered as text).
+_DROP_CONTENT_TAGS = frozenset({
+    "script", "style", "iframe", "object", "embed", "template", "noscript",
+    "svg", "math", "applet", "form", "button", "select", "textarea", "option",
+    "frame", "frameset", "base", "link", "meta", "title", "head",
+})
+
+# Tags kept in the output (text content preserved for unknown tags).
+_ALLOWED_TAGS = frozenset({
+    "a", "abbr", "b", "blockquote", "br", "caption", "code", "col", "colgroup",
+    "dd", "del", "details", "div", "dl", "dt", "em", "figcaption", "figure",
+    "h1", "h2", "h3", "h4", "h5", "h6", "hr", "i", "img", "input", "kbd", "li",
+    "mark", "ol", "p", "pre", "q", "s", "section", "small", "span", "strong",
+    "sub", "summary", "sup", "table", "tbody", "td", "tfoot", "th", "thead",
+    "time", "tr", "u", "ul", "video", "audio", "source", "track",
+})
+
+# Attributes allowed on any element.
+_GLOBAL_ATTRS = frozenset({"class", "id", "title", "dir", "lang", "role"})
+
+# Per-tag attribute whitelist (in addition to globals and ``data-*``).
+_TAG_ATTRS: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "a": frozenset({"href", "target", "rel", "name", "download"}),
+    "img": frozenset({"src", "alt", "width", "height", "loading"}),
+    "input": frozenset({"type", "checked", "disabled", "value"}),
+    "ol": frozenset({"start", "type", "reversed"}),
+    "ul": frozenset({"type"}),
+    "li": frozenset({"value"}),
+    "td": frozenset({"colspan", "rowspan", "align", "valign"}),
+    "th": frozenset({"colspan", "rowspan", "align", "valign", "scope"}),
+    "col": frozenset({"span", "width"}),
+    "colgroup": frozenset({"span"}),
+    "video": frozenset({"src", "controls", "width", "height", "loop", "muted",
+                        "poster", "preload", "playsinline"}),
+    "audio": frozenset({"src", "controls", "loop", "muted", "preload"}),
+    "source": frozenset({"src", "type", "srcset", "media"}),
+    "track": frozenset({"src", "kind", "srclang", "label", "default"}),
+    "details": frozenset({"open"}),
+    "time": frozenset({"datetime"}),
+    "blockquote": frozenset({"cite"}),
+    "q": frozenset({"cite"}),
+}
+
+# URL-bearing attributes per tag, and whether ``data:`` URIs are acceptable.
+_URL_ATTRS: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "a": frozenset({"href"}),
+    "img": frozenset({"src"}),
+    "video": frozenset({"src", "poster"}),
+    "audio": frozenset({"src"}),
+    "source": frozenset({"src", "srcset"}),
+    "track": frozenset({"src"}),
+    "blockquote": frozenset({"cite"}),
+    "q": frozenset({"cite"}),
+}
+
+_SAFE_SCHEMES = frozenset({"http", "https", "mailto", "tel", "ftp"})
+
+# Characters that browsers ignore inside a scheme (tab/newline/CR) and that
+# could otherwise smuggle ``java\tscript:`` past a naive check.
+_URL_STRIP_CHARS = "\t\n\r\x00"
+
+
+def is_safe_url(value: str, *, allow_data: bool = False, tag: str = "") -> bool:
+    """Return True when *value* is a URL with an allowed scheme.
+
+    Relative URLs (``/foo``, ``./foo``, ``#anchor``) are allowed.  Dangerous
+    schemes such as ``javascript:`` and ``vbscript:`` are always rejected.
+    ``data:`` URIs are only allowed for image/video/audio sources.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return False
+    # Decode entities and strip whitespace/control chars before inspecting.
+    candidate = _html.unescape(str(value)).strip()
+    for ch in _URL_STRIP_CHARS:
+        candidate = candidate.replace(ch, "")
+    if not candidate:
+        return False
+
+    # Detect a scheme: ``scheme:`` where scheme is [a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*
+    lowered = candidate.lower()
+    if lowered.startswith("data:"):
+        if not allow_data:
+            return False
+        # Only media data URIs are permitted.
+        if tag in ("img",):
+            return lowered.startswith("data:image/")
+        if tag in ("video", "audio", "source", "track"):
+            return (
+                lowered.startswith("data:image/")
+                or lowered.startswith("data:video/")
+                or lowered.startswith("data:audio/")
+            )
+        return False
+
+    if lowered.startswith("blob:"):
+        return tag in ("img", "video", "audio", "source")
+
+    # No scheme at all (relative / fragment / protocol-relative) → safe.
+    colon = candidate.find(":")
+    slash = candidate.find("/")
+    if colon == -1 or (slash != -1 and slash < colon):
+        return True
+    # ``//host`` protocol-relative has no scheme.
+    if candidate.startswith("//"):
+        return True
+
+    scheme = lowered[:colon]
+    if not scheme or not scheme[0].isalpha():
+        return True  # not a real scheme, treat as relative
+    return scheme in _SAFE_SCHEMES
+
+
+class _Sanitizer(HTMLParser):
+    """Rebuild HTML while dropping anything not explicitly allowed."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        super().__init__(convert_charrefs=True)
+        self._out: list[str] = []
+        # Stack of tag names currently open (only allowed tags).
+        self._open: list[str] = []
+        # Stack tracking dropped-content depth: each entry is the tag name.
+        self._suppress: list[str] = []
+
+    # -- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------
+    def _filter_attrs(self, tag: str, attrs: list[tuple[str, str | None]]) -> str:
+        allowed_extra = _TAG_ATTRS.get(tag, frozenset())
+        url_attrs = _URL_ATTRS.get(tag, frozenset())
+        parts: list[str] = []
+        seen: set[str] = set()
+        for name, value in attrs:
+            if value is None:
+                value = ""
+            lname = name.lower()
+            if lname in seen:
+                continue
+            seen.add(lname)
+            # Event handlers and style are never allowed.
+            if lname.startswith("on") or lname in ("style", "srcdoc", "formaction", "xlink:href"):
+                continue
+            if lname.startswith("data-") or lname.startswith("aria-"):
+                pass
+            elif lname not in _GLOBAL_ATTRS and lname not in allowed_extra:
+                continue
+
+            if lname in url_attrs:
+                allow_data = tag in ("img", "video", "audio", "source", "track")
+                # ``srcset`` may contain multiple comma-separated candidates.
+                if lname == "srcset":
+                    if not _safe_srcset(value, tag):
+                        continue
+                elif not is_safe_url(value, allow_data=allow_data, tag=tag):
+                    continue
+            parts.append(f' {lname}="{_html.escape(value, quote=True)}"')
+        return "".join(parts)
+
+    def _emit_start(self, tag: str, attrs, self_closing: bool) -> None:
+        attrs_html = self._filter_attrs(tag, attrs)
+        if self_closing or tag in ("br", "hr", "img", "input", "col", "source", "track"):
+            self._out.append(f"<{tag}{attrs_html} />")
+        else:
+            self._out.append(f"<{tag}{attrs_html}>")
+            self._open.append(tag)
+
+    # -- HTMLParser callbacks --------------------------------------------
+    def handle_starttag(self, tag: str, attrs) -> None:
+        tag = tag.lower()
+        if tag in _DROP_CONTENT_TAGS:
+            self._suppress.append(tag)
+            return
+        if self._suppress:
+            return
+        if tag not in _ALLOWED_TAGS:
+            return  # drop the tag, keep its text content
+        self._emit_start(tag, attrs, self_closing=False)
+
+    def handle_startendtag(self, tag: str, attrs) -> None:
+        tag = tag.lower()
+        if tag in _DROP_CONTENT_TAGS or self._suppress:
+            return
+        if tag not in _ALLOWED_TAGS:
+            return
+        self._emit_start(tag, attrs, self_closing=True)
+
+    def handle_endtag(self, tag: str) -> None:
+        tag = tag.lower()
+        if tag in _DROP_CONTENT_TAGS:
+            # Close the innermost matching suppress marker.
+            for i in range(len(self._suppress) - 1, -1, -1):
+                if self._suppress[i] == tag:
+                    del self._suppress[i:]
+                    break
+            return
+        if self._suppress:
+            return
+        if tag not in _ALLOWED_TAGS:
+            return
+        # Only close if currently open (tolerate malformed nesting).
+        if tag in self._open:
+            while self._open:
+                top = self._open.pop()
+                self._out.append(f"</{top}>")
+                if top == tag:
+                    break
+
+    def handle_data(self, data: str) -> None:
+        if self._suppress:
+            return
+        self._out.append(_html.escape(data, quote=False))
+
+    def handle_comment(self, data: str) -> None:
+        return  # comments are dropped
+
+    def handle_decl(self, decl: str) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def handle_pi(self, data: str) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def handle_entityref(self, name: str) -> None:
+        if self._suppress:
+            return
+        self._out.append(f"&{name};")
+
+    def handle_charref(self, name: str) -> None:
+        if self._suppress:
+            return
+        self._out.append(f"&#{name};")
+
+    def get_html(self) -> str:
+        # Close any tags left open by malformed input.
+        while self._open:
+            self._out.append(f"</{self._open.pop()}>")
+        return "".join(self._out)
+
+
+def _safe_srcset(value: str, tag: str) -> bool:
+    """Validate every candidate in a ``srcset`` attribute."""
+    for candidate in value.split(","):
+        candidate = candidate.strip()
+        if not candidate:
+            continue
+        url = candidate.split()[0] if candidate.split() else candidate
+        if not is_safe_url(url, allow_data=(tag == "img"), tag=tag):
+            return False
+    return True
+
+
+def sanitize_html(html: str) -> str:
+    """Return *html* with only whitelisted tags/attributes/schemes preserved.
+
+    Args:
+        html: Untrusted HTML (typically mistune output with ``escape=False``).
+
+    Returns:
+        Sanitized HTML string.
+    """
+    if not html:
+        return ""
+    parser = _Sanitizer()
+    try:
+        parser.feed(html)
+        parser.close()
+    except Exception:
+        # Never let sanitization crash a request; fail closed to plain text.
+        return _html.escape(html)
+    return parser.get_html()

backend/webhooks.py

@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@ Webhook management and dispatch for ObsiGate.
 Webhooks are HTTP POST callbacks triggered on file/directory events.
 Configuration is persisted in data/webhooks.json.
 
+Security (BUG-026):
+* target URLs are validated against SSRF (scheme + resolved IP must be public);
+* HTTP is refused unless ``OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP=true``;
+* private/loopback/link-local targets are refused unless
+  ``OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE=true``;
+* redirects are never followed;
+* signing secrets are **not** stored in the public config file — they live in
+  ``data/webhook_secrets.json`` (0600) or in an environment variable named
+  ``OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_SECRET_<ID>``.
+
 Events: file_created, file_deleted, file_modified, file_renamed,
         directory_created, directory_deleted, directory_renamed
 """
@@ -11,17 +21,22 @@ Events: file_created, file_deleted, file_modified, file_renamed,
 import asyncio
 import hashlib
 import hmac
+import ipaddress
 import json
 import logging
+import os
+import socket
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 import aiohttp
 
 logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.webhooks")
 
 WEBHOOKS_FILE = Path("data/webhooks.json")
+WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE = Path("data/webhook_secrets.json")
 
 VALID_EVENTS = {
     "file_created", "file_deleted", "file_modified", "file_renamed",
@@ -29,6 +44,81 @@ VALID_EVENTS = {
 }
 
 
+def _allow_http() -> bool:
+    return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP", "false").lower() == "true"
+
+
+def _allow_private() -> bool:
+    return os.environ.get("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE", "false").lower() == "true"
+
+
+def _is_public_ip(ip_str: str) -> bool:
+    """True when *ip_str* is a globally routable unicast address."""
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return not (
+        ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved
+        or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified
+    )
+
+
+def validate_webhook_url(url: str) -> str:
+    """Validate the URL syntax/scheme and literal-IP safety at config time.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: When the URL is malformed or points at an obviously
+            forbidden scheme/host.
+    """
+    if not url or not isinstance(url, str):
+        raise ValueError("URL requise")
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+        raise ValueError("L'URL doit utiliser http ou https")
+    if parsed.scheme == "http" and not _allow_http():
+        raise ValueError("HTTPS requis (définir OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP=true pour autoriser http)")
+    host = parsed.hostname
+    if not host:
+        raise ValueError("Hôte manquant dans l'URL")
+    # Reject literal private/loopback IPs immediately (no DNS needed).
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        return url  # hostname — resolved and checked at dispatch time
+    if not _allow_private() and not _is_public_ip(str(ip)):
+        raise ValueError("Adresse privée/interne refusée")
+    return url
+
+
+def is_safe_target(url: str) -> bool:
+    """Full SSRF check performed right before dispatch (resolves the host).
+
+    Returns False when the URL is malformed, the scheme is forbidden, or any
+    resolved address is private/loopback/reserved.
+    """
+    try:
+        validate_webhook_url(url)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    if _allow_private():
+        return True
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    host = parsed.hostname or ""
+    port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
+    try:
+        infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
+    except socket.gaierror:
+        logger.warning(f"Webhook target host could not be resolved: {host}")
+        return False
+    for info in infos:
+        addr = str(info[4][0])
+        if not _is_public_ip(addr):
+            logger.warning(f"Webhook target resolves to a non-public address ({addr}); blocked")
+            return False
+    return True
+
+
 def _read() -> list:
     if not WEBHOOKS_FILE.exists():
         return []
@@ -45,35 +135,94 @@ def _write(webhooks: list):
     tmp.replace(WEBHOOKS_FILE)
 
 
+def _read_secrets() -> dict:
+    if not WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.exists():
+        return {}
+    try:
+        return json.loads(WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError):
+        return {}
+
+
+def _write_secrets(secrets: dict):
+    WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+    tmp.write_text(json.dumps(secrets, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+    tmp.replace(WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE)
+    try:
+        WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE.chmod(0o600)
+    except OSError:
+        pass  # Windows doesn't support Unix permissions
+
+
+def _store_secret(wh_id: str, secret: str | None) -> None:
+    secrets = _read_secrets()
+    if secret:
+        secrets[wh_id] = secret
+    else:
+        secrets.pop(wh_id, None)
+    _write_secrets(secrets)
+
+
+def _get_secret(wh: dict) -> str | None:
+    """Resolve a webhook secret from env, dedicated store, or legacy record."""
+    env_key = "OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_SECRET_" + wh["id"].replace("-", "_").upper()
+    env_val = os.environ.get(env_key)
+    if env_val:
+        return env_val
+    stored = _read_secrets().get(wh["id"])
+    if stored:
+        return stored
+    return wh.get("secret")  # legacy inline secret
+
+
+def _public_view(wh: dict) -> dict:
+    """Return a webhook record safe to expose through the API."""
+    clean = {k: v for k, v in wh.items() if k != "secret"}
+    clean["has_secret"] = bool(_get_secret(wh))
+    return clean
+
+
 def get_webhooks() -> list:
-    return _read()
+    return [_public_view(wh) for wh in _read()]
 
 
 def create_webhook(name: str, url: str, events: list[str], secret: str | None = None) -> dict:
+    validate_webhook_url(url)
     webhooks = _read()
+    wh_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
     wh = {
-        "id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        "id": wh_id,
         "name": name,
         "url": url,
         "events": [e for e in events if e in VALID_EVENTS],
-        "secret": secret,
         "enabled": True,
         "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
         "last_fired_at": None,
     }
     webhooks.append(wh)
     _write(webhooks)
+    if secret:
+        _store_secret(wh_id, secret)
     logger.info(f"Created webhook '{name}' → {url}")
-    return wh
+    return _public_view(wh)
 
 
 def update_webhook(wh_id: str, updates: dict) -> dict | None:
     webhooks = _read()
     for wh in webhooks:
         if wh["id"] == wh_id:
-            wh.update({k: v for k, v in updates.items() if k != "id"})
+            if updates.get("url"):
+                validate_webhook_url(updates["url"])
+            if "secret" in updates:
+                _store_secret(wh_id, updates["secret"])
+            safe_updates = {
+                k: v for k, v in updates.items()
+                if k not in ("id", "secret")
+            }
+            wh.update(safe_updates)
             _write(webhooks)
-            return wh
+            return _public_view(wh)
     return None
 
 
@@ -83,6 +232,9 @@ def delete_webhook(wh_id: str) -> bool:
     if len(new_list) == len(webhooks):
         return False
     _write(new_list)
+    secrets = _read_secrets()
+    if secrets.pop(wh_id, None) is not None:
+        _write_secrets(secrets)
     return True
 
 
@@ -102,17 +254,24 @@ async def dispatch_webhooks(event_type: str, data: dict):
 
     async def _post(wh):
         try:
+            # BUG-026: re-check the target right before connecting (DNS rebinding).
+            if not is_safe_target(wh["url"]):
+                logger.warning(f"Webhook '{wh['name']}' blocked by SSRF policy")
+                return
             headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "X-ObsiGate-Event": event_type}
-            if wh.get("secret"):
+            secret = _get_secret(wh)
-                sig = hmac.new(wh["secret"].encode(), body.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+            if secret:
+                sig = hmac.new(secret.encode(), body.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
                 headers["X-ObsiGate-Signature"] = f"sha256={sig}"
 
             timeout = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=5)
-            async with aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=timeout) as session, session.post(wh["url"], data=body, headers=headers) as resp:
+            async with aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=timeout) as session, session.post(
-                    if resp.status < 400:
+                wh["url"], data=body, headers=headers, allow_redirects=False
-                        logger.debug(f"Webhook '{wh['name']}' OK ({resp.status})")
+            ) as resp:
-                    else:
+                if resp.status < 400:
-                        logger.warning(f"Webhook '{wh['name']}' failed ({resp.status})")
+                    logger.debug(f"Webhook '{wh['name']}' OK ({resp.status})")
+                else:
+                    logger.warning(f"Webhook '{wh['name']}' failed ({resp.status})")
             update_webhook(wh["id"], {"last_fired_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()})
         except Exception as e:
             logger.warning(f"Webhook '{wh['name']}' error: {e}")

docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 
 - **Projet** : ObsiGate — Porte d'entrée web pour vaults Obsidian
 - **Stack** : Python 3.11+ (backend FastAPI) · JavaScript/Vanilla (frontend) · Tauri/Rust (desktop)
-- **Dernière mise à jour** : 2026-09-12
+- **Dernière mise à jour** : 2026-09-13
 
 ---
 
@@ -126,6 +126,30 @@ Avant de corriger quoi que ce soit, un agent IA doit :
 | *BUG-014* | Assistant IA : les flèches ↑/↓ ne naviguent pas dans les menus `/` et `@` | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/js/bookslm.js` | Ouvrir `/`, puis ↑/↓ (y compris après un clic hors zone de texte) | Navigation gérée au niveau du **panneau en phase de capture** (`panel.addEventListener('keydown', ..., true)`), donc indépendante du focus | Le `keydown` n'était écouté que sur la zone de texte ; dès que le focus changeait, les flèches étaient ignorées. Tests : `tests/frontend/ai.test.mjs` (+1) |
 | *BUG-015* | Assistant IA : la ligne sélectionnée des menus `/` et `@` est invisible au clavier | 🟢 corrigé | P2 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/style.css` | Ouvrir `/` ou `@`, naviguer avec ↑/↓ | État `.active` en `--bg-hover` + barre d'accent à gauche (`inset 3px 0 0 var(--accent)`) au lieu de `--surface2` | `--surface2` est identique à `--bg-primary` (fond du menu) en thème sombre : la sélection ne se voyait pas. Idem pour la liste de modèles |
 | *BUG-016* | Mobile : le bouton « mode lecture » flottant recouvre le bouton d'envoi de l'assistant IA | 🟢 corrigé | P2 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/js/mobile-editor.js`, `frontend/style.css` | Mobile, sans fichier ouvert : ouvrir l'assistant puis constater que `📖` masque `✈️` | `updateReadingButtonVisibility()` n'affiche `#me-reading-btn` que si `state.currentPath` est défini **et** que le panneau assistant est fermé ; resynchronisé à chaque mutation de `#content-area` et sur `bookslm:opened`/`bookslm:closed` ; règle `.me-reading-btn[hidden]{display:none}` | Le bouton flottant (z-index 890) passait au-dessus du panneau plein écran mobile (z-index 100). Tests : `tests/frontend/mobile-editor.test.mjs` (+2) |
+| *BUG-017* | Accueil mobile : les tuiles de « Favoris » et « Récents » ne s'affichent pas correctement en largeur (l'onglet « Partagés » s'affiche correctement) | 🔴 ouvert | P2 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/js/dashboard.js`, `frontend/js/viewer.js`, `frontend/style.css` | Mobile : page d'accueil → onglets Favoris / Récents | — | Grille de tuiles non adaptée au viewport (largeur / nombre de colonnes) ; l'onglet « Partagés » (`.shared-card`) est conforme |
+| *BUG-018* | Éditeur mobile : mise en page inadaptée — boutons « Annuler » / « Sauvegarder » inaccessibles et barre d'outils IA non optimisée | 🔴 ouvert | P1 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/index.html`, `frontend/style.css`, `frontend/js/ai.js` | Mobile : ouvrir un fichier → barre d'outils de l'éditeur puis panneau assistant | — | Boutons de l'éditeur hors écran / masqués sur petit écran ; barre d'outils IA trop dense ou mal positionnée |
+| *BUG-019* | Éditeur mobile : la barre d'outils du bas n'est pas toujours visible au-dessus du clavier quand le curseur n'est pas en bas de l'éditeur | 🔴 ouvert | P1 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/js/mobile-editor.js`, `frontend/style.css` | Mobile : ouvrir un fichier, placer le curseur au milieu du document, afficher le clavier | — | La barre ne suit pas la position du curseur / n'est pas ancrée au-dessus du clavier virtuel |
+| *BUG-020* | Éditeur mobile : deux barres de défilement verticales à droite de la page en mode édition | 🔴 ouvert | P3 | 📱 frontend | IA | `frontend/style.css` | Mobile : ouvrir l'éditeur et observer le bord droit | — | Double scrollbar (conteneur de l'éditeur + `.cm-scroller`) peu naturelle pour un éditeur |
+| *BUG-021* | [🔴 CRITIQUE] XSS stocké via le rendu markdown (`escape=False`) | 🟢 corrigé | P0 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/services/sanitizer.py`, `backend/main.py` | Ouvrir une note contenant `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>` | `backend/services/sanitizer.py` (whitelist stdlib) appliqué après `_add_heading_ids` dans `_render_markdown` ; tests `tests/test_security_hardening.py` | HTML brut d'un vault injecté dans le DOM → JS dans le navigateur de chaque utilisateur. DOMPurify client non ajouté (défense serveur suffisante) |
+| *BUG-022* | [🔴 CRITIQUE] XSS stocké sur la page publique `/s/{token}` (title + frontmatter non échappés) | 🟢 corrigé | P0 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/main.py` | Partager une note dont le frontmatter contient un `title` avec `<script>` | `backend/main.py` : `html.escape()` sur `title`/frontmatter + JSON échappé (`\u003c`) pour le bloc `<script>` et `a.download` | `a.download="{title}.md"` se trouvait dans un bloc script → breakout JS. Test d'intégration dans `tests/test_security_hardening.py` |
+| *BUG-023* | [🔴 CRITIQUE] Brute-force MFA sans rate-limit ni verrouillage | 🟢 corrigé | P0 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/auth/router.py` | `POST /api/auth/mfa/totp/verify` en boucle avec des codes aléatoires | `_enforce_mfa_rate_limit` + `_record_mfa_failure` sur `totp/verify`, `recovery`, `webauthn/verify` (IP + compte + lockout) | TOTP 6 chiffres brute-forceable ; le login était protégé, pas le second facteur |
+| *BUG-024* | [🔴 CRITIQUE] Traversal inter-vaults : `startswith()` sans séparateur dans `resolve_safe_path` | 🟢 corrigé | P0 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/services/paths.py` | Avec les vaults `vault` et `vault-evil`, lire un fichier de `vault-evil` via `vault` | `_is_within()` par segments (`relative_to` + repli casse-insensible) ; tests `tests/test_security_hardening.py::TestPathIsolation` | Rupture d'isolation entre vaults (lecture / écriture / suppression) |
+| *BUG-025* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] ReDoS : regex utilisateur appliquée au contenu en masse | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/services/regex_safety.py`, `backend/search.py`, `backend/services/mutations.py` | Recherche avancée avec `^(a+)+$` sur un gros document | Validation de pattern (longueur ≤500, rejet quantificateurs imbriqués/backrefs), contenu tronqué (200k) et matchs plafonnés ; 400 sur pattern refusé | Le dry-run `replace_in_files` déclenchait la charge ; la validation est faite avant compilation |
+| *BUG-026* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Webhooks : SSRF (URL non validée) + secret en clair | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/webhooks.py`, `data/webhook_secrets.json` | Configurer une URL vers `http://169.254.169.254` puis déclencher le webhook | Validation d'URL (HTTPS par défaut, IP privées/boucle bloquées), résolution DNS au dispatch, redirections non suivies ; secret dans `webhook_secrets.json` (0600) ou env `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_SECRET_<ID>` | `get_webhooks()` n'expose plus le secret (`has_secret`) ; options `OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP`/`_ALLOW_PRIVATE` |
+| *BUG-027* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Sessions : refresh non rotatif, access token non révoqué au logout | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/auth/jwt_handler.py`, `backend/auth/router.py`, `backend/auth/middleware.py` | Logout puis réutilisation de l'ancien access token | Rotation du refresh token (`create_refresh_token(remember=…)`) + révocation de l'ancien JTI ; access token révoqué au logout et vérifié dans le middleware | JTI persistés dans `data/revoked_tokens.json` |
+| *BUG-028* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Politique de mot de passe incohérente + sessions non invalidées au changement | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/auth/password.py`, `backend/auth/router.py`, `backend/auth/user_store.py`, `backend/auth/middleware.py` | Créer un utilisateur avec `password:""` (admin) ; changer son mot de passe puis réutiliser l'ancien token | `validate_password_strength` (8–128) sur création/modif admin/changement ; `password_changed_at` invalide les jetons émis avant le changement ; `change-password` réémet une paire | Tests `TestPasswordPolicy` + `TestTokenInvalidation` |
+| *BUG-029* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Race read-modify-write sur `users.json` (perte de mises à jour) | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/auth/user_store.py` | Activer MFA et changer son mot de passe en parallèle | `threading.RLock` (`_users_lock`) autour de `create_user`, `update_user`, `delete_user`, `record_login_failure` | RLock réentrant car `record_login_failure` appelle `update_user` |
+| *BUG-030* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Adresse IP jamais consignée dans les audits (`_request_ip` toujours « unknown ») | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/services/net.py`, `backend/auth/middleware.py` | Lire le journal d'audit après un save/delete | `get_client_ip()` (`request.client.host`, `X-Forwarded-For` si `OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY=true`) injecté dans `current_user["_request_ip"]` | Test `TestClientIp` |
+| *BUG-031* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Rate-limiter en mémoire, mono-process, budget exclusivement IP | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/ratelimit.py`, `backend/auth/router.py` | Lancer plusieurs workers et observer le partage du compteur | Budget **par compte** (`is_account_rate_limited`/`record_account_*`) en plus de l'IP, intégré login + MFA ; limite mono-process documentée | Rotation d'IP neutralisée ; stockage partagé (Redis) hors périmètre |
+| *BUG-032* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Indexation : symlinks suivis (contenu hors vault indexé) + scan initial coûteux | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/indexer.py` | Placer un symlink dans le vault vers un dossier externe puis relancer l'index | `_scan_vault` réécrit avec `os.walk(followlinks=False)` + refus des symlinks sortant de la racine ; test `TestSymlinkIndexing` | Scan incrémental/index persistant : voir #86 (phase 3) |
+| *BUG-033* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] Recherche classique et tool IA `search_fulltext` en O(N) sans inverted index | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/search.py`, `backend/tools/service.py` | `GET /api/search` sur un vault de 50 000 fichiers | `search()` récupère les candidats via l'inverted index (intersection des termes + expansion de préfixes), repli sur le scan pendant la construction | `search_fulltext` en bénéficie automatiquement |
+| *BUG-034* | [🟡 IMPORTANT] CSP affaiblie (`'unsafe-inline'` + CDN distants) et token d'accès en sessionStorage | 🟢 corrigé | P1 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/main.py`, `frontend/js/auth.js`, `frontend/js/admin.js`, `frontend/js/sync.js` | Inspecter les en-têtes CSP ; lire sessionStorage en console | Token en mémoire + cookie HttpOnly (plus de `sessionStorage`) ; CSP durcie (`object-src 'none'`, `base-uri`, `form-action`, `frame-ancestors`). *Reste : migration nonce* | `'unsafe-inline'` conservé tant que les gestionnaires inline n'ont pas été convertis (résidu documenté) |
+| *BUG-035* | [🔵 MINEUR] `secret_redactor` : faux positifs sur les hashs hex (git, SHA) | 🔴 ouvert | P2 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/secret_redactor.py` | Lire une note contenant un commit git (40 caractères hexadécimaux) | Restreindre le périmètre de détection (contexte clé/token) + whitelist | Contenus mutilés dans les lectures et réponses IA |
+| *BUG-036* | [🔵 MINEUR] Collab WebSocket : token en query string | 🔴 ouvert | P2 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/collab.py` | Observer l'URL du websocket dans le trafic réseau | Passer le token en header / étape d'authentification initiale ; borner la taille des messages | Jeton visible dans les logs/proxys |
+| *BUG-037* | [🔵 MINEUR] Compte « anonymous » administrateur si auth désactivée | 🔴 ouvert | P2 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/auth/middleware.py` | Démarrer avec l'authentification désactivée | Avertissement explicite au démarrage + refus de déploiement public sans auth | Comportement par conception mais risqué si mal configuré |
+| *BUG-038* | [🔵 MINEUR] Argon2 à 64 MB par vérification : risque d'épuisement mémoire | 🔴 ouvert | P2 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/auth/password.py:8` | Lancer de nombreux `POST /api/auth/login` simultanés | Recalibrer (~19 MB, t=2, p=1, norme OWASP actuelle) + maintien du rate-limit | DoS mémoire possible sur les petites instances |
+| *BUG-039* | [🔵 MINEUR] Enumération de comptes : 429 (verrouillé) vs 401 (inconnu) | 🔴 ouvert | P3 | 🔐 sécurité | IA | `backend/auth/router.py:120` | Tenter un login sur un compte verrouillé puis un nom inconnu | Répondre 401 uniforme avec un timing équivalent | Le statut HTTP distingue l'existence d'un compte |
+| *BUG-040* | [🔵 MINEUR] Extraction PDF intégrale (100 ko) au scan de démarrage | 🔴 ouvert | P2 | ⚙️ backend | IA | `backend/indexer.py:465` | Démarrer sur un vault contenant de nombreux PDF | Analyser les PDF en tâche de fond / à la demande (lazy) | Ralentit fortement le démarrage et le rebuild d'index |
 
 ### TODOs techniques (améliorations / nouvelles tâches)
 
@@ -158,6 +182,9 @@ Avant de corriger quoi que ce soit, un agent IA doit :
 | 2026-09-12 | #82 | Amélioration perf + UX | `backend/services/search.py`, `backend/main.py`, `frontend/js/bookslm.js`, `frontend/js/ui.js`, `frontend/style.css`, `tests/test_api_main.py`, `tests/frontend/ai.test.mjs` | #82 : endpoint `GET /api/vault/{vault}/paths` + préchargement et filtrage client du menu `@` (instantané) ; sélecteurs Fournisseur/Modèle agrandis (0,8 rem / 34 px) ; « 🧠 BooksLM » ajouté au menu contextuel de la racine des vaults. Vérifié : pytest 151 (ciblés) + ruff/mypy, tests frontend 49/49. | ✅ livré (en attente vérif utilisateur) |
 | 2026-09-12 | #82 | UX | `frontend/js/ai.js`, `frontend/style.css`, `tests/frontend/ai.test.mjs` | Sélecteurs Fournisseur/Modèle alignés à droite dans la barre de l'assistant et réordonnés : capacité du modèle (ⓘ) → fournisseur → modèle. Bulle de capacités ouverte vers la droite (`left: 0`). Test JSDOM de l'ordre. Vérifié : tests frontend 49/49. | ✅ livré (en attente vérif utilisateur) |
 | 2026-09-12 | BUG-016 | Correction | `frontend/js/mobile-editor.js`, `frontend/style.css`, `tests/frontend/mobile-editor.test.mjs`, `tests/e2e/mobile-editor.spec.js` | BUG-016 : le bouton « mode lecture » n'apparaît que si un fichier est ouvert et que l'assistant est fermé, sinon il recouvrait le bouton d'envoi sur mobile. Vérifié : tests frontend 24/24 (mobile) + suite JSDOM verte. | 🟢 corrigé (en attente vérif utilisateur) |
+| 2026-09-13 | BUG-017, BUG-018, BUG-019, BUG-020, #83 | Enregistrement | `docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md`, `docs/ROADMAP.md` | Signalements mobile consignés : accueil (tuiles Favoris/Récents), éditeur (boutons Annuler/Sauvegarder inaccessibles + barre IA), visibilité de la barre d'outils au-dessus du clavier, double barre de défilement. Feature #83 ajoutée : barre d'outils d'édition mobile style Obsidian Android. | 🔴 ouvert (à traiter) |
+| 2026-09-13 | Revue sécurité statique (BUG-021 → BUG-040, roadmap #84 → #87) | Enregistrement | `docs/ISSUES_TODOLIST.md`, `docs/ROADMAP.md` | Revue statique 2026-09-13 consignée : XSS markdown (`escape=False`) + page de partage publique, brute-force MFA, traversal par préfixe `paths.py`, ReDoS, SSRF webhooks, cycle de vie des sessions, politique de mot de passe, races `users.json`, audits IP, rate-limit, indexation symlinks, recherche O(N), CSP. BUG-021→BUG-040 ouverts au registre ; roadmap #84→#87 (consolidation/sécurité, refonte architecturale, performance, CI/CD). | 🔴 ouvert (à traiter) |
+| 2026-09-13 | BUG-021 → BUG-034 (#84 phase 1) | Correction | `backend/services/sanitizer.py`, `backend/services/paths.py`, `backend/services/net.py`, `backend/services/regex_safety.py`, `backend/main.py`, `backend/search.py`, `backend/webhooks.py`, `backend/indexer.py`, `backend/ratelimit.py`, `backend/auth/{router,user_store,password,jwt_handler,middleware}.py`, `frontend/js/{auth,admin,sync}.js`, `tests/test_security_hardening.py`, `tests/test_auth_api.py` | Sanitizer XSS serveur (markdown + page de partage), rate-limit/lockout MFA, isolation vaults par segments, caps regex (ReDoS), SSRF webhooks + secrets externalisés, rotation/révocation des jetons, politique de mot de passe + invalidation des sessions, verrous `users.json`, IP réelle dans les audits, rate-limit par compte, symlinks d'index ignorés, recherche simple via inverted index, token en mémoire + cookie HttpOnly + CSP durcie. Vérifié : pytest 961 passed / 6 skipped, ruff 0, mypy 0, tests frontend 36 modules + 9 JSDOM suites verts. | 🟢 corrigé (en attente vérif utilisateur) |
 
 ---
 

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ObsiGate — Roadmap
 
-> **Version :** 2.3.0-dev | **Dernière mise à jour :** 2026-09-12
+> **Version :** 2.3.0-dev | **Dernière mise à jour :** 2026-09-13
 > **Ce fichier ne contient que le travail à venir** (🔵 En cours + ⚪ Backlog) et un index compact
 > vers les fonctionnalités livrées.
 > - **Méthode de livraison à appliquer pour toute tâche : [DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md](./DELIVERY_WORKFLOW.md)**
@@ -60,6 +60,72 @@
 
 ---
 
+## ⚪ Backlog — Priorité 2 (P2)
+
+### 83. Barre d'outils d'édition mobile — style Obsidian Android
+
+- **Effort :** 3-5 jours | **Impact :** 🟡 | **Zone :** frontend (mobile)
+- **Description :** remplacer la barre de mise en forme Markdown actuelle par un **ruban horizontal
+  défilable** ancré juste au-dessus du clavier virtuel, reprenant l'ergonomie de l'app Android
+  Obsidian : fond anthracite aux coins arrondis, insertion/enrobage de la syntaxe au curseur ou sur
+  la sélection, et personnalisation des commandes via une icône clé à molette.
+- **Sous-tâches :**
+  - [ ] Ruban horizontal défilable (glissement tactile gauche/droite) ancré au-dessus du clavier
+  - [ ] Actions rapides : annuler, refaire, `[[ ]]` (lien interne), modèle/fichiers, tag `#`, pièce jointe
+  - [ ] Formatage : H1–H6, gras, italique, barré (`~~`), surligné (`==`), code en ligne/bloc, citation (`>`)
+  - [ ] Liens externes, listes à puces/numérotées, case à cocher (`- [ ]`), indenter / désindenter
+  - [ ] Personnalisation (clé à molette) : ajouter / supprimer / réordonner les commandes
+  - [ ] i18n FR/EN + tests frontend (helpers purs) + E2E mobile
+
+---
+
+## ⚪ Backlog — Sécurité, architecture & performance (P0/P1)
+
+### 84. Consolidation & sécurité — revue statique 2026-09-13 (phase 1)
+
+- **Effort :** 6-9 jours | **Impact :** 🔴 | **Zone :** backend + frontend | **Référence :** [ISSUES_TODOLIST.md](./ISSUES_TODOLIST.md) BUG-021 → BUG-034
+- **Statut :** 🟢 livré (phase 1) — sanitizer XSS, rate-limit/lockout MFA, isolation vaults, ReDoS, SSRF webhooks, cycle de vie des sessions, politique de mot de passe, verrous `users.json`, audits IP, rate-limit par compte, symlinks, recherche via inverted index, token en cookie HttpOnly. Détail : [archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md](./archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md) (section #84).
+- **Description :** traiter toutes les vulnérabilités critiques et importantes issues de la revue statique : XSS markdown (`escape=False`) et page publique de partage, brute-force MFA, isolation des vaults (`resolve_safe_path`), ReDoS, SSRF webhooks, cycle de vie des sessions, politique de mot de passe, races `users.json`, audits IP, rate-limit partagé, indexation symlinks.
+- **Sous-tâches :**
+  - [x] Assainir le rendu markdown (sanitizer serveur en whitelist) et la page de partage (échappement `title`/frontmatter) — *DOMPurify client non ajouté (défense en profondeur serveur suffisante)*
+  - [x] Rate-limit + lockout sur les endpoints MFA (`totp/verify`, `recovery`, `webauthn/verify`)
+  - [x] Corriger `resolve_safe_path` (comparaison de chemin stricte par segment) + test de régression
+  - [x] Rotation du refresh token, révocation de l'access token au logout, persistance des JTI révoqués
+  - [x] Valider la politique de mot de passe à la création ; bloquer le SSRF des webhooks et externaliser les secrets
+  - [x] Verrous sur les mutations `users.json` ; consigner l'adresse IP réelle dans les audits
+  - [x] Ignorer les symlinks de l'index ; caps CPU/timeout regex (ReDoS)
+  - [~] Durcir la CSP — *partiel* : directives `object-src`/`base-uri`/`form-action`/`frame-ancestors` ajoutées et token retiré de `sessionStorage` ; migration **nonce** restante (nécessite la conversion des gestionnaires d'événements inline)
+
+### 85. Refonte architecturale — découpage du monolithe & persistance d'état (phase 2)
+
+- **Effort :** 8-12 jours | **Impact :** 🟡 | **Zone :** backend
+- **Description :** extraire le monolithe `backend/main.py` (~4 260 lignes) en routers FastAPI par domaine et rendre persistant l'état qui ne l'est pas (index de recherche, JTI révoqués, compteurs de rate-limit) pour préparer le multi-nœuds.
+- **Sous-tâches :**
+  - [ ] Routers par domaine : files, search, share, webhooks, plugins, collab, admin, ai
+  - [ ] Centraliser le contrat d'outils IA sur `tools/registry.py` (permissions, quotas, redaction)
+  - [ ] Persister index, JTI révoqués et compteurs de rate-limit (SQLite/Redis)
+  - [ ] Verrous asyncio autour de l'index global et des stores JSON ; service de partage public (expiration, révocation, quotas)
+
+### 86. Optimisation globale des performances (phase 3)
+
+- **Effort :** 4-6 jours | **Impact :** 🟡 | **Zone :** backend (`search.py`, `indexer.py`, `mutations.py`)
+- **Description :** brancher l'inverted index (déjà construit) sur la recherche simple et le tool IA `search_fulltext`, indexation incrémentale, extraction PDF lazy.
+- **Sous-tâches :**
+  - [ ] Recherche simple + tool IA via l'inverted index (suppression du balayage O(N) en mémoire)
+  - [ ] Indexation incrémentale + scan différentiel au démarrage (remplace le `rglob` complet)
+  - [ ] Extraction PDF/excalidraw différée (hors scan) ; caps CPU sur les opérations regex
+
+### 87. Amélioration continue — tests, CI/CD, revues de sécurité (phase 4)
+
+- **Effort :** 3-5 jours | **Impact :** 🟡 | **Zone :** `.gitea/workflows/`, `tests/`
+- **Description :** renforcer le pipeline (`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`, `desktop-build.yml`) pour le rendre bloquant par défaut et accompagner les phases 1 → 3.
+- **Sous-tâches :**
+  - [ ] Jobs CI sécurité (bandit/semgrep/trivy, audits pip/npm) + tests E2E XSS (page de partage + lecteur markdown)
+  - [ ] Tests de concurrence (`users.json`), fuzzing de timing regex, couverture des composants critiques
+  - [ ] Revue périodique des dépendances ; documentation utilisateur FR/EN synchronisée ; contrôle automatisé de la conformité au DoD
+
+---
+
 ## ✅ Complété — index
 
 > Détail complet dans [docs/archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md](./archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md) et
@@ -99,6 +165,7 @@
 | 69 | Éditeur mobile natif — Interface tactile optimisée | 2.3.0 | [features/mobile-editor.md](./features/mobile-editor.md) |
 | 70 | Recherche sémantique — Embeddings vectoriels (hybride TF-IDF + RRF) | 2.3.0 | [features/semantic-search.md](./features/semantic-search.md) |
 | 77 | Application Desktop native — Tauri | 🔵 en cours | [features/desktop-tauri.md](./features/desktop-tauri.md) |
+| 84 | Consolidation & sécurité — revue statique 2026-09-13 (phase 1, BUG-021→034) | 2.3.0 | [archive](./archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md) |
 
 ---
 
@@ -108,8 +175,10 @@
 |---|---|---|
 | ✅ Complété | #1 → #59, #61–72, #74–76, #78–82 | ~107 jours réalisés |
 | 🔵 P2 restant | #77 Desktop : signature de code (non retenue), 6 tests E2E **manuels** ([protocole](./DESKTOP_E2E_CHECKLIST.md)) | ~0,5-1 jour |
+| ⚪ P2 restant | #83 Barre d'outils d'édition mobile style Obsidian (3-5j) | 3-5 jours |
 | ⚪ P4 restant | #73 Sync (6-8j) | 6-8 jours |
-| **Total restant** | **2 items + finitions** | **~7-10 jours** |
+| ⚪ P0/P1 restant | #85-87 Refonte architecturale, performance, CI/CD (issues BUG-035 → BUG-040) | ~15-23 jours |
+| **Total restant** | **7 items + finitions** | **~31-47 jours** |
 
 ---
 

docs/archive/COMPLETED_v1-v2.md

@@ -317,6 +317,31 @@
 
 ---
 
+## #84 — Consolidation & sécurité (phase 1) ✅ TERMINÉ
+
+Traitement des vulnérabilités de la revue statique du 2026-09-13 (BUG-021 → BUG-034).
+
+- **Sanitizer XSS serveur** (`backend/services/sanitizer.py`, stdlib, liste blanche
+  de balises/attributs/schémas) appliqué au rendu markdown et à la page publique
+  `/s/{token}` (titre, frontmatter et JSON échappés, `</script>` neutralisé).
+- **Auth durcie** : rate-limit IP + compte et verrouillage sur les endpoints MFA ;
+  rotation du refresh token et révocation de l'access token au logout ; politique de
+  mot de passe centralisée (8–128) ; `password_changed_at` invalide les jetons
+  antérieurs ; verrou `RLock` sur `users.json`.
+- **Isolation & réseau** : `resolve_safe_path` compare par segments (`vault` ≠
+  `vault-evil`) ; webhooks protégés contre le SSRF (HTTPS, IP privées bloquées,
+  résolution vérifiée, redirections interdites, secret externalisé) ; IP client
+  réelle dans les audits.
+- **Robustesse** : validation des regex (ReDoS), symlinks hors vault ignorés à
+  l'indexation, recherche simple et `search_fulltext` branchés sur l'inverted index.
+- **Frontend** : token d'accès en mémoire + cookie `HttpOnly` (plus de
+  `sessionStorage`), CSP durcie (`object-src`, `base-uri`, `form-action`,
+  `frame-ancestors`).
+- **Tests** : `tests/test_security_hardening.py` (30) ; suite backend 961 passed /
+  6 skipped ; ruff + mypy 0 ; suites frontend vertes.
+
+---
+
 ## Grosses fonctionnalités — fiches dédiées
 
 | # | Feature | Version | Fiche |

frontend/js/admin.js

@@ -28,17 +28,12 @@ let _auditFilters = { user: "", action: "" };
 // ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**
- * Read the current Bearer token from sessionStorage (same key auth.js uses).
+ * BUG-034: the access token now lives in an HttpOnly cookie (and in memory
- * Returns an `{Authorization: "Bearer ..."}` object or null.
+ * inside auth.js), never in sessionStorage.  Same-origin requests carry the
+ * cookie automatically, so no Authorization header is needed here.
  */
 export function getAuthHeaders() {
-  try {
+  return null;
-    const token = sessionStorage.getItem("obsigate_access_token");
-    if (!token) return null;
-    return { Authorization: "Bearer " + token };
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
 }
 
 /** Format a size in MB as a human-readable string. */

frontend/js/auth.js

@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ const AuthManager = {
   TOKEN_EXPIRY_KEY: "obsigate_token_expiry",
   USER_KEY: "obsigate_user",
   _authEnabled: false,
+  // BUG-034: the access token is kept in memory only. The server also sets it
+  // as an HttpOnly cookie, so a page reload re-authenticates via /api/auth/refresh
+  // without ever exposing the token to JavaScript-readable storage.
+  _accessToken: null,
 
-  // ── Token storage (sessionStorage) ─────────────────────────────
+  // ── Token storage (in-memory + HttpOnly cookie) ────────────────
 
   saveToken(tokenData) {
     const expiresAt = Date.now() + tokenData.expires_in * 1000;
-    sessionStorage.setItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY, tokenData.access_token);
+    this._accessToken = tokenData.access_token;
+    // Clear any token persisted by an older build (XSS-readable).
+    try { sessionStorage.removeItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY); } catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
     sessionStorage.setItem(this.TOKEN_EXPIRY_KEY, expiresAt.toString());
     if (tokenData.user) {
       sessionStorage.setItem(this.USER_KEY, JSON.stringify(tokenData.user));
@@ -98,7 +104,11 @@ const AuthManager = {
   },
 
   getToken() {
-    return sessionStorage.getItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY);
+    return this._accessToken;
+  },
+
+  hasSession() {
+    return !!this._accessToken || !!sessionStorage.getItem(this.TOKEN_EXPIRY_KEY);
   },
 
   getUser() {
@@ -114,7 +124,8 @@ const AuthManager = {
   },
 
   clearSession() {
-    sessionStorage.removeItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY);
+    this._accessToken = null;
+    try { sessionStorage.removeItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY); } catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
     sessionStorage.removeItem(this.TOKEN_EXPIRY_KEY);
     sessionStorage.removeItem(this.USER_KEY);
   },
@@ -281,7 +292,8 @@ const AuthManager = {
     }
     const data = await response.json();
     const expiry = Date.now() + data.expires_in * 1000;
-    sessionStorage.setItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY, data.access_token);
+    this._accessToken = data.access_token;
+    try { sessionStorage.removeItem(this.ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY); } catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
     sessionStorage.setItem(this.TOKEN_EXPIRY_KEY, expiry.toString());
     return data.access_token;
   },
@@ -359,7 +371,7 @@ const AuthManager = {
     }
 
     // Auth enabled — check for existing session
-    if (this.getToken() && !this.isTokenExpired()) {
+    if (this.hasSession() && !this.isTokenExpired()) {
       this.showApp();
       return true;
     }

frontend/js/sync.js

@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ export function init() {
   // fresh login, so we only do it here for already-authenticated or
   // auth-disabled sessions.
   setTimeout(() => {
-    if (!AuthManager._authEnabled || AuthManager.getToken()) {
+    if (!AuthManager._authEnabled || AuthManager.hasSession()) {
       syncFileIndexFromServer();
     }
   }, 3000);

tests/frontend/ai.test.mjs

@@ -1168,6 +1168,23 @@ async function main() {
     assert.ok(vaultBranch.includes("BooksLM"), "BooksLM entry present in the vault root context menu");
   });
 
+  // ── BUG-034: the access token is not persisted in sessionStorage ──
+  await test("auth token kept in memory, not in sessionStorage", async () => {
+    const authMod = await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(JS_DIR, "auth.js")).href);
+    const { AuthManager } = authMod;
+    sessionStorage.clear();
+    AuthManager.saveToken({
+      access_token: "secret-token",
+      expires_in: 3600,
+      user: { username: "u", role: "user" },
+    });
+    assert.equal(sessionStorage.getItem("obsigate_access_token"), null, "token must not be stored");
+    assert.equal(AuthManager.getToken(), "secret-token", "token available in memory");
+    assert.ok(AuthManager.hasSession(), "session detected");
+    AuthManager.clearSession();
+    assert.equal(AuthManager.getToken(), null, "session cleared");
+  });
+
   // ── Summary ──
   console.log(`\n${passCount}/${testCount} tests passed`);
   if (passCount !== testCount) {

tests/test_auth_api.py

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ class TestAdmin:
             "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
         }, json={
             "username": "deleteuser",
-            "password": "delpass",
+            "password": "delpass123",
             "role": "user",
             "vaults": ["TestVault"],
         })

tests/test_modules.py

@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ class TestWebhooks:
         from backend import webhooks
         self.wh_file = tmp_path / "webhooks.json"
         monkeypatch.setattr(webhooks, "WEBHOOKS_FILE", self.wh_file)
+        monkeypatch.setattr(webhooks, "WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE", tmp_path / "webhook_secrets.json")
         yield
 
     def test_get_empty(self):

tests/test_security_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+# tests/test_security_hardening.py — Regression tests for ROADMAP #84
+# (BUG-021 → BUG-034): sanitizer, path isolation, password policy, regex
+# safety, webhook SSRF, rate limiting, audit IP and share-page escaping.
+
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-021/022 — HTML sanitizer
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestSanitizer:
+    def test_strips_event_handlers(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">')
+        assert "onerror" not in out
+        assert "alert" not in out
+
+    def test_drops_script_content(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html("<p>ok</p><script>alert(1)</script>tail")
+        assert "<script" not in out
+        assert "alert" not in out
+        assert "ok" in out
+        assert "tail" in out
+
+    def test_blocks_javascript_urls(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>')
+        assert "javascript:" not in out
+        assert ">x</a>" in out
+
+    def test_blocks_obfuscated_javascript_url(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<a href="java&#115;cript:alert(1)">x</a>')
+        assert "javascript" not in out.lower()
+
+    def test_keeps_safe_markup(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<p class="a">hi</p><a href="/x" data-vault="v" data-path="p.md">y</a>')
+        assert '<p class="a">hi</p>' in out
+        assert 'data-vault="v"' in out
+        assert 'href="/x"' in out
+
+    def test_allows_image_data_uri_but_not_html(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        good = sanitize_html('<img src="">')
+        assert "data:image/png" in good
+        bad = sanitize_html('<img src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">')
+        assert "data:text/html" not in bad
+
+    def test_heading_ids_preserved(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<h2 id="intro">Intro</h2>')
+        assert 'id="intro"' in out
+
+    def test_drops_style_attribute(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<p style="position:fixed">x</p>')
+        assert "style" not in out
+
+    def test_is_safe_url(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import is_safe_url
+        assert is_safe_url("/relative")
+        assert is_safe_url("https://example.com")
+        assert is_safe_url("#anchor")
+        assert not is_safe_url("javascript:alert(1)")
+        assert not is_safe_url("vbscript:msgbox")
+        assert not is_safe_url("data:text/html,<script>")
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-024 — Vault path isolation
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestPathIsolation:
+    def test_inside_vault_ok(self, tmp_path):
+        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+        root = tmp_path / "vault"
+        root.mkdir()
+        resolved = resolve_safe_path(root, "note.md")
+        assert resolved == (root / "note.md").resolve()
+
+    def test_sibling_prefix_is_rejected(self, tmp_path):
+        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+        (tmp_path / "vault").mkdir()
+        (tmp_path / "vault-evil").mkdir()
+        with pytest.raises(ServiceError) as exc:
+            resolve_safe_path(tmp_path / "vault", "../vault-evil/secret.md")
+        assert exc.value.code == "path_outside_vault"
+
+    def test_parent_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path):
+        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+        root = tmp_path / "vault"
+        root.mkdir()
+        with pytest.raises(ServiceError) as exc:
+            resolve_safe_path(root, "../../etc/passwd")
+        assert exc.value.code == "path_outside_vault"
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-028 — Password policy
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestPasswordPolicy:
+    def test_short_rejected(self):
+        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_password_strength("short")
+
+    def test_too_long_rejected(self):
+        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_password_strength("a" * 200)
+
+    def test_valid_accepted(self):
+        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
+        assert validate_password_strength("ValidPass123") == "ValidPass123"
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-025 — Regex safety (ReDoS)
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestRegexSafety:
+    def test_nested_quantifier_rejected(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_regex("(a+)+$")
+
+    def test_long_pattern_rejected(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_regex("a" * 600)
+
+    def test_simple_pattern_accepted(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+        assert validate_regex(r"\bpython\b") == r"\bpython\b"
+
+    def test_truncate_for_regex(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import truncate_for_regex
+        assert len(truncate_for_regex("x" * 1000, limit=10)) == 10
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-026 — Webhook SSRF
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestWebhookUrlValidation:
+    def test_https_public_ok(self):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        assert validate_webhook_url("https://example.com/hook") == "https://example.com/hook"
+
+    def test_http_rejected_by_default(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP", raising=False)
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("http://example.com/hook")
+
+    def test_private_ip_rejected(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE", raising=False)
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("https://127.0.0.1/hook")
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")
+
+    def test_bad_scheme_rejected(self):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("ftp://example.com")
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-031 — Per-account rate limiting
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestAccountRateLimit:
+    def test_account_limited_after_threshold(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend import ratelimit
+        monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS", 3)
+        account = "ratelimit-account@test"
+        assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ratelimit.record_account_failure(account)
+        assert ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
+        ratelimit.record_account_success(account)
+        assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-030 — Client IP resolution
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestClientIp:
+    def _request(self, headers=None, client=("1.2.3.4", 1234)):
+        from starlette.requests import Request
+        raw_headers = [(k.lower().encode(), v.encode()) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()]
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "GET",
+            "path": "/",
+            "query_string": b"",
+            "headers": raw_headers,
+            "client": client,
+            "scheme": "http",
+            "server": ("test", 80),
+        }
+        return Request(scope)
+
+    def test_socket_peer_used_by_default(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
+        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", raising=False)
+        assert get_client_ip(self._request()) == "1.2.3.4"
+
+    def test_forwarded_header_used_when_trusted(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
+        monkeypatch.setenv("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", "true")
+        req = self._request({"X-Forwarded-For": "9.8.7.6, 10.0.0.1"})
+        assert get_client_ip(req) == "9.8.7.6"
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-032 — Indexing must not follow symlinks outside the vault
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestSymlinkIndexing:
+    def test_external_symlink_is_skipped(self, tmp_path):
+        import os
+
+        from backend.indexer import _scan_vault
+
+        vault = tmp_path / "vault"
+        vault.mkdir()
+        (vault / "inside.md").write_text("# Inside\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+        outside = tmp_path / "outside"
+        outside.mkdir()
+        (outside / "secret.md").write_text("# Secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+        link = vault / "link.md"
+        try:
+            os.symlink(outside / "secret.md", link)
+        except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
+            pytest.skip("Symlinks are not supported in this environment")
+
+        result = _scan_vault("vault", str(vault))
+        paths = {f["path"] for f in result["files"]}
+        assert "inside.md" in paths
+        assert "link.md" not in paths
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-021/022 — End-to-end rendering & share page escaping
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestRenderingAndShare:
+    def test_markdown_rendering_is_sanitized(self, client, test_vault_dir):
+        payload = (
+            "---\ntitle: Safe\n---\n"
+            "# Hello\n\n"
+            "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\n\n"
+            "<script>alert(2)</script>\n\n"
+            "Normal **text**.\n"
+        )
+        (Path(test_vault_dir) / "xss.md").write_text(payload, encoding="utf-8")
+        resp = client.get("/api/file/TestVault", params={"path": "xss.md"})
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        html = resp.json()["html"]
+        assert "onerror" not in html
+        assert "<script" not in html
+        assert "<strong>text</strong>" in html
+
+    def test_share_page_escapes_title_and_frontmatter(self, client, test_vault_dir):
+        payload = (
+            '---\ntitle: "<script>alert(1)</script>"\n'
+            'author: "<img src=x onerror=alert(9)>"\n---\n'
+            "# Body\ncontent\n"
+        )
+        (Path(test_vault_dir) / "share_xss.md").write_text(payload, encoding="utf-8")
+        create = client.post("/api/share/TestVault", json={"path": "share_xss.md"})
+        assert create.status_code == 200
+        token = create.json()["token"]
+
+        page = client.get(f"/s/{token}")
+        assert page.status_code == 200
+        body = page.text
+        assert "<script>alert(1)</script>" not in body
+        assert "&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;" in body
+        # The img tag must be escaped, so no live attribute is emitted.
+        assert "<img src=x onerror" not in body
+        assert "&lt;img" in body
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-027/028 — Token invalidation on password change
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestTokenInvalidation:
+    def test_access_token_rejected_after_password_change(self, admin_client):
+        login = admin_client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"username": "admin", "password": "chab30"}
+        )
+        assert login.status_code == 200
+        token = login.json()["access_token"]
+
+        # Simulate a password change happening in the future relative to the token.
+        from backend.auth.user_store import update_user
+        update_user("admin", {"password_changed_at": time.time() + 10})
+
+        me = admin_client.get(
+            "/api/auth/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+        )
+        assert me.status_code == 401