fix(security): consolidation & securite phase 1 (#84, BUG-021 a BUG-034)

- sanitizer XSS serveur (markdown + page de partage) [BUG-021/022]
- rate-limit/lockout MFA [BUG-023]
- isolation vaults par segments [BUG-024]
- caps regex ReDoS [BUG-025]
- SSRF webhooks + secrets externalises [BUG-026]
- rotation/revocation des jetons [BUG-027]
- politique de mot de passe + invalidation sessions [BUG-028]
- verrous users.json [BUG-029]
- IP reelle dans les audits [BUG-030]
- rate-limit par compte [BUG-031]
- symlinks hors vault ignores [BUG-032]
- recherche simple via inverted index [BUG-033]
- token en memoire + cookie HttpOnly, CSP durcie [BUG-034]

Tests: pytest 961 passed / 6 skipped, ruff 0, mypy 0, frontend vert.

tests/frontend/ai.test.mjs

@@ -1168,6 +1168,23 @@ async function main() {
     assert.ok(vaultBranch.includes("BooksLM"), "BooksLM entry present in the vault root context menu");
   });
 
+  // ── BUG-034: the access token is not persisted in sessionStorage ──
+  await test("auth token kept in memory, not in sessionStorage", async () => {
+    const authMod = await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(JS_DIR, "auth.js")).href);
+    const { AuthManager } = authMod;
+    sessionStorage.clear();
+    AuthManager.saveToken({
+      access_token: "secret-token",
+      expires_in: 3600,
+      user: { username: "u", role: "user" },
+    });
+    assert.equal(sessionStorage.getItem("obsigate_access_token"), null, "token must not be stored");
+    assert.equal(AuthManager.getToken(), "secret-token", "token available in memory");
+    assert.ok(AuthManager.hasSession(), "session detected");
+    AuthManager.clearSession();
+    assert.equal(AuthManager.getToken(), null, "session cleared");
+  });
+
   // ── Summary ──
   console.log(`\n${passCount}/${testCount} tests passed`);
   if (passCount !== testCount) {

tests/test_auth_api.py

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ class TestAdmin:
             "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
         }, json={
             "username": "deleteuser",
-            "password": "delpass",
+            "password": "delpass123",
             "role": "user",
             "vaults": ["TestVault"],
         })

tests/test_modules.py

@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ class TestWebhooks:
         from backend import webhooks
         self.wh_file = tmp_path / "webhooks.json"
         monkeypatch.setattr(webhooks, "WEBHOOKS_FILE", self.wh_file)
+        monkeypatch.setattr(webhooks, "WEBHOOK_SECRETS_FILE", tmp_path / "webhook_secrets.json")
         yield
 
     def test_get_empty(self):

tests/test_security_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+# tests/test_security_hardening.py — Regression tests for ROADMAP #84
+# (BUG-021 → BUG-034): sanitizer, path isolation, password policy, regex
+# safety, webhook SSRF, rate limiting, audit IP and share-page escaping.
+
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from backend.services.errors import ServiceError
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-021/022 — HTML sanitizer
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestSanitizer:
+    def test_strips_event_handlers(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">')
+        assert "onerror" not in out
+        assert "alert" not in out
+
+    def test_drops_script_content(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html("<p>ok</p><script>alert(1)</script>tail")
+        assert "<script" not in out
+        assert "alert" not in out
+        assert "ok" in out
+        assert "tail" in out
+
+    def test_blocks_javascript_urls(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>')
+        assert "javascript:" not in out
+        assert ">x</a>" in out
+
+    def test_blocks_obfuscated_javascript_url(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<a href="java&#115;cript:alert(1)">x</a>')
+        assert "javascript" not in out.lower()
+
+    def test_keeps_safe_markup(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<p class="a">hi</p><a href="/x" data-vault="v" data-path="p.md">y</a>')
+        assert '<p class="a">hi</p>' in out
+        assert 'data-vault="v"' in out
+        assert 'href="/x"' in out
+
+    def test_allows_image_data_uri_but_not_html(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        good = sanitize_html('<img src="">')
+        assert "data:image/png" in good
+        bad = sanitize_html('<img src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">')
+        assert "data:text/html" not in bad
+
+    def test_heading_ids_preserved(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<h2 id="intro">Intro</h2>')
+        assert 'id="intro"' in out
+
+    def test_drops_style_attribute(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import sanitize_html
+        out = sanitize_html('<p style="position:fixed">x</p>')
+        assert "style" not in out
+
+    def test_is_safe_url(self):
+        from backend.services.sanitizer import is_safe_url
+        assert is_safe_url("/relative")
+        assert is_safe_url("https://example.com")
+        assert is_safe_url("#anchor")
+        assert not is_safe_url("javascript:alert(1)")
+        assert not is_safe_url("vbscript:msgbox")
+        assert not is_safe_url("data:text/html,<script>")
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-024 — Vault path isolation
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestPathIsolation:
+    def test_inside_vault_ok(self, tmp_path):
+        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+        root = tmp_path / "vault"
+        root.mkdir()
+        resolved = resolve_safe_path(root, "note.md")
+        assert resolved == (root / "note.md").resolve()
+
+    def test_sibling_prefix_is_rejected(self, tmp_path):
+        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+        (tmp_path / "vault").mkdir()
+        (tmp_path / "vault-evil").mkdir()
+        with pytest.raises(ServiceError) as exc:
+            resolve_safe_path(tmp_path / "vault", "../vault-evil/secret.md")
+        assert exc.value.code == "path_outside_vault"
+
+    def test_parent_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path):
+        from backend.services.paths import resolve_safe_path
+        root = tmp_path / "vault"
+        root.mkdir()
+        with pytest.raises(ServiceError) as exc:
+            resolve_safe_path(root, "../../etc/passwd")
+        assert exc.value.code == "path_outside_vault"
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-028 — Password policy
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestPasswordPolicy:
+    def test_short_rejected(self):
+        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_password_strength("short")
+
+    def test_too_long_rejected(self):
+        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_password_strength("a" * 200)
+
+    def test_valid_accepted(self):
+        from backend.auth.password import validate_password_strength
+        assert validate_password_strength("ValidPass123") == "ValidPass123"
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-025 — Regex safety (ReDoS)
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestRegexSafety:
+    def test_nested_quantifier_rejected(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_regex("(a+)+$")
+
+    def test_long_pattern_rejected(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_regex("a" * 600)
+
+    def test_simple_pattern_accepted(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import validate_regex
+        assert validate_regex(r"\bpython\b") == r"\bpython\b"
+
+    def test_truncate_for_regex(self):
+        from backend.services.regex_safety import truncate_for_regex
+        assert len(truncate_for_regex("x" * 1000, limit=10)) == 10
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-026 — Webhook SSRF
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestWebhookUrlValidation:
+    def test_https_public_ok(self):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        assert validate_webhook_url("https://example.com/hook") == "https://example.com/hook"
+
+    def test_http_rejected_by_default(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_HTTP", raising=False)
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("http://example.com/hook")
+
+    def test_private_ip_rejected(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE", raising=False)
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("https://127.0.0.1/hook")
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")
+
+    def test_bad_scheme_rejected(self):
+        from backend.webhooks import validate_webhook_url
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            validate_webhook_url("ftp://example.com")
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-031 — Per-account rate limiting
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestAccountRateLimit:
+    def test_account_limited_after_threshold(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend import ratelimit
+        monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit, "ACCOUNT_MAX_ATTEMPTS", 3)
+        account = "ratelimit-account@test"
+        assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ratelimit.record_account_failure(account)
+        assert ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
+        ratelimit.record_account_success(account)
+        assert not ratelimit.is_account_rate_limited(account)
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-030 — Client IP resolution
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestClientIp:
+    def _request(self, headers=None, client=("1.2.3.4", 1234)):
+        from starlette.requests import Request
+        raw_headers = [(k.lower().encode(), v.encode()) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()]
+        scope = {
+            "type": "http",
+            "method": "GET",
+            "path": "/",
+            "query_string": b"",
+            "headers": raw_headers,
+            "client": client,
+            "scheme": "http",
+            "server": ("test", 80),
+        }
+        return Request(scope)
+
+    def test_socket_peer_used_by_default(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
+        monkeypatch.delenv("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", raising=False)
+        assert get_client_ip(self._request()) == "1.2.3.4"
+
+    def test_forwarded_header_used_when_trusted(self, monkeypatch):
+        from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
+        monkeypatch.setenv("OBSIGATE_TRUST_PROXY", "true")
+        req = self._request({"X-Forwarded-For": "9.8.7.6, 10.0.0.1"})
+        assert get_client_ip(req) == "9.8.7.6"
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-032 — Indexing must not follow symlinks outside the vault
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestSymlinkIndexing:
+    def test_external_symlink_is_skipped(self, tmp_path):
+        import os
+
+        from backend.indexer import _scan_vault
+
+        vault = tmp_path / "vault"
+        vault.mkdir()
+        (vault / "inside.md").write_text("# Inside\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+        outside = tmp_path / "outside"
+        outside.mkdir()
+        (outside / "secret.md").write_text("# Secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+        link = vault / "link.md"
+        try:
+            os.symlink(outside / "secret.md", link)
+        except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
+            pytest.skip("Symlinks are not supported in this environment")
+
+        result = _scan_vault("vault", str(vault))
+        paths = {f["path"] for f in result["files"]}
+        assert "inside.md" in paths
+        assert "link.md" not in paths
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-021/022 — End-to-end rendering & share page escaping
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestRenderingAndShare:
+    def test_markdown_rendering_is_sanitized(self, client, test_vault_dir):
+        payload = (
+            "---\ntitle: Safe\n---\n"
+            "# Hello\n\n"
+            "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\n\n"
+            "<script>alert(2)</script>\n\n"
+            "Normal **text**.\n"
+        )
+        (Path(test_vault_dir) / "xss.md").write_text(payload, encoding="utf-8")
+        resp = client.get("/api/file/TestVault", params={"path": "xss.md"})
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        html = resp.json()["html"]
+        assert "onerror" not in html
+        assert "<script" not in html
+        assert "<strong>text</strong>" in html
+
+    def test_share_page_escapes_title_and_frontmatter(self, client, test_vault_dir):
+        payload = (
+            '---\ntitle: "<script>alert(1)</script>"\n'
+            'author: "<img src=x onerror=alert(9)>"\n---\n'
+            "# Body\ncontent\n"
+        )
+        (Path(test_vault_dir) / "share_xss.md").write_text(payload, encoding="utf-8")
+        create = client.post("/api/share/TestVault", json={"path": "share_xss.md"})
+        assert create.status_code == 200
+        token = create.json()["token"]
+
+        page = client.get(f"/s/{token}")
+        assert page.status_code == 200
+        body = page.text
+        assert "<script>alert(1)</script>" not in body
+        assert "&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;" in body
+        # The img tag must be escaped, so no live attribute is emitted.
+        assert "<img src=x onerror" not in body
+        assert "&lt;img" in body
+
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# BUG-027/028 — Token invalidation on password change
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+class TestTokenInvalidation:
+    def test_access_token_rejected_after_password_change(self, admin_client):
+        login = admin_client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"username": "admin", "password": "chab30"}
+        )
+        assert login.status_code == 200
+        token = login.json()["access_token"]
+
+        # Simulate a password change happening in the future relative to the token.
+        from backend.auth.user_store import update_user
+        update_user("admin", {"password_changed_at": time.time() + 10})
+
+        me = admin_client.get(
+            "/api/auth/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+        )
+        assert me.status_code == 401