fix(security): consolidation & securite phase 1 (#84, BUG-021 a BUG-034)
CI / lint (push) Successful in 1m20s
CI / security (push) Successful in 47s
CI / test (push) Successful in 2m21s
CI / build (push) Successful in 43s
CI / e2e (push) Successful in 10m48s

- sanitizer XSS serveur (markdown + page de partage) [BUG-021/022]
- rate-limit/lockout MFA [BUG-023]
- isolation vaults par segments [BUG-024]
- caps regex ReDoS [BUG-025]
- SSRF webhooks + secrets externalises [BUG-026]
- rotation/revocation des jetons [BUG-027]
- politique de mot de passe + invalidation sessions [BUG-028]
- verrous users.json [BUG-029]
- IP reelle dans les audits [BUG-030]
- rate-limit par compte [BUG-031]
- symlinks hors vault ignores [BUG-032]
- recherche simple via inverted index [BUG-033]
- token en memoire + cookie HttpOnly, CSP durcie [BUG-034]

Tests: pytest 961 passed / 6 skipped, ruff 0, mypy 0, frontend vert.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-13 10:51:42 -04:00
parent d47fcbf2be
commit 162a5b4acc
29 changed files with 1690 additions and 281 deletions
+21 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ import os
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
from .jwt_handler import decode_token
from backend.services.net import get_client_ip
from .jwt_handler import decode_token, is_token_revoked
from .user_store import get_user
logger = logging.getLogger("obsigate.auth.middleware")
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ def get_current_user(
"vaults": ["*"],
"active": True,
"_token_vaults": ["*"],
"_request_ip": get_client_ip(request),
}
token = None
@@ -57,14 +60,31 @@ def get_current_user(
if not payload or payload.get("type") != "access":
return None
# BUG-027: access tokens revoked at logout must be rejected immediately.
jti = payload.get("jti")
if jti and is_token_revoked(jti):
return None
user = get_user(payload["sub"])
if not user or not user.get("active"):
return None
# BUG-028: a password change invalidates every token issued before it.
pca = user.get("password_changed_at")
iat = payload.get("iat")
if pca is not None and iat is not None:
try:
if int(iat) < int(float(pca)):
return None
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
# Attach vault permissions from the token (snapshot at login time)
user["_token_vaults"] = payload.get("vaults", [])
# Attach the token id for per-token rate limiting (AI tool layer).
user["_token_jti"] = payload.get("jti")
# BUG-030: expose the real client IP to the audit log.
user["_request_ip"] = get_client_ip(request)
return user